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Krasnoyarsk Station Still Being Dismantled

LD1105151790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0742 GMT 11 May 90

[By TASS political observer Yuriy Kornilov]

[Text] Moscow, 11 May, (TASS)—When an article called "Shadow Over the Summit" appears in THE WASHINGTON POST now, just three weeks before the Soviet-U.S. "summit," it is difficult to ignore it.

What has cast the shadow? What has happened? The authors of the article R. Evans and R. Novak report: The military has gained the upper hand in the USSR on the issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar station and the decision to dismantle this installation has lost its force. That means that it is hard to count on progress at talks on strategic offensive weapons.

Let's be forthright: That is a strange allegation. The USSR's position on the Krasnoyarsk radar station was presented very clearly by the Soviet foreign minister during the Soviet-U.S. dialogue in Wyoming (September 1989). Later in October, at the second session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, it was noted that the building of the Krasnoyarsk radar station was a violation of the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty and, in deciding to dismantle it, we are "saving the ABM Treaty and opening up a path toward reaching agreements on strategic weapons." This decision, which was understood and accepted by the Soviet and international public, pulled the rug out from under those in the United States who wanted to undermine results from the Moscow-Washington talks on reducing strategic offensive weapons. This decision gave our country the legal and moral right to complete clarity on the issue of U.S. radar stations in Greenland and Britain as well. What has changed in our position since then?

The answer to my question from the USSR Defense Ministry was that nothing has changed: Apparatuses installed at the Krasnoyarsk radar station are now being removed and preparations are underway to dismantle the building structures. Allegations that it has been decided, under pressure from the military, to keep this radar station are nothing but idle chatter and absolutely groundless conjecture.

Indeed, that would be the end of the matter if it were not for one circumstance: The closer the Soviet-U.S. summit gets, a summit in which important problems of disarmament will be discussed, the more energetically certain circles in the United States, which have no interest in the success of the dialogue, are deliberately putting out disinformation designed to complicate the talks. Sometimes they allege that Moscow "has been influenced by the military to stiffen its positions on strategic offensive weapons," sometimes they look for nonexistent "evidence" alleging that the USSR is not "fully" meeting its obligations under the intermediate- and shorter-range missile treaty. Of course, neither of these is confirmed. It is at this point that the Evans-Novak duet "comes in." They have long specialized in cooking up various sorts of dubious "sensations"....

A question arises: What is the purpose behind this; why is even such an apparently solid paper as THE WASHINGTON POST resorting to disinformation? That question is even more natural if one takes into consideration that what is at stake is the strengthening of U.S. security, reducing the level of military confrontation, and eliminating the military threat—that is, problems in whose resolution the United States, indeed, has no less an interest than our country.

Efforts To Reduce Chemical Weapons Stocks Noted

LD1105203490 Moscow TASS in English 2004 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 11 TASS—By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev:

Chemical weapons are rapidly spreading throughout the world. In addition to the developed industrial states, several developing countries already possess such weapons and consider them the "atomic weapon of the poor."

It will require a great deal of work to convince all states to renounce this weapon of mass destruction. The Soviet Union and the United States should set an example in this respect.

According to the U.S. press, President George Bush suggested stopping the production of chemical weapons if the Soviet Union agrees to American initiatives, one of which envisages deep cuts in toxic agents that are available in both countries.

The Soviet Union has already agreed together with the United States to assume obligations envisaging, in particular, the reduction of stocks of chemical weapons to an equally low level, pending the adoption of a multilateral convention.

Moreover, during the 15th round of the U.S.-Soviet consultations on a ban of chemical weapons, which ended on April 26, the sides specifically agreed that under a bilateral agreement the stocks will be reduced to the level of 5,000 tonnes (that is, accounting for approximately 20 per cent of current U.S. stocks).

The previous unwillingness of the United States to abandon the production of chemical weapons, as was already done by the Soviet Union, was a major obstacle to the final elaboration of a Soviet-American agreement.

The U.S. President's decision to give up production can be regarded as a positive step and as an attempt to clear the way to finalising such an agreement. This inspires hope that the document will be ready to be signed at the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Washington.

The fruitful cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States in this respect has greatly contributed to the advance towards a full ban on chemical weapons.

The elaboration of a joint plan of action aimed at preparing a multilateral convention, constructive consideration of each other's positions, the drafting of a bilateral agreement to eliminate the bulk of the two countries' chemical arsenals and the pledge to promote the elimination of dangerous weapons—all serve as an exceptionally fruitful example of what can be done through joint efforts provided there is goodwill on both sides.

Possible Shift in U.S. Position

PM1105152590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "White House Has Refused To Confirm..."]

[Text] Washington 10 May— An official White House spokesman has refused to confirm or deny reports which have appeared in the U.S. press suggesting that the Bush administration has shifted its position at the chemical weapons talks with the USSR and has expressed a readiness to end the production of chemical weapons by a mutually acceptable date. The Soviet Union has long been calling for this.

A report on this was published in Wednesday's WASHINGTON POST and NEW YORK TIMES, citing information from high-level administration representatives. Both papers noted that the U.S. proposal removes one of the remaining obstacles to the conclusion of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on chemical weapons reductions at the forthcoming 30 May-3 June summit. Up to now, the UPI agency reminds us, the administration has been stating that even after the start of chemical weapons reductions the need to modernize them will remain.

Roman Popadiuk, official White House spokesman, stated Wednesday that "some progress has been achieved" in talks between the USSR and the United States on reducing chemical weapons. But "there are still details which need further work." Popadiuk declined to comment on the newspaper reports, saying that he neither "confirms nor denies" them. "We would be happy if we succeeded" in concluding an agreement on reducing chemical weapons, he remarked, adding that he "cannot talk about time frames."

"The talks are continuing," the White House spokesman emphasized. "There is no doubt that we have proposed new ideas to the Soviets. They have proposed some new ideas. And these discussions are still continuing. At the present stage it would be premature to say definitely how the talks will develop. I would like to say that both sides are embarking on this stage in a spirit of good will."

7th Round of Vienna Talks Discuss New Proposals

LD1405062390 Moscow TASS in English 0619 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Vienna May 14 TASS—The Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe, which opened its seventh round after a two-week interval, will discuss new proposals made by the sides.

The talks are being conducted by 23 Warsaw Treaty and NATO states. The seventh round opens with meetings of working groups.

During the sixth round, the sides searched for solutions, compromises and agreements on all the technical issues that will be included in the future treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe.

Forum participants are now close to completing several key sections of the document. The sixth round discussed for the first time in detail the destruction of arms and hardware that will be limited. This is a priority topic today.

The start of the seventh round coincides in time with the forthcoming working visit by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to Moscow.

Local analysts express hope that his talks in the Soviet Union between May 16-19 will enable the sides to step up the negotiating process and give it new impetus.

U.S. Experts Cited on Violation of ABM Treaty

LD1305173690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0530 GMT 13 May 90

[Text] Washington, 13 May (TASS)—TASS correspondent Oleg Polyakovskiy reports:

Leading specialists on arms control in the United States consider that a new infrared device for tracking missile warheads, testing of which started on Friday, violates the 1972 ABM treaty if it is undertaken in the framework of the "Strategic Defense Initiative."

The very tests of this device border on violation of this treaty, said Surgeon Keeney, president of the Association of Arms Control Supporters, former director of the government Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who at one time took part in working out the ABM treaty. Now, he stressed, "the question is whether the tests will lead to the creation of a component which, if the work is successful, will be a violation" of the treaty.

As has already been reported, the United States started tests on Friday over the Pacific coast of an apparatus installed on a Boeing-767, which is to distinguish real warheads from false ones and to guide interceptor systems onto real targets. The designers consider the merit of the aircraft system to be that it makes it possible to use infrared sensors, instead of ordinary radar signals, and is practically undetectable. Apart from that, an on-board system is known to be less vulnerable than any land-based facility. It is really a matter of a "flying radar" ABM system, and the creation of mobile radar stations is forbidden by the 1972 treaty.

John Pike, an expert on space problems from the Federation of American Scientists, made a statement in this connection, pointing out: "An on-board optical system plays a role analogous to radar emplaced along the perimeter. Such radars are unambiguously considered to be part of ABM defence, and are strictly limited by the treaty. Although it is possible that this system will not carry out all the functions of ABM radar, it can nevertheless be a substitute for such a radar, and since it is on board, it is forbidden by Article 5 of the treaty."

U.S. Missile Stand 'Jeopardizing' Strategic Ties

OW1205193990 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1200 GMT 4 May 90

[By military commentator Colonel Solovyev]

[Text] The most difficult problem at the 13th round of offensive strategic arms limitation talks in Geneva is the issue of air force cruise missiles. Our military commentator, Colonel Solovyev, will now relate the view of a Soviet military figure on this issue:

Air force cruise missiles refer to aircraft-launched cruise missiles. They are similar to naval cruise missiles to some extent. As we have reported, this kind of missile may be equipped with nuclear or nonnuclear warheads. Since 1974, the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed to classify guided missiles with a range of more than 600 km as strategic arms. For this reason, cruise missiles with a range exceeding 600 km are included in the talks on reducing offensive strategic arms. Now, reports from Geneva allege that the issue of air force cruise missiles has become an obstacle in the talks because of the refusal by the Soviet Union to yield.

The following is the view in this regard of Colonel (Shiliyaji), a Soviet disarmament expert. He explains the controversary on the 600-km range as follows:

The United States ignored the agreement reached on this range. At the Geneva talks, it first insisted that the limit be raised to 1,500 km and then reduced it to 1,000 km. In a subsequent proposal, the United States said that it would agree to an 800-km range. Even the latest proposal, if put forward officially, is unacceptable because, if accepted, the various categories of strategic air force missiles with ranges under 800 km would not be restricted. As a result, the United States would be unrestrained in equipping its heavy bombers and strategic Air Force with these missiles.

As an excuse to nullify the previous agreement, the U.S. side alleged that the Soviet air defense system is capable of destroying missiles with a range of 600 km. It also alleged that it is difficult to launch such cruise missiles against the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet expert said that the range covered by Soviet air defenses does not exceed 300 or 400 km. Hence, there is no reason to revise the agreement, according to Col. (Shiliyaji).

In addition, the United States refused to limit nonnuclear missiles, saying that the talks concerned only nuclear weapons. This argument seems very convincing, but only at first glance. Also, the United States rejected the request to separate nonnuclear from nuclear cruise missiles; that is, it refused to take measures to prevent the use of launching devices for nuclear missiles to launch nonnuclear missiles or vice versa. In our opinion, however, a distinction should be made between the two functions, and neither side should be allowed to use nuclear warheads to substitute for nonnuclear warheads. The separation of the two functions will ensure that air force cruise missiles will not exceed the level permitted under the agreement.

As can be seen, the U.S. attitude in both instances is jeopardizing the strategic relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. Moreover, if the large U.S. Air Force contingent stationed in Europe is taken into consideration, the effect of a medium- and short-range missile treaty will lose its value.

Who is putting forward a consistent stand, Washington or Moscow? Our commentator, Col. Solovyev, concludes: I believe the answer is clear from the abovementioned facts.

Soviet Observers Inspect U.S. Air Base

LD1205123290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 12 May 90

[Text] A group of Soviet observers have visited the Grand Forks air base, where one of the bomber wings of the Strategic Air Command of the U.S. Armed Forces is based.

According to an official representative of the United States Defense Department, the Soviet observers carried out a sample inspection [probnuyu inspektsiyu] within the framework of preparations for a Soviet-U.S. treaty on reducing strategic offensive weapons.

Warsaw Pact Organization Viewed After 35 Years

Yazov Discusses Transformation

LD1305123590 Moscow TASS in English 1206 GMT 13 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 13 TASS—"The Warsaw Treaty Organisation is as ever a significant factor of security and peace as applied to Europe and, considering the objective place and role of this continent in international affairs, to the whole world," Soviet Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov said in an interview published in the IZVESTIYA newspaper today.

"The Warsaw Treaty Organisation continues its activity and this is reaffirmed by all of its participants," Yazov points out. "Such is the political reality. It does not conform to speculative conclusions and predictions by some politicians and publicists speaking about the 'disintegration' of the Warsaw Pact.

"Given all the dramaticism and sometimes painfullness of current democratic changes in East Europe, they open new prospects for creating the collective security system, for which we have worked even before NATO and then the Warsaw Pact emerged. At point is the system based on equality, mutual respect and trust and on the principles of reasonable sufficiency for defence.

"The thesis about transforming the Warsaw Pact and NATO from the military-political to politico-military alliances is being shifted onto the practical plane today," Yazov said. "But this transformation is a mutual rather than unilateral process, which equally concerns the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

"It is this nature of transformation, which stipulates the conversion of both alliances into instruments of political coopeation. The issue of reducing the ratio of military aspects in the Warsaw Pact activity can be viewed only this context," Yazov emphasised."

On German unification, Yazov noted that a future united Germany's membership in NATO would tip the strategic balance and, hence, destabilize the situation. "Soviet people do not accept this idea. Evidently, new solutions need to be searched for, which would take into account existing concerns and ensure reliable security for all European countries.

"The principle of mutual interests should be found and a document, fusing the provisions on the borders of a united Germany, its armed forces, the military-political status, the continuity of obligations and the stay of the victor powers' military contingents on the territory of the new state, should be elaborated," Yazov emphasised.

Yazov said that the role of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in building a new European home can and should be constructive. Favourable conditions for this are being created as the ideas of new political thinking are consistently asserting themselves.

Yazov Assesses Pact Role

PM1305164090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 May 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, member of the Presidential Council, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and USSR defense minister, by IZVESTIYA military correspondent V. Litovkin; date, place of interview not stated: "From Confrontation to a Security System"]

[Text] [Litovkin] The Warsaw Pact is 35 years old. On the eve of the anniversary I would like to go back to the origins, to the time when the Warsaw Pact Organization was set up. What prompted the Soviet Union and other European socialist countries to implement this step?

[Yazov] The foundations of the military-political defensive alliance of European socialist states were laid by the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance concluded in Warsaw on 14 May 1955.

This act was not only a response, but an enforced one. Let us remember what kind of winds began to determine the political climate in Europe immediately after the defeat of fascism and the victorious conclusion of the Great Patriotic War. These icy winds arose in Fulton (United States) and led to the disintegration of the anti-Hitler coalition, the unleashing of the cold war by the forces of reaction and aggression, and the escalation of confrontation.

The Western powers' emphasis not on cooperation, which was what the Soviet Union was calling for, but on confrontation was given organizational form in the NATO military-political bloc, which was created in 1949. That bloc was conceived as an instrument of confrontation, strong-arm military pressure, aggression. And that is what it became. Let me remind you that NATO military doctrine was based on a nuclear strategy directed against the USSR, socialism, and the national liberation movements.

The Soviet Union made energetic efforts to prevent the partition of Europe into opposing groupings and to create a collective security system. One step in this direction was, in particular, the proposal put forward by our country in 1954 for the USSR to join NATO. But this was rejected by the Western powers. And in that same year, under the Paris agreements, they set up the Western European Union, designed in effect to open the way to the remilitarization of the FRG and its inclusion in NATO. The following year, incidentally, contrary to the well-known decisions of the Potsdam conference, the FRG became a member of NATO.

Thus the West's refusal to set up a collective security system led to its logical conclusion, and the threat to the socialist countries from the North Atlantic bloc was intensified still further. In order to ensure their own security, stability, and peace in Europe the socialist states decided to pool their defensive efforts and created the Warsaw Pact Organization.

[Litovkin] So the Warsaw Pact was a kind of counterweight to the aggressive aspirations of reactionary forces. Was its defensive, peace-loving thrust reflected in the documents defining the alliance's status and functions and in its practical activity?

[Yazov] Naturally. When the Warsaw Pact was signed it was stated that its aim is to ensure the security of the member countries and maintain peace in Europe. The Warsaw Pact Organization member states took on the commitment, in accordance with the UN Charter, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, and to resolve disputes by peaceful means. They stressed their readiness to participate in all international actions aimed at ensuring peace and security and to seek the adoption of effective measures toward general arms reduction and the banning of weapons of mass destruction. The pact's defensive nature is also expressed in the fact that it is open for other states to join.

The Warsaw Pact Organization has been steadily following this main political line throughout its 35 years of existence. Let me recall just a few milestones. At the very first session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee it was proposed that an agreement be concluded on cooperation to ensure collective security in Europe between the USSR, Britain, France, and the United States. It was proposed that the fulfillment of the agreement begin with the withdrawal of foreign troops from the GDR and the FRG or the reduction of their numerical strength. These proposals, as you know, were rejected by the Western powers.

It was thanks primarily to the constructive initiatives and persistent peacemaking efforts of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states that the all-European process leading to the adoption of the Final Act in Helsinki in 1975 became a reality. This process was given a second wind by the ideas of the new political thinking, which were generated by Soviet perestroyka and are now forging a path in international life.

In 1983 the Warsaw Pact member states adopted a Political Declaration in which they proposed to the NATO states that a treaty be concluded on the mutual nonuse of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace between the members of the two military-political groupings. In 1987 they adopted the defensive military doctrine, which set the prevention of war as the main task.

In short, all 35 years of the Warsaw Pact's activity convincingly confirm its defensive, peace-loving thrust.

[Litovkin] And in this sense one can obviously speak of the Warsaw Pact Organization as an effective factor for security and peace?

[Yazov] Certainly. The Warsaw Pact was and is just such a factor in relation to Europe, and, in the light of the objective place and role of this continent in international affairs, in relation to the whole world, too.

[Litovkin] Three and a half decades of Warsaw Pact history—that is a considerable time. Were there events in that history that may be regretted today?

[Yazov] The sphere in which the Warsaw Pact operates is so complex and contradictory that it would be quite wrong to represent its history in just one—let us say, rosy—light. There have been difficulties and disagreements. And unfortunately there were mistakes too, as in the case of the sending of allied troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968. Today's critical reevaluation of certain events of past years is natural and necessary. Serious analysis of the past enables us to derive lessons for the future. And that is very important in the context of the perestroyka that has begun in recent years in international relations.

[Litovkin] In connection with the rapid development of political processes in Eastern Europe, certain politicians and commentators are talking about the "disintegration" of the Warsaw Pact. What can you say about that?

[Yazov] Only one thing: The Warsaw Pact Organization is continuing its activity. All its participants confirm this. That is the political reality, and, as you can see, it does not coincide with speculative conclusions and predictions. At the same time it should be said that for all the dramatic and sometimes painful nature of the democratic changes taking place in East Europe, they open up new prospects for the creation of that very same collective security system that we were fighting for even before first NATO and then the Warsaw Pact sprang up. It is a question of a system based on equality, mutual respect, and confidence, on the principles of reasonable sufficiency for defense.

Naturally, I think it would hardly be responsible or farsighted to destroy, even before creating a new system, the existing one in which both NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization are components.

[Litovkin] Insofar as those components are interconnected and interdependent and their balance determines the functioning of the existing security system, the future of the Warsaw Pact and NATO should presumably also be viewed in unity?

[Yazov] You are right. I think that should be clear to everyone. Incidentally, even at the time of the signing of the Warsaw Pact 35 years ago, it was stated unequivocally that in the event of the conclusion of an all-European treaty on collective security the Warsaw Pact will lose its force from the day that such a treaty comes into force. The states belonging to our defensive alliance have repeatedly expressed readiness to disband the Warsaw Pact on condition that NATO is disbanded simultaneously, and, as a first step, to abolish the two alliances' military organizations. This principled stand of ours remains unchanged.

[Litovkin] Today the thesis on transforming the Warsaw Pact and NATO from military-political alliances into political-military alliances is entering the realm of practicality. Does this mean that the military aspects of the Warsaw Pact's activity are receding into the past?

[Yazov] It should be borne in mind that the transformation is not a unilateral, but a mutual process, concerning the Warsaw Pact and NATO equally. It is this aspect of the nature of the process that determines the transformation of the two alliances into instruments of political cooperation. Only in this context is it possible to examine the question of reducing the share of the Warsaw Pact's activity taken up by military aspects.

[Litovkin] At present a key question in this activity, and, indeed, in the situation in Europe, is evidently the question of the unification of Germany. How do you see the resolution of this question?

[Yazov] The resolution of this question should be synchronized with the Helsinki process, with the creation of new all-European security structures, and should take place by peaceful, democratic means within the framework of the political realities established in postwar Europe. A united Germany's membership of NATO would lead to the disruption of the strategic balance and thereby to the destabilization of the situation. Soviet people will not accept that idea. It is obviously necessary to seek other solutions taking into account the concerns that exist and unconditionally ensuring equal and reliable security for all European countries. A full balance of interests should be found and a document drawn up that constitutes a synthesis of provisions on the borders of a united Germany, its armed forces and military-political status, the continuity of commitments, and the presence of military contingents of the victorious powers of World War II on the territory of the new state.

[Litovkin] One last question,, Dmitriy Timofeyevich. How do you assess the role of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in building a common European home?

[Yazov] That role could and should be constructive. Favorable conditions are created for this by the consistent assertion of the ideas of the new political thinking. The widening of the zone of mutual understanding and confidence in such a sensitive sphere as the military sphere, the mutual reduction of arsenals, the lowering of the level of confrontation, mutual movement toward the limits of reasonable sufficiency for defense and toward a nonbloc security system—all this is not only a substantial prop for the building of a common European home, but an essential condition of the building's success.

Agayants Cites Importance of Pact

LD1105194290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] I would like to draw the attention of listeners to a certain date which falls in a few days time—to be more precise—to 14 May. On that day, 35 years ago, the Warsaw Treaty was signed by the states of East Europe, which for decades was justly regarded as a guarantee of the member-states' security, and which was an important factor toward stability and peace in Europe and throughout the world. But this is what is interesting. In former times not so long ago, to mark this important date, articles would certainly have appeared with garish titles something like the reliable shield of socialism; Together toward a common goal; On guard over the interests of the community; and so forth.

[Agayants] There is no need for you to worry. I think that in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA or SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, which do not wish to give up their principles, there will still be publications like this.

[Announcer] I apologize, comrades, I almost forgot to introduce Nikolay Ivanovich Agayants, my collocutor, and foreign political commentator on all-Union radio. But continuing on this subject, it has to be noted that over the last six months the situation in the countries of the former community has measurably changed. Today, both in East Europe and in the West, and even here in the Soviet Union, one increasingly frequently hears it said that there is a need to search for and set up a new security structure instead of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization.

[Agayants] Yes, that really is the case. The fact is that for very many people the drastic turnabout in events in East and central Europe was something completely unexpected. And paradoxical as that might seem, our Soviet public turned out to be especially unprepared for it. Year in, year out, our politicians and, incidentally, the mass media instilled in it a sufficiently divergent idea that our continent was divided into opposing parts almost for ever—the capitalist part, which had had its day and is fairly rotten, and the rising socialist one that is going from success to success. The objective state of affairs and the truth were replaced by victorious reports, sugary self-deception, and deception of others.

[Announced] So the myth has collapsed. We have all found ourselves, as they say, face to face with the harsh and bitter reality. The political system that has prevailed for more than 40 years has almost fallen apart within a single hour. That could not fail to have an effect on, and naturally did have an effect on, military organizations.

[Agayants] Undoubtdly. Whether we like it or not, the truth is specific. The Warsaw Pact has ceased to be a uniting authority of the fraternal states for those countries in the community that were on a common ideological and political platform. Their interests have been freed of the cementing influence of ideology and in the forefront, as our well-known political observer Aleksandr Bovin wrote, bare political calculation has emerged. It is hardly likely thta that calculation will strengthen the allied obligations within the Warsaw Pact Organization. The events of the last few months show that it is more likely to be the other way round, that is, the centifugal tendencies will start to grow stronger. And in general, life has confirmed the falsity of the concept of advantages for the Soviet Union from some kind of purified cordons, buffer zones, and things like that. I think that the burder of military and political control over an extensive territory in central and East Europe which we implemented for decades cost us a pretty penny. Economists still have to calculate how much the attempt to achieve absolute parity with all the opposing forces surrounding the Warsaw Pact Organization cost us as well, if one takes into account that the Soviet Union's share in the expenditures of the Pact was always more than 90 percent.

I would remind you in passing that the American contribution to NATO is something like 50 percent. So, may our renowned marshals and generals and other military leaders forgive me—a dabbler—but the groupings in the Warsaw do, in my opinion, represent a cumbersome, vulnerable, and extremely costly military machine which, however, like the whole of our army, is in need of serious reform. And so that they do not suddenly suspect me of slander, I will tell you that a similar point of view is also adhered to by serious Soviet experts, and, incidentally, by the newspaper PRAVDA.

[Announcer] But where, for all that, is the way out? What is going to happen to the Warsaw Pact Organization? What do you think about that?

[Agayants] As Marshal Yazov, the USSR defense minister, has repeatedly noted, our position is generally known. We are categorically in favor of the dissolution of the military and political unions, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, on a mutual basis. And it looks as if things are moving toward that, but our policy should take into account today's reality. It should not labor under a delusion. It should not set itself tasks that cannot be fulfilled and, in examining the problems of security, it should avoid the rhetoric that sets one's teeth on edge on the place and role of the Warsaw Pact. The new political thinking, the interests of our state, require both new approaches and new solutions. Without that, naturally it is difficult to imagine the possibility of formulating a common European home.

Lushev Views Pact's Future Role

PM1205190090 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 May 90 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Army General P. Lushev, commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA editorial office; date, place of interview not stated: "The Warsaw Pact Is 35 Years Old"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Tomorrow is the 35th anniversary of the signing, by representatives of a number of East European states and the Soviet Union, of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance which went down in history as the Warsaw Pact.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Comrade Army General! What role, in your view, has the Warsaw Pact Organization played during its years of existence? Has it helped to strengthen security or, on the contrary, led to the stepping up of military confrontation?

[Lushev] The postwar period of Europe's development supplies a cogent answer to the question of the Warsaw Pact's role. Throughout its 35 years of history the defensive alliance of the East European states has served and continues to serve as a guarantee of the security of the allied countries' peoples and a stabilizing political and military factor on the continent. Today this is acknowledged even by the leaders of leading Western states.

From the earliest days of the alliance's existence, the Pact member countries actively pursued a peace-loving policy and secured the prevention of war. And the danger of the outbreak of war was very real, although some people today try to claim the reverse.

It is common knowledge that in 1949 the imperialist states created the NATO bloc, which had a clearly manifested aggressive thrust, and began actively to step up preparations for a possible war against the USSR and other East European countries.

As a countermeasure and so as to avoid a repetition of the horrors of world conflagrations, the Warsaw Pact was concluded, having the aim of ensuring the peoples' security and maintaining peace in Europe. In the years that have elapsed the allied states have done much in this direction. Numerous actions have been carried out with the aim of eliminating the threat of war and improving international relations. Thus in 1965 the Pact member countries were the initiators of the convening of an all-European Conference on Security and Cooperation. This, as you know, took place in Helsinki in 1975 and culminated in the signing of the Final Act, which consolidated the postwar realities in Europe and defined the paths of further peaceful development for the continent. And I could cite many similar examples.

However, to be fair, mention should also be made of the fact that stagnation phenomena in the economy, in public life, and in the activity of communist and workers' parties in the alliance countries led at one time to a decline in the effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact's efforts. In the late seventies and early eighties the arms race unleashed by the West and our own retaliatory steps aimed at preventing the disruption of military-strategic parity promoted a stepping up of military confrontation. The achievements of the detente of the early seventies gradually gave way to stereotypes from the past. Peace-loving initiatives were not always backed up by concrete deeds comprehensible to all the peoples, and this formed the basis of the myth of the "military threat from the East."

All the same, the main avenue of the Warsaw Pact's activity was and remains the struggle for peace and the safeguarding of security by political means. The last few years have been particularly fruitful in this respect. The allied countries' switch to the positions of the new political thinking made possible profound breakthroughs in the sphere of nuclear and general disarmament and the lessening of the danger of war.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Major changes have taken place recently in East European states belonging to the Warsaw Pact. How have they affected the Warsaw Pact Organization's activity?

[Lushev] Undoubtedly the changes in East European countries could not but affect the activity of the Warsaw Pact in general and its military organization in particular. But here I wish to stress particularly that the substantial transformations in the Joint Armed Forces did not begin only yesterday, or even last year, but have been going on for at least five years now.

Relations between the allies are being cleansed of the imposition of a social system, way of life, or policy from outside. Sovereignty and independence, equality and the renunciation of interference in other states' internal affairs, and consideration for different countries' national characteristics are becoming the fundamental basis of cooperation. Today the main component of perestroyka in the Warsaw Pact's activity and structure is its politicization. This will promote the transition to a more constructive partnership within the alliance.

With what meaning do I invest that term? The main thing here, in my view, is the preferential development and functioning of political structures coupled with the gradual reduction of the role of the alliance's military components. From a purely military viewpoint, politicization, or the transformation of military-political blocs into political-military blocs, is, I think, based primarily on the principle of defense sufficiency as the material basis for the new model of security. The Warsaw Pact's real initiatives and practical steps in this sphere are well known Let me remind you of the adoption of the document "On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact States," which unequivocally proclaims its defensive character and indicates that it is dedicated to the task of preventing war and ensuring readiness to rebuff any aggression. Also in this category are the unilateral and substantial reduction in the troops and arms of the allied states, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the imposition of a defensive structure on the Soviet units and formations that remain for the time being on our allies' territory. In the light of the fundamental principles of the document on the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states, the main efforts in the training of the Joint Armed Forces are now concentrated on developing the ability to carry out defensive operations to rebuff possible aggression.

In view of the fact that in present-day conditions a lowering of the level of military activity is necessary and possible, we have also changed the approach to the planning of joint operational and combat training measures by the allied armies and the methodology for implementing them. The number and volume of such measures have been reduced. We are seeking to hold more joint exercises at the lowest (tactical) level. In operational training we are putting the main emphasis on command post exercises, methodological assemblies and conferences, scientific conferences on topical questions of military science, and the exchange of experience in the training of troops (forces).

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] In the West, Petr Georgiyevich, nowadays people not infrequently write about the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. Is this true, are there grounds for such conclusions?

[Lushev] Indeed, not only in the West, but also in the allied countries and even some Soviet press organs voices are now heard speaking of the "collapse" of the Warsaw Pact. Rather varied "arguments" are used to support this claim. Some try to demonstrate the bankruptcy of the very idea of the Pact and the invalidity of its existence in present-day conditions. Others say that the Warsaw Pact Organization has become obsolete and is losing ground, and its influence on international affairs is declining. People also say that membership of the Warsaw Pact is a kind of brake on the allied countries' development. And many equate the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia with the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact.

Such opinions are very far from the truth. I cannot agree with them, for a number of reasons. First, I wish to remind readers that the new leaders of all the allied states and governments have announced their countries' continued fulfillment of their commitments under the Pact. Second, they have reaffirmed the view that the disbandment of the two military alliances, the Warsaw Pact and NATO, can only take place simultaneously and only when an all-European system of collective security has been created. Third, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Hungarian Republic and the CSFR [Czech and Slovak Federative Republic] is taking place on the basis of bilateral, rather than allied, accords, does not affect alliance-wide relations, and does not, of course, mean the elimination of the Joint Armed Forces. Under the Pact, in peacetime certain contingents of troops assigned by each country to the Joint Armed Forces remain subordinate to national commands and are trained according to their plans. In the event of aggression, however, they should be ready for actions as part of the coalition forces.

Of course, I cannot totally rule out the possibility of any country's withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact in future. In Hungary, for instance, the question of withdrawal has been raised by one faction in the newly elected National Assembly. I believed and still believe that every people determines its own fate. But in my view the time to disband the Warsaw Pact has not yet come. Today the Warsaw Pact gives the member countries guarantees of stability.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Comrade Army General, we would like your opinion on this: What consequences does the process of German unification have for the Warsaw Pact?

[Lushev] Today it is hardly possible, desirable as it may be, to predict fully all the consequences of this process. The question is very complex and delicate. It concerns not only the Warsaw Pact, but the majority, if not all, of the countries of Europe. And how it turns out for the continent as a whole, for NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and for individual European countries will depend on many factors.

As yet only one thing is certain: The question of German unification has already entered the realm of practicalities. Neither we nor anyone in the world can call into question the Germans' sovereign right to unity. But much is still unclear, for instance the problem of the military-political status of the future Germany.

We are concerned about how this problem will be resolved. After all, today the entire disarmament process and all the ideas of building a common European home are based on recognition of the balance of forces and parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Therefore any changes in the structures of the two military-political alliances leading to its disruption could ultimately have an adverse effect on the processes of relaxation of international tension.

Now, after the meeting according to the "two plus four" formula in Bonn, many options for resolving this question have become known. I think the most realistic path is that indicated by the Soviet Union, although naturally it cannot be considered the only possible path. The Soviet Union's proposals may be formulated briefly thus: The unification of Germany and the definition of its military-political status should take place in parallel with the formation of all-European security structures within the framework of the Helsinki process. This security system should be fundamentally new, built on the basis of the gradual transformation of the military-political alliances culminating in the attainment of non-bloc collective structures. The future united Germany will take its place in this system alongside the other states of Europe.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What are the relations today between the military organizations of the Warsaw Pact and NATO? How, in your opinion, will they develop in future?

[Lushev] Of course, certain changes in relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO are clearly visible. The specter of the cold war is receding into the past and the detente and disarmament processes are being stepped up. Interbloc military confrontation is giving way to partnership, not to say cooperation, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Military contacts, meetings between military leaders and experts from the two alliances, and exchanges of delegations are becoming wider. The first, albeit unofficial, meeting between the commanders in chief of the allied armed forces has taken place. Reciprocal military inspections, notifications of certain types of military activity, and the practice of inviting observers to troop exercises have become regular. A seminar has taken place on miltiary doctrines, which to some degree promoted a better understanding of the sides' intentions in the military sphere.

All this indicates that East-West relations, including relations in the sphere of military-political alliances, have entered a new phase of their development. And this, in turn, creates a firmer basis for mutual security and confidence and lessens military tension on the continent.

However, here, I think, we have covered only the first few meters, the start. Far more can and must be done. We are ready for this, but it does not depend entirely on us. Unfortunately, at present the positions of the Warsaw Pact and NATO do not coincide on a number of fundamental issues of great significance for the security of the world community. At the same time we cannot forget that for us NATO is still what it always was—an opposing military bloc with a certain type of doctrine, oriented toward the possibility of making a first nuclear strike.

That is the reality. But the last thing I want is for my reflections to be assessed as the view of a pessimist. True, today the situation in relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO is not yet cloudless. But it is not hopeless, and prospects for improving it are emerging increasingly clearly. Here the attainment of accords at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe should play an important role. This will be another major step along the path of joint participation in the building of the common European home and the gradual abandonment of bloc politics.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] One last question, Petr Georgiyevich. In our dynamic, changing times it is hard to make long-term predictions. Nonetheless, how do you see the future of the Warsaw Pact?

[Lushev] I think in essence I have already answered that question. And the answer is in effect unequivocal. In the immediate future the Warsaw Pact will continue to embody the alliance relations among East European countries, but without failing to take into account new approaches to the resolution of problems of cooperation within the Warsaw Pact. Nor is the Pact's military organization losing its role as yet. It is undoubtedly premature at present to speak of the speedy elimination of the alliance.

The more—though not much more—distant future is another matter. The allied states have never regarded the Warsaw Pact and NATO as permament organs in the Europe of the future. In advocating the simultaneous disbandment of the two alliances we are guided by existing European realities, and have not forgotten that Article 11 of the Warsaw Pact states: "In the event of the creation in Europe of a system of collective security and the conclusion to that end of an All-European Treaty on Collective Security, which the contracting parties will persistently seek, the present Treaty will lose its force from the day that the All-European Treaty comes into force."

If you look at the Warsaw Pact's future from a military-strategic viewpoint, it seems that it will be needed until such time as the opposing blocs' military potentials are brought into line with the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense and the armed forces are deprived of the potential for large-scale offensive operations

For the time being, while pursuing a peace-loving foreign policy in the spirit of the new political thinking, the allied states are not losing sight of questions of ensuring the allied states' security against aggression from outside, which is still possible.

Lobov Interviewed on Pact Changes

LD1305064690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 12 May 90

[From the "I Serve the Soviet Union" program presented by K. Kukholev]

[Text] [Kukholev] The day after tomorrow, 14 May, is the 35th anniversary of the Warsaw Treaty Organization [Warsaw Pact], the WTO, as we call in an abbreviated way this defensive alliance when speaking about stratgegic parity between it and NATO. Of course we speak not only of this, but also about important differences between their military doctrines. There are many questions in this respect, especially now that central Europe is living through so many acute political events. Here is an interview which Army General Vladimir Nikolayevich Lobov, chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, has given to journalist Vyacheslav Rusinov.

[Begin recording] [Rusinov] Nowadays, the changes in the WTO participant countries are of a revolutionary character and so in one way or another they touch upon military sphere, too. Vladimir Nikolayevich, what is changing the principles and bases of the Warsaw Treaty Organization's structure?

[Lobov] As is known a specially and strictly defined contingent of troops from every state forms part of the Joint Military Forces of the Warsaw Pact. It is mutually agreed and certainly takes into account the economic, political, human, and geographic possibilities of each state. This is the first important point.

Second, I must say that allocated troops remain at the disposal of their national commands, and the national commands are responsible for the military and operational training of these troops, their combat readiness, the degree of their being equipped with armaments and military machinery, their discipline, instruction, and so on.

You have asked me what changes are at present taking place in the Warsaw Pact. I tell you this: The task has been set to politicize our alliance, in order that we will not be just a military organization. At the moment we are working along these lines, and I can say that this work is going successfully. We understand each other in all the questions we have to resolve when moving toward the political orientation of our alliances.

A second point, from the sphere of disarmament. On this problem too we are working in a coordinated way. Vienna testifies to that, as well as the fact that the Soviet Union decided, on a unilateral basis, to reduce its Armed Forces by 500,000 men, and each WTO participant state supported this idea and reduced its own forces as well.

Finally, it is certainly the defensive orientation of our military doctrine. It is another political, so to speak, feature. We care for the security of each state, so that all the participant states in the Warsaw Pact have enough forces and means for reliable and quality protection and defense of its state and its people.

[Rusinov] Vladimir Nikolayevich, has the present political situation in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland affected the contacts between the Warsaw Pact participant countries?

[Lobov] Speaking of the mutual relations within the Joint Armed Forces, I can say, and I want to stress this, that I for instance at present do not perceive serious difficulties. We are resolving serious tasks that are directed at perfecting the Warsaw Pact mechanism and its Joint Armed Forces, and are finding mutual understanding in all questions.

[Ryusinov] The Warsaw Pact armies have of late agreed to a unilateral reduction of their armed forces. Do similar measures exist in response on the part of NATO countries? Or are there still only declarations?

[Lobov] Quite frankly, apart from words, we have seen no real steps toward our initiatives on the part of NATO and its member states yet. And this compels us to be watchful and to strengthen the defensive capacity of the Warsaw Pact.

[Rusinov] And one of the last questions, which at present worries many. What will happen to the Warsaw Treaty Organization when Germany becomes unified? And, in general, what are the prospects for the Warsaw Pact and NATO?

[Lobov] Many approach this question in different ways. Some say that a unified Germany should be a NATO member; others that there should be no troops in its eastern part, but only in the western part. Some say that a unified Germany should be a NATO and a Warsaw Pact member. But I think that in no case should one believer pray to two gods, and obviously believers never pray to two gods. I would say that in any case, in whatever way the unification of Germany takes place, in the first place the security of all the peoples of Europe must be ensured.

[Rusinov] And what about the prospects for the Warsaw Pact and NATO?

[Lovov] The prospects? You know that the position of our state and alliance is that we are for a simultaneous disbandment of the NATO bloc and the Warsaw Pact. Simultaneous! Only for that. The future will show us how this process will come about. [end recording]

Hungarians Propose Withdrawal

LD1005151490 Moscow TASS in English 1449 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Budapest May 10 TASS—The parliamentary group of the Hungarian Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD) on Wednesday proposed that the legislature call on the government to declare Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.

The proposal, read by Miklos Vasarheyi, was based on the November 1, 1956 decision by the Hungarian "revolutionary" government to quit the pact immediately. The decision's implementation was prevented by subsequent developments.

The proposal says that Hungary does not wish to belong to any bloc. At the same time, it notes, Hungary will make every effort to create a European security system in coordination with Warsaw pact members.

AFD leaders old a news conference later that the withdrawal proposal had always featured in the alliance's programme and that the initiative was intended to show that the AFD "is following traditions of the 1956 revolutionary government."

They said there was no "political or logical relationship" between their initiative and the fact that it was put forward on Victory Day.

The Hungarian Foreign Ministry's State Secretary Ferenc Somogyi told the MTI News Agency that the revision of Hungary's relations with the Warsaw Pact and its individual members had been "on the horizon for the government even before the AFD made its proposal."

At the same time, he noted, Hungarian interests would be best met if such a revision determined what elements of these relations, corresponding to the country's aspirations, could remain. Somogyi said the Warsaw Pact's role "has markedly changed and one can expect further radical changes. But this organisation in the near future can still play an important part in creating a European security system, implementing disarmament treaties and verifying them."

He emphasised that Hungary's stand on this issue "must be taken very carefully."

Hungarians Divided on Membership

PM1105132490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent F. Lukyanov: "Hungary and the Warsaw Pact"]

[Text] Budapest—A sitting of the first session of the Hungarian State Assembly, which has to discuss questions concerning the formation of the new government, has resumed in quite an unexpected way. Miklos Vasarheyi, representative of the opposition SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats]—the second largest parliamentary party—stated that the SZDSZ proposes that the country's government begin talks with the Soviet Union on Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.

He explained that the Free Democrats consider it essential to return to the situation as of 1 November 1956, when the Imre Nagy government proclaimed Hungary's neutrality and its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact after which, according to Vasarheyi, a delegation had even been formed and was standing by to fly to Warsaw for talks with representatives of the organization's member countries. However, further development of events was prevented by the intervention of Soviet troops.

The Free Democrats' statement was not, of course, altogether unexpected. The SZDSZ election manifesto, which IZVESTIYA has written about, does include the task of achieving the status of a neutral country along the lines of Austria or Finland. And yet....

Jozsef Antal, chairman of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum], who has been charged with forming a cabinet, stated not so long ago that withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact is not an end in itself and that it is essential to develop a special mechanism and take into account the realities of the international situation.

As MDF Deputy Tamas Katona reported, the Free Democrats' proposal on Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact or suspension of membership in that organization was made without the MDF's knowledge. Although, according to T. Katona, the Warsaw Pact's activity has become "quite strange" since the coming to power of new political forces, any upsetting of the balance of forces in Europe is not in anyone's interest at present. As the MDF representative stated, there must be no haste in deciding such a crucial question, it is important to wait for the conclusion of the talks in Vienna and the end of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. Moreover, neutrality or even just withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact military organization is quite an expensive business: All questions concerning the country's security will then have to be tackled alone.

I think that the next parliamentary sitting, scheduled for 15 May, will fully clarify this. In any event, not only deputies but also the country's new government, which is in the process of being formed, will have to examine the SZDSZ proposal and respond to it in some way.

CEMA Trade Problems, Prospects Viewed

PM1105105590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 11 May 90 Second Edition p 5

[Interview with V.D. Demchuk, chief of the USSR Council of Ministers State Foreign Economic Commission Cooperation With Socialist Countries Department, by S. Semendyayev; no place ordate of interview given; first paragraph is an introduction: "Partners Yesterday. But What About Today? East Europe and the USSR: Problems and Prospects of Foreign Economic Ties"]

[Text] The USSR's trade and economic ties with central and East European countries in their present form are deadlocked, and many specialists describe our relations as being in a state of "precrisis" and even "crisis." Priorities of foreign trade within the CEMA framework are being reviewed at all levels. So, what were the flaws in the cooperation mechanism that caused this wave of reciprocal complaints and cutbacks in commodity turnover? Our correspondent asked V.D. Demchuk, chief of the USSR Council of Ministers State Foreign Economic Commission Cooperation with Socialist Countries Department, to answer this and other questions.

[Demchuk] In order to better explain the present situation in our economic and trade relations with East European countries, it is necessary to look into the past, going back several decades. What do we see? It transpires that almost all of East Europe's major enterprises in metallurgy, machine building, and the power and chemical industries were built either by the Soviet Union or with its active participation. Many of these "industrial giants" failed to prove economically worth while and, moreover, call for additional expenditures since they are "tied" to Soviet raw materials.

The economies' inefficiency also had an effect on trade links between the USSR and East European countries. Here we have two sets of problems. The first concerns the structure of commodity turnover. It is no secret that the lion's share of our exports to East Europe is accounted for by raw materials and fuel. On the one hand, this is attributable to the needs of those selfsame enterprises which were built by us and, on the other hand, to the short list of Soviet goods we offer to purchasers abroad. Furthermore, the present crisis was aggravated by our past foreign trade policy. In order to expand commodity turnover with socialist countries, we opted for the easiest path, which was still cheap at the time—boosting the volumes of extraction and sale of oil; the increase of deliveries in individual five-year plan periods was in excess of 100 million tonnes. And now we have reached a point beyond which each tonne of oil in excess of plan involves solid losses, while an expansion of imports which we need so badly can be achieved only by significantly increasing the volumes of our non-raw material exports, something for which we are virtually unprepared at present.

[Semendyayev] But surely it could have been foreseen that oil and other raw material reserves would dry up at some point?

[Demchuk] Certainly, and this is why the concept of reforming trade with socialist countries was adopted in 1986. According to this concept, the proportion of raw materials and fuel in our exports should be reduced, with a corresponding increase in the sales of machines and equipment. Moreover, the proportion of exports represented by processing industry's output should reach 50 percent by the year 2000 (against 15-20 percent at present) and should be equal to imports. As you can see, however, events are outpacing our plans.

But let us turn back to your first question. Price formation is another and equally tangled knot of problems. The fact that our "intra-CEMA" prices bear no relation to world prices gives both sides a pretext for reproach and dissatisfaction. It is well known that we set "black gold" prices taking world prices into account, but express them in convertible rubles; when oil products became considerably more expensive in the seventies, all East European countries immediately became our debtors. In order to eliminate this imbalance in commodity turnover, either they should have increased the exports of machines, equipment, and consumer goods to the Soviet Union, which was very difficult to effect in the conditions of our planned economies, or the USSR could have granted them credits to meet this debt, which we did only partially. A balance was maintained largely by increasing "import" prices. Last year, however, oil prices dropped sharply while the price of East European imports remained the same. Due to this "scissors" effect we are now in debt to all of East Europe except Poland, and have to again seek a way out, but we are fast running out of time.

[Semendyayev] Ways out of the present crisis were also discussed at the Sofia meeting of CEMA countries' heads of government in January. It produced an agreement in principle—and an appropriate document has already been signed with Hungary—about a switch to world prices and settlements in freely convertible currency between East European countries. At first glance, this decision really removes all differences between partners as regards prices, and creates prerequisites for the emergence and development of market structures in East European countries' foreign trade. On the other hand, however, in the conditions of market competition and abandonment of the clearing system, goods from East Europe will simply be unable to break into the Soviet market because their quality is considerably inferior to similar Western products and they are more expensive. The result will be that our partners will be totally unable to pay for Soviet oil, and the entire system of foreign economic ties between our countries will collapse. But if reciprocal deliveries under previously signed agreements were retained, what would be the point of introducing foreign currency settlements in trade? After all, the dollar will then have to perform the present functions of the convertible ruble, in other words it would have to serve as the unit for calculating the volume of commodity cross-flows, which are usually more or less equal. This will be no market....

[Demchuk] There are complexities here, of course, and this is why our partners reacted differently to N.I. Ryzhkov's proposals about switching to world prices and freely convertible currency. This solution is actively supported by the Hungarians and Poles, while Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria took a more cautious stand. What do the Czechs have to fear? After all, they do not have the huge external debt that Hungary, the GDR, or Poland have. The point is that if we were to start delivering oil for dollars, oil prices in Czechoslovakia's domestic market would increase severalfold.

Therefore, many of our partners now insist that the switch to world prices and freely convertible currency run in parallel with clearing-system deliveries for a certain period of time. We are not averse to examining different options for transition to freely convertible currency and current world prices, either. The main point is not to disrupt prevailing foreign trade ties in the process.

[Semendyayev] Fine, we are clear about our East European partners' fears as regards transition to freely convertible currency. But many people in our own country firmly believe that the Soviet Union "fed" East Europe for 40 years, and now they cannot comprehend why we should spend our "oil" dollars buying Polish or Hungarian goods instead of American or West German ones which are also much better. What about our fears?

[Demchuk] Yes, I am familiar with this view. Incidentally, people in East European countries are profoundly convinced that the opposite holds true.

We depend on deliveries of equipment and components from East Europe as much as they depend on our raw materials. Production sharing in some sectors has reached quite a high level, and a break of foreign economic ties could inflict irreparable damage to our economy. Here are two examples. Everyone knows about the new "Tavriya" car. Its production is totally dependent on deliveries of constant velocity joints from the GDR. If we suddenly fail to receive a scheduled shipment of these components, the production line at Zaporozhye would come to a standstill at once. We are also complaining about the shortage of new passenger rail cars, the Ministry of Railways is using wrecks to put trains together. We receive about 5,000 cars from the GDR over a five-year plan period. Judge for yourself, are we in a position to give up these deliveries?

[Semendyayev] Is the transition to freely convertible currency likely to result in East European countries altogether losing interest in trade with the USSR? After all, we already perceive a distinct trend of East European states' economic contacts being reoriented toward the West. In this process, it is proposed that the expansion of ties with the West—and nobody in our country has anything against this—should be implemented at the cost of cutbacks in the volume of trade with the Soviet Union, seeing that East Europe has no new capacities at present....

[Demchuk] The East Europeans' desire to expand trade, economic, and other contacts with developed capitalist countries is perfectly understandable. But, in order to trade with the West, to obtain and assimilate new technologies, it is mandatory to sell something there as well. There are two, hitherto insurmountable barriers blocking the path of many, many East European goods to the Western market: high costs and poor quality.

There is also another—and quite weighty, in my opinion—argument in favor of preserving existing trade links between East Europe and the USSR. The former socialist countries now enjoy positions in the Soviet market of which the "capitalists" are still only dreaming. I say "still" because as soon as the East Europeans yield these positions to the West, they will never be able to regain them. Seeing that the Western market are saturated, trade with the Soviet Union is highly promising and holds the prospects of big profits, something of which the Americans, Japanese, and West Germans are perfectly well aware.

[Semendyayev] Valentin Dmitriyevich, sundry large-scale projects built on a multilateral basis were often enough cited as an example of successful economic cooperation within the CEMA framework in the past. Less and less mention has been made of them in the last few years. How logical was this decline of interest in them?

[Demchuk] As a matter of fact, only one such project is still in existence today—the gas pipeline between Yamal and the USSR's western border. I suppose one could also class the Krivoy Rog mining and enriching combine as such, but the participants are fewer and the scales are not the same. But if we were to think back of the seventies? A lot was really built then on a multilateral basis—asbestos, pulp, and ferroalloy plants, the gas pipeline between Orenburg and the USSR's western border, the "Mir" power supply system, and so on.

At present, given the transition to intensive paths of development and the acute shortage of resources, the construction of expensive projects which take a long time to pay for themselves is no longer expedient.

[Semendyayev] And finally, a traditional question. Being well aware of today's situation in trade between the Soviet Union and East Europe, how would you appraise the prospects of our development in the immediate future? Is it possible to forecast the nature and structure of these ties now?

[Demchuk] I do not think that the crisis in our trade relations will produce a break or any sizeable cutback in these relations. Due to the causes I have already listed, the USSR and East Europe are simply "doomed" to cooperate over the next decade. But the structure of commodity turnover must really undergo radical change, and priority in trade must be given to science-intensive and energy- and resource-saving output, to consumer goods.

Of course, changes in foreign trade occur with difficulty, at times even painfully, but this is a necessary process. Sundry ties, which were formerly subsidized and are no longer needed today, will fall by the wayside and wither, and may they rest in peace. It is more important for us to preserve and further develop mutually advantageous cooperation in the economy's promising strategic sectors.

USSR-EC Commission Issues Communique

LD1105161290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1432 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Moscow, 11 May (TASS)—We are transmitting the full text of the joint communique of the USSR-EC commission. It says:

The first session of the USSR-EC Mixed Commission, set up in accordance with the agreement signed on 18 December 1989 in Brussels on trade and commercial and economic cooperation, took place in Moscow on 10-11 May.

E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the USSR Presidential Council and USSR foreign minister, and F. Andriessen, deputy chairman of the Commission of European Communities, were present at the opening of the session and addressed the participants in this important event.

USSR Deputy Foreign Minister E. Ye Obminskiy was in the chair at the session. The delegation of the communities was headed by H. Krenzler, general director for for foreign relations of the Commission of European Communities.

The sides discussed the macroeconomic situation in the USSR and in the community and exchanged information, in particular, about progress in economic reforms in the USSR. They agreed the acceleration of this process will assist a more vigorous integration of the Soviet economic into the world economic system and will create favorable conditions for trade and economic cooperation between the sides.

During a special seminar the members of the EC delegation briefed the representatives of Soviet Government bodies and experts on progress in the creation of a single EC internal market.

Both delegations analyzed progress in fulfilling the agreement.

They discussed the state of and prospects for the development of trade-turnover and noted that the existing volume and structure of trade between them do not accord with their economic potential. They decided to take joint efforts to promote direct investments and encourage other forms of cooperation between companies and enterprises of the USSR and the Community, which will create a fine basis for structural changes in trade between the USSR and the EC.

The expansion and diversification of economic links between the two sides will in view of the complementary nature of their economies bring about an enhancement of living standards.

They urged the encouragement of the creation of favorable conditions for trade and economic cooperation, in particular by means of the removal of Soviet goods to the Community and the creation of opportunities for the USSR to increase imports from the EC, particularly of consumer goods. In this regard the Community's delegation welcomed the progress achieved in ensuring favorable conditions for the representatives of business circles in the Soviet Union. At the same time the Community expressed the hope that there would be a further improvement in the situation in respect of the provision of all necessary information for economic organizations, in particular with regard to failures to pay on time and the availability of office and residential accomodation.

The sides discussed the state of and prospects for cooperation in areas such as the environment, power engineering including nuclear power engineering and nuclear safety, science and technology, economic issues, management and the training of cadres, and also in other areas of mutual interest. They put forward a number of proposals on specific measures aimed at developing trade and commercial and economic cooperation in these and other spheres for the short term and the medium term. Both sides expressed a readiness to consider these proposals in a most favorable spirit and agreed in particular at this stage to create subcommissions on cooperation in the field of trade policy and in the field of the environment. The sides decided to intensify contacts between experts in various fields coming under the operation of the agreement and of mutual interest, especially in those which are directly connected with the process of perestroyka in the USSR.

The sides discussed a broad range of bilateral and international trading policy problems, in particular ones concerning the creation of an all-European economic area, ones linked with the USSR's obtaining observer status within GATT and others.

The session took place in a cordial atmosphere of mutual understanding and cooperation.

It was agreed that the next session of the commission will be held in Brussels in 1991 at dates to be determined later.

'No Obstacles' for Gemany's NATO Membership

LD1105210690 Moscow TASS in English 2041 GMT 11 May 90

[By TASS political news analyst Aleksandr Antsiferov]

[Text] Moscow May 11 TASS—"There are no obstacles to German unity any longer. This has been achieved due to the joint efforts of participants in the "Two Plus Four" meeting. "The Soviet side merits particular gratitude," stated the West German NUEUE PRESSE newspaper about the Soviet Union's position at the "Two Plus Four" talks that were held in Bonn earlier this month.

"The Soviet Union should be repaid in its own coin for its response to the idea," the newspaper concluded.

The four NATO countries that participated in the meeting—West Germany, the United States, Britain, and France—which advocate NATO membership for a reunited Germany had such an opportunity in the Canadian city of Calgary this week during the session of NATO's planning group at defence ministers' level.

Expectations of response rose as Western political figures of the highest rank recently talked about a new role for NATO and about the need to reorganise it in light of changes taking place in East Europe and to create new security structures on the continent.

However, the outcome of the session in Calgary makes one question the sincerity of such statements. The ministers did not introduce any substantial adjustments to NATO's military doctrine, which envisages—in particular—a first use of nuclear weapons.

In the new conditions, sub-strategic nuclear systems were said to be of "relatively greater importance", meaning the United States plans to deploy new Tactical Air to Surface Missiles (TASM) in West Europe, including on West German territory.

What kind of alliance should a reunited Germany join—"reorganised" and "transformed", which NATO leaders only speak of so far, or a military group that seeks to build up its combat might?

It is naive to base one's policy on counting on altruism or gratitude, which the NEUE PRESSE urges the West to do. The steps being taken by NATO indicate that the Soviet Union's apprehensions about a reunited Germany's NATO membership are more than justified.

"Reliable guarantees must ensure that the interests of our security, just as those of other nations, and the strategic stability in Europe and the world will not be upset," President Mikhail Gorbachev emphasised in his remarks in Moscow on May 8.

It is clear that a reunited Germany's NATO membership by itself cannot provide such guarantees, despite all the verbal assurances by NATO leaders.

The Soviet proposal to conclude a German peace treaty taking into account present-day realities and interdependent interests seems to be the most acceptable solution to the problem.

Soviet Envoys Address NATO Commissions

LD1305143190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1413 GMT 12 May 90

[TASS correspondent Sergey Batyrev report]

[Excerpts] Paris, 12 May (TASS)—The economic aspects of East-West rapprochement—an issue, it would seem, that is far removed from the problems according to widespread ideas preoccupying such an organization as the NATO bloc—today were the focus of debate by members of the North Atlantic Assembly's Economic Commission. The assembly brings together parliamentarians from the 16 countries of the alliance and is presently holding its spring session in the French capital. [passage omitted]

Great interest was evoked among the participants by the first-ever speech from the rostrum of the North Atlantic Assembly's Economic Commission by a Soviet spokesman: V. Shemyatenkov, the USSR's ambassador to the European situation in the Soviet Union and touched on the prospects for the full-scale integration of the USSR into the world economy.

At the same time, another commission of the North Atlantic Assembly—the Commission on Science and Technology—also was discussing a report that was not on a "NATO theme" —the problem of the destruction of the ozone layer, global overheating of the earth's atmosphere, and the state of the environment in the Soviet Union and the countries of East Europe. Here, too, members of the commission had an opportunity to listen for the first time to a spokesman for our country: V.V. Zhurkin, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Europe Institute. His speech was devoted to problems relating to the development of East-West cooperation in the fields of science, technology, and ecology.

The session of the North Atlantic Assembly is continuing its work.

North Atlantic Assembly Session Opens 10 May

LD1005201690 Moscow TASS in English 1945 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Paris May 10 TASS—Large-scale political changes taking place on the European continent, security problems connected with them, the future of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, NATO countries' relations with East European states and the Soviet Union, NATO's military strategy, and various aspects of disarmament are some of items that are on the agenda of a spring session of the North Atlantic Assembly that opened here today.

The session is being attended by more than 200 members of parliament from 16 West European member-states, the United States and Canada and by observers from a number of East European countries and the Soviet Union.

For the first time in the past 13 years, law-makers from NATO countries have gathered in the capital of France—the country which holds a special position within the bloc and does not participate in its military structure.

The North Atlantic Assembly is a consultative body which has no official powers. Nevertheless, much importance is attached to its activities, since it is believed in NATO that the Assembly plays an irreplaceable role of a connecting link between the bloc's leading bodies and the national parliaments of NATO member-states.

In addition, it constitutes a rather accurate "barometer of public opinion" and makes it possible to constantly have an idea of the public opinion in NATO countries on major problems of the bloc's political and military strategies.

One can say that the Assembly's attention will be focused on the future-related matters: the future of Europe, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, and German unification, Patrick Duffy (Britain), chairman of the North Atlantic Assembly, told a news conference today.

He said the Assembly would try to formulate an opinion about major issues that agitate the international public now: How long will the opposing blocs exist, what is understood by the building a united Europe and what changes should be introduced to nato strategy in the light of the current development of events.

Duffy said the Assembly devotes special attention to the development of cooperation with East European countries and the Soviet Union in the belief that this dialogue is now important as never before for the building of Europe.

For the first time in the history of the North Atlantic Assembly Romanian Foreign Minister Sergiu Celac is expected to address members of its political committee while East German members of parliament are expected to address the Assembly's committee for defence and security.

"One can say without exaggeration that few of the previous sessions can compare with this one by their importance," said Jean-Michel Boucheron who leads a delegation of the French National Assembly.

"This is only understandable: It meets at a historic moment Europe is living through. Really, when we met last time in October last year we could not even imagine what would happen within the next few months," said Michel Chauty, leader of a French Senate delegation.

"The major problem now is, to my mind, not only to work out issues of defence strategy. It is necessary to give up the approach according to which NATO means only defence. It is now essential to think more of most diverse types of international cooperation, including cooperation with those whom we only recently regarded as our potential enmies," he said.

Arbatov Participates in European Security Conference

LD1305145790 Moscow TASS in English 1056 GMT 13 May 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Drozhzhin]

[Text] Rome May 13 (TASS)—An international conference on the topic "Two Europes—One Security. Disarmament and Cooperation" wound up its proceedings here. The conference was sponsored by the Documentation on Disarmament Centre, a non-governmental organisation, and brought together parliamentarians from East and West Europe, representatives of the USSR and the United States, Italian diplomats and experts on disarmament and military industry conversion.

They exchanged views on the all-important issues of our time ranging from restructuring processes in the Soviet Union to disarmament and detente, the unification of two Germanys, the future of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO, and the building of a common European home.

During the debate on the introductory report delivered at the forum by Centre President Luigi Anderlini, delegates were unanimous that the future of both Europes could not be built on positions of the cold war time. The same idea ran through the speeches by British Shadow Foreign Secretgary Gerald Kaufman and Bundestag deputy from the Social Democratic Party of Germany Hermann Scheer.

Setting out the basic principles of the new Soviet foreign policy and new political thinking, academician Georgiy Arbatov, chairman of the Soviet UN Association and director of the United States and Canada Institute, emphasised that the very notion of security was not only and not so much a military problem. For this reason, he said, it called for political rather than military solutions. It cannot be ensured at other side's expense and has economic, ecological and humanitarian dimensions.

Given all the diversity of the approaches to the problem of building a collective security system in Europe, participants arrived at the conclusion that this system should first of all take into account the interests of all parties concerned.

Delegates agreed that the Rome conference had demonstrated anew the complexity of the problems faced today by state leaders, politicians and public organisations in European countries in the unusually rapidly changing sitaution, problems which can be solved.

Weekly 'Observers' Roundtable' Aired 13 May

LD1305164190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 13 May 90

["International Observers' Roundtable" program with presenter Boris Andrianov and all-Union radio foreign affairs commentators Nikolay Agayants and Gennadiy Vedenyapin]

[Excerpts] [Andrianov] Good day, comrade listeners. We begin our regular meeting of international observers at the roundtable, presented by Boris Andrianov. Alongside me are my colleagues Nikolay Agayants and Gennadiy Vedenyapin, all-Union radio foreign-affairs commentators. [passage omitted: Andrianov says an important event of the past week around the globe has been the Victory Day anniversary celebrations; telegrams from abroad confirm that the exploits of the Red Army in beating fascism have not been forgotten; on the anniversary one recalls the feelings of friendship and mutual understanding that made it possible for the peoples of the anti-Hitlerite coalition to overcome a dangerous and strong foe; one also recalls that soon after victory the cooperation between states with different social systems was replaced by the cold war and the military confrontation of two systems and the later creation of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Agayants says life has shown the world's present problems cannot be solved by force of arms in the manner of Alexander the Great; They need to be carefully tackled, while guarding the supreme value of human life. The three speakers note how things have been changing recently with growing cooperation between the USSR and the United States and the changes in East Europe]

The process of democratization in the countries of East Europe and in our own country, the positive changes in relations between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, and the definite progress in the main areas of disarmament are welcomed by all sober-minded politicians in the West. Take just this week's session of the ministerial committee of the Council of Europe, in which the foreign ministers and secretaries of state of 23 member countries of the organization took part. The main attention was indeed focused on relations with the states of central and East Europe. The final communique expressed satisfaction with the processes of democratization in these countries. The ministers expressed firm support for the reforms being implemented in our country and confirmed their desire to broaden contacts and cooperation with us.

Once we have begun speaking about the problems connected with organizing and deepening closer economic cooperation throughout the world we cannot fail to mention the fact that a few days ago the Bush administration proposed that certain restrictions on the supply of high technology products to the USSR and the countries of East Europe be lifted. These restrictions were established by the well-known Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls. [Cocom]. [passage omitted: Vedenyapin says Cocom restrictions have cost Western businessmen many millions in lost deals]

[Agayants] The White House has taken this initiative, of course, not by itself alone but under pressure from its allies and has yielded to the demands of U.S. business circles and legislators. For a long time now those interested in expanding mutually beneficial trade have not believed in the Cocom restrictions, and indeed Washington's allies have for quite a long time and not without justification suspected that Washington is not averse to making use of the draconic Cocom lists in the interests of American firms. They can do something, but others, it is claimed, are not allowed to do so.

[Andrianov] Moreover, it is as yet early to speak of radical changes in this respect. Many people in the West and in the United States believe measures proposed by George Bush are definitely insufficient. Indeed U.S. Secretary of Commerce Mosbacher admitted this was so by saying that although this was a significant step, it would not satisfy everyone. The White House statement indicated that it is proposed to lift restrictions on the supply of only 30 classes of equipment and technical devices and to ease restrictions on the supply of a further 13 classes of goods. [passage omitted: Vedenyapin quotes a member of the U.S. house of representatives criticizing the limited nature of the step]

[Agayants] The supporters of a hard line against us evidently do not intend to give up their position without a fight. Incidentally, this was confirmed by the session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, which was held near the Canadian town of Calgary. The session considered problems relating to the military strategy of the bloc in view of the political changes occurring in the continent of Europe. In the final communique—and NATO, alas, remains NATO—the North Atlantic Alliance confirmed its adherence to nuclear weapons as an essential element in the bloc's military arsenal.

[Andrianov] So you can see the hopes have not been vindicated of those who predicted that at the current session of the Nuclear Planning Group the NATO defense ministers would be taking a decisive step to reduce their nuclear arsenal in Europe, in particular to give up all their short-range nuclear weapons.

[Vedenyapin] Indeed, Boris Vasilyevich, on the contrary: The Pentagon has been silent but the press has been stubbornly assuring one that NATO intends to station in West Germany more state of the art and longer-range air-launched air-to-surface missiles. Unlike Lance, which is at present deployed on the continent, they will be able to strike at targets in our remote areas. If one is speaking of the old Lances—and thank goodness Washington has, as you know, given up new ones—they indeed are now losing all their significance. Changes are occurring in East Europe, the situation is not simple, and we are withdrawing troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. One wonders why in such a situation it is necessary to leave the Lances on European soil, especially in view of the fact that Washington never made it a secret that they are aimed at our troops in the East European countries.

[Agayants] You are quite right, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich. It would seem the right time to fully remove tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, but judging by the communique NATO is ready to undertake this only on condition that the present systems are replaced by more state of the art ones.

[Vedenyapin] You know, Nikolay Ivanovich, through the smooth style of the communique one discerns differences too, of course, concerning precisely these problems. I should like to draw you attention to the statement made to journalists by Gerhard Stoltenberg, the West German defense minister. According to him, the majority support Bonn's viewpoint that the United States and the Soviet Union should hold talks for the purpose of eliminating all surface tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The FRG also supports a Netherlands proposal that U.S. nuclear artillery charges be unilaterally removed from Europe. However, London is against this. Evidently it is for this reason that there is no mention in the final communique about these charges. The communique only welcomes the prospect of talks in the near future between the Soviet Union and the United States—talks on short-range nuclear missiles.

[Andrianov] Washington is nevertheless, as it were, agreeable to the withdrawal from Europe of its artillery nuclear munitions, although this is being presented as none other than a concession to Moscow. You know, this decision is neither more nor less than a sensible step dictated by the development of the situation in the continent, where the targets for which they were intended are gradually vanishing. They are quite simply becoming unnecessary. Indeed, if one recalls to what a degree our continent is filled with nuclear explosives, it is clear that reducing this lethal potential even a little is a blessing and not a concession. Surely one cannot make a concession to common sense!

[Agayants] In general one gest the impression—well, just recall, we have been speaking of new air-launched systems for West Europe, and this is while in practice the existing systems are being retained—one gets the impression that the plans for modernizing the nuclear arsenals, which as we remember evoked such stormy protests from the West Europeans and not only them, are being revived in a new and more dangerous form, are they not?

[Vedenyapin] Yes, NATO unfortunately remains NATO. One would like nevertheless to hope that in the future sensible approaches will prevail too at NATO's headquarters. [passage omitted: Speakers discuss the reasons for the antigovernment student protests in South Korea]

Havel Speech to European Parliament Cited

PM1405103190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 90 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Toward a Security Community?"]

[Text] Paris, 11 May—CSFR [Czech and Slovak Federative Republic] President V. Havel set out his views for the creation of a new system of all-European security when speaking in Strasbourg at the 42d session of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. He called for the rapid transformation of the two military alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—in accordance with the ideals of the new system of security, "a kind of community of security" encompassing the entire Northern Hemisphere. Thus it must not only be the United States and Canada in the West but also the Soviet Union in the East that are the guarantors of the process of European unification.

Concretizing the question of the transformation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Czechoslovak president advocated their transformation into "political instruments at disarmament talks" and the significant weakening of their current military functions. In his opinion, the NATO bloc aspires more than the Warsaw Pact to be the "germ of the new security system in Europe." But NATO must also change in order for this to occur. As for the Warsaw Pact, it will, V. Havel believes, disappear after fulfilling its role as the "political instrument for disarmament in Europe."

'International Situation' Program on Cuban Relations

LD1105223490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 11 May 90

["International Situation—Questions and Answers" program presented by Stanislav Blazhenkov, all-Union radio foreign policy commentator, with Viktor Levin, special correspondent in Berlin; Vladimir Taranov, correspondent in Prague; (Rafail Maseyev), international affairs journalist; and "colleague" Yuriy Isayev]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted: Blazhenkov says that listeners have shown an interest in developments in East Europe. Viktor Levin, special correspondent in Berlin, gives an update (from Berlin) on what is happening in the GDR today. He mentions the desecration of the graves of Brecht and his wife by anti-Semitic thugs. Such events have taken place in the GDR previously, but, at that time they were not publicized in the media. He goes on to highlight the fact that many GDR citizens remember and honor the World War II feat of the USSR in crushing German fascism. A description of how the anniversary was marked in the GDR then follows: fewer official wreaths, but more wreaths from ordinary citizens. Although the GDR now seems to be turning its back on the USSR, preferring the glitter of the Deutschmark, Levin says that the USSR still retains many friends in the GDR—as, incidentally, in the FRG too.

Then prague correspondent Vladimir Taranov is invited to answer the question: What is going on in Czechoslovakia? Taranov outlines the electoral struggle that is taking place between the political parties in Czechoslovakia, and then moves on to the problems of economic reform. Parties are trying to gain electoral support by offering the least painful economic measures, but the people are confused by rising prices and shortages of goods. Crime is increasing too: burglaries are rife, and skinheads roam the streets. "Certain forces" wish to complicate Czechoslovak-Soviet relations, he says. The Soviet embassy in Prague has been blockaded. Some people would like to wipe out the last 40 years, ignoring the positive features. Blazhenkov then reads out comments from listeners urging young Czechs to remember the sacrifices made by the USSR to free the country from the Nazis.

Blazhenkov then says that listeners are asking about the processes of renewal that are now taking place in Vietnam. He gives a brief survey of recent history and talks about some of his own impressions from a recent trip to Vietnam, pointing to the improvement in the supply of daily necessities in the towns. The cost of rice, meat, sugar, fruit, and vegetables is falling. Consumer goods are on the increase, too. New shops and cafes, many privately owned, are opening. Food is now being exported. Foreign capital has been invited into the country. Over 100 mixed companies have been formed. Free economic zones have been set up in the southern part of the country. "New forms of economic cooperation are developing with the Soviet Union and other countries," he says. Details of cooperation between the Hanoi mechanical works and the Alma-Ata mechanical works to produce a metal-cutting machine tool are then given. New forms of industrial management and private enterprise are being encouraged. A new spirit of enthusiasm is abroad in the country]

[Blazhenkov] Semen Fedorovich Malkin in Gomel is interested in the development of Soviet-Cuban economic relations.

At the 20th meeting of the Soviet-Cuban intergovernmental commission on economic and scientific-technical cooperation, which took place in Havana on 11-17 April this year, new positions [rubezhi] were identified in the relations between the two countries. After the end of the commission's work, Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, the head of the Soviet delegation, assessing the results of the talks, pointed out, in an interview with a Soviet journalist, that the contacts had been successful if only becaue they had enabled an agreed understanding of the problems to be found. We agreed, Abalkin stressed, to strengthen the traditional Soviet-Cuban ties that had developed historically. Over the past years, the head of the Soviet delegation said, quite a stable division of labor has taken shape between our countries, as well as a certain interlocking of the economies. For example, supplies of Cuban sugar ensure 30 percent of the Soviet Union's domestic consumption. Twenty percent of the cobalt produced in the USSR is derived from nickel-cobalt concentrate, without deliveries of Cuban nickel, enterprises in the Urals could not produce high-quality steel. Supplies of citrus fruits from Cuba account for 40 percent of the country's market stocks.

Similarly, the economy of modern Cuba cannot exist without supplies of Soviet oil. Such is the complementary nature of the economies. In accordance with the protocol signed in Havana for 1990, the volume of mutual trade amounts to over R9,000 million. The agreements for the current year make provision, for the first time, for sizeable deliveries of Cuban medicines and modern medical equipment. The opportunities for setting up joint tourist enterprises are being studied so that Soviet citizens can take their holidays in Cuba all the year round.

The Cuban side expressed its willingness to receive, for treatment and rest, up to 10,000 Soviet children who had suffered from the consequences of the accident at Chernobyl, as well as up to 500 servicemen from Afghanistan.

There is no doubt that the ties between our two countries can be successfully expanded. As for economic relations, in the document signed in Havana, both sides acknowledge the need to improve them radically.

[Passage omitted: Blazhenkov says that many listeners have written in to ask about the USSR's position vis-a-vis the Middle East these days; He invites foreign-affairs journalist Rafail (Maseyev) to comment. (Maseyev) surveys the unabated turmoil in the region, commenting that the USSR finds Israel's continuing unjust treatment of the Palestinians unacceptable; He singles out Mubarak's visit to Damascus as being the most promising recent development in the area: The enmity between Egypt and Syria has been ended; Arab observers say that Mubarak's forthcoming visit to the USSR will be of fundamental imporance both to bilateral relations and to a settlement in the Middle East; Blazhenkov then asks (Maseyev) to comment on the likelihood of weapons of mass destruction being used in the Middle East; (Maseyev) details the acquisition of weapons by both Israel and the Arabs, and says that the situation remains volatile and dangerous; (Maseyev) describes the continuing governmental crisis in Israel; Yuriy Isayev is then invited to give an update on the Colombian drugs situation, especially the position in Medellin]

United States & Canada

Bessmertnykh, Matlock Discuss Upcoming Summit

LD1105203890 Moscow TASS in English 2025 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 11 TASS—Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh today received the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack Matlock.

They discussed issues related to the forthcoming top-level Soviet-American political contacts.

Upcoming Soviet-U.S. Summit Previewed

LD1305124490 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 13 May 90

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] One major event this week will be the talks in Moscow between the Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, and his American opposite number, James Baker. The success of their negotiations could determine thue outcome of the U.S.-Soviet summit scheduled for the end of May-early June.

As it appears, Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Baker will, above all, try to remove the last obstacles to an agreement on a 50-percent cut in strategic offensive arms. The draft treaty has, on the whole, been coordinated. However, work has come to a standstill because of Washington's intransigence over sea- and air-based strategic cruise missles. If the problem is not resolved, President Gorbachev's adviser Marshal Akhromeyev said in the American Senate on Tuesday the USSR would not sign the treaty. Still, in all, it seems that the way out suitable for both sides can be found. There is a much better situation with work on other accords to ban and scrap chemical agents and introduce more control to verify nuclear tests and explosions in peaceful purposes.

The forthcoming preliminary exchange of views in Moscow on events in Europe seems to be important, too. For one thing, Moscow and Washington have different approaches to the future military and political status of a united Germany. One hopes for closer positions of the two countries on how to settle the regional conflicts, above all those in Afghanistan and the Middle East.

Anyway, even today there is a good reason to say that preparation for the Soviet-American summit has been going actively, with the sincere desire of the sides to secure the maximum possible results.

In his speech in Moscow for the 45th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany, President Gorbachev said that nothing circumstantial must stop the movement toward a world without war and violence. It would be a great crime before nations if the United States, the Soviet Union, and other countries failed to safeguard the early fruits of new thinking and returned to confrontation. From these positions, President Gorbachev said, we approach the upcoming Soviet-American summit. I want to hope, the president added, that the top-level meeting would make it possible to advance significantly along the trodden path and would, above all, give a constructive impetus to disarmament.

TASS Reviews Past Baker-Shevardnadze Meetings

LD1105152390 Moscow TASS in English 1411 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 11 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker will arrive in Moscow on May 15th as planned. Talks will take place from May 16 to 19. An indepth exchange of views on an entire range of problems covered by the Soviet-American dialogue will take place. The sides are expected to discuss problems linked with the forthcoming Soviet-American summit meeting in Washington, scheduled for the end of May and the beginning of June.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker have met ten times.

The first meeting took place in Vienna on March 7, 1989.

The ministers confirmed the continuity of the Soviet-American political dialogue, discussed a plan for summit political contacts, as well as questions linked with problems of security, primarily the disarmament negotiations. Regional problems—the situation in Central America, Afghanistan and the Middle East—were discussed. The agenda of the negotiations included also transnational problems, such as ecology, economy, anti-terrorist actions and cooperation in preventing drugs trafficking.

The second meeting took place in Moscow from May 10 to 11, 1989.

The ministers discussed the state of Soviet-American relations and fundamental approaches to their further development. They focused on regional problems, primarily the situation around Afghanistan, the situation in Central America and in the Middle East, including in Lebanon. Humanitarian cooperation and human rights were discussed constructively. They concentrated on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons. An agreement was reached during the meeting to resume the work of delegations at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space armaments, to hold a regular round of bilateral consultations on banning chemical weapons and to resume full-scale negotiations on the limitation and banning of nuclear tests. The sides adopted a joint statement on Lebanon and signed an "agreement on cooperation in combatting the pollution of the Bering and Chukotka Seas in emergency situations".

The third meeting was held in Paris on July 30, 1989.

Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker met during the international conference on Cambodia, which was attended by representatives of 19 states, including permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. In their statements the ministers stressed the need for a ceasefire in Cambodia and a quick settlement of the problem by peaceful means.

The fourth meeting was held in Wyoming, USA, from September 22 to 23, 1989.

The ministers discussed bilateral relations, human rights, regional conflicts, control over armaments and transnational problems. They released a joint statement and adopted a Soviet-American statement on Lebanon. Agreements on temporary trips among local residents in the area of the Bering Strait and on a regional Bering Strait commission were signed. Describing this meeting, Baker noted that the sides had broken a 15-year deadlock in talks on nuclear tests and made fundamental progress in the domain of strategic offensive weapons.

The fifth meeting was on Malta from December 2 to 3, 1989.

The talk between Shevardnadze and Baker took place during an unofficial summit meeting between President Mikhail Gorbachev and President George Bush. It reflected the topics and constructive atmosphere of the summit dialogue. The sides stressed the tremendous importance of the summit meeting for Soviet-American relations and for world politics in general.

The fifth meeting was held in Moscow from February 7-10, 1990.

The Moscow meeting was an important step in laying the groundwork for the forthcoming summit. The sides made substantial progress in the reduction of strategic offensive armaments. They discussed regional and transnational problems and human rights. It was noted that relations between the USSR and the United States were marked by mutual understanding, cooperation and a desire to find mutually acceptable decisions.

The seventh [as received] meeting took place in Ottawa from February 1990.

The talks of Shevarnadze and Baker during the first lap of the international Open-Skies conference, with the participation of foreign ministers from 23 Warsaw Treaty and NATO states, yielded tangible practical results. Agreement was reached, specifically, on the levels of American and Soviet Armed Forces in Europe, which eliminated one of the most serious obstacles to the treaty to reduce conventional armed forces in Europe. The sides also agreed to hold a meeting of foreign ministers of West Germany and the German Democratic Republic with foreign ministers of France, Great Britain, the USSR and the United States to discuss external aspects of German unity, including the security of neighbouring nations.

The eighth meeting was held in Windhoek on March 20, 1990.

In the course of a tete-a-tete talk, the sides discussed a wide range of international issues and problems of Soviet-American relations. Regional problems were reviewed from the point of view of implementing the peace-making potential of the Soviet-American dialogue. The sides discussed the situation in South Africa, including Angola, Mozambique, and also in Afghanistan and in the Middle East. They made several new suggestions intended to create an atmosphere that would help reach a fair political settlement and national reconciliation.

The ninth meeting took place in Washington from April 4-6, 1990.

The sides reviewed the entire range of Soviet-American relations at the final stage of preparations for the summit. They had a fruitful talk on transnational problems, regional issues, the situation in Europe and several other problems. The ministers believe their talks were constructive and useful.

The tenth meeting was held in Bonn on May 5, 1990.

Shevardnadze and Baker had talks within the "Two Plus Four" framework in Bonn. The Soviet and American ministers discussed preparations for the forthcoming Soviet-American summit meeting. They reaffirmed their intention to achieve tangible results in the reduction of strategic weapons and the elimination of chemical armaments.

Bush's 12 May Commencement Address Evaluated

PM1405083390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 May 90 Second Edition p 7

[TASS report: "Can Democracy Be Exported?"]

[Text] Washington, 13 May—Speaking at Columbia College in Columbia, South Carolina, on Saturday [12 May], U.S. President George Bush delivered a speech in which he announced the administration's new initiatives aimed at expanding support for East European governments in the implementation of democratic and economic reforms.

Having emphasized that the United States is already actively working along this avenue via numerous exchange programs with East Europe and the USSR, within the framework of which jurists, legislators, and politicians are visiting the United States to meet their colleagues, Bush announced the setting up of a "Civic Democracy Corps." "Its first task is to provide a center and a channel for assistance from the U.S. private sector and the performance of voluntary work in East Europe," the U.S. President declared.

This initiative envisages that Americans privately provide technical assistance to East European countries in spheres like constituional law, parliamentary activity, health care, education, environmental protection, the drafting of new laws on business enterprise, financial and publishing activity, and study of the English language. "We must export our experience," the U.S. President said. "Americans can offer a lot and do a lot to help these countries advance along the path of democracy."

Senate's 'Double Standards' on Lithuania Criticized

LD1305165290 Moscow World Service in English 2300 GMT 12 May 90

[Commentary by Valentin Zorin—read by announcer]

[Text] The American Senate has passed a resolution calling on the Washington administration not to conclude a trade agreement with the Soviet Union so far as Lithuania's economic blockade continues. Valentin Zorin of our staff has contributed this commentary.

I would like to voice some considerations concerning the American Senate's unfriendly gesture towards the Soviet Union. First of all, it is not for the first time that many Senators display double standards in their understanding of political ethics. For them the invasion of sovereign Panama is an act worthy of approval. At the same time, they call for denouncing the actions of Moscow recognizing the right of the Lithuanians to self-determination but insisting that Lithuania should exercise this right in accordance with the secession procedure approved by the Soviet parliament.

The double standard approach to norms of international law alone makes the position of American senators immoral. To suppose that Moscow's policy can be outlined in Washington or the other way around is a dangerous delusion. I am afraid the normalization of relations between the two countries will be running into quite a few obstacles unless Washington decides to give up its desire to dictate its will to the Soviet Union. And it is not only the Soviet Union who is interested in normalizing these relations.

Here we come to one more thing that I'd like to draw your attention to: Sanctions in relations to the Soviet Union are certain to boomerang. President Carter once saw that for himself. His attempts to introduce sanctions cost the American farmers, among others, dearly. So those who hurry to take up the sanctions weapon should first cool their heads and estimate realistically all the possible losses that the American side may sustain as a result of such a policy.

I have no intention to underestimate the importance of the problem connected with the decision of the Lithuanian parliament to withdraw from the Soviet Union. I am sure the less pressure is applied the quicker the problem will be solved. But serious politicians have to make it clear for themselves if the artificial heightening of tension is justified now that real opportunities are opening for the solution of the crucial problems of the present-day world. I do not urge them to assume a cynical attitude, but I think that every politician must develop a knack for determining political priorities.

We in Moscow couldn't help but notice the moment that the senators have chosen for their unfriendly act. Preparations for the Soviet-American summit in Washington later this month are drawing to a close. The two leaders are going to review the issues of global importance. It is no secret that there are some who don't want this meeting to be a success. There are some who are dangerously deluded, some who place their selfish interests above the interests of the nation and the state. What is required under current circumstances is a cool head and self-restraint. Some American legislators have failed to demonstrate these qualities. They have succumbed to emotions and put their signatures under the resolution.

I would like to state, however, that the top leaders, both in Moscow and in Washington, have managed to preserve self-control and common sense, which gives us a lot of hope.

Chernobyl Relief Campaign Active in U.S.

LD1405082890 Moscow TASS in English 0818 GMT 14 May 90

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Sidorin]

[Text] San Francisco May 14 TASS—Hundreds of letters with checks for sums ranging from five to hundreds of dollars stream to the new public organisation "Chernobyl Union, USA" in Anchorage, Alaska.

Americans enthusiastically responded when the organisation's leaders televised their appeal for help to Soviet people who suffered from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster, Board of Directors Chairman Dick Traney said.

People ready to render practical help were phoning in and mailing letters and sending medical equipment and drugs, he told TASS.

Donations to the Chernobyl fund, set up in the United States to provide medical and humanitarian aid to the Soviet Union, is a priority for Americans, who regard it as their human duty, he said.

"We've realised that the Soviet people will need this support for an extended period of time, since the real scope of the disaster is becoming clear only now. We have established close links with our sister organisation in the Soviet Union, which we consult about the types of aid and priority needs," Traney said. "I am certain that the support of many U.S. volunteers and financial donors will help prolong the life and ease the suffering of radiation victims," he said.

The Chernobyl Union, USA also enlists the help of U.S. and Canadian businessmen and firms.

"In order to boost public control and vigilance towards nuclear objects, we are also educating our compatriots about the danger and aftereffects of Chernobyl-like disasters," he said.

"What happened there could have happened in the United States. We were all very lucky that the nuclear reactor accident at the Pennsylvania plant was not more serious. No one is protected against such incidents in the nuclear age," he said.

U.S.-USSR Trade, Business Problems Viewed

PM1105123190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Special correspondent M. Berger dispatch under the "World and We" rubric: "You Scratch My Back And I'll Scratch Yours. Why Does This Internationally Recognized Commercial Principle Not Operate in Our Country"]

[Text] New York—The volume of our trade with the United States has risen by more than 50 percent in the last year. This would seem to be an inspiring fact, but only until this relatively rapid rise is translated into figures. In monetary terms, Soviet-U.S. commodity turnover has risen from 2.1 billion rubles [R] to R3.4 billion. But it is not even the humbleness of the figures for absolute commodity turnover between the powers that is the issue. Imports represent more than 80 percent of this total—R2.9 billion. So it looks as though "we scratch their back" far less than "they scratch ours." We do not, of course, obtain goods for free from them, but for money that we have mainly earned by selling raw materials to third countries. Our annual exports to the United States, barely in excess of R0.5 billion, cannot be considered successful or normal.

While recognizing the abnormality of this situation, many people both in our country and in the United States see the political restrictions and, of course, the nonconvertibility of the ruble as two of the main reasons for it. However, will the situation change radically after the (quite likely) lifting of the Jackson-Vanik amendment which deprives the USSR of most favored nation status, and the Stevenson, Church, and Bird amendments—and others—which limit financing for U.S. exports to the USSR? Will there be a surge of goods in both directions after the ruble joins the ranks of convertible currencies—let us imagine this for a minute? It is, admittedly, much harder to imagine ruble convertibility than the abolition of the notorious amendments, at least in the foreseeable future. All the same, we can but wait and see; after all, the Yugoslav dinar became convertible quite recently—something that no one probably expected in the quite recent past. Why not "convert" the ruble, too, at an opportune moment in the not too distant future? What then?

Despite the fact that it is important for these conditions to be fulfilled, they will not resolve the whole problem. There are reasons to fear that the likely abolition of the amendments and the even less likely, but theoretically possible, convertibility of the ruble will not necessarily bring about a drastic increase in economic cooperation. Why?

V. Malkevich, chairman of the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry, believes that there will still be a whole range of objective obstacles which it will take time to overcome. Above all our countries have gotten accustomed over the long years of "frozen" interstate relations to managing without one another. Our businessmen's unpreparedness for trading on the world market is another similar obstacle. This is not their fault but their misfortune, and they have to be helped to deal with it—this is, incidentally, what the Chamber of Commerce and Industry is doing among other things.

Even a reader without special training would probably add the poor quality and uncompetitiveness of most of our commodities to the aforementioned obstacles. What will we offer the Americans when they open the doors of their market to us?

However complex and difficult this problem might be to resolve, however, it is beginning to appear secondary given certain general principles governing our "business behavior" both on the foreign market and at home, and given the ingrained (or is it organically inherent in our economic system?) philosophy—which seems extremely strange to the rest of the world—of business decision-making at various levels.

You do not have to go abroad to be conscious of, see, and appreciate this. But when you are "there" in the world market, when you meet and talk to Western businessmen directly on their own territory, you are very acutely conscious of the total "incoherency" of our foreign economic behavior.

The Soviet Union is the last unexplored [neosvoyennyy] major market in the world, with a tremendous potential. However, it is not that simple to open up this "entrepreneurial Klondike"; the specific results (or lack of them) indicate that we are not in any great hurry to part with our reputation as the country with the greatest untapped potential.

When we found ourselves at a U.S.-Soviet symposium in a "remote province" of America—the state of Utah—with W. Forrester, president of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council [ASTEC], and its First Vice President V. Cheklin [name as transliterated], local entrepreneurs showed literally miraculous interest, meticulously explaining how best to do business with us and what business will catch on best and more rapidly in the USSR. Some people expressed a readiness to fly to Moscow or any other city in our country almost immediately to study the situation and conduct talks—just tell us whom we should talk to and what questions have to be resolved.

However, here is a curious detail. The questions asked indicate that people who have never had any dealings with us in the past and are thus not versed in our bureaucracy and have no experience of combating our realities were the most active. There is thus no guarantee that this initial interest will take any specific form. Moreover, the advantages of any proposal generally are of no importance for its advancement. This is the hardest thing for our potential—and even our existing—partners to understand.

The most experienced and patient of people treat the irrationality of many of our actions and decisions as inevitable and try to adjust to them with varying degrees of success. Others are puzzled as they wait for more favorable conditions, while yet others change their area of interest.

Some 60 American companies left ASTEC—the nonstate, noncommercial organization whose task is to promote the development of trade and economic cooperation between our countries, that is to help the patient, spur on the dalliers, and convert the nonbelievers. Of course, not all our partners are members of ASTEC, but those who left the council include people who are simply not satisfied with its work. It is an indisputable fact that many people are terminating their membership of ASTEC—the largest association of partners in bilateral business relations—primarily owing to the loss of interest in trade with the USSR and the uncertain prospects for the development of and the inconsistent nature of reform.

Last year a somewhat smaller number of companies—52—left the council, but the losses are still palpable. Although 68 companies also joined the council the same year, this does not remove the problem of disillusionment among those people who have tried to do business with us and have failed to achieve any tangible results.

While elucidating the reasons for companies' leaving the council, ASTEC personnel heard increasingly frequently that Soviet organizations showed no interest in Americans' proposals, or that counterproposals proved unacceptable owing to considerations of competitiveness. Firms often simply received no response to their proposals despite numerous appeals or trips to the USSR and ASTEC aid.

The headquarters of one of the world's largest shipping companies—Stolt Nelson—which specializes in shipments of chemicals, vegetable oils, and certain other special freight, is located in Connecticut, not far from New York. This company is a world leader in its field and has recently been looking for a firm to build it a new generation of ships. Its attention was drawn to Soviet shipbuilding which has been given special freedom in connection with the conversion of military production.

Stolt Nelson studied the question with help from ASTEC, which has actively set about enlisting our military-industrial complex's export potential. Its representatives visited some of our shipyards and concluded that at least two—in Kherson and Leningrad—could quite easily cope with a large complex order from the company.

"Why produce primitive stainless steel washing machines and other very basic goods that can be manufactured anyplace else at Leningrad's well-equipped Admiralteyskoye Association, when there is not the appropriate equipment to produce them here?" Samuel Cooperman, vice president of Stolt Nelson, marveled. "This yard could manufacture excellent export goods which you won't be able to build anywhere else—such as specialized chemical container tankers for our company."

Today the company is prepared to offer us an order worth $0.5 billion in total. Don't we build ships very quickly? They are asking for two tankers a year. It suits them that production at our military shipyards is, so to speak, by the piece and is in the hands of highly-skilled personnel, as they saw for themselves. Isn't there a shortage of stainless steel and special equipment? All this can be imported if you want, using some of the hard-currency proceeds.

In numerous letters to various bodies in our country, Stolt Nelson tried to convince us of the indisputable benefits of their proposal. The company increases its fleet every year by approximately three vessels, it could thus be a question of long-term joint production, which would in turn, and at the same time, raise our shipbuilding and related production units to a new level that meets the tough demands of the world market. The reputation of the customer, who is prepared to share technology and supply the requisite state-of-the-art equipment, guarantees that. From their viewpoint, it would be far more beneficial for us to order ordinary maritime vessels and freighters abroad and to produce high-class vessels for export with the equipment that is no longer needed for military orders. However, the company has been unable to obtain an answer to its proposals for a long time.

Tankers are also among the few commodities that we can sell for hard currency, along with energy sources and other raw materials. You can, of course, swap them for soda pop, which is also something in short supply on our empty consumer market. But would it not be better to exploit the interest in us and accept Stolt Nelson's proposal (or just consider it or anything similar) and jump on the bandwagon of scientific and technical progress?

When ASTEC Vice President V. Cheklin inquired about the attitude to the Stolt Nelson plan at the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, a senior ministry official said: We have all manner of people here with various proposals... But we are, after all, talking about a world leader in its field which has capital, a reputation, and guarantees, V. Cheklin tried to convince his interlocutor. Hitherto without success.

The craving for gain is, without doubt, an extremely depraved passion but does in principle—given the right circumstances, restrictions, and control—serve as a good incentive for creating socially useful benefits. The indifference on the part of many of our officials to anything that may result in profit or "gain" for an enterprise that has no formal owner, on the contrary, to a sector or to the country represents a peculiar kind of greed which is far more depraved and devastating since, whatever the circumstances, it creates nothing but obstacles for business.

Businessman Denis Sokol [name as transliterated], who is so energetic that you would think he could generate electricity, spoke keenly about his brainchild—the American Medical Consortium—whose plans include the creation of Soviet-U.S. enterprises producing baby food, diagnostic laboratories, medical preparations, medical equipment, hygiene products including soap and deodorants, the construction of medical institutions, and so on. It is planned to set up 20-25 joint enterprises within the framework of the American Medical Consortium which could radically change the quality and nature of medical services in the USSR.

With the help of ASTEC, which D. Sokol considered to be the American Medical Consortium's "second parent," he went right to the very top in our country. He is full of optimism and is highly aware of the noble nature of his mission. He says that three components have to be right for any business to succeed—the people, the product, and the profits. Of course U.S. companies are expecting not only to help us but also to obtain a certain revenue, with a great proportion of this revenue to be plowed back into production development. He spoke enthusiastically of how the first polyclinic will be opened this fall, while the "Kazanskiy Medikoinstrumentalnyy Zavod" Association will soon begin producing joint output.

But being a patient, purposeful, and certainly tactful man, D. Sokol has not begun to complain that our country has not created its own counterpart to the American Medical Consortium in the last two years. Things now seem to be moving toward the signing of a corresponding document which is planned to take place at ASTEC's annual meeting in May in Moscow, which will be attended by more than 500 U.S. businessmen. But how much time has been lost and how many plans have remained unrealized owing to this. One deputy minister from the USSR Ministry of Health answered V. Cheklin's question about the medical consortium as follows: "These Americans want to rip us off!"

Does this mean that we won't yield an inch? That we will defend every inch of our crumbling commodities and services market and will not allow the "commercial enemy" in? This is probably not so much a question of defending totally incomprehensible interests, as of total lack of interest since national property is managed by people with extremely theoretical connections with it. Hence the quality of the management and the standard of many of the decisions adopted.

We must learn to seek profits and master the principle of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" in its best commercial form and thus give "them" an opportunity to make money in order to ensure that we ourselves make money in the process.

U.S. Officials Received by Estonia's Ryuytel

LD1005203590 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Today Arnold Ryuytel, chairman of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, received a group of U.S. officials and journalists who are taking part in the preparations for the summit meeting between Soviet President Gorbachev and U.S. President Bush [words indistinct]. During the meeting Arnold Ryuytel opined that (?once again) the Baltic issue should definitely take an important place among the problems to be discussed at the meeting. The discussion must under no circumstances become a second Molotov-Ribbentrop pact with which the fate of Baltic states was decided for them in 1939.

The Americans assured him during the conversation that U.S. public [words indistinct] in favor of state independence.

China

Yang Shangkun Stops Over in Leningrad

LD1305174290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 13 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] [Presenter] Yang Shangkun, president of the PRC, made a stopover in Leningrad today, on his way from Beijing to Mexico City.

[Correspondent V. Batalov] The procession of cars went from the airport to Victory Square, where the monument to the heroic defenders of Leningrad is erected. [passage omitted] The town paid a heavy price for victory. PRC President Yang Shangkun laid flowers at the sculpture groups Victors and Blockade. He paid respects to the shining memory of the defenders of Leningrad, those who bore on their shoulders the inhuman weight of the cruelest war.

The distinguished guest looked at the monument on Victory Square. Yang Shangkun made an excursion round the town and visited the historical and architectural sights of Leningrad.

[Presenter] PRC President Yang Shangkun is being accompanied by Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. [video shows flower laying, official cars driving down street]

Rogachev Assesses Ties With PRC

Anniversary of Gorbachev Visit Noted

LD1205134890 Moscow World Service in English 0610 GMT 12 May 90

[Text] The first anniversary of the complete normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and China will be marked in the middle of May. (?The) USSR deputy foreign minister, Igor Rogachev, gave an exclusive interview to Radio Moscow's special correspondent (Konstantin Garibov). Here is a translation of the interview:

How would you characterize the development of Soviet-Chinese relations following President Gorbachev's visit to China and the meeting he had with the Chinese leaders?

[Begin Rogachev recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] As the saying goes, you've got to stand back to see things; and the more time passes from the moment of President Gorbachev's visit to China—from the time of the normalization of our bilateral relations—the more distinctly we are seeing the importance of this event for the Soviet, Chinese, and Asia people and even for the people of the world.

The passing year has brought a lot of new elements to Soviet-Chinese relations, although it has taken a lot of work. I'd like to remind the listener that the situation in our country and in China remains complicated, and there are a lot difficulties to be overcome. Of course this is reflected in the speed of the growth of our contacts and cooperation as a whole. All the same, great progress has been made in our relations.

A very important landmark in developing our bilateral relations was the recently concluded visit of the Chinese Premier Li Peng to the Soviet Union, continues Igor Rogachev, USSR deputy foreign minister in the exclusive interview with Radio Moscow. I'd like to draw attention to the significantly broadening legal base of Soviet-Chinese relations as a result of the agreements signed during Li Peng's visit. The six major agreements prepared during many years have brought our cooperation on firm tracks.

During the year, as was set out in the May 1989 Soviet-Chinese communique, we have made significant movement in the sphere of trade ties. It's very pleasing that part of our overall trade is made up of the growing ties between the border regions of our two countries. At the end of last year, regular contacts began between CPSU and the Chinese Communist Party. This is very important after decades of the absence of any sort of ties between our parties. We have set up these contacts, and there are now exchanges of delegations between the central committees of both parties. It also means a great deal that our military departments have also reached agreement on the exchange of experience and delegations. There was the recent visit to the Soviet Union of the head of the foreign relations department of the Chinese Ministry of Defense. A number of Soviet military chiefs have been invited to visit China.

Of special interest are the contacts between public organizations, continues Igor Rogachev in the Moscow Radio interview. For us who are engaged in working with the Soviet foreign policy in relation to China, we feel there is no need to explain to the Soviet people the meaning of the friendship with our neighbor, the Chinese people. We often visit the border regions, and I see how the Soviet people are drawn to the renewal of friendly contacts with the Chinese people and organizations. This is also happening on the other side of the border.

As I see it, this is a perfectly natural process. It is helping the aim of broadening and deepening the goodneighborly process and the friendship between the two countries and our peoples. [end recording]

'Disagreement on Some Points' Seen

LD1405141490 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 14 May 90

[Excerpts] Tuesday marks one year since the visit to China by the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. A full normalization of bilateral intergovernmental relations was announced during the visit. What has there been special in the past 12 months? Notes on this topic from our observer Oleg Shchedrov and this is what he writes:

Having opened a new page in the record of their relations, Moscow and Beijing seems to be trying to fill the page as soon as possible. Solution of many old issues, including military and political ones, have begun to move from the dead point. [passage omitted: noting demarcation of Sino-Soviet border; acceleration of bilateral trade; Li Peng's visit to Moscow as signing of documents which gave hope for advancement of Sino-Soviet relations in all spheres]

But as a matter of fact, the progress made far from indicates there are no negative aspects to the two-way ties. During the stay in Moscow by Premier Li Peng, a number of influential Soviet public organizations staged acts of protest at what they call suppression of the prodemocracy movement in China. They mean the events in Beijing's Tiananamen Square a year ago, when the Chinese authorities used the army to put down massive student unrest. That was also the meaning of a symbolic hunger strike of solidarity over the weekend in Moscow by college and university students. [passage omitted on solidarity hunger strikes held in other Soviet cities]

Against a background of an ardent public response to the events in Tiananmen Square, the Soviet leadership has taken a cautious stand of noninterference in the internal affairs of China. Has this approach justified itself? A question to Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev: [Begin Rogachev recording in Russian with superimposed English report] I have no doubt whatsoever, he said, that this is the only correct approach to matters of this kind. Of course, now amid the conditions of glasnost and pluralism of opinions, some individuals, groups and organizations may disagree with it, but I think this disagreement is based on the failure to understand the overall picture. We may disagree one with another, but an understanding was reached that this disagreement on some points should not affect our cooperation. We have gone over to more civilized relations with China. I sincerely hope that the history of the early '60's will never repeat itself. You remember that the ideological differences in the relations between the Soviet and Chinese communist parties covered the entire sphere of Soviet- Chinese intergovernment relations. I am convinced, concluded Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev, that neither the USSR nor the People's Republic of China will permit such a thing happening again. [end recording]

Well, a de-ideologization of Soviet-Chinese relations is forcing a division of emotions and state interests, concludes Radio Moscow's Oleg Shchedrov.

Students Stage Hunger Strike Over Beijing Events

PM1305141590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 90 p 2

[K. Belyaninov report under the general heading "From One Discovery to Another"]

[Text] To all appearances the time of paradoxes is already upon us and is now reaching its apogee. Having barely ended their war against their own military departments and the social sciences, Soviet students have now gotten involved in the development of international relations

...On 12 May 1989 Beijing saw the start of a hunger strike by students advancing modest and—in A.D. Sakharov's definition—by no means revolutionary demands: the implementation of democratic reforms in the country. The government's response was to move troops into the square and carry out mass arrests and executions. It would have been possible, of course, to pay no special attention to the Beijing events by adopting the usual stance of "noninterference in the affairs of a sovereign state." But a well-used but apparently half-forgotten phrase—"no man is an island"—has again become topical. And the experience of Tbilisi, Yerevan, and Baku has again confirmed this: After all, we will hardly learn how to avoid sufferings in our own land unless we attach significance to other people's.

"We will only be able to become free by joining in the worldwide process of the struggle for freedom," Moscow Students' Club member Igor Kan believes. "This is precisely why a symbolic solidarity hunger strike is being held on the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square events. It is being supported by students in the United States, Britain, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the GDR, Canada, and Australia. In the USSR students from 36 cities will be taking part in the hunger strike."

The action will begin at sunset today in the square in front of the main Moscow University building.

USSR-PRC Commission Discusses Border River

LD1205082890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1810 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Moscow, 11 May (TASS)—Past and future cooperation between the USSR and the PRC in utilizing the water resources of the Amur and Argun border rivers are being discussed at the fourth meeting of the Soviet-Chinese commission that began here today. The commission was formed in 1986 following an agreement between the two governments and is working on a plan for the comprehensive development of those rivers.

Opening the meeting, Polad Polad-Zade, the chairman of the Soviet side of the commission and first deputy minister of water construction of the USSR, noted that in 1989 Soviet and Chinese specialists had carried out a series of joint geological surveys and topographical-geodesic work in the area of the Amur and Argun Rivers. They had also conducted hydrological research and agreed on consumption of water from the two rivers to satisfy the needs of the adjacent areas of the USSR and the PRC.

The Soviet representative said that specialists from both countries are closely observing the quality of the water. They have conducted research during the high- and low-water seasons at six control section lines on the rivers. In addition, the flood zone of the Amazarskoye and Dzhalindinsoye reservoirs has been studied.

The commission has also concerned itself with problems such as flood prevention, exploitation of the rivers' fish stocks, and organizing river transport, continued Polad-Zade.

He stressed that all the research was, of course, connected with the construction of a cascade of hydroelectric power systems on the Amur and Argun. The commission has been presented with options for developing the upper and middle reaches of the rivers to which neither side ojects. No agreement has been reached, however, over the extent of compensation for electricity to be given by the PRC to the Soviet Union in connection with the flooding of the Shilka River.

Northeast Asia

Reportage on Visit by Mongolian Delegation

Greeted by Shevardnadze on Arrival

LD1305102590 Moscow TASS in English 1005 GMT 13 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 13 TASS—Chairman of the Mongolian Great People's Hural Presidium Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat and chairman of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee Gombojabyn Ochirbat arrived in Moscow on a working visit today.

They were invited by the Soviet president.

At Sheremetyevo Airport, where the state flags of Mongolia and the Soviet Union were hoisted, the guests were met by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and other officials.

Meets With Gorbachev

LD1405085190 Moscow TASS in English 0825 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 14 TASS—The renewal of the content and refinement of the forms of Soviet-Mongolian cooperation are the main subject of discussion at a current meeting in the Kremlin between President Mikhail Gorbachev and Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat, chairman of the presidium of the people's great hural, and Gombojabyn ochirbat, chairman of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.

They arrived in the Soviet capital on Sunday for a working visit which will end on Tuesday.

Apart from matters aimed at further strengthening the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries, they will also discuss topical international problems, primarily those connected with the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, within the context of democratic transformations in the Soviet Union and Mongolia.

'Restructuring' Ties 'Essential'

LD1405100590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0920 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Moscow 14 May (TASS)—A TASS diplomatic correspondent reports: Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat, chairman of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural of the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR], and Gombojabyn Ochirbat, chairman of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP], have begun the second day of their stay on Soviet soil. They arrived here yesterday on a working visit at the invitation of USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Mikhail Gorbachev received the Mongolian leaders in the Kremlin in the early part of the day. During the talks there was an exchange of opinions on the radical revolutionary transformations taking place in both countries and in the CPSU and MPRP within the framework of the perestroyka processes. Much attention was devoted to issues relating to the state of and prospects for the development of traditional friendly bilateral relations, above all in the sphere of trade and economic cooperation. The two sides came to the conclusion that a restructuring of these relations in line with the demands of the time and the spirit of renewal is essential. In addition, topical problems regarding the international situation, not least the atmosphere in the Asia—Pacific region, came in for analysis.

After the meeting a luncheon will be given in the Catherine hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace on behalf of the USSR president in honor of the distinguisted visitors.

The schedule for the second half of the day includes a meeting between Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR foreign minister, and Tserenpiliin Gombosuren, MPR foreign minister. Aleksandr Yakovlev, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, is to have a conversation with Gombojabyn Ochirbat, chairman of the MPRP Central Committee, in the CPSU Central Committee offices.

At the end of the day the leaders of the MPR and the MPRP will have a meeting at the USSR Foreign Ministry's Moscow State Foreign Relations Institute with Mongolian students studying in the Soviet Union.

G. Ochirbat Interviewed Prior to USSR Trip

PRAVDA Interview

PM1205141690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 90 Second Edition p 7

[Interview with Gombojabyn Ochirbat, chairman of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, by PRAVDA correspondent V. Sapov in Ulaanbaatar in May; date not further specified: "'We Have Chosen a Difficult Path'"]

[Excerpt] Ulaanbaatar, May—[passage omitted] [Sapov] You were elected chairman of the MPRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] Central Committee at an extraordinary party congress. Prior to that, a plenum had accepted the resignation of all of the former Politburo and secretaries of the MPRP Central Committee. What was the reason for this decision and for the convening of the extraordinary congress? Does this indicate a crisis in the party and in society as a whole?

[Ochirbat] It may be said that the decisions of the Eighth MPRP Central Committee Plenum were prompted primarily by the requirements of strict implementation of perestroyka in Mongolian society.

Despite the fact that representatives of various strata of the population and party members submitted proposals and made demands for a fundamental transformation of society and a renewal of political relations, the top party and state leadership disregarded this and was holding back the processes of transformation. It was this that caused dissatisfaction and irritation among the people and the party masses. It was necessary to convene an extraordinary party congress in order, in accordance with present-day requirements, to formulate a policy and an outline of future work, to renew the Central Committee, and to reinforce it with cadres who have taken on board the ideas of perestroyka.

About the crisis situation in the country: First of all, I should mention the grave situation in the economy. A part is also played by the existence of a bureaucratic administrative mechanism at all levels of leadership, shortcomings in the structure of the political system, and dogmatic thinking. The extraordinary MPRP congress defined the main avenues for leading the country out of the crisis situation.

[Sapov] A multiparty system is now being established in Mongolia. A coalition of political forces exists. Will your party be able to hold on to the leading role? What is being done in this direction?

[Ochirbat] As a result of the development of democracy and pluralism in our society, real conditions have been created today for the establishment and functioning of other social movements. Many of them, having formed themselves into parties, set themselves the goal of building a humane democratic society in Mongolia and are generally moving in the same direction as we are. However, sometimes their methods of action, which are far from civilized, jeopardize the processes of transformations in the country.

The MPRP, learning from past mistakes, is striving by means of a radical renewal of the concept behind its activity to become a political force capable of determining the fate of its motherland. We have chosen a difficult path, but the party believes that only by means of real activity can it ensure its prestige.

[Sapov] There is a long-standing tradition of interparty ties between the CPSU and the MPRP. Of course, by no means everything in the past experience of collaboration between the fraternal parties is acceptable now. But you will agree that "autonomy" in this matter is fraught with the risk of sectarianism and other unforeseen consequences. How do you see CPSU-MPRP relations in the long term?

[Ochirbat] I think it is worth emphasizing the historic significance of realtions between our parties. A special place here belongs to the meeting between D. Suhbaatar, founder of the MPRP, and V.I. Lenin. The MPRP advocates the development and strengthening of cooeperation and international links on the basis of equality with the CPSU.

Our parties' relations cannot be said to have developed without problems. Certain questions of history must be reviewed in the light of the new thinking. This will give a new impetus to the renewal of our relations. I think the exchange of opinions and experience on contemproary problems, especially on questions of perestroyka, between the MPRP and the CPSU, which have common views of the building of a humane, democratic socialism, will be of great significance. This is fully in accordance with the interests of our two countries and peoples.

[Sapov] How does the Mongolian leadership, and you personally as Central Committee chairman, assess our countries' present economic relations? Have all the reserves for cooperation been exhausted?

[Ochirbat] I assess Mongolian-Soviet economic collaboration positively. But it is necessary to increase the effectiveness of these economic ties, which are beneficial to both sides. In the sphere of Mongolian-Soviet economic partnership new efforts must be made jointly to resolve questions. I have no doubt that there are great reserves for widening and deepening our countries' all-around economic ties and increasing their effectiveness.

We should also utilize the USSR's credit resources primarily to fully exploit the capacities of enterprises created with the Soviet Union's technical and economic aid and to modernize them and equip them with advanced machinery and technology, so as to ensure a good return on capital investments.

We must seek a balance in Mongolian-Soviet cooperation and in the country's economy in general, which will reflect a real prospect of resolving acute social problems. The MPRP fully supports effective forms of cooperation which have proved themselves, such as the creation of joint enterprises and the widening of direct contacts between the two countries' economic organs. Here it is necessary to seek new forms of cooperation in the sphere of production sharing and specialization.

The recent extraordinary MPRP congress defined the main direction of the acceleration of economic renewal and formulated a concept for providing the conditions for its implementation by political methods.

We believe that Mongolian-Soviet economic cooperation is of great significance for successfully overcoming our country's economic crisis. The MPRP's influence in the implementation of this fundamental position of ours will remain strong.

[Sapov] Personally, I am concerned about the recent increase in attacks by leaders of certain informal organizations on the Mongolian leadership and on the Soviet Union. The sincerity of the USSR's aid and the traditional Mongolian-Soviet friendship is called into question. Of course, it was not always crystal pure; we Soviet people ourselves acknowledge this. But to disregard its fruit is to disregard all the good that was done by the MPRP and by your country with the moral and material support of the Soviet state. What would you say about that?

[Ochirbat] I can say with confidence that the Mongolian people wholeheartedly sense and perceive the fruit of the historical, traditional friendship and cooperation between the Mongolian and Soviet peoples.

Broad strata of the Mongolian public are genuinely annoyed at the attempts to misrepresent in every way the traditional friendship of the Mongolian and Soviet peoples and express their determination to widen and deepen the two countries' cooperation. Evidence of this is provided by numerous letters and documents sent to the MPRP Central Committee and to the extraordinary congress.

Our party's position on this question is clearly expressed in the documents of the extraordinary MPRP congress and the recent Central Committee plenum.

I share your view that Mongolian-Soviet collaboration, as a living organism, has not been free of problems. Here, as well as achievements, there were also, unfortunately, errors and formalism. We are trying to understand every aspect so as to endow the two countries' cooperation with new content and increase its effectiveness. This would accord with the aims of perestroyka and the vital interests of our peoples.

[Sapov] Can you outline the aims of your visit to the USSR? Especially since you will be accompanied on your visit to our country by Punsalmagiyn Ochirbat, chariman of the Presidium of the Mongolian People's Great Hural.

[Ochirbat] It will be the first time that I will meet with M.S. Gorbachev and the other CPSU Central Committee leaders in my capacity as chairman of the MPRP Central Committee.

I expect that the chairman of the Mongolian People's Great Hural Presidium and I will have an exchange of opinions and information with the Soviet leaders on the processes of perestroyka and renewal in our countries and on other problems of interest.

I think an important place in our discussions will be occupied by key questions of MPRP-CPSU ties and Mongolian-Soviet economic, scientific, and technical cooperation.

I am profoundly confident that the discussions and talks with the Soviet party and state leadership will give new impetus to Mongolian-Soviet relations and serve the cause of perestroyka in Mongolia.

Moscow Radio Interview

LD1205204690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1645 GMT 12 May 90

[Interview with Gombojabyn Ochirbat, chairman of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee, by correspondent Vladimir Korolev in Ulaanbaatar; date not given—recorded questions and answers are read by unidentified announcer]

[Text] [Announcer] Gombojabyn Ochirbat, chairman of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP], is arriving in our country on a visit at the invitation of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, president of the USSR and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. On the eve of the visit he gave an interview specially for Soviet radio to Vladimir Korolev, our correspondent in Ulaanbaatar.

[Korolev] Your meeting with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is to take place on 14 May. In this connection, what can you say about the present state of Soviet-Mongolian relations, and what, in your opinion, are the prospects for their development?

[Ochirbat heard speaking in Mongolian with superimposed Russian report] The feeling of respect for Mongolian-Soviet friendship lives in the soul of many generations of our people, Gombojabyn Ochirbat, chairman of the MPRP Central Committee, stressed. Our country's multilateral cooperation and broad ties with the Soviet Union are founded on a real historial basis. That is why the winds of the times cannot shake the friendly relations between our two peoples. We will, in the future as well, continue to make joint efforts to perfect the mechanism of bilateral cooperation and to enhance its efficiency in keeping with the new conditions and demands of perestroyka.

[Korolev] Great interest is shown in the Soviet Union in the changes taking place today in Mongolia. Judging from press reports, they were in the center of the attention of the recent extraordinary congress of the MPRP. Can you single out the main position of the party determined by the congress?

[Ochirbat] The extraordinary congress of the MPRP will go down in party history as a truly important event, Gombojabyn Ochirbat said. The main result of the congress was that the party disassociated itself resolutely from all the deviations and distortions that took shape in society, and in the party itself, as a consequence of the cult of personality. It has embarked upon the path of renewal and self-purification. The extraordinary congress drew the appropriate conclusions from the fact that although the MPRP itself came forward as the initiator of perestroyka, the supreme party and state leadership were unable to change their activity quickly under the conditions of the new situation. They adhered to old approaches and therefore lost time. Meanwhile, dissatisfaction grew among the people and the crisis came to a head in society. The extraordinary congress defined the possibilities for overcoming them. The main line which our party is adhering to, Gombojabyn Ochirbat stressed, is the construction of a democratic socialist society, by carrying out deep transformations in it; the affirmation of the principles of democracy and justice; the granting of and the defense of human rights and freedoms; and the provision of conditions for the people's prosperous and peaceful life.

[Korolev] What changed in the political situation in the country after the extraordinary congress?

[Ochirbat] The decisions of the emergency congress infused a fresh spirit into the life of Mongolian society, Gombojabyn Ochirbat noted. The changes in the party program and rules—all of that has created the legal basis for the renewal of its activities, its style, and its methods of work. That concerns the conception of the party, the democratization of internal party life, the development of glasnost, and pluralism of opinions. The MPRP elaborated directives [napravleniye] for solving the social problems of the population, and raising its standard of living and the people's spiritual enrichment. That party line was affirmed by its extraordinary congress. At the same time, the Government of the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic] acquainted the public with its program for carrying out social and economic transformatins in the next few years. All that is giving rise to the people's belief in the irreversibility of the process of perestroyka, and is inspiring it for creative labor. After the extraordinary congress of the party, Gombojabyn Ochirbat said, favorable conditions began to take shape for accelerating the processes of our country's renewal. However, these positive changes were not to the liking of some public groupings, who place their narrow mercenary interests above public ones. Because of that, attempts can be seen on the part of certain political forces to distort and hinder the policy for overcoming the crisis situation that is being carried out by the party and the government. However, the overwhelming majority of people, Gombojabyn Ochirbat stressed, do not approve of such actions nd express their support for the MPRP, the state, and the government.

[Korolev] The MPRP stated that it was prepared, under the conditions of a multiparty system, to cooperate with all forces in favor of perestroyka and the country's renewal. What shape might that take, in practice?

[Ochirbat] We regard the appearance in our country of numerous parties and alliances as the result of the restructuring and democratization of society begun by the MPRP, Gombojabyn Ochirbat said. All parties and alliances born now promise the people democracy and happiness and state their aims as the creation in Mongolia of a humane and democratic state. Our party also sets itself such aims. Therefore, I consider that there is no serious basic for confrontation between us and other political forces. Our party, founded upon common aims in its relations with the new parties and alliances, adheres to the principle of mutual respect and the joint solution of problems by political and democratic methods. The MPRP as the ruling party today, Gombojabyn Ochirbat stressed, bears particular responsibility to society. Therefore, its whole activity, including that with respect to the new formations and organizations, is determined not by somebody's will, but namely by such a responsibility. That does not always please certain political forces. However, such is the historical reality.

[Korolev] The new political formations that have appeared in Mongolia recently state that they are striving to correct the situation that has taken shape in the country. In this respect, their efforts seem to proceed in the same direction as the MPRP. Meanwhile, it has come to light that some of them have created a coalition in order to appear jointly at the forthcoming elections to the People's Great Hural. What is that? An opposition which has formed?

[Ochirbat] Although some political forces have stated that they will take part in the elections to the People's Great Hural as a united bloc, it would be hasty to regard them as an opposition to the MPRP, Gombojabyn Ochirbat stated. It is still difficult to say now that a formed coalition really exists between the political forces. It seems to us that these forces differ in many ways from each other, both in their social composition, in their views, and in the choice of forms and methods of activity. Their further steps will show if they do represent a real opposition.

[Announcer] In conclusion, Gombojabyn Ochirbat said that the MPRP has renounced its monopolistic right to the leading and guiding role in society, consolidated in the Constitution, but it has openly stated its resolution to struggle for the preservation of its right to be the ruling party,the political vanguard force—not in the legal sense, but to prove this by its activity for the good of the country and the people. For our party there are no other interests beyond the interests of the people, Gombojabyn Ochirbat stressed. The questions of is participation in the elections to the People's Great Hural at all levels were discussed at the plenum of the party Central Committee. The MPRP Central Committee addressed its progarm to the whole people, to the electorate, reflecting the party policy and platform that it is taking to the elections.

USSR-DPRK Relations Assessed

SK1405230090 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 7 May 90

[From the "Annals of Friendship" program]

[Excerpt] [First announcer] A Workers' Party of Korea [WPK] Central Committee group, led by Kwon Min-chun, deputy director of a department of the WPK Central Committee, has stayed in the Soviet Union from 25 April until 2 May. The Korean comrades met officials of the CPSU Central Committee and held talks with them. They also visited Ulyanovsk and saw relics related to the life and activities of Vladimir Ilich Lenin. The members of the delegation participated in May Day celebrations at Red Square in Moscow.

[Second announcer] May Day celebrations have also been held in Khabarovsk. For the first time, DPRK workers at Soviet-Korean enterprises in Khabarovsk, and representatives of a DPRK trade company participated in May Day celebrations.

[First announcer] [Title indistinct], a new artistic movie jointly produced by the Soviet Union and Korea, was shot in a Moscow studio named after Koritz [name as heard]. This history-adventure movie will be first shown in Moscow and Pyongyang in late May.

[Second announcer] Another Korean cultural center has opened in (?Minsky), the capital of (?Kabardino-Bakarskaya) Autonomous Republic. [passage omitted]

[First announcer] Korean artistic pieces were on display at the Moscow State Oriental People's Art Museum [words indistinct]. This museum is a big research institute for Korean art, and exhibitions that introduce the Korean people's art and culture are regularly held at this museum. Almost all the objects on display at the museum are artistic pieces of various sorts that the DPRK minister of culture donated to the Soviet people.

DPRK Envoy Holds News Conference in Moscow

SK1205052490 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] On 11 May a news conference was held at the DPRK Embassy in Moscow.

Speaking at the press conference, Son Song-pil, DPRK ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in the Soviet Union, read an appeal to all political parties and social organizations of the world adopted at a joint meeting of the DPRK political parties and social organizations.

The appeal harshly denounces infringement upon human rights and the suppression of democratic reporters in South Korea.

He also read a statement issued by the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with the Japanese authorities' provocations against Koreans in Japan and their arrest of three members of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan prior to South Korean President No Tae-u's visit to Japan.

Anniversary of Moscow Korean Broadcast Observed

SK1205070190 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 7 May 90

[Commentary by station commentator (Tatiana Shinvestova]

[Text] Today, 7 May, is Radio Day. Ninety-five years ago today, the great Russian physicist and electrician Popov started radio broadcasts for the first time in history.

At present, the Soviet Union has 119 television broadcasting stations, 176 radio broadcasting stations, and more than 5,000 local broadcasting stations. Television is broadcast in 48 languages, and radio broadcasts are transmitted in 72 national languages of the Soviet people. Meanwhile, the two broadcasting stations in Sakhalin and Alma-Ata are Korean-language stations.

The Soviet State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting cooperates with the broadcasting systems of 123 countries, including Democratic Korea. It has concluded a treaty with the DPRK Radio and Television Broadcasting Committee. In accordance with the treaty, delegations and trainees are exchanged.

This year marks the 45th anniversary of the beginning of the Moscow Korean-language service. The service began on 15 August 1945.

Today, our broadcast is listened to in North Korea, South Korea, China, and Japan. It also is listened to in other countries where Koreans are living. This fact is proved by letters sent by you, our listeners.

Depending on the international situation, sometimes we receive more letters and sometimes we receive less. At any rate, your letters always have encouraged us and offered new themes of broadcast to us. Your opinions on whether our broadcast is heard well or not is also very valuable to us. We greatly welcome your letters.

In the course of perestroyka, a great change has taken place at the Korean language service department of the Moscow broadcasting station. Truthfulness, high efficiency, and high (?skills) are not our only goals. In producing programs, we are trying to make you realize that our program writers love Korea, the Korean language, and the Korean culture and that they are experts on Korea and not disinterested in it.

We also have produced many new programs with themes that may attract your attention. The "Annals of Friendship" program, which is about cooperation in various sectors between the Soviet Union and Democratic Korea, and the program for the reunion of separated families are examples of this.

As for the program for the reunion of separated families, the first broadcast was aired on 1 April this year. Then, several days after this, we heard the news that relatives living in the Soviet Union and in the ROK had come to find each others' whereabouts, thanks to the program we broadcast. This success gave us a great sense of pride.

Meanwhile, among the new programs, there is the "Radio Magazine, Perestroyka" program. In this program, our station deals with the most noteworthy issues today in Soviet society. And, to the "Open Studio" program, anyone with any interesting idea is invited.

At our station, the themes on the life of Korean-Soviets, which were never dealt with as recently as three years ago, have now assumed a place of importance. In this program, we talk about great Koreans in the Korean community in the Soviet Union and about their history and their cultural organizations being established throughout the Soviet Union. On 18 and 19 May these cultural organizations will be integrated into a central society, and our Moscow radio will organize a special program on its inauguration.

Another recent development is the establishment of contact with the ROK. Reporters, businessmen, politicians, and religious activists of that country speak today through our studio. We are extremely happy about this. This is because we think that this fact shows interest in our broadcasting work as well as recognition of its significance.

Not a single week passes without us receiving reactions to our broadcast from news agencies and broadcasting stations from those countries in which the Moscow

Korean-language broadcast is heard. The relations between the races within the Soviet Union, economic restructuring, the establishment of a multiparty system, spiritual and moral re-evaluation, the history of the Soviet connection with foreign culture, and new aspects in Soviet history—these are only some of the matters our listeners are interested in. We have no definite answers on these issues.

The days when facts were distorted and truth was concealed according to formal ideas are now gone. Therefore, we often invite to our studio those who hold views diametrically different from ours. This is because truth is disclosed within the course of debate. So, we invite you to dialogue.

On 6 May the first program of the "International Club of Moscow Radio Friends" was aired. In this program, our leader (Aleksandr Primakov) invited you to the program.

We believe that you have come to realize during the course of our 45-year broadcasting service that we are genuine friends of yours. The sentiment of friendship can (?dispel the sentiment of confrontation).

Today, when the situation is rapidly changing, the "Moscow Radio Friends Club" may be established in Democratic Korea and the ROK as well. If you agree with this idea, please send your letters to the Korean language service department of the Moscow broadcasting station in the Soviet Union.

Correction to Soviet-DPRK Economic Meeting

SK1105042290

The following correction pertains to the item headlined "USSR, DPRK Sign Cooperation Agreement," published in the 10 May Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, p 12.

Column one, first paragraph, sentence four, make read: ...status of the utilization of production capacities... (clearing queried word)

Second paragraph, first sentence, make read: ...in principle on the problem of adopting the system of calculation by world prices and convertible notes in trade is... (supplying indistinct words)

Same paragraph, sentence two, make read: ...light-industrial goods according to the demands of the buyer, and the shipbuilding... (supplying indistinct words)

Paragraph four, first sentence, make read: ...on commodities and payment for 1990 was... (supplying indistinct word)

Same paragraph, sentence three, make read: ...metal-cutting machine tools, batteries, barite, zinc, magnesia clinker, and people's consumer... (supplying indistinct words)

Last paragraph on item, from first sentence to end of item, make read: ...contribute to solving social and economic problems. So said the leader of the Soviet delegation before returning to Moscow. The basic direction for reshaping the external economic relations between the Soviet Union and the DPRK is identical to that of relations with other socialist countries. (supplying indistinct passages)

Near East & South Asia

Reportage on Visit by Egyptian President Mubarak

Welcomed by Shevardnadze, Others

LD1405152290 Moscow TASS in English 1512 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 14 TASS—President Husni Mubarak of Egypt arrived on an official friendly visit to the Soviet Union today.

At Vnukovo-2 airport he was welcomed by Presidential Council members Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign minister, and Yevgeniy Primakov, as well as other officials.

The Soviet and Egyptian national flags were hoisted at the airport. Honour guards representing the three branches of the Soviet Armed Forces—the army, the navy and the air force—were lined up. The state anthems of the Soviet Union and Egypt were played.

From the airport, President Mubarak's cortege escorted by motorcyclists, went to his residence in the Kremlin, where he is due to meet Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in an official ceremony.

Vinogradov Welcomes Visit

LD1405102590 Moscow TASS in English 0958 GMT 14 May 90

[by TASS diplomat correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow May 14 TASS—Soviet people welcome the forthcoming arrival of President Husni Mubarak of the Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE) in the Soviet Union, Vladimir Vinogradov, the Russian Federation's foreign minister and chairman of the board of the USSR-ARE Friendship Society, told TASS.

He voiced confidence that the upcoming visit by the Egyptian president, the first one in 18 years, will be a landmark in the two countries' relations and will add qualitatively new elements to all fields of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation at international, national and regional levels.

The Egyptian president's arrival completes the normalization of bilateral relations and draws a line under the abnormal state of affairs that had existed for a certain period in relations between the two great states, Vinogradov said.

He believes that this is a corollary to changes that are now taking place in the international arena and to renewal and restructuring both in the Soviet Union and Egypt and in world relations.

Having pointed to the lack of any contentious problems as the characteristic feature of the two countries' relations, be it in politics, economics, culture and other fields, Vinogradov emphasised that the main task of the current period is to look for ways to further develop and refine bilateral relations.

In foreign policy our positions are quite close and coincide in many respects, retaining, naturally, their peculiarities, Vinogradov said.

Throughout our cooperation (diplomtic relations beween the two countries were established in 1943) the Soviet Union has rendered invariable support to the Egyptian people's struggle for national independence, peace and freedom, against aggression, and to efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict.

There is no doubt, Vinogradov said, that the situation in the Middle East will be one of major subjects at Soviet-Egyptian top-level talks in Moscow.

Egypt's active role in the search for a settlement of this acutest problem and in promoting the elaboration of a unified Arab position has been taken note of in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet public has unambiguously supported making the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

A steady tendency toward developing active, truly equal and mutually beneficial contacts has been observed in the field of bilateral trade and economic relations, Vinogradov said.

He recalled the Soviet-Egyptian agreement, signed in 1988, on economic, trade, scientific and technical cooperation.

The Aswan hydropower complex, the Alexandria shipyards, the Helwan steel mill and the Nag Hammadi aluminium plant—industrial facilities built in Egypt with Soviet technical and economic assistance—are well known throughout the world, Vinogradov added.

In short, I can say that Soviet-Egyptian friendship has a solid foundation, Vinogradov emphasised.

Visit 'Turns New Page' in Ties

LD1305112790 Moscow TASS in English 1101 GMT 13 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 13 TASS—"The forthcoming visit to Moscow by Egyptian President Husni Mubarak draws a line under the past and turns a new page in Soviet-Egyptian relations, which have cleansed themselves of political ambitions and ideological stereotypes in recent years," the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA newspaper writes today.

"Mutual injuries are a matter of the past. Sincere interest in cooperation between the two countries' peoples occupied their place," SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA writes. It views this as the pledge of success in future.

"The Soviet-Egyptian summit meeting is expected to consider a wide range of issues related to bilateral cooperation and various international and regional issues," the Army newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA writes.

"Mindful of the role our countries have to play in the Middle East, the international situation and the situation in the region, the Egyptian leader's visit is an event of great importance. It is meant to play a constructive role and open new vistas in Soviet-Egyptian comprehensive relations and in the Middle Eastern policy system," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA points out.

Reportage on Petrovskiy's Visit to Iran

Meets With Velayati

LD1105180990 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR Vladimir Petrovskiy has paid a visit to Tehran at Iran's invitation.

His discussions with Iran's foreign minister, 'Ali Akbar Velayati, focused on bilateral relations as well as on international and regional issues. Special attention was paid to ways of settling the conflict between Iran and Iraq.

On an Afghan settlement, both sides voiced the sincere desire to normalize the situation in Afghanistan. Iran reiterated its readiness to assist in bringing the Soviet servicemen captured in Afghanistan home.

Meets With Deputy Foreign Ministers

PM1405095190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 May 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Visit to Tehran"]

[Text] V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, has been in Tehran at the invitation of the Iranian side. He was received by Iranian Foreign Minister 'A.A. Velayati and had consultations with Iranian Deputy Foreign Ministers M. Mottaki and M. Va'ezi.

During the meetings and talks there was a thorough exchange of opinions on questions of bilateral relations and also on a broad range of international and regional problems of mutual interest.

Special attention was paid to a discussion of questions concerning a political settlement between Iran and Iraq. The Soviet side emphasized the importance of the talks process between Iran and Iraq under way under the auspices of the UN secretary general and of the fulfillment in its entirety of UN Security Council Resolution No. 596. The Iranian side assessed highly the Soviet Union's constructive position aimed at promoting the establishment of peace and quiet in the region.

During the discussion of the question of an Afghan settlement both sides expressed sincere interest in normalizing the situation in and around Afghanistan and in the speediest ending of the bloodshed in this long-suffering land. In response to a relevant question from the Soviet side the Iranians reaffirmed their readiness to render assistance in the return home of Soviet servicemen taken prisoner in Afghanistan.

Iran-USSR Commission Discusses Caspian Sea

LD1105174790 Tehran IRNA in English 1445 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Moscow, May 11, IRNA—An Iran-Soviet joint session started work today to discuss topics in relation with Caspian Sea water, fishing and fish culture at the Caspian Sea and utilization of border rivers during 1990-91.

The week long session held within the framework of the two countries' joint economic commission, is also to explore prospects for exchanging students and college professors and for cooperation in scientific and technological areas.

The Iranian delegation at the commission is headed by Deputy Minister of Energy Manuchehri Ardestani, and the Soviet delegation by Mikhail Gorgovich Gorilov.

Protocol Signed With Syria on Economic Ties

LD1105163890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1000 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Damascus, 11 May (TASS)—A meeting of the Soviet-Syrian standing commission on economic, scientific and technical cooperation took place 4-11 May in the Syrian capital. The Soviet delegation was led by Yu.K. Semenov, USSR minister of power and electrification, and the Syrian delegation was led by Sabah Baqjaji, the Syrian Arab Republic minister of state for planning affairs.

The sides agreed on the continuation and development of mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries in trade, power engineering, the oil industry, irrigation, transportation, and so on. Consideration was given to new effective forms of cooperation.

A protocol was signed on the results of the commission's work.

USSR, Jordan Discuss Mediterranean Issues

LD1405084790 Moscow TASS in English 0821 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Amman May 14 TASS—Two-day Soviet-Jordanian consultations on Mediterranean problems have ended here. Soviet roving Ambassador I. Andropov told Foreign Minister Marwan al-Qasim and other senior Jordanian officials about preparations for the forthcoming meeting on Mediterranean security, stability and cooperation, which will take place in the Spanish town of Palma de Mallorca in the second half of this year.

The Palma de Mallorca meeting will be attended by representatives of 35 states, signatories of the Helsinki Final Act, and also countries of the Mediterranean Basin. It is planned to hold a Mediterranean non-aligned foreign ministers' conference in Algeria on the eve of the meeting to elaborate a common stand.

The Soviet ambassador had consultations on these questions in Morocco. He left for Damascus on Sunday.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Soviet, Zambian Officials Sign Cultural Agreement

LD1105195190 Moscow in English to Africa 1700 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] At a ceremony in Lusaka on Thursday, representatives of Zambia and the Soviet Union signed a program of cultural and scientific cooperation for the years 1990 and 1991. Under the document Zambia will send its youths and girls to the Soviet Union to study and the Soviet Union will send its teachers to Zambia. The program also provides for the development of bilateral contacts in health services, medicine, and filmmaking.

'Major Success' Seen in RSA-ANC Talks

PM0605170390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 May 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Commentary by IZVESTIYA special correspondent B. Pilyatskin: "South Africa: Big Step Forward"]

[Text] Cape Town—The three rounds of meetings in Cape Town between delegations of the RSA [Republic of South Africa] Government and the ANC [African National Congress], which lasted more than 15 hours altogether, have brought a major success: The sides have expressed their common commitment to a peaceful solution of the country's problems and agreed on specific measures that should be taken.

As is clear from the final communique published Friday evening, a working group is being set up for this purpose. Its main task is to work out a general approach to defining what is considered to be a political offense. This opens the door to the release of political prisoners in the RSA itself and to the return home from emigration of those ANC members who fall afoul of current South African laws on terrorism and subversive activity. The group is to complete its work by 21 May.

It is the general opinion, however, that the most important thing achieved during the three days of unprecedented talks is the creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust. After so many years of confrontation and alienation, an important breakthrough has been made into the future, as President Frederick de Klerk put it. At a news conference attended by some 300 foreign and local journalists, he appraised highly the businesslike, constructive approach by the meeting's participants to the discussion of difficult issues. Speaking after him, Nelson Mandela said this: There were no winners or losers at the negotiating table—the whole of South Africa has benefited. Mandela expressed satisfaction with the sincere, even cordial, nature of the talks, stressing that the aims of the talks, for which the ANC has fought these last three years, have now found real embodiment in practice.

Numerous observers agree that the wording of the communique and the nature of the ANC leader's statements show that this organization has essentially dropped the slogan of armed struggle. For its part, the government has made it clear that the state-of-emergency laws, which have lost their point in the present situation, will be abrogated in the very near future. Journalists have also been informed that joint working commissions are being set up to consider the problem of ending school boycotts in African townships and improving medical services for the black population.

On Sunday Alfred Nzo, general secretary of the ANC, and Joe Slovo, member of the ANC Executive Committee and general secretary of the South African Communist Party, will address a rally in Johannesburg, while President De Klerk will leave at the beginning of next week for a major tour of West European countries. He will visit France, Britain, the FRG, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. The press points out that this is the first time since 1948 that the head of the South African state is getting such broad access to the international arena. One could add to this that it will also be the first time he is received as the leader of a country where real progress has begun in the direction of completely dismantling the apartheid system.

Ethiopian-ELF Talks in Sanaa Viewed

EA2604133990 Moscow International Service in Swahili 1730 GMT 24 Apr 90

[Text] Representatives of the Ethiopian Government and of the Eritrean Liberation Front, [ELF], one of the dissident groups in the country, have ended preliminary talks in Sanaa, the capital of North Yemen. Here is a commentary written by (Aleksandr Pralovskiy):

The Ethiopian national news agency was quoted as saying that the talks were a complete success. A joint statement issued by the two sides, and addressed to President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih of North Yemen, said that the talks had concluded that the conflict should be solved by peaceful means, through participation in negotiations. The two sides have also agreed to hold another session of talks within the next five months, and called on all antigovernment groups to join in the negotiations to end the conflict in northern Ethiopia by peaceful means.

It is obvious that such an outcome should be praised. However, it is still not certain how this outcome will be received in Ethiopia itself, because the ELF is one of many groups fighting against the Addis Ababa government. The Ethiopian leaders agreed to hold talks with the movement after their earlier talks with the larger opposition groups in the country, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front [EPLF] and the Tigray People's Liberation Front, TPLF, had failed. The decision to hold talks with the ELF led some Western observers to conclude that the Ethiopian Government was ready to continue negotiations with the rebels in the country, although talking to the ELF is not an important step to end the civil war. The conclusions reached in such negotiations could be used as a basis for talks with other groups.

Unfortunately, apart from encouraging statements and the hope for more meetings, the talks brought nothing new. The parties involved even failed to agree on working principles. They also failed to appoint a mediator for their future talks to solve the the problem. The Ethiopian Government does not want UN representatives to be invited to be mediators, while the ELF group insisted on that point.

This issue is not at all easy to solve, because the same difference in opinion made the talks between the Addis Ababa government and the EPLF, a larger rebel group, collapse. The main cause of disagreement between the two sides is the fact that in 1950 the United Nations passed a resolution to establish a federal system in Eritrea. The decision gave the people in Eritrea more rights to rule themselves. The Federation of Eritrea and the special rights of its people were abolished by the government of the Ethiopian emperor in 1962 which caused the current civil war in the country. Therefore, the participation of the United Nations in the talks between the government and the rebels in Eritrea would be taken as an indication of support for the decision of 1950, and that is what the Eritrean rebels are fighting for.

The Ethiopian Government is certainly opposed to the UN resolution. The position of Addis Ababa leaders is well understood, because their aim is to maintain the unity of the country. However, so far the unity is already in a shambles. The rebel forces control almost all areas in Tigray and Eritrea, as well as regions such as Gonder, Welo, and even in Shewa, where the country's capital is situated. So far, all efforts to defeat the rebels by military force have failed. Therefore, the question of maintaining national unity will only come about through a solution to the prevailing problem. If the parties to the conflict succeed in finding a solution, the question of national unity will be taken into consideration. Otherwise, the country will continue to face problems because of the civil war. I think this problem should be solved by the rebels as well as by the country's government.

East Europe

Eastern Europe's Future Examined

PM1105174890 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 18, 13-20 May 90 p 13

[Feature on views of CSFR's Petr Pithart, Bulgaria's Petur Dertliev, Hungary's Janos Kis prepared by Svyatoslav Bulakh, Andrey Ivanov, and Dmitriy Prasolov: "Eastern Europe: Forecasts of Change;" first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] The crumbling of the old political structures and the creation of new ones, the search for a way out of the economic crisis, the wide range of public moods and tendencies—these are today's realities in Eastern and Central Europe. What lies ahead?

MN's questions are answered by Chairman of the Government of the Czech Republic Petr Pithart who was until recently chief spokesperson of the Civil Forum, Petur Dertliev, Chairman of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, and Janos Kis, Chairman of the Alliance of Free Democrats in Hungary.

MN: What's your own forecast of the nature of the government to come?

Pithart: I'd like to first refer to what President Havel said: He described the coming parliamentary elections as a dress rehearsal for free elections. The President, as with so many other people, is not happy with the electoral system. Havel thinks that elections which are based solely on parties rather than individuals are bad elections.

I share the view that real elections will be held only two years from now, when really free parties have been formed. Czechoslovakia cannot invent a new electoral system without new parties. That new system has many drawbacks of course, but to date it offers the best opportunity to voice one's political preferences based on a choice of party platforms.

I believe that Czechoslovak innovations will tally with President Havel's concepts of ideology and morals. First and foremost, there should be greater freedom in the sphere of ethics in politics. A way should be found to ensure greater individual freedom as political parties fight it out between themselves.

But all that is in the future. The present is less spectacular. My country's politics are moving to the right, but I'm convinced this is transient and politics will start to move to the left again after some time. This will not mean a return to the 1989 situation. This will never happen. The greatest drawback of our present political system is the absence of an up-to-date strong left-wing party. Its absence means chaos in politics.

Dertliev: I think the opposition is going to win. But who is going to win the elections is only part of the problem. The questions remains: Who will take responsibility for the future? The situation is so serious that all Bulgaria's public fores would do well to take their share of responsibility.

Unlike those who ruled the country before us, we, the opposition and specifically our party, are going to come to power as part of the Democratic Froces Union. We are going to govern relying on the nation's creative potential.

MN: Does this potential include communists? Generally, what would be the role in your countries of communists or the parties that have succeeded them? Have they got any chance to be in the coalition government or to get back to power in the near future?

Pithart: I can't see so far any change in how the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia operates. On the one hand, that's natural, on the other it's a pity. The biggest trump card of the CPC is at the same time the biggest obstacle to turning it into a modern european-type left-wing party. This is the social demagogy. The CPC can build its electoral campaign on criticizing the unpopular decisions of present and future governments, while the truth is that these decisions result from the Communists' 40-year rule, that's, they reflect the real state of our economy. Acting this way, the CPC would be able to win over to its side a certain number of voters who don't know much about politics. The worrying fact is that at the moment, the CPC, especially in Slovakia, is fishing in the troubled waters of nationalism, trying to capitalize on the populist moods. These tendencies can hardly make for the creation of a modern-day European party of a left-wing type.

One can confidently expect that the communists are not going to gain enough votes in the June elections to take part in the new government.

Kis: I cannot tell now if a government with the Hungarian Socialist Party taking part is possible in the future. Today this is impossible. The Alliance of Free Democrats (this party came in second in the recent parliamentary elections but failed to make it into the coalition government) does not wish to rule the country together with it, or even to try to win over individual members of the Hungarian Socialist Party. We are convinced: The change of system can be complete and final only if all the successors to the former state party that ruled the land for 40 years are relegated to the opposition. Whether they will be able to play an important role in politics depends entirely on their efforts. The law provides for such an opportunity.

Dertliev: The role to be played by communists or their successors depends on their ability to change. It would be dishonest to claim they have not changed. For part of the members of the former Bulgarian Communist Party, and now members of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, this change is sincere. But for most of them the change is merely formal.

The role of the party in society will depend on these things. If the party remains based on the old Stalinist positions, it will disappear. If it changes it will gravitate to social democracy and will be able to again play an important part in politics. As an oppoosition or as a ruling party, I can't tell. It all depends on whether it can adapt to changed conditions.

MN: What is your vision of society's economic model? Is it sensible to use the terms "socialism" and "capitalism" discussing the future economies of Eastern and Central Europe?

Pithart: No one has of course forbidden the use of such terms as "socialism" and "capitalism", but today they mean nothing. They merely cause confusion and chaos.

I don't think Czechoslovakia is going to come up with an original economic concept. Our economy will be based on the market, but we'll proceed towards that slowly and cautiously. We will try to avoid the commercialization of culture and a sell-out of national wealth to foreign firms. Already now I can predict that there will necessarily be firm socialist guarantees and an effective anti-inflation budget.

To use some obvious examples, we would sooner pick something between the US and Swedish model. The Austrian model is the closest to our ideal. The Swedish model is also attractive enough, but to tell the truth, Sweden is much wealthier than we are.

Dertliev: Our economic model should be founded on a balanced relation between individual economic elements. That includes private initiative (free and dynamic) and public initiative, including cooperative property. Before the war, Bulgaria was among the leading countries as regards cooperatives. Its cooperative movement rated after that of Denmark in scope. An important part of the economy will be occupied by the state sector represented by all forms of property: joint-stock, municipal, etc. The fundamental principle, however, should be equality of all forms of property and equality of economic opportunities. Specifically, I think of something like the Austrian model, although we can't mechanically adopt it in Bulgarian conditions. All new political forces are generally agreed to this. It is encouraging to note that our opponents also have come up with the same or at least similar views.

Kis: I think Hungary will become a state of liberal democracy with a capitalist market economy controlled by a network of social support institutions.

MN: Do you see any chances of a rockback of the reforms, a sort of a counterrevolution?

Pithart: I don't rule out such a possibility. Such a counterrevolution can score some success but for that it must disguise itself. No one is going to be duped by "socialism" any longer. The mask can perhaps be nationalism or chauvinism. Without a sharp worsening of ethnic relations, the counterrevolution has no chances. It should be remembered that any fundamentalist movement (not necessarily a nationalist movement, but also an ecological movement) increases the chances of reaction, because such a movement is based on rejection of democracy for the rest of society. The possibility of going back cannot be ruled out absolutely. The leaders of this process would have totally different faces but they may be as dangerous to democracy as was the former totalitarian regime.

Kis: Time will tell. It is clear, for example, that Poland is implementing a very harsh programme of emergency measures but up to now society's attitude to them has been surprisingly positive. In Hungary chances of a similar attitude are less likely, but, on the other hand, there isn't the same need for a drastic surgery.

There is no threat of a restoration of the old system, but there is a danger that democracy and the market economy will not be able to gain a foothold (partly due to the looseness of political institutions, partly due to the serious economic crisis), and there might follow a period of unstable unpopular dictatorial regimes with weak parliaments and vice versa, as happened in Latin America in the 1950s-60s.

Commentary on Albanian Reforms

LD1105162690 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 11 May 90

[Announcer-read commentary by Stanislav Vasilyev]

[Text] A few days ago Albania volunteered to join in the process of building up security and cooperation in Europe. The parliament of that neutral Balkan country has taken a number of measures to expand the range of civic rights and freedoms—specifically, every Albanian will be allowed to have a foreign passport and travel abroad; the state will separate from the church; there will be freedom of religion and no punishment for the propagation of religious ideas. More in a commentary by Stanislav Vasilyev:

It is still unclear whether Albania, which until recently kept away from major change in Europe, is about to review its policy drastically. Anyway, one can only welcome the program of measures announced by the Albanian government and parliament. Self-isolation has naturally created considerable difficulties for the country itself.

Until recently Albania was the only European nation which would see no positive trends in promoting cooperation and building up security on the continent, and would deliberately stay away from that work. But now, Prime Minister Adil Carcani has said in parliament, the country is ready to get involved in talks within the framework of the international Conference on European Security and Cooperation.

Significantly, Albania expressed readiness to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. On Friday the United Nations secretary general, Perez de Cuellar, begins his visit to that country, obviously with a view to involve Albania in the work of that international organization.

Time has clearly come to take account of the new situation taking shape in Europe and worldwide. The newly passed laws allow the attraction of foreign investment, although parliament insists that Albania will not use foreign credits or conclude economic agreements which can endanger its national sovereignty. In opening the door to Europe and the world, Albania is advancing a number of self-imposed conditions that could help it get incorporated into the world system without excessive shocks.

GDR Ties With USSR Declining With Socialist Option

PM1105141590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview in Berlin with GDR historian Prof. Stefan Doernberg by own correspondent V. Lapskiy: "History Cannot Be Canceled Out;" date not given]

[Excerpt] Berlin—[passage omitted] [Lapskiy] Until recently friendship with the Soviet Union was akin to a state doctrine in the GDR, and the German-Soviet Friendship Society had millions of members. The situation has changed now, and the society's ranks have thinned appreciably. But the friendly relations that took shape in the postwar period between the Germans in the GDR and the Soviet people and between individual collectives and organizations continue to exist. How do you see these relations in the future, when the GDR unites with the FRG?

[Doernberg] Friendship with the Soviet Union will initially occupy by no means the chief place in the united Germany's scale of values. First, German unification has as its goal the GDR's full inclusion in the West's socioeconomic and political system, in the social market economy. In other words, a process of the restoration of capitalism will take place—true, in its modern aspect. The GDR will participate in the West's integration processes, and it follows from this that ties with Western countries—economic, political, and cultural—will predominate. Of course, this does not exclude normal good-neighborly relations with the Soviet Union. Second, in the general election in March the majority of the GDR population came out against the socialist option and for a market economy. This promises more social and other benefits, if you compare the levels reached in the two German states. But relations with the Soviet Union on the former scale would essentially signify support for the socialist option.

The public movement in our country last fall, which became known as the second November democratic revolution, at first proceeded under slogans of supporting perestroyka in the USSR, strengthening German-Soviet friendship, and struggling for the democratic renewal of socialism. However, those slogans quickly changed. As can be seen, there was a great temptation to take the time-tested road trodden by the West. There are many supporters of democratic socialism in the GDR, although they are in a clear minority. Moreover, they are disunited. Many local organizations of the German-Soviet Friendship Society, whose activity was hindered by formalism and bureaucratic administration, have broken up. But the number of sincere friends of the Soviet Union has not fallen so greatly—our friendship has deep historical roots, and it also has a future.

[Lapskiy] On GDR territory there are many historic locations and monuments associated with the liberation, Soviet military cemeteries, and other monuments and memorials. Recently some of them have been defiled—we know that this is the handiwork of neo-Nazis. We are, of course, not indifferent to such facts. What do you think about the future fate of the monuments and historic locations associated with the liberation?

[Doernberg] That is the most difficult question to answer. During the years of fascism I personally found political refuge in the USSR and volunteered for the Red Army. With it I reached Berlin in the spring of 1945 and greeted Victory Day and the liberation in my native, war-crippled city. Therefore these monuments and, above all, the places where comrades in arms are buried are sacred places. As far as I can judge, the majority of GDR citizens treat them with respect. They see these memorials as a reminder of the lessons of history, notably a reminder of the blame that Germans and their political forces and parties bear for the fact that fascism was able to triumph in Germany and then to unleash a world war. However, individual acts of vandalism can hardly be ruled out in the future. And I am afraid that certain official organs may connive at them. [passage omitted]

De Maiziere Receives Jewish Leaders

LD0805142290 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1017 GMT 8 May 90

[Excerpt] Berlin (ADN)—GDR Premier Lothar de Maiziere gave a reception in the Eastern part of the city today to mark the meeting of the World Jewish Congress in West Berlin. His invitation was taken up by, among others, Edgar Bronfman, president of the World Jewish Congress; Siegmund Rotstein, chairman of the Association of Jewish Communities in the GDR; and Dr Heinz Galinski, chairman of the Directorate of the Central Council of Jews in Germany.

Earlier, the GDR premier met Edgar Bronfman and Dr Heinz Galinski for a short exchange of views. [passage omitted]

Open Letter Criticizes Polish Nationalism

90UF0153A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 10 May 90 p 3

[TASS correspondent V. Volkov report: "When the Old Specters Are Revived"]

[Text] Warsaw, 9 May—Serious concern in connection with the increase in Poland of negative phenomena, intolerance and nationalism included, has been expressed in the document "Polish Social Life" by 44 authoritative political and public figures, among whom are Sejm and Senate deputies and representatives of the world of science and culture—persons closely connected with "Solidarity" and the Catholic clergy. They include A. Stelmachowski, marshal of the Senate, B. Geremek, chairman of the Citizens' Parliamentary Club, and film producer A. Wajda. They adopted the document at a meeting in Krakow. Their concern is caused by the increasingly frequent manifestations of hatred and chauvinism, and not only on the part of representatives of extreme-right groups, what is more, but of certain "Solidarity" figures also.

The document points out that the old specters of nationalism are being revived in the Central European countries, Poland included. Slogans of national hatred, anti-Semitism and chauvinism have appeared in the political campaigns of recent months. The advantage of this mood being taken by political groups (of the right particularly), a striking example of which were the incidents at the Palace of Culture and Science on May Day, when militants guarding a congress of Poland's forces of the right employed manifestly fascist symbols, or the anti-Semitic disturbances in Kielce and Lodz, is causing concern. The authors of the document declare that this is contrary to their ideals and is damaging Poland's reputation in the world. Tolerance and cooperation between peoples, religions, and cultures have been and should remain a Polish tradition.

Despite the fact that authoritarian power has been smashed in Poland, the authors of the document point out, there is a certain lack of confidence in democratic institutions and procedures. For this reason some people are being tempted into a repressive "firm hand" policy and a propensity for establishing the "Catholic Pole" or "Poland for the Poles" stereotype. However, Poland has no other way than a strengthening of democratic institutions, the document observes. While expressing confidence in the T. Mazowiecki government, the authors of the document advocate the term of the present Polish Sejm and Senate being halved in order that "Poland be managed by a parliament elected wholly on a democratic basis."

Romanian Election Struggle Viewed

PM0805130190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 May 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Dispatch by V. Volodin under the rubric "Disposition of Forces in Romania": "Who the Voters Are Following"]

[Text] Bucharest—Indeed, as it approaches the finish the election marathon, which started out very languidly, is acquiring an unprecedented tempo, with a striking volume of contradictions in the information filling the Romanian press.

Reports of the destruction of the posters of the "historical parties" in the provinces, the devastation of their offices in some places, and of the beating and even in two instances the murder of functionaries of the National Peasants Party are constantly appearing in the newspaper DREPTATEA and ROMANIA LIBERA. In turn newspapers like AZI and DIMINEATA deny this information.

While DREPTATEA, the organ of the National Peasants Party, and many other newspapers are "revealing" to the Romanian reader that Ion Iliescu, leader of the National Salvation Front, is a neocommunist who defends the interests of the former Romanian Communist Party nomenklatura, the "left-wing" press is publishing some biographical details of figures of the "historical parties." Thus, it was reported in one issue of DIMINEATA that Ion Puiu, a veteran of the National Peasants Party and deputy chairman of the "for Bessarabia and North Bukovina" society was once a legionnaire and active participant in the 1941 "green shirts" fascist rebellion in Bucharest.

The activist of civil battles merely emphasizes the pitch of the election struggle. [sentence as published] But if we are speaking of the disposition of political forces in the country, we should not that Romanian voters' sympathies are not on the side of the historical National Liberal, National Peasants, and Social Democratic Parties. The story of Ion Ratiu, the National Peasants Party candidate for the post of Romanian president, who complained at a press conference that during an election tour citizens in Buzau pelted his automobile with eggs reflects the general attitude toward these parties on the part of Romanians in some parts of the country. In Buzau the National Peasant Party candidate had to seek refuge from the large crowd in the police precinct.

Nonetheless, according to a recent public opinion poll carried out by the independent "Dacia" organization, eight percent of Romanian voters are prepared to vote for Ratiu. In the election marathon as it gathers momentum he has even succeeded in overtaking the National Liberals' candidate, Radu Campeanu, who after a successful start unexpectedly started to lose popularity and today enjoys the support of only six percent of citizens.

Of course, putting your hand on your heart you have to note that their popularity bears no comparison with voters' sympathies for I. Iliescu, leader of the National Salvation Front. Some 79 percent of those polled are prepared to vote for him. Incidentally, the National Salvation Front also enjoys the support of 68 percent of voters, while only 12.5 and 9.5 percent of Romanian citizens respectively expressed themselves in favor of the National peasants and National Liberal parties.

There is no doubt that in the two weeks remaining before the start of the elections the disposition of political forces could change somewhat. The two-week blockade of University Square in Bucharest continuing under the slogan "Down with Iliescu!" and "Down with the Neo-communists' Dictatorship!" is gradually bearing fruit. The "national alliance" formed in Timisoara as a powerful opposition to the National Salvation Front has succeeded in collecting 4 million signatures in favor of the Bucharest demonstrators. But here we must also consider that the demonstration, which for two weeks has paralyzed the center of the city of 2 million inhabitants, is beginning to anger some Romanians. Evidence of this was the protest conveyed on Romanian television from inhabitants of Prahova region against the actions of the demonstrators, who are destabilizing the situation in the Romanian capital.

Romania's Iliescu Ready for Talks With Opposition

LD1205203590 Moscow TASS in English 2000 GMT 12 May 90

[Text] Bucharest May 12 TASS—By TASS Correspondents Dmitriy Dyakov and Nikolay Morozov:

Romanian leader Ion Iliescu has described the activity of the provisional National Accord Council (PNAC), the last pre-election session of which was held on Friday, as a school of democracy and cooperation. The elections will be held on May 20. He was responding to TASS questions during a news conference here today.

Commenting on the disruption of dialogue between PNAC representatives and University Square protesters, Iliescu pointed to the differences between various protest groups which prevented them from forming an authoritative delegation to talks. "In spite of the fact that our opponents' position remains largely vague," he stressed, "we are ready to resume our dialogue".

Iliescu noted that the meeting in University Square is clearly pre-election in nature, so the protesters will have to leave the square because all propaganda will be banned on May 18 in accordance with the election law. "We are still hoping," he stressed." that they will be able to settle the dispute through negotiations."

Asked if he will be able to secure order in the country, if he is elected president in spite of considerable resistance to his election, Iliescu said that a variety of opinions existed in any democratic society. It is important to prevent the struggle of ideas from turning into attacks against persons.

Speaking about other candidates for the presidential post, who called to waive the appointed date for presidential elections—May 20, Iliescu said that he had no intention to heed their call. He reaffirmed his intention to run in the elections even if his opponents resign from participation. Iliescu said that no matter what the outcome of the elections was like, the National Salvation Front would propose to form a broad coalition government.

West Europe

Reportage on Lithuanian's Prunskiene FRG Visit

Holds Talks With Kohl, Genscher

LD1105214790 Moscow TASS in English 2127 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Bonn May 12 TASS—West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher met Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene here today.

Prunskiene is completing her tour of several American and West European countries.

West German Government spokesman Hans Klein described her one-hour talks with Helmut Kohl as constructive.

Kohl reiterated West German Government's interest in a peaceful and mutually acceptable solution to the Lithuanian question.

The solution could be based on a formula offered by him together with the French president, known as the "Mitterrand-Kohl formula".

Genscher also called for an early dialogue between Vilnius and Moscow.

Commenting on her Western tour, Prunskiene said it was very important politically.

The West is cautious in supporting Lithuania, although it fully shares the Lithuanian people's striving towards genuine independence, she told reporters.

The visit will help the Lithuanian leadership to seek new ways for a compromise and talks with Moscow, he [as received] said.

Lithuania is prepared to suspend some laws on independence, which infringe Moscow's interests, she said.

These include laws on the Armed Forces, militia, and party property, which prompted the economic blockade against Lithuania, she said.

The site of talks is unimportant. It could be Moscow, Paris or other city, she said.

Prunskiene admitted that she failed to win concrete economic help from the West.

She established several contacts which could help Lithuania develop cooperation with the United States and Western Europe in the long term.

The West failed to recognise Lithuanian independence, she said.

Prunskiene denounced Western statements that the Lithuanian leadership had no control over the situation in the republic and could not be considered independent.

Assesses Talks

LD1105233290 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 11 May 90

[Excerpts] The Lithuanian prime minister, Kazimiera Prunskiene, had a meeting with the West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in Bonn today. [passage omitted]

After the meeting a news conference was held during which the Lithuanian premier stated that if talks with Moscow were started, Lithuania was ready to suspend the implementation of some laws passed by the Lithuanian Supreme Council. She also noted that she would try to take personal direct contacts with Moscow so as to bring nearer the beginning of talks. As Kazimiera Prunskiene pointed out at the news conference in Bonn, the recognition of the republic of Lithuania by foreign states was very important. She said she understood the reluctance of Western states to take measures against the Soviet Union by way of retaliating to its economic blockade of Lithuania. Still, she added, the West was overestimating the danger that Mikhail Gorbachev might be removed from power over the problems in the Baltic states. Kazimiera Prunskiene said she could not agree with the opinion held by Western politicians that the Lithuanian government did not have control over the situation in the republic. We control all public life in the country, Kazimiera Prunskiene declared at a news conference in Bonn.

Interviewed in Bonn

AU1105205790 Vienna Television Service in German 2000 GMT 11 May 90

[Interview with Lithuanian Premier Kazimiera Prunskiene by Susanne Scholl in Bonn on 11 May—recorded]

[Text] [Scholl] Mrs. Premier, you have taken trips to America and Western Europe. Today you also met with Chancellor Kohl, who, together with Francois Mitterrand, presented a proposal for mediation between you and Moscow. Have you made any progress?

[Prunskiene] We openly discussed our situation. However, we did not discuss mediation. I hope and I think that the German Government understands that direct contacts between Lithuania and the Soviet Union might be more advantageous for both sides.

[Scholl] Lithuania's independence has not been really recognized by any Western country.

[Prunskiene] This is also an issue that we see in a different light than Western countries do. They do not hurry. They wonder how the independence of Lithuania and of other Baltic countries will affect the situation in the Soviet Union and the position of President Gorbachev. They overestimate the danger that might arise for the Soviet Union and President Gorbachev because of our independence.

[Scholl] How should the West, which fears that an end might be put to perestroyka by Gorbachev's overthrow, react?

[Prunskiene] I think that there is a completely different danger. If no positive solution to the present situation in Lithuania is achieved and we do not find any way for negotiations and understanding, a major danger for the continuation of perestroyka, the democratization of the Soviet Union, and the relations between East and West will be created. If all three sides—Lithuania, the Soviet Union, and Western countries—come to a joint opinion or position in order to positively solve this question and to stabilize the situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself, we all will certainly experience the beginning of a new era in Eastern Europe and Europe as a whole.

Meets With Envoy to FRG

LD1205225790 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 12 May 90

[Text] The Lithuanian prime minister, Kazimiera Prunskiene, met the Soviet ambassador to West Germany, Yuliy Kvitsinskiy, in Bonn yesterday. As reported by REUTER the meeting came at the request of the Lithuanian premier and lasted about an hour.

Kazimiera Prunskiene told the Soviet ambassador that the leaders of North American and West European states, which she had visited, expressed a stand similar to that of the Lithuanian Government.

In a phone interview to Radio Free Europe the Lithuanian premier pointed out that the Western leaders whom she had met were concerned about stability in East Europe and the successful development of democratic processes there. That is primarily linked with Mikhail Gorbachev remaining in power. Kazimiera Prunskiene said that the Lithuanian leaders did not deny that either, but in her opinion the Western leaders gave a one-sided evaluation of the situation and that they did not see how to make agree the bid of the Baltic states for independence with the interest of the Western states to secure Mikhail Gorbachev as the Soviet leader.

Kazimiera Prunskiene defined her talks with the Western leaders as businesslike and open. They understand that we cannot renounce the act of independence but they consider that we should suspend the practical implementation of independence. Yet that must be settled through negotiations, said Kazimiera Prunskiene.

TASS Account Questioned

PM1105205390 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 90 p 1

[TASS report followed by comment by E. Bickauskas, Lithuanian permanent representative: "Lithuania: Formula With One Unknown"]

[Text] K. Prunskiene, chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers, has made a private trip to Paris, where she was received by French President F. Mitterrand. She had meetings with a number of the country's leading politicians. This trip is the latest stage in her tour of a number of Western countries, in the course of which attempts are being made to secure the West's concrete support for the present Lithuanian leadership's policy.

As Hubert Vedrine, spokesman for the Elysee Palace, reported at the end of the talks, the French president "sees no solution to the Lithuanian problem other than to begin a genuine dialogue" between Moscow and Vilnius. For our part, we will do everything possible to avoid the situation deteriorating and escalating into a conflict, H. Vedrine declared. In particular, agreement in principle with the so-called "Mitterrand-Kohl formula" was confirmed during the talks in Paris. Under this formula Lithuania should suspend the law which unilaterally proclaims Lithuania's independence. To judge from the Elysee Palace spokesman's statements, France advanced no other proposals, including on specific measures to give economic support to Lithuania.

Addressing journalists at the end of the talks, K. Prunskiene pointed out that Lithuania has ended up in an extremely difficult position, which threatens to escalate into a crisis in the very near future. The acute shortage of energy raw materials could completely paralyze the Lithuanian economy. In her opinion, the crisis situation can still be overcome if a commodity exchange is arranged with other Soviet republics. In this connection K. Prunskiene declared her "readiness for a dialogue" with Moscow, including on the basis of the "Mitterrand-Kohl formula."

What is the West's reaction to the events in Lithuania as regards giving it real economic support? "Everything ends in debates—everything is confined to this," K. Prunskiene stated.

Permanent Representative's Commentary

We asked E. Bickauskas, Lithuania's permanent representative [in Moscow, presumably], to comment on this essentially sensational TASS report. He did warn, however, that he was expressing only his own viewpoint, since he was not present at K. Prunskiene's news conference.

"I doubt whether the TASS correspondent understands the 'Mitterrand-Kohl formula' correctly. As far as we understand it, the well-known letter and the commentary on it by Roland Dumas says nothing about freezing the very act of independence. It is a question only of Lithuania suspending the laws adopted after the act of independence—laws which affect the Soviet Union's interests and are unacceptable to the Soviet side. Lithuania confirms this readiness. We are prepared to make such a compromise for the sake of the talks."

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] That is, it is not a question of suspending the declaration of independence itself?

[Bickauskas] No.

French Reportage on Prunskiene's Visit to Paris

For French reportage on the visit by Prime Minister Prunskiene to Paris, including reports on her talks President Mitterrand, Jacques Chirac, and Laurent Fabius, please see the France section of the 11 May West Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Brazauskas Visits Switzerland

AU1105182890 Vienna Television Service in German 1730 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Algirdas Brazauskas, deputy head of the Lithuanian Government, has unexpectedly arrived in Switzerland, where he hopes to gain recognition through public appearances. He refers to the recognition of Lithuania by Switzerland in the twenties and hopes for a repetition of this.

[Begin Brazauskas recording] As regards the atmosphere, there is unanimity and unity. We are happy about our freedom. [end recording]

Meets Swiss Bankers

LD1205092890 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 11 May 90

[Excerpts] The Lithuanian vice premier, the first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, Algirdas Brazauskas, is visiting Switzerland. Having arrived in Zurich at the invitaiton of Swiss politicians, economists and scientists, Algirdas Brazauskas met bankers and industrialists. The possibilities of direct economic and financial ties between the two countries and of obtaining credits from Switzerland were discussed. They also discussed what assistance could be rendered to Lithuania in training economists and managers. [passage omitted] Algirdas Brazauskas spoke on Swiss television and a press conference was arranged. [passage omitted]

According to Vatican Radio, Algirdas Brazauskas expressed belief at the press conference that the Soviet Army stationed in Lithuania did not represent danger to the restoration of independence in the republic. The presence of Soviet military units in Lithuania does not mean that they will be used agianst the Lithuanians, stated Algirdas Brazauskas. [passage omitted] He also stated that, in his opinion, Lithuania can endure for another three of four weeks Moscow's economic blockade. According to Vatican radio, when asked what would happen then, Algirdas Brazauskas only smiled and did not answer.

German Friendship Societies' Leaders Meet

LD1005160790 Moscow TASS in English 1547 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 10 TASS—Chairman of the Central Commission of the GDR German-Soviet Friendship Society Cyrill Pech, President of the Federation of "FRG-USSR" Societies Dietrich Sperling and Chairman of the West Berlin German-Soviet Friendship Society Franz von Hammerstein met representatives of the Soviet public here today. The German guests arrived in Moscow for the celebrations of the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Second World War and Nazi Germany's surrender.

During the informal talk on problems of German unification, the sides discussed, among other things, the question of a united Germany's military and political status. The Soviet representatives noted that they restricted the German people's right to self-determination.

"At the same time," eminent Soviet Germanist Abdulkhan Akhtamzyan stressed, "the Soviet people are disturbed by western plans to incorporate a united Germany into NATO. Professor Akhtamzyan and his Soviet colleagues expressed the view that it is necessary to overcome Europe's split into two military blocs and to establish a system of all-European security.

After the meeting, its participants expressed the usefulness of such open discussions, irrespective of sometimes differing evaluations.

"Such differences came to light during the discussion of the idea of signing a German peace treaty," Dietrich Sperling told TASS. In his opinion, all the guarantees, which the victor-states are entitled to get from Germany, could be determined collectively when preparing the Helsinki summit conference and during it. "At the same time," Dietrich Sperling said, "measures should be taken before the meeting to dispell the Soviet Union's concern about its security.

Sperling stressed in this context the need of revising West Germany's commitments to NATO, to reducing its military contribution to the Atlantic alliance and cut the number of foreign troops in its territory. Sperling, who is deputy of the West German Bundestag from the Social Democratic Party of Germany, called for a revision of the old NATO strategy, which regards the Soviet Union as a potential enemy.

"People in the FRG," Sperling added, "are insufficiently informed about the Soviet people's apprehensions concerning Germany's unification. It is the duty of our society to inform the West German public opinion about these apprehensions. We also need closer coordination among the three German societies for friendship with the USSR. It is necessary to perpetuate the traditional forms of cooperation that have proved their worth."

Supreme Soviet Session

Moscow Radio Carries Supreme Soviet Session 12 May

Lukyanov Chairs Session

LD1205163390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 12 May begins carrying a recording of the 12 May USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow.

Anatoliy Lukyanov chairs the session; he opens by saying much work was done yesterday on the pension provision draft law. He says 23 people who are not Supreme Soviet members spoke at the session yesterday. He then asks for the registration of deputies.

At 1502 GMT it is noted that 410 Supreme Soviet members are present; forty-five nonmembers are present; there is a quorum. Lukyanov notes there are three articles of the pension provision draft law to be discussed: Article 14, on special pensions; Article 15, on pensions for underground workers, and Article 16, pensions for workers in the far north. Gritsenko is to take the floor.

At 1504 GMT Gritsenko speaks. He says his commission has tried to solve the problems brought up by deputies. He asks to expound changes to be made in light of deputies' suggestions. He suggests changes in wordings to Article 14 Section 2. The recommendations amount to making enterprises provide better pensions and lowering the pension age for female tractor-workers and tobacco workers.

At 1513 GMT Gritsenko asks whether to continue with the other articles. Lukyanov comments that it is quite involved. He recommends to the Council of Minsters and local Supreme Soviets the addition of a list of professions including, cooks, confectioners, hunters, fishermen, glasshouse workers, deer breeders, cotton growers, silk growers, smiths and welders to the draft resolution.

At 1517 GMT Lukyanov asks Shcherbakov for the Council of Ministers' opinion. He says the government does not want to expand the list of professions entitled to the new pension priveleges. It will recommend leaving the resolution as it stands, given that the amendment would cost the government about R800.

At 1519 GMT Lukyanov asks for specific proposals on the amendments.

An unidentified deputy, a cattle breeder, asks for the support of other cattle breeders. He remarks that the law is for the future, therefore he proposes including women involved in poultry, sheepbreeding, and cattlebreeding in one of the sections of the article.

At 1522 GMT Ivchenko says using the phrase "female cattlebreeders" is enough. An unidentified female deputy asks Lukyanov to elucidate. Another unidentified deputy says there is a catastrophe in agriculture. He wants the phrase "women working by hand in agriculture" to be added. He says they are worn out by age 50. Lukyanov says it will cost a lot. An unidentified deputy says the wording should be "cattle-breeding workers" to include all, women should retire at age 50 and men at age 50. He stresses the hard working conditions of vehicle drivers.

At 1527 GMT Lukyanov interrupts, saying he has a right to speak. He reminds them that everyone is making a case for better pension provision, but no one is suggesting where to find the funding. He says any representative of any profession could make just as good a case. He asks people's deputies to be realistic. He says they are allocating twice what they have because they have not yet passed the law on taxation of companies. He says if the law is going to be blockaded by endless emotional pleas it should be returned to the commissions. He apologizes for intefering, but believes it is necessary.

An unidentified deputy takes up his argument. Lukyanov rebukes him for quoting percentages and asks for concrete figures. The deputy asks agriculturists not to vote for the law. An unidentified woman says she does not understand Lukyanov's peakiness. She says agriculturists are not seasonal workers and asks for the 116 agriculturist deputies to be supported. Lukyanov says she is disturbing everything. The woman says for all tractor drivers to go on pension at 50/55 for women/men would cost R500 million rubles. An unidentified deputy disputes this, saying it would cost R700 million. The same woman asks for a vote on it. Lukyanov brushes her off. Klishchuk then talks about keeping the youth in the country. He proposes voting by name on the issue of pension provision for tractor drivers. Lukyanov thanks him. People's Deputy Mongo wants to add the nomads to the list. (?Abdalova) believes that Gritsenko's and Shcherbakov's reports show a step forward for women, but among these women cotton pickers have been ignored. Belov rejects such a flippant attitude toward the peasantry, saying "What is R500, when billions are thrown into the air?" Lukyanov asks Belov not to put this on a class level by talking about disrespect to the peasantry. He again calls for a realistic approach.

At 1546 GMT Karpychev says the word cattlebreeders must be left for women so as to not leave anyone out. He goes on to differentiate between tractor drivers and others. He says money going into agriculture is increasing by three times, so should pensions.

Agricultural Pensions Discussed

LD1205165190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1547 GMT on 12 May continues carrying a recording of the 12 May USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 1548 GMT a deputy suggests there should be no subdivision of cattlebreeders. He is a leader of a farm in Kirghizia, and says that very few male tractor drivers reach age 60. Ivanov asks for the amendment on fishermen, deerbreeders and hunters to be supported, going on to portray conditions in the Far North. Lukyanov repeats his proposal.

At 1552 GMT Sukhov agrees with Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov that a case could be made for better pensions in any profession. He calls for the article to be adopted as it stands. He asks for scientific, empirical investigation into working conditions to be carried out. He says the different professions are like parts of a clock, all necessary. Burayev suggests compromise ages of 58 and 53 for men and women. Amanova says tobacco is not grown in Turkmenia, but cotton is, and goes on to explain that women do a lot of carrying of heavy cotton and asks for the government to make the same noble gesture to the cotton pickers as to the tobacco pickers.

An unidentified deputy says there is a shortfall in agriculture production because of a shortage of manpower. Therefore, it makes financial sense to attract workers to agriculture. An unidentified deputy from Lugansk says workers of the Lugansk agricultural plant should be included in the law.

At 1602 GMT Shchelkanov raises the question of invalids. Klibik congratulates the government for not turning its back on social interests. However, female cotton-growers should not be forgotten. However, a compromise should be struck here and the article voted for as it stands. Kirgizbayeva supports the proposals on better pensions for tractor drivers, going on to describe difficult cotton-harvesting conditions. She herself was a tractor driver.

At 1607 GMT Chursina of the womens' committee criticizes the trade unions. She puts the case for keeping the textile workers on the second list, describing how they are 30 percent more prone to sickness than other workers. (?Sokoneva) says cotton pickers have earned their pension long before age 50. Krasilnikov calls on male deputies to make women a little more happier, otherwise the situation will be even more complex tomorrow.

An unidentified deputy says tractor drivers have already earned their pension. Poor technology contributes to their conditions. He says women should be forbidden from being tractor drivers. Motornyy says that an issue more awful than aids or chernobyl is creeping up on us. Problems are being caused because bread is starting to cost its real price after 70 years. Local collective farms and state farms which can afford it should stop paying into the all-union pension fund and form their own ones.

An unidentified deputy supports the 50/55 age tractor drivers' pension improvement, citing conditions in Vologda Oblast. Glazkov supports this.

At 1620 GMT a Karelian deputy respects agricultural workers but supports the government decision, stressing the long time taken to prepare it. Valentin suggests including excavator drivers.

Debate Moves Ahead

LD1205172190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1621 GMT on 12 May continues carrying a recording of the 12 May USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow.

Lukyanov refuses to list the professions enumerated. He says eight Georgian deputies have mentioned tea growers. Lukyanov asks whether this can be decided by the Supreme Soviet, or whether they can be left in just very broad categories and hand it back to the government and commissions. He asks for less agitation.

At 1625 GMT Pribylova, a doctor, notes there is a great percentage of illness among women in agriculture in Kursk. She says a special case can be made for tractor drivers. An unidentified speaker suggests the professions entitled to an early pension should be left to enterprises. Mikhaylova asks what privileges third category invalids who have suffered industrial accidents are entitled to in the pension provision law. Piskunovich, a member of the pension provision group, says that he is offended by suggestions that agricultural workers do not live to their pension because of alcohol abuse, or would just spend their extra five years' in sexual intercourse. He puts the case for tractor drivers and all agricultural workers to be included on the list for early pensions. Vasilets says resolutions have been passed ever since Khrushchev on improving the conditions of agricultural workers. He supports the proposal of including tractor drivers in the early pension list. An unidentified deputy suggests avoiding professional antagonism by charging the Council of Ministers, the Academy of Medical Sciences and Academy of Sciences on investigating the issue.

Zhuravlev says there is a way out of the dead end. He does not know an easy job. He accuses deputies of trying to get rid of the problem of agriculture by handouts. He suggests agreeing with the Council of Ministers.

At 1639 GMT Grib says he does not want to make a proposal, but says that mutual respect is necessary. Mayboroda puts forward a complicated mathematical formula to solve the impasse for balloting. Romanenko says a principle is needed to determine special pension provision. General principle of people working in harmful conditions should be entitled to these special pensions. An unidentified deputy suggests getting rid of an amendment making enterprises responsible for special pension allocation.

At 1646 GMT Lukyanov asks the hall how to proceed further.

Gritsenko Speaks on Status of Law

LD1205184290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1647 GMT on 12 May continues carrying a recording of the 12 May USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow.

Lukyanov calls on Biryukova. Biryukova says that more and more people are becoming entitled to benefits. Much money has gone into improving conditions of labor, so that conditions are much improved. Since the fifties the list of those involved in harmful work has tripled, although objectively this is not the case. We cannot buy the problems off by palming them off onto the government. More than two months have gone into this law under discussion between the All-Union Central Council of Trades Unions, AUCCTU, and the government. It would be good to agree to it. She pleads for the Supreme Soviet to agree. She says Textile workers are in the 14th section so the speaker who mentioned them is wrong.

Voronin, for the government, understands the aspiration of each deputy to represent his voters, but asks them to pass the resolution, saying is it no good being humane to certain categories. We must be like statesmen, humane to the whole Soviet Union. Yesterday additional decisions were made to the tune of R2,000 million. The concessions today amount to R10,000 million. The proportion of income spent in the Soviet Union on pensions is 17 percent, compared to 6 percent in Canada and much more than in the United States, Japan, etc. There are problems with establishing age limits especially in the countryside. He proposes the adoption of two points giving the republics greater authority.

At 1701 GMT Gritsenko returns to the microphone, asking that a vote be taken on a government and AUCCTU resolution and calling for a decision to be made as to whether the law should be further debated by the Supreme Soviet or the Council of Ministers. He prefers this be dealt with immediately rather than delayed. Lukyanov notes the commission's proposal is to be voted on after the recess.

at 1704 GMT before announcing the vote, Lukyanov points out that it is the 120th anniversary of the Odessa State University. He congratulates the university and its principle and hopes that the people of Odessa will continue to work in the spirit and humor they have always shown.

Female Pensions Cited

LD1205194090

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1705 GMT on 12 May continues carrying a recording of the 12 May USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow.

Discussion on workers' pensions resumes.

At 1719 GMT a deputy talks on the fact that female poultry farmers have been allocated to the responsibility of the republics. Another vote is announced. Another deputy takes the floor to point out the complexity the situation of female poultry farmers. He feels the various categories of worker and labor have been satisfactorily covered. Female beekeepers may, says Lukyanov jovially, be a category hard to define: Do they raise animals or insects? A vote is then taken on whether to accept women poultry farmers as livestock breeders. The proposal is rejected.

At 1724 GMT a deputy asks that a mesaure on mechanizers be voted on by name. Many of these workers are women. Expected retirements may threaten spring harvest. A vote is taken on whether they, too, should be included in the lists. The proposal does not pass the vote.

At 1726 GMT Deputy Zhuravlev points out that perhaps an important political and economic opportunity is being missed. If women are to retire on the grounds of length of service rather than age, this would be quite fair, on the grounds that conditions are harder for women than men.

At 1728 GMT a deputy provides the background to this issue. Back to previous votes. Again the measure did not get through.

At 1729 GMT Mayboroda says that female cotton workers do a year's work in nine months. When establishing norms of length of service, another deputy points out, differences between men and women are taken into account.

At 1732 GMT Sukhoruchenko from the AUCCTU says that this has been discussed by the trade unions. She asks that exceptions to the rules will be tolerated. This is a matter for local authorities.

At 1733 GMT Mayboroda's proposal is voted on. It does not pass.

At 1734 GMT Lukyanov recalls a note asking about measures on specific groups of people handicapped since childhood.

At 1735 GMT Voronin raises the matter of regulating the pension fund. Sukhoruchenko contributes by suggesting what percentages of pensions and for how long, the enterprises should pay.

At 1739 GMT Shcherbakov sees the pension fund as a tax on enterprises. It is not to be decided by the State Labor Committee. He proposes the state assume all payments for the first and second category lists.

At 1740 GMT a deputy asks who will provide compensation in the event of an enterprise's closing. Lukyanov says this is to the point. Another deputy explains that much of this will come from insurance or the profits of the enterprise.

At 1742 GMT conditions of labor, notes a deputy, have worsened considerably with the introduction of financial autonomy. Health problems and hence pension demands will only increase. Those who tolerate poor conditions should, literally, be made to pay. It is hard to establish pension differentials without introducing individual insurance at the enterprise for every worker.

At 1745 GMT Yefimov calls for the issue to be removed from the draft. A vote is taken. It remains in the draft, however.

At 1747 GMT a deputy takes the floor to ask about whether rabbit breeders should be classed as livestock breeders when it comes to pensions.

At 1748 GMT another deputy asks what is the point of enterprises being asked to pay pensions if they can even manage the wages.

At 1750 GMT a deputy takes the floor to raise the issue of the situation of workers in dangerous and harmful production who have worked less than half the time needed to qualify for pension rights should be included in the pension law's provision.

At 1753 GMT Shcherbakov points out that the pension fund should function reliably given insurance measures and the budget laws.

At 1755 GMT Lukyanov says that with the introduction of economic reform, the establishment of a market, legislation will have to be adapted to new realities.

At 1756 GMT Deputy Obolenskiy says there is no guarantee that enterprises will pay pensions.

At 1757 GMT Deputy Mongo speaks about the specific needs of the far north's reindeer herders.

AT 1758 GMT Biryukova believes we will have read an interview by Vlasov saying that central laws must not be allowed to govern everything. The republic's must have a say. This relates to the nomads of the north who are subordinate to republican legislation first of all.

At 1800 GMT a deputy tells Lukyanov that economic guarantees are provided by the government rather than the enterprises

At 1801 GMT a deputy points out that if an enterprise closes, e.g. because of bankruptcy, existing legislation comes into force regarding its property.

Miner's Pensions Debated

LD1205194590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1802 GMT on 12 May continues carrying a recording of the 12 May USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 1804 GMT a deputy says that there are over one million invalids of the third group from birth, who are supposed to be able to work. They can work in libraries, for instance, and could easily work to age 60. This should be left to the Council of Ministers.

Lukyanov puts Shchelkanov's proposal to the vote. The amendment fails.

At 1809 GMT Lukyanov wants to move onto Article 15, on miners' pension. An unidentified member of the commission says the article has been agreed between the government and the miners' strike committees. For the government, an unidentified spokesman says it is proposed that miners should retire at 45 years. He compares Soviet miners' holidays and retirement ages with other contries. He says that Soviet benefits are the best in the world. Miners' most productive labor is between the ages of 25 and 40. Are all the points in the protocol of the strike committees covered, asks Lukyanov. The spokesman says yes. Luzhnikov agrees with the most productive age. However, the average life-expectancy is 43. Conditions are getting worse. We are getting deeper, pressure is increasing. The conditions in the Donbass are worse than anywhere else in the world. A deputy says mines are and always will be a danger area. Deputy Nikolaychuk became a miner at the age of 18. He says 20 years' work down a mine is too much. An unidentified woman notes that despite the law, women are still working underground. Lukyanov proposes a forty-minute break. The deputies ask for an hour. Lukaynov makes a break for one hour.

At 1830 GMT the recording resumes and Lukyanov asks the deputies to register. There is a quorum.

Makeyevka, not a miner but representing a mining community, speaks. He draws the hall's attention to the fact that miners' pension provision requires a differentiated approach. Soviet mining is different from other countries' mining. He supports the article. Another deputy says there is a shortage of miners. Lukyanov asks for a proposal. He, however, does not put forward a proposal, but says that geological conditions are getting worse, the deeper mines get, and something has to be done about it. Therefore, there can be no arguments against this article.

An unidentified deputy calls for an amendment to be approved.

Shcherbakov says yesterday strike committees met with members of the Council of Ministers. The miners have withdrawan some of their demands for better conditions. The Donbass is an extremely difficult zone. Vorkuta and Kuzbass are different. The technical level everywher is very low.

At 1840 GMT Shcherbakov notes negotiations on conditions other than pensions must be carried out individually, because of individual circumstances. Donchak, from Karaganda, says Karaganda has not been mentioned, neither has Sakhalin. Shcherbakov says that all conditions are different.

Miner's Resolution Passed

LD1205201990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1841 GMT on 12 May continues carrying a recording of the 12 May USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow.

An unidentified woman objects to women doing heavy work. A deputy argues to include prospecting miners and expanding the list of those eligible to special pensions. Lukyanov asks the opinion of the hall. Voronin goes into technical details on geological conditions. He says that what is harmful to health is technical equipment, or rather the level of it.

Lukyanov closes the discussion. He recaps the AUCCTU proposal and government, which coincides with the strike committees' protocol. The deputies can either accept the above, or the proposals of those miners' deputies who are present.

Voting takes place on the deputies' amendment proposed by Nikolaychuk, Saunin, and others. The amendment is not accepted. (?Degetyan) asks for a second ballot and asks for voting by name on such important issues. Lukyanov agrees to a second ballot.

At 1900 GMT Ivashko is invited to speak. In addition to the type of mine under discussion, there is the obvious fact that while one chamber has passed a measure, the other has not. Agreement needs to be reached. Lukyanov offers ways in which this might be done.

At 1904 GMT an unidentified female deputy points out that in all the mines there is dissatisfaction albeit with different things. She favors retaining formulae from the government-miners' decisions of the summer. Lukyanov calls the session to order.

At 1906 GMT with reference to what Ivashko said, an unidentified deputy says he cannot understand what all the argument is about. Surely twenty years underground is good enough whatever.

At 1908 GMT Pivovarov asks to vote on the miners' proposal. Lukyanov asks the members to register yet again. There are 400 present. He calls for the vote. Both chambers vote. The proposal is accepted to much applause: Miners can now retire after 20 years service.

At 1911 GMT Yudin calls for the inclusion of those prospecting for minerals in underground and open deposits. Many of their conditions are the same. If they are not included at this point, it will be very difficult to do so later on. There are 5,000-7,000 individuals, subordinate to the Ministry of Geology, who would be affected by this measure.

At 1915 GMT the debate as to the inclusion of prospecting workers continues. The criterion for deciding in their favor must be if they are considered to be working in conditions equivalent to those in the Donbass. Lukyanov calls for the vote. The measure is not adopted.

At 1916 GMT comments on Article 16 are invited. Deputy Nikolaychuk comes to the microphone to point out that there are two versions of this article from the preparatory commission, one from the Council of Ministers and the AUCCTU, the other, supported by the peoples of the North, from the commission itself.

At 1918 GMT debate ensues on whether to consider the second version or the first for amendments.

Nikolaychuk says that for every three years in the Far North or every four in a similar area, one year is knocked off the number one must wait before qualifying for a pension. A commission spokesman says the commission is happy with the second version, but not with every proposed amendment. Voskoboynikov stresses that the amendments are from the deputies of the Far North. He calls for backing for the proportional reduction in the length of service clause for pension qualification. Deputy Yudin explains the finer points, distinguishing the two versions. If someone leaves the Far North for a similar region, they can, the commission suggests, take their special pension provisions with them. Deputy Alekseyev expresses complete agreement and support for Nikolaychuk's proposal. Deputy Osipov complains that medical supplies in Norilsk and Yakutiya no longer correspond to the demands of a growing population. He also supports the motion. (?Yudin) draws attention to the fact that many areas are similarly disadvantaged. All areas of climatic extremes will require special treatment. He says Nikolaychuk's amendment is too costly.

At 1929 GMT Lukyanov asks for a vote on Nikolaychuk's amendment. The amendment is rejected in favor of the government-backed version.

At 1931 GMT Deputy (?Vaykov) from Yakutiya is rebuked by Lukyanov for going beyond the bounds of deputies' etiquette by asking that (?Shcherbakov) is not given the final word since Russia cannot decide Yakutiya's problems. He should not give the final speech, he has led the deputies astray.

At 1936 GMT Lukyanov rounds up this section of the work.

Presidential Protection Law Noted

LD1205203790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1937 GMT on 12 May continues carrying a recording of the 12 May USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 1937 GMT Lukyanov introduces the draft law on the protection of the honor and dignity of the USSR president. The commissions and committees have been working on this. Kalmykov, chairman of the legislative committee, is invited to speak.

At 1939 GMT Kalmykov begins speaking, listing those involved in working out the draft law under discussion. The work has been lengthy and various versions and proposals were submitted as agreement was sought. The basic version was distributed to the deputies yesterday. He enumerates the main points of interest, emphasizing the need for the law in light of desecration of such symbols as statues of Lenin. He protests that the commission's work on the law has certainly not been slipshod. There was a question as to which body should deal with affairs involving insults to the president and his office. He goes on to answer the questions that were asked. Should protection of the president and that of state symbols be treated in the same legislation? The commission decided that they should be treated separately. There are sufficient laws already being developed to deal with the case of symbols of statehood. As the head of state, the president as the defender of the supreme authority should be regarded separately. This is done similarly in other countries. A curtailed preamble has been adopted. Is there any need for a definition of insult and slander? Kalmykov feels satisfactory legal definitions already exist. Legislation from France, Italy, and West Germany was considered. They have no need of explanations: The concepts are self-explanatory. As for who should investigate instances of such insults, it should be the Supreme Court that judges and the procuracy that investigates. If republican legislation already contains norms on insults and slander, is there really any need for this law? The experience of other states suggests that even if only as a preventative measure, the head of the state is in need of special protection. The commission believes such offenses affect the public. They are not the province of private charges as they impinge upon the state and its dignity. Without being able to protect our present and future president, we cannot have a state based on law. Nor will we be able to defend our people's deputies or even our Constitution.

At 1950 GMT Kalmykov goes on to look at the text distributed yesterday in further detail. He cites amendments to the orginal preamble to the law.

At 1953 GMT Kalmykov completes his address.

At 1954 GMT Deputy Golik comes to the microphone to address the legal and criminal aspects of the law. Why will existing republican laws on slander and insults suffice? He says we should all realize the president must be protected, otherwise no one is protected. Attempts to keep the law concise have been undertaken. Definitions are included in the republican legislation. There are no difficulties in applying them. Precedence helps. Public offense or slander means there may be people present at the time or who arrive in time to see, for instance, offensive slogans or banners.

(?Chelychev) agrees with the sentiments expressed. He thinks it is clear what is meant by slander. However, insult should be defined. Do we include jokes? Golik says that insult means, according to the criminal code, verbal injury in an indecent form. Another deputy says the Council of Ministers, the Congress of People's Deputies, and the Supreme Soviet are also state symbols. Golik asks for the hall to concentrate on the draft law in hand.

At 1958 GMT the question is asked as to why the fine of R3,000 was decided on. Who can afford it? Golik replies that people must think about this before committing a crime. The idea is expressed that this will encourage slander.

Amendments to Slander Law Discussed

LD1205213290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1959 GMT on 12 May continues carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow.

Volkov notes that last year in the election campaign they experienced slander. The question arises as to what should be done about this. Legislative acts should be adopted. Kalmykov has not given any figures on the prosecution of slanderers of the president.

At 2006 GMT the reasons for the preparation of this law are the recent rallies. There has been much criticism of insults of Lenin monuments, etc. Volkov thinks separation of a law against slandering people's deputies from slandering the president will not be a good thing. He considers steps to increase trust in the president to be very important. He recalls Sobchak's speech at the Third Congress of People's Deputies and says that things can be taken the wrong way. He is afraid the adoption of this law could be a return to totalitarianism.

Zelinskiy appeals to those who strove for the institution of president. Zelinskiy was for this. This law should have been adopted simultaneously with the establishment of presidential power. Zelinskiy considers that the law will lead to the stabilization of the political situation.

At 2013 GMT Zhuravlev sees one danger: He is dissatisfied with Golik's definition of slander and calls for a clear definition of this term before the law can be passed. He is apprehensive of this turning into a witch-hunt. The president has concentrated a lot of power in his hands. He hopes the law will be more of a warning than a means of punishment. Foteyev says the defense of the president is essential. However, the word insult could mean anything. He feels the law almost has some connection with the Gdlyan and Ivanov papers.

Sverdlov points out that, unlike private persons, organs such as the Supreme Soviet cannot take a slanderer to court. Therefore, as well as supporting this draft law, he proposes that the law inlcude the defense of the honor of the highest organs of state power of the USSR. He gives further amendments throughout the text corresponding to this proposal.

At 2020 GMT Akhromeyev calls for the draft law to be adopted. He says in the present circumstances it is vital.

If the head of state is constantly insulted, the prestige of the highest organs of state power is subverted. However, the president is insulted both as a person and as an institution. Deputies are insulted by being accused of bribery and corruption. Therefore, a second law is required to protect people's deputies.

Ryabchenko says Gorbachev is citizen Number One. Therefore, he must be protected. It is obvious Gorbachev himself does not have the time to investigate who is insulting him. Therefore, there should be an amendment on the practical implementation of the law.

At 1034 GMT a deputy calls for no more discussion on the rights and wrongs of the presidency. He is glad it is functioning well.

Lukyanov considers that the issue of insults against the Congress of People's Deputies etc, is mateial for another law. Time is pressing. Registration prior to voting takes place.

At 2040 GMT The Soviet of Nationalities is deputies short. They vote anyway on a minor change in wording to the draft law. The minor textual amendment is adopted. They then vote on cessation of debates. Debates are to cease.

At 2045 GMT Gubarev says the mass media can be shut down at the second case of an insult against the president. He says the press is a counterweight against presidential power. He asks for the article including this to be excluded. The Soviet of the Union has accepted the law and the Soviet of Nationalities has not.

At 2048 GMT Lukyanov says an announcement is to be read out to the deputies. Deputy Sazonov, representing a social Democrat fraction, presents a proposal to Lukyanov and to the Supreme Soviet concerning USSR People's Deputy Vayshvila, who was beaten in Lithuania at the direct order of a Soviet officer. Sazonov's proposal requests investigations. Lukyanov says the Lithuanian deputies have submitted a proposal on Deputy Vayshvila, who does not consider himself a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

At 2051 GMT Lukyanov declares the sitting closed. He says the next session will begin at 0700 GMT on Monday, 14 May.

12 May Supreme Soviet Joint Session Begins

LD1205082190 Moscow TASS in English 0721 GMT 12 May 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow May 12 TASS—The two chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet opened a joint session today to adopt a pension bill. The discussion of the bill, comprising more than 130 articles, began as early as last autumn.

The parliament is also expected to complete the discussion of the first reading of a bill on taxing enterprises. The bill's discussion in April was postponed because of heated debates about tax rates.

The Supreme Soviet is also planning to consider bills on the protection of the honour and dignity of the president, and on his maintenance and protection.

Supreme Soviet Debates Pension Law

LD1205135190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 12 Mar 90

[Text] The third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet continues its work in the Kremlin today. At the joint session of the chambers, the deputies are working on a draft law on pension provision for USSR citizens.

Three articles of the draft law which examine questions of pensions for workers entitled to special benefits and of those working in difficult and harmful conditions have become the stumbling block. These articles had to be coordinated with a few other clauses which deal with pensions for long service. Forty delegates spoke in the debate before the first interval. Though views diverged widely, they advocated one thing with the fullest unanimity: that female labor should be accorded priority, especially in those sectors of the economy which are traditionally heavy.

Biryukova on Increase in Pension Benefit Recipients

LD1305155190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1648 GMT on 12 May in its recorded relay of the 12 May USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin carries a 5-minute report by Aleksandra Biryukova concerning the Supreme Soviet's debate on pensions.

Biryukova's contribution to the pension debate points out that in the years since lists of heavy and dangerous work were introduced there has been a vast increase in the number of people given pension and other benefits because of doing such work. This is in spite of millions of rubles spent by enterprises and the state on improving conditons of labor. Conditions today simply cannot be compared with those of 1957 when the lists were introduced. All the same, enterprises, ministries, and sector trade unions have made so many demands that there has been an almost three-fold increase in those ostensibly working in dangerous conditions. This is objectively unnecessary and has served to enable enterprise managers to avoid improving conditions of work on the grounds that higher pensions were adquate recompense, she notes. Biryukova believes the enterprises should not be completely freed of responsibility for improving conditions of work.

On the topic of the varieties of professions with which the Supreme Soviet is trying to deal, Biryukova is convinced it is impossible to deal with them all, one by one. Each republic has its own specific professions.

Sometimes areas within a republic have their own as well. There are the reindeer herders of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Georgia's tea planters, the cotton workers of Uzbekistan, to name a few. Given recent legislation granting greater powers to the republics, as part of perestroyka, particularly that on local self-government and that regulating relations between the USSR and the Union republics, the republics, oblasts and enterprises should be left to deal with these specific professions.

Biryukova then corrects a person who previously addressed the Supreme Soviet session, placing textile workers in the wrong category. Since the state has paid their pensions for a long time already, nothing will be changed. Only new equipment will alter the arduous task of weavers.

Presidential Honor Law Debated

LD1205152790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 12 May 90

[Excerpts] Now over to the All-Union Radio correspondent's office in the Kremlin for news of the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Olga Vasilenko is at the microphone:

[Vasilenko] [passage omitted on discussion of pension law once again became bogged down in wrangles about which categories of workers deserve special pension regulations] Now, despite the fact that it is already 1700 hours [1300 GMT], the session still has not ended because one more item is on the agenda today. It is the draft law on protection of the honor and dignity of the USSR President, and on guaranteeing the upkeep of the president. This document was drafted by the chairman of the chambers, and by the Committees for Glasnost, Citizens' Rights and Appeals, and for Legislation, Issues of Law and Order, and the Fight Against Crime. [passage omitted: the draft document was presented to the deputies by Deputies Kalmykov and Golik]

Because the law consists of two articles, I can familiarize listeners with it. The preamble says that, taking into consideration the inadmissability of damage being occasioned to the honor and dignity of the USSR president as the head of the Soviet state, the USSR Supreme Soviet establishes:

Article 1—and I stress that this is a draft law, still a draft law—says: Public insult of the president or slander of him are punishable by a fine of up to R3,000 rubles or corrective labor for up to two years, or imprisonment for up to three years. The same actions performed with the use of the press or other mass information media are punishable by corrective labor for up to two years or imprisonment for up to six years.

Article 2 says: A fine of up to R25,000 is to be imposed by courts on mass information media which publish material insulting to the USSR president or contain slander against him. The activity of mass information media which a second time have distributed materials insulting the president or containing slander against him can be stopped.

Well, naturally, there were a whole series of questions about this draft law. Now speeches have begun. A number of deputies have spoken—Volkov, Zelinskiy, and Zhuravlev. Now Deputy Smirnov is speaking. The most various opinions are being pronounced. A majority of the deputies favor the adoption of this draft law, but they also express the opinion that it is also necessary to think about protecting the honor and dignity of each deputy and of each state figure. The session is continuing, and I hereupon end my report about the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Akhromeyev Favors Law on Presidential Dignity

LD1305142390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2020 GMT 12 May 90

[Speech by Deputy Akhromeyev at the 12 May session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin—recorded]

[Text] [Akhromeyev] Esteemed Comrade Deputies! In my opinion, it is essential to adopt the draft law on protecting the honor and dignity of the president which has been submitted to us....

[Lukyanov, interrupting] I have proposed it as it is....

[Akhromeyev, continuing] ...and the appropriate Supreme Soviet decision. The situation in the country is developing in such a way that this law is essential, not only because we must not permit the head of state to be insulted and discredited with impunity, but also because simultaneously with his being discredited and insulted, our society is shaken. If it is possible, day after day, month after month, without end, to offend and insult the head of state, this begs the question: Where is there respect for him and hence where is there respect for all of us?

For this reason, I think this law should be adopted. However, I consider well-founded the views of those deputies who say that it is also essential to protect our ditnity too, that of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies. All the same, there is a difference here. After all, the president, the head of state, is a person, and he is insulted both as the president, and sometimes, as a person. For this reason, the law should protect him, as they say, on both fronts. We are the supreme body of state power. We should not be accused, as people here are accused, of bribe-taking and cheating, and yet such insults abound. I am not talking about the individual deputy, I am talking about the body of power, but the point that we are offended. After all, they say that we have no right to exist because we do not reflect the mood of the people, that we should be removed from power, forced to resign, etcetra.

In other words, to answer Anatoliy Ivanovich's question, a second law is essential and we should, at least we will undertake to draft it, and thereby protect our supreme bodies of power from such actions, as well, since this also leads to the breakdown of society.

Thank you for your attention.

Gubarev Opposes Restrictions to Press Freedom

LD1205224890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2045 GMT 12 May 90

[Remarks by Deputy Gubarev at the USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin on 12 May—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed comrade deputies! I believe we cannot vote for the second article of the antipenultimate section: The activity of the mass media may cease at the repetition of the propagation of slanderous farbrications. Comrades, we have said on more than one occasion that with the post of president we have strengthened executive power. The counterweight to this power is independent judicial power, legislative power, and free mass media. How can we halt the activity of the mass media if they constitute a counterweight to strong presidential power for such motives? [heckling in hall] We can take the editor of a newspaper to court, we may prosecute a journalist, but not the mass media themselves. Here, by analogy, yesterday I reported to you how a member of the Academy of the National Economy acted. According to this analogy we must close the Academy of the National Economy if it repeatedly propagates such fabrications. We must close the Council of Ministers if it, by analogy, produces some information discrediting legislative power. Therefore, I insist and ask for this issue to be put to the ballot and exclude this norm.

Lukyanov, Sazonov Discuss Vayshvila Investigation

LD1205224990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2048 GMT 12 May 90

[Remarks by Anatoliy Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Deputy Nikolay Semenovich Sazonov, representing the USSR Supreme Social Democratic Fraction, at the USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin on 12 May—recorded]

[Text] [Lukyanov] Deputy Sazonov would like two minutes. Comrades, sit down, please. Please, sit down.

[Sazonov] Good evening, esteemed comrades. [murmurs from hall] Because I have not said hello to you today, that is why.

[Lukyanov] Nikolay Semenovich.

[Sazonov] I think evening is okay. If we are going to part like this....

[Lukyanov, interrupting] Nikolay Semenovich, I would ask you to forego the commentaries. You asked for two minutes. Please save your time.

[Sazonov] Comrades, we have adopted a law today but we must also defend deputies at lower levels. For this reason we, that is, a group of deputies, address the Comrade Lukyanov, Anatoliy Ivanovich, USSR Supreme Soviet chairman. We ask that the proposal we submit in this address be put to a vote by the USSR Supreme Soviet: We, members of the Social Democratic Faction of the USSR People's Deputies, draw the attention of the USSR Supreme Soviet to the fact that there are incidences within the country of violations of the people's deputies' right, guaranteed by the USSR Constitution, to inviolability. In particular, the Supreme Soviet has received a statement from the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic, of 5 May 1990, of the fact that USSR People's Deputy Vayshvila beaten by servicemen on a direct order from an officer of the Soviet Army. During May Day parades in the town of Saratov, part of the columns of marchers were rudely dispersed, with measures of coercion being used with regard to the people's deputies from the town and oblast soviets at the head of the march. We ask that the Supreme Soviet instruct the USSR Procuracy to conduct official investigations into the facts that have been cited and that the appropriate charges be brought against the guilty officials.
[signed] USSR People's Deputies Sazonov, Obolenskiy, Tutov, Valentinov.

[Lukyanov] Right. I understand the question. I should like to inform you that the Lithuanian deputies have submitted a proposal regarding Deputy Vayshvila, although I have to tell you that Deputy Vayshvila has stated that he does not consider himself a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, a USSR People's Deputy. As for these facts, allow me, before handing them over to the Procuracy, to pass them on the Committee for the Work of the Soviets [as heard] and the Committee on Criminal Affairs. [as heard] Let them give their conclusion and then we will decide whether or not we need to hand it over to the Procuracy. [murmurs from hall] Are there any objections, comrades? [distinct calls of "no" from hall]

Moscow Radio Carries 11 May Supreme Soviet Session

Lukyanov Chairs Session

LD1105160690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 11 May begins carrying a recording of the 11 May USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow. The session is chaired by Anatoliy Lukyanov.

Lukyanov opens the joint session, and calls for deputies to register; there are 406 present. He notes this is the first meeting after May Day holiday and refers to the continuing uncertainties in the country, but thinks people generally approve of the changes taking place.

At 1504 GMT he comments on how productive the third session has been; 20 major laws have been passed already, as compared with that number as total for previous two sessions.

At 1505 GMT he outlines the expected plan of work for the coming period. The law on pensions is to be adopted this week. Next week will concern the law on tax inspection, and the law on USSR citizenship. Changes in legislation on women's affairs and the procedures for recall of deputies will be addressed.

Lukyanov notes next Wednesday's (16 may) work will be in committees and commissions. This will coincide with Supreme Soviet sessions of RSFSR and the Ukraine. Ryzhkov will speak on the change to the market economy. Other subjects to be examined next week include the police and public transport.

At 1510 GMT Lukyanov asks if anyone wants to make any points. Deputy Gryazin speaks. Lukyanov says the government and the president will be continuing to keep the situation concerning Lithuania and Estonia under review.

At 1514 GMT Deputy Kisin asks a question about possibility of deferring discussion of the question concerning the industry commission. Lukyanov replies that there has been some disagreement between different committees on the matter of introducing the law on enterprises.

At 1516 GMT there are brief questions from deputies (?Khodyrev), Litvinov, and Ruchkin on procedural and timetable matters. Deputies Medikov and Zhuravlev make further remarks. Lukyanov agrees with the general thrust of some of these that more forward planning of parliamentary work is required.

At 1525 GMT Deputy Belozertsev refers to the Gdlyan and Ivanov affair and possible slandering of the USSR president. Lukyanov says the matter is still under consideration.

At 1526 GMT Deputy Yablokov complains that the time allotted at the end of the daily sitting for brief statements by deputies is not being properly used.

At 1528 GMT Lukyanov announces that a delegation from the U.S. Congress headed by Joseph Ross is observing the sitting today. Brief welcoming applause.

At 1530 GMT Lukyanov moves on to the law on pensions, reviewing progress to date, and calls on Deputy Gritsenko to speak. He mentions some of the suggestions tabled to the commission during the recess, including withdrawing or reducing pensions for those in work and points concerning the timing of the introduction of the law. He speaks in particular about Article 24, which refers to working pensioners.

At 1538 GMT an unidentified speaker responds, pointing to the problem of the 8 million or so people expected to join the pensionable population by 1995. He goes on to suggest drawing a distinction between pensioners working on contract and under agreement.

At 1540 GMT Deputies Kikul and Lubenchenko make brief suggestions concerning changes to wording of the article.

Pension Discussion Begins

LD1105174990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1544 GMT on 11 May continues carrying a recording of the 11 May USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow.

Aleksandra Biryukova, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, speaks on behalf of the government, saying local soviets should decide the matter of when it is appropriate for pensioners to work.

At 1549 GMT Deputy Tsuryupa speaks of the special needs for medical workers.

At 1551 GMT Deputy Bosenko, of the Committee for Veterans' Affairs, comments on the article.

At 1555 GMT Lukyanov sums up the debate so far, suggesting that discussions take place during the lunch break between government representatives and members of commissions, otherwise a vote will be needed.

At 1558 GMT Lukyanov says the next series of articles—25 to 33—concern pensions for invalidity. As there are no speakers, he asks whether the section should be put to the vote. A vote is taken and the section is approved.

At 1600 GMT the next section to be debated, Lukyanov says, concerns pensions in case of loss of breadwinner. There are brief interventions from Deputies Kostishin, Shcherbokov, and Rakhmanova. Lukyanov asks Voronin, representing the government, whether these points will be taken into account. The discussion continues on pensions for invalids.

At 1605 GMT Biryukov speaks again briefly

At 1606 GMT Lukyanov engages in exchanges with other deputies about how the government should approach the invalidity question.

At 1607 GMT Deputy Neumyvakin, of the society for the blind, speaks.

At 1609 GMT an unidentified deputy complains of illogical difference in rates of pensions. Other deputies make similar brief points.

At 1613 GMT Lukyanov says they are now coming to the section dealing with pensions in case of loss of breadwinner—Articles 40 onward.

At 1614 GMT there is an intervention from Deputy Obolenskiy on the detail of Article 46.

At 1616 GMT the government and relevant commission representatives respond to Obolenskiy's points. Lukyanov calls a vote on the section, which is passed with one against, no abstentions (the Soviet of the Union voted 208 for, the Soviet of Nationalities 171 for).

At 1620 GMT Lukyanov makes a brief allusion to Articles 59-61 dealing with privilege pensions, but effective discussion is not possible. He moves on to Articles 67-73, dealing with details of periods of employment qualifying for pension. Interventions come from Deputies Chelyshev and Shchelkanov, who proposes an amendment for those who have served the homeland—he has in mind Afghan veterans and Civil War veterans. A discussion follows on the distinction between those who served at the front and those who did not. Lukyanov puts the amendment to the vote, but the result is not announced. Deputies Nikolaychuk and Kiseleva make minor wording proposals.

At 1635 GMT the government representative (presumably Voronin) restates the thinking on payment of pensions to working individuals, on privilege pensions, citing parallels in other countries.

At 1638 GMT Lukyanov proposes a vote on the amendment proposed by deputies Nikoylaychuk and Kiseleva. The Soviet of Nationalities rejects the amendment—it received only 127 votes, nine short of the required figure. Lukyanov suggests the way out will be to invoke the quorum amendment passed in the wake of the withdrawal of Lithuanian deputies. He calls a vote on this suggestion, which is approved. He then puts the Nikolaychuk-Kiseleva amendment to a second vote.

At 1645 GMT Deputy Andreyeva refers to the situation of persons who have been unjustly imprisoned or exiled, outlining an option involving including the word "rehabilitated" in the bill.

Amendments Debated

LD1105175990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1654 GMT on 11 May continues carrying a recording of the 11 May USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow.

Deputy Shcherbakov argues that oil workers should get the same privileged pension scheme as miners.

At 1655 GMT Lukyanov announces a break

At 1657 GMT the afternoon sitting begins. Lukyanov asks everybody to take their seats.

At 1659 GMT Deputy Ivanov takes the microphone to comment on Article 71, dealing with privileges for serving in the Far North. Another deputy says it is not fair that people who go to the Far North would get pension privileges, while those who have grown up there will not.

At 1702 GMT Deputy Mamedov, many of whose electors are oilmen, wants to speak about the pension position of oilworkers, but Lukyanov is unwilling to let him, saying that the question has already been dealt with. He persists in making his point, however.

At 1703 GMT Deputy Yemelyanenkov takes over, suggesting that the law should be retrospective for people who have gone to the Far North.

At 1705 GMT Deputy Nimbuyev points out that two articles—56 and 74—overlap.

At 1707 GMT Deputy Alekseyev comments on Article 71, which deals with privileges for working in the Far North. Lukyanov for some unaccountable reason thinks he is talking about Article 69, on seasonal work. Once the mix-up is sorted out, Lukyanov clarifies the point. A government representative explains the thinking behind the current wording of Article 71, under which the maximum pension in the Far North could be R542.

At 1711 GMT Deputy Obolenskiy takes the government view to task for its unfairness over those who go to the Far North and those who have always lived there. The unfairness is particularly acute for those who leave the Far North before they are pension-eligible. He puts forward an amendment to the wording.

At 1715 GMT Lukyanov wants to put Article 71 to the vote, but Deputy Yudin asks for the floor to say that the scheme to introduce a retrogressive coefficient on years worked would produce a worse pension for most people than to allow them 1.5 times the number of years worked as a contribution to their pension entitlement.

At 1719 GMT Lukyanov puts the Obolenskiy wording to the vote. Article 71 remains as the committees and commissions proposed.

At 1720 GMT Deputy Pribylova takes the microphone to put the case for medical workers on Article 72, which deals with privilege pensions for people who work in isolation wards in medical establishments, i.e. those coming into contact with contagious infections. She wants an extension of the list of people to include those who work with Aids victims and in areas affected by Chernobyl. A committee and government spokesman says the matter is being looked into.

At 1724 GMT Deputy Borodin is invited to speak: He supports Pribylova's argument.

At 1725 GMT Deputy Shchelkanov Begins to talk about Article 70, suggesting extra benefits for people who served on the home front. Deputy Shcherbakov takes up the same point.

At 1728 GMT Shcherbakov says more work must be done on this point.

At 1731 GMT the government spokesman mentions the problem of verification of having served on the home front in the last war.

Article by Article Discussion Continues

LD1105185390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1735 GMT on 11 May continues carrying a recording of the 11 May USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow.

Discussion continues on the subject of the home front and of people in Leningrad under the blockade. One deputy adds the position of people who were children in concentration camps—"german camps and our camps."

At 1743 GMT Lukyanov suggests voting on an amendment proposed by the government at the instigation of the commission: It is passed by a simple majority—the figures are not given. He then calls a vote on an amendment proposed by Deputy Obolenskiy concerning the Leningrad issue. The result is not announced.

At 1747 GMT Deputy Ignatovich speaks about Article 69 and refers to persons subjected to unjustified repression and asks for a vote on his proposal. Lukyanov calls a vote, with the result that the article remains unchanged.

At 1752 GMT Deputy Koryugin speaks about the problems of providing evidence of the period of qualifying service for pension purposes. Unidentified deputies speak briefly.

At 1756 GMT Deputies Pylnikov and Korshunov return to Ignatovich's proposal to include reference in Article 69 to persons subjected to repression. Lukyanov says it may be possible to do something at a later stage.

At 1757 GMT there is a discussion of the order in which certain articles should be debated.

At 1759 GMT Lukyanov says the next section for debate is Articles 76-98 dealing with pension levels.

At 1800 GMT Deputy Zhuravlev queries the use of different words for salary and quotes what he thinks are some strange discrepancies in pensions for men and women of different ages. Lukyanov suggests referring these matters to the commission.

At 1805 GMT Deputy Sazonov suggests a change of wording in Article 98 to return it to its status before the commission amended it. Exchanges take place between him and Lukyanov.

At 1810 GMT Deputy Kulikov partially backs Sazonov's suggestion.

AT 1812 GMT Deputy Bosenko thinks pensions for special service should be clearly spelled out.

At 1814 GMT Deputy Rogatin says this article is one which entitles people to a pension on the basis of special talent—sportsmen and others. An unidentified deputy adds comment.

At 1816 GMT the government representative says decisions about pensions for people with special merits need to be taken at the appropriate level—local or national. There is too much in Article 98 to be decided now—let the commission work on it further. Lukyanov proposes trying to deal with everything up to Article 97.

At 1820 GMT Deputy Nikolskiy speaks of injustice in Article 94, inasmuch as minimum pensions do not keep pace with minimum pay levels.

At 1822 GMT the government representative defends the existing arrangement in the face of the protests by Zhuravlev and Nikolskiy.

At 1825 GMT Lukyanov declares a break.

Debates, Exchanges Continue

LD1105195990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1825 GMT on 11 May continues carrying a recording of the 11 May USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow.

After the break Lukyanov invites the deputies to register their presence and sit down.

At 1826 GMT back to the pensions law, Deputy Igityan takes the microphone to plead the case of artists, particularly when they have been part-time artists. In that case they must choose whether to have their salaries or their royalties taken into consideration for pension purposes. The committee spokesman comes back to express the view of his committee. After the clarification Igityan withdraws his amendment.

At 1830 GMT Deputy Piryazeva rejects Deputy Shcherbakov's views on pensions, but supports Deputy Zhuravlev. She wants a name-by-name vote on personal pensions. Lukyanov says the matter will be discussed. She pleads the case of some chemical industry workers.

At 1835 GMT Deputy Alekseyev comes back on Article 71 and the Far North question.

At 1837 GMT Deputy Ignatyev agrees that it is unfair when a Far North person leaves his native region—he loses lots of pension and other privileges.

At 1838 GMT Deputy Nikolaychuk deals with Article 96 and the wording "regional coefficient."

At 1840 GMT the proposal is to remove the third paragraph from Article 71. Indistinct exchanges from the floor demonstrate a division of opinion.

At 1841 GMT Deputy Yudin is unsure where the unfairness lies, since Article 76 entitles Far North people to a full pension anyway.

At 1843 GMT the committee representative says his committee has met with Far North representatives to hear their views. He agrees that the last words of Article 96 could be removed.

At 1845 GMT an unidentified deputy sums up the state of affairs as they relate to people in the Far North.

At 1847 GMT Lukyanov says there is a certain consensus to remove the words "without applying the regional coefficient" from the bill.

In a vote the first version is adopted. Alekseyev withdraws his amendment.

At 1850 GMT Shchelkanov tries to say something, but Lukyanov silences him. Shchelkanov wants to mention a specific illogicality.

At 1852 GMT Deputy Obolenskiy on Article 77 Part 1, proposing a certain wording.

At 1854 GMT the committee wants the former wording to be retained. Voting on the amendment ensues: The amendment is defeated.

At 1855 GMT just two articles have to be examined today: Articles 24 and 98. Voronin is invited to tackle these.

Voronin explains the committee view on Article 24.

At 1857 GMT Deputy Dikul proposes Paragraph 2 be removed entirely.

At 1900 GMT Government spokesman Voronin moves on to Article 98 to explain this article.

At 1902 GMT Lukyanov says the article has more or less been adopted already. It is just that some deputies want the old version adopted.

At 1903 GMT a vote is called on returning to the old version of Article 98.

Lukyanov is obliged to repeat what he wants to be done. At long last he succeeds and the motion to return to the old version is put to the vote: It is rejected, so the new version is adopted, but Deputy Rogatin put forward a proposal to include sportsmen and masters of sport. This amendment is put to the vote and rejected by the Soviet of Nationalities. Voronin says since the newest version includes this amendment, it should be accepted automatically.

At 1915 GMT Deputy Osipov wants to know exactly what is meant by "special services."

At 1916 GMT an unidentified deputy wants "physical exercise specialists" removed, to leave just "sportsmen."

Ammendments Voted On

LD1105202290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1918 GMT on 11 May continues carrying a recording of the 11 May Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow.

An unidentified deputy says artiste of renown of the likes of Plisetskaya do not need the extra few rubles; we should be thinking about old people who are really in need.

At 1920 GMT an unidentified deputy takes up again the situation of people unjustly subjected to criminal proceedings or represssions and proposes a change of wording in Article 79. Lukyanov calls for a vote on it; the amendment is passed.

At 1923 GMT Deputy Burykh refers to Article 78 as it applies to doctors and how much of their income should be taken into account. Lukyanov calls on a committee representative to comment, then a government representative. Burykh insists that the situation of doctors is unfair. After some further discussion Burykh agrees to let the matter drop without a vote.

At 1928 GMT Lukyanov says the next session is Articles 99-105, on the pay-out of pensions. He proceeds immediately to a vote on this; the section is passed.

At 1930 GMT Deputy Schelkanov raises a proposal concerning Article 114, whether part of a person's pension can be transferred to another member of the family. Lukyanov calls a vote on the amendment: The article remains as originally drafted.

At 1931 GMT Deputy Chelyshev proposes a change to Article 107 on pension payments to invalids. Deputy Obolenskiy responds with an amendment, on which Lukyanov calls a vote: The wording remains as per the draft.

At 1935 GMT Lukyanov proposes debating Section 3 (Articles 119-128) dealing with social pensions. A vote approves the section.

At 1941 GMT Deputy Kiseleva introduces a "small" change to the wording. The committee decides not to change the wording.

At 1942 GMT Section 4 passed after a vote.

At 1943 GMT the last session (Section five) on the rights of union and autonomous republics, local soviets of people's deputies, and labor collectives is adopted.

At 1944 GMT Deputy Panfilova takes the microphone to suggest that the word "personal" be detached from the phrase "personal pension" in Articles 129 and 131 with reference to "outstanding services:" to the republic.

At 1945 GMT Deputy Naumov of the Society of Inventors complains of the lack of pension privileges which they have. He Cites an article in today's TRUD newspaper.

At 1946 GMT Deputy Sukharuchenko rejects the rewording of Article 131.

At 1948 GMT the committee spokesman explains its position.

At 1949 GMT if we exclude the word "personal" from the section, can we vote on it? Lukyanov asks. It is adopted after a vote.

At 1951 GMT the announcer says the discussion will be continued at further sittings.

Lukyanov Sets Out Supreme Soviet Agenda

LD1105203990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0830 GMT 11 May 90

[Speech by Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, at USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin on 11 May—recorded]

[Text] We have tentatively agreed with you that the third session of the Supreme Soviet could finish its work by the end of May. Hence we have for our work a little over two weeks; commissions are going to be working at the same time as well. During this period we have to examine a considerable number of draft laws and other issues which we included in the agenda at the beginning of the session. We intend to adopt a law on pensions this week; we received a great number of telegrams and letters from our voters who insist that the first thing we should do is to pass a law on pensions. We intend to complete the debates on the first reading of the draft law on tax collected from enterprises, to examine draft acts, submitted, as you remember, by commissions, on defending the honor and dignity of the president, and on safeguarding his protection, as well as to form a commission on the procedure of work of the highest bodies of the state power of the USSR. All this is for the next two days, on Monday and Tuesday next week. We are intending to examine draft laws on appointing and releasing of the heads and other officials of the enterprises. The Soviet of Nationalities adopted it, the Soviet of the Union has some remarks regarding it, it looks like we have to come to an agreement on these draft laws.

We are intending to consider a draft law on the rights of state tax inspections, because the law about tax was adopted, but inspections do not exist. The Council of Ministers, together with our commissions, has done fundamental work on it recently—we have a draft. The law on Soviet citizenship is the last law from the national and state laws package. We are intending to discuss the adoption of the amendments to the law regarding women, family, and childhood. We adopted a resolution on women. Now we have to change the law in connection with it. We are intending to listen to information concerning a draft law on the procedure of recalling a USSR people's deputy, which is being submitted by the committee on the soviets and which has been made ready for publication.

We are intending to spend Wednesday, Thursday and Friday working in committees and commissions. We arranged it, comrades, this way first of all because the Congress of Peoples Deputies of the RSFSR will start its work at that time and the first sessions of our largest republics—the Ukraine and Belorussia will take place. Then we will have to discuss a most important question about the practical implementation of the program of the Soviet government to rehabilitate the economy of the country and of the measures to make the transition to the planned and market economy more radical.

We will be discussing the entire package of draft laws, we will discuss a very vital government report. Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov requested that during this very time, it would be right after that break, this very government report on all the problems connected with making the economic reform in the country more radical should be examined.

Supreme Soviet Debates Draft Law on Pensions

LD1105112790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 11 May 90

[Report by Lyudmila Semina on the USSR Supreme Soviet session]

[Excerpts] Today discussion continued on the draft law on pension provisions for USSR citizens. Voting article by article is now under way. [passage omitted] Now, after the interval, the deputies will return to Article 24, the procedure for paying pensions to working pensioners. At the insistence of a number of deputies, there is discussion on the possibility of paying full pensions to those who are working not only as workers and skilled workers—There are a number of other jobs on the list—but also to those who work with their brain—engineers and technical workers, say. The government specifically Biryukova and Shcherbakov, do not consider it possible to pay everyone both salaries and pensions as this will block the path for young specialists. The deputies did not agree with them. A compromise formula appeared: to pay them as long as a specific-term labor contract is concluded. Perhaps justice will triumph. Voting will soon be held on this formula. [passage omitted]

According to the schedule distributed on the May sittings of the session today will be very intensive. The most important sittings are planned for 21 and 22 May. There will be a report from the USSR Council of Ministers and a decision made implementing the USSR Government program to improve the country's economy and on measures to radicalize the transfer to a planned and market economy.

Primakov Released as Priveliges Chairman

LD1105165190 Moscow TASS in English 1615 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] At a joint session of its two houses today, the Soviet Parliament continued to discuss the second reading of a pension bill, started in April. Its implementation would cost 34 billion roubles a year. At present, 65 billion roubles is applied to all kinds of pensions.

The Parliament will probably adopt this extremely complicated and detailed legal act comprising more than 130 articles tomorrow.

Under the scheme, the overwhelming majority of Soviet citizens will be eligible for so-called work pensions. Men will start collecting them upon reaching the age of 60, after having worked for at least 25 years. For women, the figures will be 55 and 20 years correspondingly.

A new type of pensions, to be known as social, will be introduced for persons who, for various reasons, lack the required work record.

Union republics, local councils and work collectives will be allowed to fix additional pensions and benefits.

Towards the end of the day, the Parliament relieved Yevgeniy Primakov of his duties as chairman of the Commission on Privileges. He was recently appointed a member of the Presidential Council.

The commission was set up last summer at the first Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR to eradicate unjustified perks.

The Parliament did not, however, elect a new chairman: the candidacy of Leningrad researcher Aleksandr Demidov did not gain the necessary majority of votes.

The formation of another parliamentary commission, on the procedure for the operation of top bodies of authority, remains unresolved. The Parliament decided to resume the debate on this issue after additional study.

The two houses will have a joint sitting tomorrow to adopt the pension law and complete the discussion of the first reading of the bill on taxing enterprises

The Supreme Soviet is also planning to consider bills on the protection of the honour and dignity of the president, and on his maintenance and protection.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Addresses Higher Education Meeting

LD1105165290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 11 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Vremya Announcer Kira Grigoryeva] Today Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has taken part in an all-Union meeting of rectors of higher educational establishments.

[Correspondent S. Lomakhin] It was no accident that the rectors invited the USSR president to this purely professional meeting. How is the higher educational establishment affected by future cardinal changes in the economy? What are the prospects for the development of the country's intellectual potential? Finally, what are the president's personal ideas on the role of higher education in the conditions of perestroyka? [video shows Gorbachev and Medvedev walking through a foyer, Gorbachev exchanging pleasantries with an unidentified woman]

In the opinion of many participants, education today will determine the country's future, its long- and short-term prospects. Unfortunately, for long years the education system has been playing second fiddle, as it were, an outcast of society. This was done without evil intent. The state simply washed its hands of the multitude of problems in the higher educational establishment, taking refuge behind supposedly more serious issues. As a result there is the real threat of the intellectual retardation of society. And many lecturers consider that this could become exacerbated by the introduction of the market and local self-government. Already at present, during the transfer of enterprises to self-financing, respect for higher education has been drastically diminished, the number of students is falling, and graduates are confronted with difficulties finding employment.

The State Committee on Public Education Strategy is aimed at the maximum possible increase in the level of education of the people. You see, people with higher education look at social problems on a more long-term basis than less educated people, and this is especially necessary now. The leaders of the higher educational establishment see ways out of the present situation by granting higher educational establishments independence, increasing the quality of teaching, and introducing a second higher education requiring payment.

Speaking before the participants, the USSR president drew attention to the fact that half of the personnel in public education do not meet modern requirements. But what will happen tomorrow? Of course, a state program to transform the mechanism of protecting the higher educational establishment is also needed. Now, when the country is starting radicalization of economic reform, it is important to convince society to reject an egalitarian [uravnitelnoy] psychology and, as they say, who better than the higher educational establishments? Without conscious, productive, high-quality labor it will be impossible to change the very state of society and a new education system must help in this respect. In conclusion, the USSR president answered the numerous questions of the participants in the meeting. [video shows the meeting in session, Gorbachev and Medvedev identified on the rostrum]

Supports Higher Education Reform

PM1105201590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 90 First Edition pp 1-2

[V. Ryashin report: "Higher Class for Higher Education"]

[Text] A meeting of rectors of the country's VUZ's [higher educational institutions] has opened in Moscow. M.S. Gorbachev addressed its participants.

Probably few people today know about the "secret list" of Academician Ivan Georgiyevich Petrovskiy. But at one time this document was famous in its own way. On it the rector of Moscow State University, who headed the country's premier university for approximately a quarter-century, noted the names of students who, being expelled for offenses of various kinds, were reinstated in the VUZ on his orders.

The experiment, which carried a certain risk, went on for years. And Ivan Georgiyevich is said to have been pleased with the results: The rector's wards, whose destiny might have been smashed by chance, included many outstanding researchers and specialists. Ivan Georgiyevich Petrovskiy, an outstanding scientist and brilliant organizer of higher schools, was noted for being particularly perspicacious with regard to gifted young people.

I believe it is perfectly natural that the meeting of the country's rectors, which opened yesterday in Moscow's Sociopolitical Center, discussed precisely Soviet traditions of higher education, among which probably the chief tradition is attention to and encouragement of talent.

This was also spoken of by M.S. Gorbachev, USSR president and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Making a political assessment of the present situation in the country and pointing out that perestroyka is now going through a very important and in many ways critical phase, he voiced confidence that the Soviet intelligentsia will be with the party, with the progressive forces of our society which is renewing itself.

Mikhail Sergeyevich supported the idea of the reform of higher education. Yes, it is needed, but on the basis of a clear concept which, however, does not resolve mere fleeting problems but divines the prospects for society's development. Otherwise we will not avoid the miscalculations which have been exposed today in the course of fulfilling earlier adopted decisions.

The VUZ system really is revealing many paradoxes now. We speak of emulating developed countries. But the number of students there is constantly growing. The opposite trend has become apparent in our country. According to the data of the USSR State Committee for Statistics, during the first four years of the current five-year plan 3.2 million specialists were trained in the country—201,000 fewer than during the same period in the last five-year plan. The following fact also arouses concern: The best VUZ's are cutting admissions, while the weak ones, conversely, are increasing them, frequently inflating the intake artificially.

The present proportions of daytime and correspondence training of specialists also need revising. It is hardly normal that more than two-thirds of graduates of jurisprudence VUZ's and faculties obtain diplomas as a result of part-time studies.

Unfortunately, these are now far from the best times for higher education. This is not always connected with the contradictions of its internal development. Many problems have arisen in connection with the new economic situation and the upcoming switch to market relations.

The report of G.A. Yagodin, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Public Education, stated, in particular, that the transfer of industrial enterprises to conditions of economic accountability has resulted in enterprises having less interest in investments in higher education. The CPSU Central Committee and government resolution on partial compensation for the costs of training specialists is not being fulfilled in practice. There is an increasing number of cases of a refusal to take graduates on for work under earlier approved allocation plans. The plan for capital construction of teaching blocks and social sphere projects in public education is not being fulfilled.

Substantial difficulties are arising because of the outflow of VUZ service personnel to cooperatives and joint ventures.

Joint efforts by VUZ's themselves, the government, and the Supreme Soviet are needed in order to survive this complex period and not only maintain, but also increase the potential of higher schools for meeting the needs for world-class specialists in a society which is embarking on a path of dynamic development.

Of course, higher schools cannot live on freeloading hopes alone. Their scientific creative reserve is tremendous. It only remains to find the most efficient ways of realizing it.

The rectors are discussing many questions in the debates which have gotten under way in the sociopolitical center: improving the quality of the training of specialists, their philosophical development, raising the standard of the teaching and professorial staff, integrating VUZ's and academy institutes, granting autonomy to VUZ's, and relations with soviets and state organs.

Another range of problems concerns the party and higher schools. Answering questions connected with the upcoming 28th CPSU Congress, Mikhail Sergeyevich said that the forum of the country's communists will enrich the party and society with new ideas. I expect no extraordinary happenings at the congress, he said, although there is talk of a possible split and of the possibility that the CPSU will cease to be Leninist. The renewed party after the congress will not be weakened but, on the contrary, strengthened, having preserved its positions as the vanguard of society.

V.A. Medvedev is participating in the meeting of rectors. The debates will continue tomorrow.

Education Crucial to Societal Growth

PM1405090590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 May 90 Second Edition pp 1,2

[TASS: "The Social Imperative of the Times"]

[Text] On 11 May there took place in Moscow an all-Union meeting of rectors devoted to topical problems of education and the work of higher educational establishments in contemporary conditions. USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev spoke at the meeting.

Listening to the rectors' speeches, he said, I have become even more convinced that such a meeting was simply essential, and I am gratified that it has taken place, given all the shortage of time. In my opinion the main thing has already been said in the speeches. You may proceed from the premise that I agree with the thesis that has been expressed and substantiated here about the primary nature of public education and about the priority role of higher education in the progress of society. I am convinced that this is the correct, state formulation of the issue. We frequently say that the most effective capital investments are investments in the sphere of education and culture. We all seem to acknowledge this. But the concern and the acuteness which were present in the rectors' speeches testify that you have grounds for great concern. I share your concern. Evidently, we must urgently engage in an assessment of the situation in order to transform it subsequently into policies and into specific solutions.

People have been saying here that presidential reform of education is needed. I don't think that it is a matter of terminology. Generally speaking, over the whole recent period we have been engaged in reforming that sphere. During the years of perestroyka we have regarded reform of public education and higher education as important aspects of our work and a number of decisions have been adopted on this. The fact that these decisions were then subjected to revision along the way, so to speak, is another matter, although we can now see that they were already insufficient from the outset. If it has already turned out that even those modest decisions, to put it bluntly, have not been fulfilled, then that is a bad thing.

Higher education is a state matter, and to a significant degree I ascribe the fact that it has happened like this to the central departments, although you, too, must fight for the decisions that have been adopted, of course.

We must act, comrades, and not hope that someone will give something to us on a plate. You see, even after decisions have been issued, enormous efforts are needed for them to work—intellectual, practical and organizational efforts, as well as great economic activity on all levels. That's how it is everywhere.

We ought now to have a state policy in education and higher education which is adequate to the current situation and the current, crucial stage in the development of society. Reform of public education and higher education was planned in certain conditions of economic life. The conditions are now changing radically. We have arrived at a phase of fundamental changes in society itself and education should always not only reflect them, but even outstrip them so that society might prepare itself better through education to apprehend new ideas, approaches and forms of life.

Therefore, the idea that a truly contemporary reform of education is necessary emerges naturally from the thesis of the primary nature of education and higher education at the current stage of our socitey's development when it is gripped by revolutionary renewal which is profound and serious. We should thoroughly consider this concept, so that we don't find ourselves under pressure from problems of the moment—and there are many of these in the development of higher education.

Of course, specific problems cannot be ignored either. Many questions were heard in today's discussion which require rapid reaction and solutions. I wish to say at once, in order not to linger too long on this section, that we shall study the shorthand report of this meeting, extract all the practical proposals from it, issue appropriate instructions and attempt to work through them with Comrade Yagodin.

I welcome the idea of an association of rectors, but you think it through so that it is not a formalized governmental structure. I think it should be an organization that would generate ideas and would be a good environment for meetings, exchanges, and comparisons of opinions. Such a form of interaction is necessary. It seems to me this idea has already formed in your minds, and all the cards, so to speak, are in your hands. You decide which form this association should take, but it must immediately start working out proposals and its concepts. It must express your view on the development of the form of higher education. It is necessary first and foremost to correctly realize the prospective demands of a society undergoing renewal. It is necessary to correctly realize wherein lies the destiny of higher education and of the whole system of public education at the present crucial stage. This will assist in correctly forecasting what higher education should be like, what sort of cadres it must train, and on what principles it should operate. Most importantly what sort of teaching cadres must be at its disposal to be capable of tackling new tasks.

Many comrades, in particular, say, and I share this approach, that another material basis is necessary today because the level of training is linked with it and all the more so the development of capabilities for scientific research. Of course we cannot do without this, but a major question is the cadres of higher education. I welcome your self-critical approach to this issue. This means we have in the person of the present corps of rectors responsible statesmen, capable of soberly regarding things.

The transformation of today's higher education into a higher education of the future—and the not-so-distant future at that—is clearly a priority task; one cannot solve everything at once, some sort of transitional period will be needed. One thing, however, is clear—higher education will not be able to manage without all possible backing, including financial, material, and other backing, from the state during this very difficult period. There is a need, especially in today's economic conditions, for mechanisms of support and protection, because to leave higher education to its own devices and to leave it in the lurch would in my opinion be irresponsible and would contradict the main thesis with which our conversation began. We need a new higher education which is capable of influencing society, of enhancing its intellectual potential, and without which we are doomed to mark time or move along slowly which is not what the situation demands now.

I, therefore, want to issue an invitation to you: Let us start taking more active measures and formulate a state program for transforming higher education. I shall give the appropriate instructions within the Presidential Council; a decree should perhaps be adopted with regard to this. Relying on your ideas we can determine a circle of people who will be responsible for this work, in conjunction with the corps of rectors. Let them put forward specific proposals, along with alternative options.

That is the first thing I wanted to say.

At the present time our society really needs scientific support for those immense changes and transformations which are underway within it.

Here I want to say that maybe our greatest difficulty is the fact that it is not all that easy to grasp these profound, revolutionary, and far-reaching transformations. We talk about a revolution, but when all the signs of a revolution suddenly appear, we begin to panic. Already we hear talk of danger, anarchy, instability, chaos, catastrophe, civil war, destruction, and apocalypse. This is the reaction of an unprepared mind.

We have embarked on radical perestroyka and revolutionary transformations, without which we cannot put our society on the road of dynamic development in the context of world civilization. We are doing this in what is possibly one of the most complex societies among the major states. We have many complexes relating to world outlook, ideology, different views on life, the economy, the functioning of political institutions, and the development of the political process. For us democracy is something which we are still only beginning to understand. Just think how much more effort we have to make in order to master a political culture connected with the development of democratic processes and glasnost. Just think how much has surfaced which not only embarrasses us, but makes us afraid and even makes us ask why, if this is democracy, why do we need democracy of this kind? Everyone can see how acute this whole business is.

The biggest complexes are those affecting our views on ownership, economic relations, labor, and ways of stimulating it. The leveling psychology is a deadly one for us. We are already dismantling the command and administrative system which has shackled our entire society in all spheres. We are reinvigorating all our institutions, both in society, the state, and the economy. But if we do not break down this highly engrained psychology, if we do not destroy it completely, we will stay trapped by the old approaches and our progress will be slow. Our society will not be receptive to science and culture and will remain at a low level.

A year or two ago I set myself the task of completely reading Lenin's speeches during the first post-revolutionary period, and also everything which was said at the party congresses held during those years under Lenin.

I collected all the transcripts and read them. This was an instructive exercise in every respect. It helps even now, at a time of a very profound and powerful politicization of society—as was the case then, too. In connection with the discussion on today's problem, I am reminded that at the congress, Lenin was to deliver the report on the political part of the program and its other sections. The second rapporteur was Bukharin. So, first of all the reports were delivered. Then these questions were discussed in sections.

I recalled one of these discussions. Bukharin and others had to justify the thesis that we should move from distributive to productive communism. Everything that had been expropriated had been distributed and consumed in one and a half to two years. Then it turned out: We need to produce. Have a read of our press today and it writes practically nothing about labor. About lofty productive labor; about talent; about how it is necessary to reward it; that it is necessary to encourage the worker's, the peasant's, the intelelctual's, the scientist's, the writer's labor, and productive labour in general. They write more about how somewhere or something or other needs to be removed and redistributed. Indeed, there are really a lot of distortions in the sphere of distribution. This is a current theme, and I do not want to belittle its importance. nevertheless, we must think about how, by means of scientific and technical progress, by advancing and encouraging it, by means of reforming property relations, by promoting the individual as an active participant in the economic sphere, we can reach a new level of progress in society and open up the possibilities of our system and of productive labor.

I have spoken more than once about the perniciousness of the wage-leveling psychology. In bringing order into distribution, we must think first and foremost of encouraging creative labor in all spheres of the life of our society. If we do not change our situation in this regard in the very near futrue, we as a nation will wither. More than that, people will depart—and are already departing.

In our country a talented worker, and all the more so if he is a lessee, is called a rockefeller and they try to squeeze him. In one of the regions they even set fire to the farm of a lessee since he had shown good results and received a high income, thereby putting everyone in an awkward position. This shows what state our public awareness is at.

Higher education, and the whole system of popular education, must help us change this social awareness. No political preachers will do this. This can only be done by the system of our popular education, including higher education. This, I believe, is the social decree of the times. Otherwise we shall not master the problem we have come straight up against. I am counting on your understanding and support in this, for I know who I am talking to.

A few words about the situation in which we are now living. It has been rightly said that we are now at the most important and critical phase of perestroyka of our society. We have arrived in earnest at the implementation of cardinal measures to radicalize the economic reform, and we have determined its priorities.

In coming days there will be a session of the Presidential Council that is to sum up the results of the last two sessions and of the government's work to build a plan of action aimed at radicalizing the transformations in the sphere of the economy.

We cannot postpone the reforms in the sphere of our federation and of interethnic relations even for a day, figuratively speaking. There are now the legal, intellectual, and practical preconditions for engaging in this in a real way. If this is not done, this process will develop spontaneously, and will be accompanied by painful phenomena that will have an effect on the whole of perestroyka and will complicate the political situation in the country. For this reason the forthcoming session of the Council of the Federation will be devoted to a fundamental exchange of opinions on how, in what forms, in what time span, and by what steps the process of reforming our federation and of filling it with new substance must be advanced.

Finally, to take the political reform, we have reached a point where we have a new body of deputies after the end of the elections to soviets at all levels. New people have come in: Experienced and inexperienced, careful and improvident, ambitious or othewise, but they are new people, and the body of deputies is now becoming involved in life and is forming the executive bodies. The soviets are assigned new rights by the law on general principles of local self-government. So here, too, from top to bottom, we are implementing cardinal changes and a transfer of power from party bodies into the soviets' hands in a real way. This is a most complex process, including for the party itself, which formed under different conditions. Power is now passing to the soviets. Cadres need to be formed there who are capable of working under the new conditions of democracy, glasnost, and economic reform.

Finally, perestroyka of the party itself. We are on the eve of the 28th CPSU Congress. From the discussion which has unfolded in the country you can see how many problems have accumulated here and what questions the congress must answer.

I would like to hope that as we pass through the pre-congress discussion on draft documents, and as we compare communists' opinions and statements—welcoming everything which is of substance—we will arm the party and society with program goals via the renewed Central Committee platform. I think it will be thoroughly renewed. Commissions and working groups have been set up in the Central Committee, which are working on the enhancement of proposals for the CPSU Central Committee platform. I think we will acquire different party rules, too, which will now reflect the needs of a new, reformed party, and above all rules which will create legal—in the party sense—preconditions for an increase in the role of rank and file communists in primary organizations.

The fact that we have gone for such elections of the body of delegates to the congress makes it possible to form elected bodies that will be up to executing the new functions placed upon the party organization, upon the party. I think that the very composition of the delegates, which is being formed directly by communists themselves, will be a substantial prerequisite of this. By relying on the active participation of this body at the congress, we will be able to form also a central committee that would successfully lead the party, directing its activity in the new conditions.

I do not expect any extraordinary events, although there is talk about a split, about the party giving up its positions and that, strictly, it will no longer be a party that can continue the Leninist cause. I think that exactly by going through the pre-congress stage and discussions the congress itself will arrive at such fundamental decisions and the party will take an important step along the path of mastering its new role—as the political vanguard of society—and will be equal to those transformations which are taking place there. I am deeply convinced that there will be no weakening, but on the contrary, a strengthening of the party.

At the congress we will very thorougly discuss the question of how we ought to act in the conditons of real political pluralism. For a multi-party system is not all that far away and the processes of the formation of political movements, of political organizations are already under way. I think the CPSU should be open for dialogue and cooperation, for alliance with all political movements which are interested in the implementation of the policy of perestroyka, and in this sense, use must be made of the whole intellectural and democratic potential of our society. I think we should realize once and for all that we have taken leave of the political monopoly of the CPSU and should be ready to act in the conditions of democracy and of political pluralism.

To put it briefly, we have really come to a very important phase of the transformations. If we can master all that, we will find the true solutions which life itself and the processes of perestroyka demand. Then we will catch the initiative for a long time and, moreover, will mightily move perestroyka ahead. Everything will be decided now, in these months. Is this process happening simply? No, it is taking place in struggle. Moreover, such a stage has now arrived where positons are crystallizing. I think that through these measures we will step up efforts in the main direction of perestroyka, will gain more supporters and more support. At the same time, probably, we will come up against the need to wage a resolute struggle against those adversaries who would like to leave everything as it is and those who, profiting by the difficulties and guided by their political ambitions, would like to whip up perestroyka, to urge it on, and thereby, perhaps, to confuse us.

I ought to say that both dangers are there for all to see. Moreover, sad as it is, this emerged during the concluding section of the May Day demonstration. Although it was presumably planned under democratic slogans, concern for society and perestroyka was clearly far from the thoughts of some of the people there. It was a political provocation, not just dissent. A spade should be called a spade. The main thrust was against Lenin, against the CPSU, and against perestroyka. The organizers expected to get half a million onto the square, but only 17-20 thousand turned out, although many of those later distanced themselves from what occurred. All this is far removed from democracy, and I believe anybody with a conscience and a sense of responsibility before the people should distance himself from this reactionary sortie.

We must do all we can to avoid retreating from the main direction: via democratic and political approaches, the consolidation of society, and transformations, to proceed and act resolutely against anyone who pulls us back. The past holds no answers to the problems that stand before our society. There are lessons and, of course, the best that preceding generations have done.

We must seek out answers by moving resolutely forward, continuing with the transformations within the framework of socialist choice, and taking account of the experience of world civilization. I believe we have now grasped all this and it has already developed, although discussion of this is taking place. Some believe that to return pan-human values to the heart of politics means virtually surrendering the positions of socialism. This interpretation stems from the dogmatism, quotation-mongering, and retarded thinking which used to deprive us of the opportunity to create. Classical thinkers used to rethink their views radically whenever life moved on, and the logic of events demonstrated the weakness of this or that theoretical tenet and called for a rethink.

It is very important for us to successfully resolve the tasks at this crucial and fateful time, for we will be living in 10, 15, 20 and 100 years according to how we have resolved them. It is very important for us that the intellectual section of society, our intelligentsia, our higher education, should be with the progressive forces of the party at this time and that they should render support, both intellectual and practical, at this difficult stage in all respects. I should like you to report this idea to your colleagues and to our student youth.

I have met students and spoken with them in detail. I must say that a profound impression has remained with me from my contacts with them. In general, young people, the young men and women are with us. They are presently seeking their place, because they understand that the future lies ahead. We should maintain constant contact with students and hold a continuous dialogue. People have spoken here about the need to regularly hold meetings such as today's meeting. I think so, too. Given all the shortage of time, we must find opportunities to speak openly, sharing our doubts, to understand each other and tackle the problems facing us together.

The meeting we have organized with you through our joint efforts should become a departure point for fresh joint considerations by us so that, as a result, we might reach a state policy in the sphere of higher education that might comply with the interests of the present stage of our society's development. We should understand that if we do not carry out a restructuring of education, then all the reforms will simply come up against our people's intellectual unpreparedness. So this is the paramount issue. I hope we have a mutual understanding here. Let us begin our work proceeding precisely from this mutual understanding. Thank you for meeting me.

Ligachev Answers Questions on Party, Agriculture

PM1105193190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 90 First Edition p 3

[Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, answers questions in "Discussion Sheet No. 31" feature under the rubric "Echo of Festival: Verbal Edition of 'Discussion Sheet'"; first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction: "Realistic Thought and Action"]

[Text] On 5 May this year Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, participated in a verbal version of the "Discussion Sheet" feature on the subject "The Party and Perestroyka: On the Eve of the 28th CPSU Congress." We publish his replies to the notes and questions asked by participants in the discussion.

[Question] Yegor Kuzmich, do you believe that there is a real threat of a split in the CPSU?

[Ligachev] Many opinions and views have been and are being expressed on this score. A group withdrawal from the party is possible. This must not be ruled out. Let us discuss it. A multiparty system is becoming a reality. Various platforms and trends are taking shape organizationally. The party's ideological and organizational foundations and the link between party ranks and the working masses have been allowed to become weak. All this has resulted in the strengthening of centrifugal and separatist trends in the CPSU.

In its open letter the CPSU Central Committee urged every Communist to take a clear stand in the ideological struggle. We really need the consolidation of party ranks precisely on a principled basis. Opponents of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th congress try to ascribe to the Central Committee's letter something that is not there. It is a question not of a struggle against dissidence but of a leave-taking [razmezhevaniye] of those who are weakening the party by their actions. They simply have to withdraw from the CPSU, or rather, leave it.

[Question] What is your position with regard to creating a Russian Communist Party?

[Ligachev] I can say that my position did not evolve at once, but it is quite definite now: I favor a Russian Communist Party. Within the CPSU, of course. Difficulties in resolving this problem exist right now. However, I believe it is already impossible to avoid creating a Russian Communist Party. Why? The creation of a Communist Party in the Russian Soviet Federated Soviet Republic will help to develop political structures in the republic, to strengthen the party's patriotic activity, to successfully resolve socioeconomic problems, and consequently, it will also benefit the Soviet Union as a whole. It is important that Russian communists assert the CPSU's unity and the integrity of the renewed Soviet Federation by word and deed. The lessons of the Lithuanian Communist Party and its former leaders, who have essentially become bankrupt, should be remembered. A Communist Party that takes up positions of nationalism has no prospect or future.

[Question] You were at the 21st Komsomol Congress. What were your impressions?

[Ligachev] It is very difficult to give a brief reply, and so I will speak of the chief thing. Yes, there were attempts to lead the country astray, in a hopeless direction. Yes, much valuable time was wasted on procedural questions. But the chief thing was decided: The Komsomol has been preserved as a communist youth league. The main congress documents emphasize that the Komsomol participates in elaborating and implementing CPSU policy. Whole groups of delegates came up and expressed alarm over the fate of young people under a multiparty system. One of the lessons that I draw from the Komsomol congress is that all of us—communists and every primary party organization—must resolutely address young people and their interests and be mentors and friends of youth. Otherwise the party is doomed.

[Question] Do you really believe that it is possible to achieve great socioeconomic changes and to resolve the food task without changing production relations in the countryside?

[Ligachev] No, I have never thought that, and I do not think it or believe it now. I have always believed and repeatedly said that a radical change in economic production relations is an accelerator to progress, including in the countryside. I advocate a diversity of forms of socialist ownership and equal rights for all of them. It is very important that the peasant should be the master of the land, the master of the results of his labor. If he wants to become a lessee on a kolkhoz [collective farm] or sovkhoz [state farm], his desire must be supported. If he wants to set up a private farm, he must also be helped.

In my view, priority must be given to public ownership in the form of state and cooperative enterprises in combination with private homesteads (family farms). Kolkhozes and sovkhozes also need profound changes. They will become cooperatives of lease collectives. Being transformed into cooperatives, lessees' associations, and joint-stock companies in close combination with private farms, they will acquire a new look and new collectivist qualities. At the same time, on entering a system of integrated ties with all kinds of associations, agricombines, and agrifirms, they will be able to make full use of their highly productive equipment and of progressive scientific achievements. For no form of ownership can produce good results without good equipment and modern working conditions.

For all the importance of improving production relations in the countryside, it is necessary to constantly remember such key questions as the technical equipment of rural labor and the peasant's social provision. Life in the countryside today is inferior to life in the city. Is this not the reason why the food question is being resolved only slowly?

[Question] You are sometimes called a conservative. What is your attitude toward this?

[Ligachev] As for myself, I count myself neither a conservative nor a radical. I count myself a realist. I have always believed and believe now that realistic thought and action in politics and in life is of decisive significance. How many cases of zigzagging and running ahead have there been? We know how it ended. And the years of perestroyka make us think. I favor consistency, gradualness, and steadfastness in transforming society. What I understand here by gradualness is a transition from stage to stage, from point to point. More effort and time must be spent on working at and preparing reforms, and it is necessary to consult with people, specialists, and the public and to discuss various projects. It is particularly important to foresee the results and consequences of the decisions adopted.

[Question] Yegor Kuzmich, the impression has been formed that you favor tough leadership methods. Forgive me—this probably could be unpleasant for you—but could you not voice your opinion about this and on the question of democratization in the party? And again. Maybe, "such" shaping of public opinion around your name is of benefit to someone?

[Ligachev] I will begin with the question about democratization. I entirely favor the party's renewal and, above all, its democratization. This process is taking place, albeit more slowly than it should, but it is taking place. On top of everything, I like this—I have always sought simplicity of relations, accessibility, and respectability. I have always been interested in things and am now, and I cannot abide bureaucrats who regard the process of relations [as published] and the acquisition of a post as of paramount importance.

As regards toughness, it depends how you understand it. I disagree with it in the sense of severity, but in the sense of exactingness—yes. Working for many years in Siberia—and living conditions there, as you know, are difficult—I was always aiming for a result and endeavored to combine exactingness with concern for people. I believe that even now, under conditions of the democratization of our life, leaders of any rank, including party workers, need qualities such as the ability to organize things, to ensure control over the fulfillment of what is planned, and to really influence an improvement in people's living and working conditions. See how people recognize and evaluate windbags and demagogues, who have increased considerably in number—those who mount the rostrum with alluring programs and platforms and do not think about the fact that they have to be fulfilled. That is, they do not think about people or, more accurately, they deceive them.

At the same time I always associate democracy with ensuring legitimate order and conscious discipline. How could it be otherwise? We have already seen quite clearly for ourselves in recent years what democracy and glasnost lead to without observance of order and discipline. Workers, kolkhoz members, and leaders constantly talk to me about this when I visit oblasts, republics, and Moscow's labor collectives.

Follow-Up Story of Illegal Tank Parts Sale

LD1105215290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 11 May 90

[from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Of the many letters the program receives every day, it is very rare that one constitutes an official denial of our information. This was, however, precisely what happened today, and we do not have the right to keep it from you.

[O. Bobin—identified by caption] Here is one of those letters, written to the chairman of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and signed "Galkin, head of the Main Armored Tank Directorate" of the Ministry of Defense, which denies the information in a "Vremya" program in a feature from Kaliningrad. The author of the feature, Gennadiy Sablin, is with me.

[Sablin] The report said that the "Toeral" joint-stock company had attempted to forward about 3,000 tonnes of high-strength alloy steel via the port of Kaliningrad, to forward it from Kaliningrad to London to the British company "Razno and Company".

[Bobin] The letter itself contains the following statement, that in January, 1990, the Main Armored Tank Directorate delivered 2,918 tonnes of ferrous metal, and I stress—these were the written-off track links and tracks from the Iosif Stalin-2 and Iosif Stalin-3 tanks. You realize that these were wartime tanks and the question arises as to how such a large amount of metal could simply lie around unclaimed.

In spite of what the television commentator said, there were no alloy elements in the track links. This is true also of the back axles from the running gear, again written off from BTR-40 and BTR-152 armored personnel carriers, and taken out of circulation in the 50's. In actual fact, then, is this claim that there were no alloy elements in the track links true?

[Sablin] I have the result of tests here. They were carried out both at Kaliningrad enterprises and at the Oskol Iron and Steel Combine and, according to these tests, all the required alloy additives were contained in the steel.

[Bobin] The letter goes on to say that by the time the television program went out, on 1 March, the scrap metal referred to was not at the port.

[Sablin] Well, if we're talking about the letter then I'd say it was entirely made up of contradictions. First of all, the first half of the letter claims that it was a perfectly legitimate deal. The appropriate license existed. It then goes on to say that the steel wasn't at the port. Indeed it wasn't because the day before, 28 February, the mighty strength of the military took it away. However, it was removed thanks to three telegrams from the same Comrade Galkin who—and I quote—asks: Dispatch the steel sent to you—namely to the port—in error to the ferrous metal reprocessing office.

[Bobin] Before it got to the Kaliningrad ferrous metal reprocessing works it had been addressed to the FRG.

[Sablin] That's right, and this, too, raised a good many questions regarding the actual license. By the time the letter was written to the broadcasting authorities the license has been annulled by the government and I don't think Comrade Galkin could have been ignorant of that fact.

[Bobin] At the same time as the letter was sent to us from the Ministry of Defense, the following telegram was sent to the port of Kaliningrad, and has just been received. It is signed by Fedoseyev, deputy metallurgy minister: The shortfall in delivering metal over four months amounts to 1.4 million tonnes for the whole country. The iron and steel industry is, evidently, being starved.

[Sablin] It was for this reason that I put these questions to Nikolay Aleksandrovich Tkachev, procurator of Kaliningrad Oblast.

[Tkachev] As for the legal side of the question and that, for me as a procurator, is most important, the government document which permitted a deal of this kind stipulated and was judicious in doing so, that these firms would be working with metal waste, with waste the country didn't need, and not with the type of thing we saw.

[Bobin] We cannot therefore agree that on 1 March of this year, when we presented our material, we did not have authentic information on this deal. [video shows Galkin letter in close-up, the signature clearly visible, Bobin and Sablin in a television studio, shots of Kaliningrad port, contract showing the names of the two firms, scrap metal in the port which appears to be tank tracks, other metal parts of machinery, close-up of telegram asking for the removal of the metal from the port, telegram from Fedoseyev, Tkachev in office]

CPSU 'Conservatism' Attacked

PM1105173890 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 18, 13-20 May 90 p 7

[Article by Georgiy Khatsenkov; first paragraph is introduction: "A Purge"]

[Text] When he contributed this article Georgiy Khatsenkov informed us that he had resigned as consultant to the Organizing Party Work Department of the CPSU Central Committee and as a member of the Party. His reasons for doing so are contained in the article. Meanwhile our own positon remains: that retreat is not a method of struggle for the Party, that the democratic forces must not permit conservatives to gain the upper nand.

The first shock is over and passions linked to the publication of the CPSU Central Committee's Open Letter to Soviet Communists (entitled "For Consolidation on a Principled Foundation") are finally subsiding.

Who exactly wrote this letter? Which group imposed its own view on the whole Party in an effort to justify old-style command methods as a way of getting people to consolidate, while ignoring the decisions of the February and March 1990 Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee to launch an open and broad discussion. As before, this is being kept secret.

But murder will out. Demands for toughening discipline have been publicly and repeatedly made by Politburo Member Yegor Ligachev. In his interview with the newspaper Selskaya Zhizn (Rural Life), granted before the publication of the Central Committee's Open Letter, he said the Party must be purged of those responsible for "socialism's temporary retreat".

This anonymous open letter was thoroughly prepared well in advance in the depths of the CC's apparat. The letter campaign was eagerly awaited by the conservative forces, some of whom launched it even before the official signal—a surprising show of independence. On March 21 the Bureau of the Byelorussian CP Central Committee passed a resolution entitled "On the Activities in the Communist Party of Byelorussia of the Followers of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU" making it incumbent on the city, district and regional party committees to split with them, and even expel them from the Party. At the Zhukovskiy Central Aerohydrodynamical Institute on April 2, CPSU CC Secretary Baklanov roundly criticized the Democratic Platform in the CPSU. "We have yet to decide what must be done" with Democratic Platform members.

Thus everyone knew that a letter of this kind would be published. The first draft of the letter was very tough and included an instruction indicating who must be purged and how. But after the letter had been circulated among Central Committee members, first secretaries of the regional and territorial Party committees, and the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, the letter was toned down and the instruction was cut.

The final draft is no more than a clumsy attempt at a compromise between conservative and progressive members of the Party leadership. It's a pity that the Party's rank and file will never learn the names of democratically-minded members of the Central Committee and their views about the Open Letter.

But even the toned-down version of the letter uses many of the old formulars: struggle against those "who have taken the path of fighting the Party", the need to "straighten things up" with Communists, "not to permit a compromising attitude towards ideological vacillations", etc.

Today much is being said about a moral rebirth. What sort of an example does the Party leadership set when it proposes an open discussion of the kind "that hasn't occurred in many years"? After all, Party members have started stating their views sincerely, criticizing "irrespective of personality". But now what is known as organizational conclusions are in store for them. To my mind, all this doesn't square with deliberations about Party comradeship and trust.

The greatest dangers to the Party and the country are conservatism and immorality. All the more so that they draw for support on the solid basis of the past, on conservative-repressive traditions in the Party.

Indeed, purges are the permanent state of the Party of Bolsheviks, and the means for combatting dissent and instilling official views and unanimity.

The first general purge of the Party (and the first reregistration of Party members) was launched on Lenin's initiative in 1921 after the 10th Congress which passed the resolution on unity. In his "Proposals on a Check-Up an Purge of the RCP (B) Membership" Lenin defined the methods which were adopted at a Politburo meeting as a directive of the Commission for the Conduct of Purge in the Party. During the first purge about 30 per cent of the membership were eliminated from the Party.

No less substanital were the other mass campaigns: the second (1929) and third (1933) general Party purges. Lesser purges took place in 1924-1925 (a review of non-factory Party cells), in 1925-1927 (a partial review of rural Party cells), in 1927 (the all-Union census or reregistration of Party members and candidate members), in 1928 (a review of candidate Party members at state institutions, universities and institutes). As a result nearly a quarter of all members were expelled from the Party. This is how Party members were educated and re-educated. The principal purpose of a purge, as Stalin put it in his "Problems of Leninism," is to make people feel that there is a master who may demand an account for sins against the Party. He believes that occasionally the master must review the Party ranks with a broom in his hands.

The uprooting continued: in 1935 there was a review of Party documents which decimated the Party's membership; in 1936 there was an exchange of Party membership cards. People were purged from the Party—and from life. Only Khrushchev stopped that flywheel of murderous repression, replacing it with the command system which blossomed in all its splendour during Brezhnev's struggle against dissent, plunging the country into stagnation and moral degradation.

It is beyond us to part with our horrible past, so strong is our nostalgia for the "Order of Sword Bearers."

But ours is a different time. The response to the Central Committee's Open Letter was quite unexpected for its authors. They have obviously been thrown into disarray—rank-and-file Communists on longer want to be extras in the apparat's games.

The campaign to purge the CPSU never got off the ground. The only reminder of it is the sporadic outbursts from the unbending supporters of the hard line. Most Party committees have been paralyzed by indecision in anticipation of the usual commands from the CC's apparat. First, local Soviets (Councils) are now being formed and many Party leaders have already picked up the posts of their chairmen. Second, what is there to be done with whole Party organizations subscribing to the Democratic Platform. They add up to a huge number of Communists, and the most active ones at that. There is a letter but no instructions. An unusual situation. Ranking officials of the CPSU Central Committee's Department of Party Building and Personnel Work can only lecture their wards, leaders of local Party bodies. But to do this, they, too, must have a command from above. But those with the authority to issue the necessary command have serious problems of their own.

Mikhail Gorbachev's address to Komsomol delegates was like a cold shower for hot heads: "Those who have in one way or another associated themselves with the Democratic Platform are not enemies of the CPSU. They, too, can contribute much that is constructive and useful."

Moreover, it is extremely difficult to convert the CC's Open Letter into practice. It is all declarations, all of which can be interpreted variously. Nothing is clear-cut, thus anyone who sticks out even a little can qualify for expulsion from the Party. Everything depends on who will administer Party justice, who will organize the purge. It is clear how I. Polozkov, First Secretary of the Krasnodar Territorial Committe of the CPSU, who has spoken out against co-op members, will view those who are Party members.

Why does the Party, while constantly reminding the people that it is the initiator and motor of perestroika, reject the democratic forces rather than the conservative ones, including CC leaders and medium-level Party functionaries who are pulling society backwards and discrediting the Party?

Why should the fate of Communists be sealed by Party committees, including those that have witnessed stormy meetings at which party leaders who have discredited themselves were asked to resign? Certain Party committees will have to give an account of their activities to Communists in a month or two during the report-and-election campaign, others will have to do this immediately after the Congress.

But if the purge becomes a massive affair, the Party will look like a communal kitchen. The CPSU will drown in petty squabbles, fights and the settling of personal scores. This at a time when the country is in a profound crisis for which the Party is primarily to blame. The CPSU will lose all prestige among the people—but will an unauthoritative party be necessary for its leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, who enjoys the reputation of a bold and persistent reformer in the USSR and the world?

What have the conservatives managed to achieve? They have increased the doubts among the people, and among many Party members about the possibility of reforming the CPSU can it become a normal, civilized political party? Can it shed the legacy of its terrible past?

Personally, I regard the CC's Open Letter as a blatant attempt to preserve the party as an outpost of conservativism and to effect an anti-perestroyka U-turn in the CPSU on the eve of its 28th Congress. In protest, I left the Party and my post as consultant to the CPSU Central Committee.

MOSCOW NEWS on Soviet Border Policy

PM1105174290 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 18, 13-20 May 90 pp 8-9

[Excerpts] Murmansk-Vaalemaa-Yalta-Moscow—Depth—7 versts, width (free from buildings, arable land

and kitchen gardens)—six arshins (one verst=3,500 feet, one arshin=28 inches). This is what the frontier of the soviet state modestly looked like under the law of May 28 1918. All the affairs on it were run by the employees of a strictly civilian ministry—that of finance. This underscored the priorities—economic. But already in November 1920 the frontier was passed in to the iron hand of Feliks Dzherzhinskiy and his VChK. The name of this government department kept changing—VChK, OGPU, NKVD, KGB—but the quintessence of the frontier, its regime and social order remained immutable; make sure that even a mouse does not cross it, that Soviet men and women should imbibe with their mother's milk the indomitable dogma—the frontier is tightly locked. This dogma was sacred for dozens of years. It was considered a crime even to doubt it. But what about it, now that openness and the de-ideologization of our politics have so greatly changed relations with the external world. What is life like on the frontier, this country within a country, the territory of the frontier zones being 3.6 million sq km—more than one-sixth of the whole of the USSR's territory?

Table

Soviet Frontiers in Figures

Length	60,000 km
Area of frontier zones	3.6 million sq km
Numerical strength of frontier troops	200,000
Number of detentions (average annual)	up to 2,000
incl. trespassers from abroad	70 per cent
for political reasons (of the total)	1.5-2 percent
Number of checkpoints	over 200
incl. those opened in 1989	22
passed through the frontier	32 million persons
growth over 1989	c. 30 per cent
Budget of frontier troops (billion rubles)	?

[passage describing visits to border areas omitted]

Headquarters

On returning to Moscow we decided to stage an unusual critique of the "operation" at the Main Headquarters of the USSR frontier Forces, which is located in the KGB building in Dzherszhinskiy Square.

Taking part in a round table discussion, arranged by MN, were Major-General Boris Golyshev and Colonels Vitaliy Sakharov and Aleksandr Rochkin.

Golyshev: the frontier guards have always been conservative. But the times of change have reached them as well. For half a year now we have been working on a new concept of the protection of frontiers. In practice, this will lay the groundwork for a new Law on the State Frontier of the USSR.

Defence of the country's economic interests, the sruggle against smuggling and, of course, the protection of the state's political interests—all of this remains. But the forms and methods of defence are different. We once fenced ourselves off from the rest of the world. Many still see us as a country of concrete wrapped up with barbed-wire. Too sombre? But we are ourselves to blame.

The great barbed-wire fence began to be built in the 1950s. The country sharply reduced its troops, including frontier, forces. And it couldn't think of anything better than replacing them with barbed wire. The more the better.

Sakharov: This seemed convincing. When our relations with China worsened we saw the danger in the frontier being crossed by large numbers of people. What ought to be done to contain the first strike, to protect built-up areas? Of course, barbed wire. Everything has changed since then. But the wire has remained.

MN: So what's the matter, who prevents it from being removed?

Sakharov: Now a command has been issued to remove it along all rivers without exception. But the population is not particularly happy about this. This is due to a psychological phenomenon—people feel safer behind barbed-wire, their security being guaranteed in the event of something unforeseen. Golyshev: Or take the same frontier zones, inflated as they are to incredible proportions. Whole regions are inaccesible not only to foreigners, but even to ordinary Soviet people who do not have special passes. Practically the whole North, the Far East and some areas along the Danube have been blockaded. This is not to mention banks, shores and islands.

Everyone is convinced that this is the work of our service. But, as a matter of fact, it is us who have been struggling for the abolition of these Zones. In each instance, they were initiated by some regional or territorial Soviet or the Council of Ministers of some Republic. In 1976 Estonia's government requested that we open the closed Island of Saaremaa. We opened it. Some three or four months later they wrote again: close it as soon as possible, the shops are empty, hooliganism is on the rampage, momuments are being desecrated. We granted that request. And we keep the island closed to this day, although this zone gives frontier guards nothing but extra worries.

Two years have passed since we opened the Primorye Territory. Vladivostok is open, and the Kamchatka Peninsula. And what do we have? Gratitude? The Kamchatka authorities advise their colleagues on Sakhalin Island: "Don't repeat our folly. Tourists will rob you of everything. The leaders of the Russian Federation recently announced: "The Chukot Peninsula will not be opened, its nature is too fragile." All well and good, declre it a national park or a wildlife preserve and let it be guarded by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They keep mum. But the fact that half of the country is a closed zone is no one's concern.

MN: Does it mean you would pull down the barriers if you were free to decide?

Golyshev: No it doesn't. This would be at variance with our international contracts. For instance, as early as 1921 we made an arrangement with Iran to have a definite zone: sanitary, veterinary, botanic, etc. We are responsible if some disease passes over to the other side. Our people die when extinguishing fires to prevent the flames from crossing the border. And one detachment even gets extra pay for its efforts to combat plague.

Kochkin: Frontier zones must be kept intact also wherever purely defensive interests are concerned. In Turkey frontier guards are part of the armed forces. Frontier battalions belong to the first-echelon divisions and regiments. We can't regard Turkey's actions as being solely aimed at protecting its frontiers. Therefore we, frontier guards, are the first echelon as it were in this respect. Nor can it be otherwise. Turkey carries out technical and visual reconnaissance of our territory, and we observe all the NATO representatives directly on the frontier. But we absolutely don't need the zones running to 500-800 km in depth, as in the Polar Region, for example.

MN: What do you suggest in the new concept?

Sakharov: The zones must be abolished on frontiers with friendly countries: where the frontiers are seas, they should be left only in the strategically most important points. However, to guard deep into our own territory for someone—no amount of money will allow us to do this.

MN: And how much do we, Soviet people, pay for the protection of frontiers?

Sakharov: Not less than a billion, and maybe much more. In any case no one in this room knows the exact figure. Vladimir Kryuchkov, Chairman of the State Security Committee, has promised to disclose it. So far he mentioned the numerical strength of the frontier forces. Is it big or small? We believe that it is small. The concentration of our frontier forces is one-third what it is in the FRG, and half that of the Turks. But it seems that we stand like a solid wall. It's an illusion.

MN: What is the situation like on the Iranian border?

Golyshev: This is the only place, perhaps, where the exchange rate of the rouble has not been falling, but growing. A year ago one rouble used to cost 100 rials, whereas now 400-600 rials are given. Smuggling has developed at a rapid pace. For some reason electric lamps are being smuggled in the thousands into Iran. We were accused of fencing people off and give relatives no chance to get in touch with each other. We opened the frontier. What has been the result? One-tenth of one per cent go to visit relatives. But we are not going to close the checkpoints down. Quite the contrary. Last year we let 32 million persons pass across the frontier. The growth over the year was near 30 per cent.

Sakharov: In preparing our policy we predicated ourselves on the assumption that another hundred crossing points will be needed. New economic partners are knocking on our doors: China, Korea, the USA, Iran and Turkey.

MN: Does it mean that the frontier is no longer a wall, but doors into our home?

Golyshev: Not for everyone. American special services openly say that not a single satellite or space module is capable of replacing man. Therefore the illegal methods of obtaining information are still considered to be the main ones. Intelligence owes its existence to a network of agents with illegal status. This is the road mainly used in acting against us. We mustn't forget about contraband either—last year an immense amount of dope (according to KGB figures—1,500 tons) was smuggled from Afghanistan into the USSR. On separate sectors in Kolyma we did not guard the frontier at all for a long time, but then a loss of gold was discovered. This necessitated putting up frontier posts.

The issue is still contentious. It's too early to think that the time of frontiers is over, that we can throw away the locks.

Blasphemy?

...We spent a whole day at the Main Headquarters of the Frontier Forces. We carried away a lot of impressions, but we also carried away doubts. Indeed, the ice of our frontiers has been broken—the wire is being removed, restricted zones keep disappearing, and new doors are being cut through the walls for business. Spring is setting in after a long winter. But how cold it is if compared with the weather of that universal human home which we want to enter, with that Europe in which very soon no national frontiers will exist in fact, with that home where searchlights don't glare at night and people don't jump from their beds when a bird inadvertently touches the screen of a radar with its wing, with that home where you are met by hospitality and not by furrowed brows under green service caps—furrowed not from character but by instruction.

"Defence of border settlements against attacks by gangs and nomadic tribes." Plus trade. For hundreds of years this has been the principal mission of the frontier, and only during the few Soviet decades has the frontier been the scene of spy chases, and people who resent living "in the most powerful and happiest" country. This we were told even at the frontier posts.

But at the Main Headquarters, despite the spring, they insist that the strength of the frontier forces must be built up, illegal methods of smuggling foreign residents (in the dark of the night, of course) are the main concern of intelligence although the whole world knows that most often spies (theirs and ours) present impeccable passports at airports. They come in broad daylight, but people don't sleep on the 60,000 kilometres of the Soviet frontier.

How many people must there be to reliably screen all these kilometres, how much money and costly equipment, how many radars, searchlights, warships, helicopters, clothes?

Maybe it is not worth blocking off these kilometres. Maybe it's not even worth keeping frontier posts in Brest, frequented as it is all year round by foreigners, among whom some "bad" people may really be found. And in Azerbaijan, where there are thousands upon thousands of those willing to "go for a walk" abroad, who occasionally fire with submachine guns not only at the sky, but also at frontier guards. And in the Baltics, where containers with ammunition are carried in the holds of civilian ships. And on the northern islands, where only polar bears wander and from which there are hundreds of miles to the nearest great power across the Arctic Ocean. Isn't it possible—instead of today's 50 soldiers—to do with just three there? One would simply feel bored....

Questions, questions. And answers? A secret. But may be there will be fewer secrets if the frontier was not the concern of the KGB. Why not a civilian government department, let's say, the Ministry of Finance. Is this blasphemy? Hardly so if the economy in our country is really pushing politics into the background.

Economic

Ryzhkov Comments on Transition to Market Economy

Economic 'Shock Therapy' Rejected

LD1305011590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2050 GMT 12 May 90

[Excerpts] Moscow, 12 May (TASS)—Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, spoke on Soviet television today on a package of problems connected with the transition to a regulated market economy. He noted that this process would be prolonged and would take many years. [passage omitted]

Replying to a question concerning social guarantees and the mechanism for protecting the interests of Soviet citizens, Nikolay Ryzhkov rejected the "shock therapy" method in implementing economic reform. A mechanism for people's social protection is being worked out and if a rise in retail prices is to be carried out beginning in 1991 a system will be brought into play that provides compensation to the population to one degree or another for losses resulting from the one-time rise in prices. Students, retirees, invalids, large families, and low-income families will receive full compensation. In addition, a system of indexation has been elaborated providing compensation for a new rise in prices of essential goods. [passage omitted]

Price Reforms Discussed

LD1305075490 Moscow TASS in English 0747 GMT 13 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 13 TASS—Soviet Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov said that transition to a regulated market economy is a lengthy process and will take many years.

In his television appearance on Saturday, Ryzhkov recalled that in late December 1989 the government submitted for the consideration of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies a programme to recover the economy and defined stages in the further development of economic reform, which was supported by deputies.

Ryzhkov said speculation that the government was elaborating some new programme was at odds with reality. "We are fulfilling the programme, which was supported by the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies," he emphasised.

Ryzhkov said the government was late with a price reform, without which further economic reform and work to raise production efficiency were impossible.

In Ryzhkov's view, a good many absurd and even paradoxical things had been created in price-setting in the country. He cited the example of grain purchasing: Low purchasing prices did not stimulate grain production in the country, which generated the need to increase its purchases abroad.

Ryzhkov said that the amount of grain purchased abroad increased from 2 million in the eighth five-year plan period to 40 million in the 12th five-year period. "The country can no longer buy this quantity of grain," Ryzhkov said.

Ryzhkov emphasised the need to create such a system of prices that, on the one hand, would enable the state to control some prices in the production sphere and on the consumer market—to be safe from spiralling inflation. And, on the other, to give an opportunity to develop the free prices, which would move the economy ahead.

On retail prices, Ryzhkov said that prices for consumer goods and food products should be increased beginning with 1991. But part of prices, especially food prices (meat, milk bread, butter, sugar and oil) should be controlled by the state. In the future, some of the consumer goods may, possibly, be allowed to go to the market.

Ryzhkov emphasised that all problems related to retail prices would be discussed with the people.

Asked about social guarantees and the mechanism to protect the interests of Soviet citizens, Ryzhkov spurned the "shock therapy" method to implement economic reform.

"The mechanism of social protection is being developed. If retail prices begin rising from 1991, this mechanism, which provides for compensation to some or other extent for the losses incurred by people as a result of a one-time price hike, will be put into operation.

"Students, pensioners, invalids, families with many children and low-income families will receive full compensation. In addition, an indexing system is developed to compensate for a new increase in prime necessaries," Ryzhkov said.

On unemployment, Ryzhkov noted that the government deemed it impermissible to create unemployment to achieve a rise in production efficiency." There are 10,000,000 job vacancies in the USSR now, especially in the service sector, which can absorb people loosing their jobs."

Ryzhkov said the government would introduce a system for job retraining. He is of the opinion that unemployment does not threaten Soviet society in the next few years.

Ryzhkov emphasised that these measures can be implemented only with people's consent, only when people realise that this is necessary.

Current Plans, Preparations Cited

LD1305133690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1750 GMT 12 May 90

[Interview with Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, USSR Council of Ministers chairman, to an unidentified reporter, place and date of interview not given—recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] Nikolay Ivanovich, questions about which the government is working actively have recently been at the center of attention in the media and society. I mean, in the first place, the preparation for the transition to a regulated market economy. How, in fact, are things going?

[Ryzhkov] Yes, really, in the past two or three months in particular attention has been given to this theme, both in society and in the organs of the mass media, in newspapers and magazines. I don't think there is a program which has not touched upon that topic. I think that, well, such a heightened interest—I would even say such an unusual interest—in this topic, is, of course, objective, because the economy touches the life of all Soviet people. And all the more so now that materials have been published saying that these are radical steps in the further development of the economy; of course people have not remained neutral to that.

Therefore, obviously, there is a need, all the same, to have objective information about what is actually happening. Unfortunately, I could not provide that earlier, although, I wanted to, that is, to tell the people what we are doing. It is such a serious question and demands such profound work that it is even more misleading to people to come out with some kind of ill-prepared versions, even on one or two questions. I know that there are a great many rumors, there are more than enough of all sorts of conjectures. Therefore, some kind of incomplete conception would not have reassured the people, but on the contrary, would have created a certain, even more unhealthy attitude toward this problem.

The essence of the question: Well, I know—and I think everybody knows—that at the end of December the government presented for examination by the USSR Supreme Soviet...[corrects himself] The congress, the Second Congress of People's Deputies, a program for improving the economy and also the stages of the development, the further development of economic reform. Practically, in that program which was supported by the Second Congress of People's Deputies, we summarized the result of two year's work on transferring the economy to new methods of management, in particular, the transition of industry, of the whole national economy, of enterprises to financial autonomy. Well in 1988-1983, that is, over two years we transferred the whole national economy over to the new methods. Therefore, the government program to a certain extent summarized the result. At the same time, we felt and realized that we, all the same, had to outline clearly the paths of the further development of the economy of our country, its improvement, and, in particular, the stages of the economic reform.

And so, now the question arises as to what sort of document is the government elaborating now. I know that a great deal is being written, and I read a lot of it myself. It is said that the government is elaborating a new program of economic development and that the program which was presented at the Second Congress of People's Deputies has effectively failed, and well, therefore some kind of new document is being created.

I wish to say right away that this is not at all true and, in general, we must take a very serious attitude to such programs—long-term, global programs—because that program is calculated for six years and you cannot draw a conclusion in the course of two or three months that the program has failed. If we take that attitude toward all programs then we shall never resolve a single issue properly. Therefore this is not the development of some other program. It is giving practical content to the government's program which was supported at the Second Congress of People's Deputies. If you look at the decisions of the Second Congress of People's Deputies, then along with an evaluation and what was supported by the people's deputies, there were many recommendations to the Council of Ministers on how to conduct itself and where, which issues required deeper study, that something should be speeded up somewhere, that a more considered approach should be taken to particular problems. Therefore, since February or March we have been involved in this work in earnest. So this is a normal and natural process of giving a government program specific content.

Unfortunately, this has acquired a somewhat unwholesome coloring in society, and it has turned out that we are creating some completely new program. So I am saying quite firmly that we are giving content to the program which was supported by the second congress. And we have attracted many specialists and scientists to the study of particular provisions of this program. For example, a conference with directors of enterprises was held at the council of Ministers. We invited about 70 people, directors of major works and factories and chairmen of collective farms, where we discussed these issues in detail. There was a conference with financiers, bankers, scientists. We have also invited the chairmen of the councils of ministers of the union republics who also took a most active part in this. Well, as you know, in April the Presidential Council and the Council of the Federation even considered our proposals on a transition to a regulated market economy. So, an enormous amount of work has been done over this period. I shall not say that we had unity of opinions among all the specialists. I should say that sometimes opinions are diametrically opposed on particular issues and, for this reason, these have been very complex months when we have been obliged to assess and reckon up all these considerations which have been expessed so that we would not, in any circumstances, make a mistake here, because I believe that even our popular saying that you must measure your cloth seven times and cut it once is too weak. I believe that we should measure more before adopting final decisions because the proposals which are now being developed affect virtually each Soviet person.

This is not some individual issue on which one can make a mistake and which society will let pass not too painfully. It affects the life of all Soviet people.

After all the discussions, we are now doing the final work on the document. We will finish work on it in the near future. In the middle of the month we will hand the document to the Presidential Council. We think that the Presidential Council and the Council of the Federation will examine it once again, and we have planned to pass this document; no, no, to submit a government report on this matter to the USSR Supreme Soviet in the last 10 days of May. We hope that it will be published in order that all Soviet people can have an idea of the transition to new methods of economic management, to a regulated market economy.

In parallel, a decision has been made that even laws which have perhaps not even been confirmed yet, or some norms, should now be passed to the enterprises so that they can work out their economic life for the coming year under more or less real conditions. After that, of course, we will have to make another analysis of what those proposals which we are now speaking about turn out to be like in real life. So this is approximately the situation that is developing for us in the elaboration of all these documents.

[Reporter] Nikolay Ivanovich, could you pick out at least two or three important tenets which will define the subtance of this transition?

[Ryzhkov] Well, first of all I consider that the transition to a regulated market economy will of course be a long one. We get the impression that all this will take place overnight, I have to disappoint such hasty conclusions—this is impossible. The transition will be a long one taking many years, but its stages must be defined.

We consider, and this has been stated in our program, that the first stage applies to 1990, 1991, and 1992. 1990 is a preparatory year, while 1991 and 1992 are the first stage which we will have to traverse, as they say, in the transition to this form of our economy. Out of the entire complex of problems, and there are a fair amount of them, all of which we will highlight in our report, I would perhaps dwell on two issues which interest everyone, of course. I have chosen two problems. One of them is purely a production problem, while the other problem is the consumer sphere.

To take the production sphere, we are planning the following. I want to remind you that when, in the middle of the Five-Year Plan period, we transferred to new methods of economic management, in other words transferred enterprises to financial autonomy, we were forced to adapt all the economic norms, incentives, and other economic factors to the Five-Year Plan. After all, the 12th Five-Year Plan was essentially shaped in the old classical form, and in the middle of the five-year plan period we had to transfer to the new conditions and new methods; and for this reason the norms were to some extent adapted to the Five-Year Plan.

Naturally enough, the way it worked out was that each factory in the country had its own individual norms. On the one hand, we opted for this with our eyes open because given our lack of experience and taking, as we were, our first steps in economic independence, I think that if we had set a single profit tax at that time, we would, of course, have created a very difficult situation in the economy, and many enterprises quite simply would have been unable to function. That is the positive side. We were forced into it, but it was necessary.

The negative side is that with essentially individual norms, separate norms, for each enterprise, we legitimize mismanagement and the way in which enterprises that worked well to some extent helped those that worked badly. This led to the creation of an abnormal economic atmosphere, of course, but we believe we had to pass through this stage. There is presently a Law on Profit Taxes up for examination in the Supreme Soviet. I know it is coming in for vigorous discussion, even stormy debate. This law would fix a single tax, a single tax for all enterprises in our country, irrespective of whether they are large or small, or what branch of industry they belong to. This is apart from collective farms; collective farms lived acording to their own economic law. Of course, this will create some very serious difficulties, the most important being that it will make enterprises think hard about how they will carry on. The old safety net will not be there, with one getting a bit more, another a bit less. Under these conditions, each enterprise is obliged to work out very carefully how it is going to work. In other words, all this is aimed at raising production efficiency. For those enterprises that will work well, this tax is no bad thng; they will do very well. They can be confident and assured, but those enterprises that work badly—enterprises that have not exerted thmselves, or even for some objective reasons—of course will have to do some serious restructuring. They will have to examine carefully and painstakingly how that used to be when the ministry could help them money-wise to some extent, will exist longer. Quite simply, the ministry no longer will have the resources to bale these enterprises out, to put it crudely. This is a great difficulty, but since we are moving over to full financial autonomy, it is necessary to be objective.

The second thing, the second point that worries everyone, as I sensed when I was meeting labor collectives in the run-up to the May holidays and being asked a lot of questions, is the issue of price formation. I might say that we are rather late in reforming the pricing system. If we had done this earlier, then the country might have been in a much better state than it is today. Without price reform, we cannot continue implementing economic reform, and—this is the chief point—we cannot raise our production efficiency. This does not affect only retail prices, although that is what we talk about most often. It also affects wholesale and purchase prices, as well as retail prices, in other words, the whole spectrum of prices in the national economy. Therefore, we must take very decisive steps, and herein rests the issue, more than anywhere else.

Great discrepancies, absurdies, even paradoxes, have developed over many years. It is hard to explain why they developed. It is just that, as the years went by certain decisions were made, and unfortunately today we are left without an integrated, balanced program that would allow us to have a structured pricing system. So we must create one. I would just like to give you an example, so that you might have an idea, although I could give you hundreds of examples like this one:

Let us take the question of grain, grain for bread, since it is closest to all of us. You will know that just a few days ago, the Council of Ministers, as the government, made the decision to introduce ahead of time the new purchase prices for grain we had been intending to introduce as of 1 January 1991, but the decision was made to introduce these new purchase prices now, so as not to lose this year's harvest. Now, here is the paradox: We had low purchase prices for grain, so it worked out that our peasants—the collective and state farms and the peasants—had no interest in selling grain to the state. So the procurements of grain for foodstuffs and for those resources supplied to stock-farming centrally declined steadly over the years. As the years went by, we had to buy more and more grain abroad. Each year of the Eighth Five-Year Plan period, we bought in two million tonnes of grain, while by the 12th Five-Year Plan period, we were buying in 40 million tonnes each year. Quite simply, the country cannot go on buying in such quantities of grain. It cannot cope with it; it does not have the resources. So what happens is that we do not give our peasants the money, so they cannot develop. They cannot get their production affairs in order, so there is great social desolation in the countryside. At the same time, because of the imperfect pricing, we essentially are fattening up the U.S. farmers! Can that be right? Clearly we ought to give our own people the money. Then they will have an interest in producing grain, and consequently they will tackle their production and social tasks.

However, the following question arises: Okay, we have increased grain prices, and I think that we were right to do so, but the question arises as to how it came about that we spend such vast sums on buying grain abroad. I have had a look and it comes to about R4 billion, gold rubles, per year. If we had put R4 billion into consumer goods or to buy equipment to produce these goods, or into the processing industry or agriculture, would we really be in the situation in which we find ourselves? At the same time, you know that bread prices are very low. It sometimes grieves me to think that we have brought up a whole generation of people whose attitude to bread is, well, like that. The older generation knows what bread actually is. The following paradox emerges: Low purchase prices, the low cost of bread, has resulted in the fact that today we are buying it for gold rubles and selling oil in order to do so, and that we are forced to buy it while at the same time, according to our calculations—and these calculations have been provided by specialists—5 to 6 million (?tonnes) of bread are thrown onto the rubbish heap, onto the scrap heap. There are the paradoxes for you, the paradoxes in price formation. I deliberately gave the example of bread and grain as the one with the greatest effect, but it would be possible, as I have said already, to provide very many examples of this kind.

We are dealing with the matter of price formation carefully and in great depth. I would say that basically there are two extremes of view on this. There are many views, but I would pick out the two extremes. These are the radical view, as I would call them. These are the specialists, including some academics, who say that free prices should be fully established for means of production, purchase prices, and consumer goods, whether industrial goods or foodstuffs. In other words, establish free prices, let demand and production be the determining factors, and finally, a balance will be established. The second extreme view is that of those who say that nothing at all needs to be done. Everything should be left as it is, or at the very least, prices should be raised, but without free prices of any kind. We believe that neither approach is suitable for us. If we are talking about the radical approach, I simply do not think we are ready for it at the moment. If we hurl everything into free prices, the scale of inflation is unpredictable and we will be putting the entire people into a most difficult situation. For this reason, it is a tempting road, a very tempting road, but one that has to be moved toward and a certain number of years will be required for monopolism to pass away, for us to get all the processes regulated, and for the economy to come to work more or less smoothly according to certain economic laws. That will be the time to think about this.

To take the conservative path generally would mean putting a stop to any progress. So our opinion, the opinion of the government, has been formed already: We must create a pricing system that would, on the one hand, allow the state to maintain control of certain prices, both in the sphere of production and particularly on the consumer market, and to safeguard itself against spiralling inflation, yet which would allow prices that could be the powerhouse of the economy to develop freely. That is our view. We think we shortly will have a clear-cut stance on wholesale and purchase prices, and on the subject of retail prices our position is as follows: As of 1991 there must be, of course, be a rise in the retail prices of consumer goods, including foodstuffs, but we are firmly convinced that a certain section—particularly of foodstuffs—should remain in the state domain. For the time being, our position is that meat definitely must be controlled by the state, as well as milk, bread and other baked goods, sugar, vegetable oil.... The prices will rise as necessary, but they still would be fixed. Rather than having market prices, and as people are saying, having the market alone calling the tune. That is our fundamental approach. Later on, we will have to see. We will have to hang on for a bit after 1991, and then see. It may be that some consumer goods should be released gradually onto the marketplace, but as far as foodstuffs are concerned, in our opinion they cannot be left to the market.

That, then, is our position on pricing. I will not dwell on the other matters. They will be set out in detail in our document, in the report we will deliver. I believe that pricing issues—and particularly whatever effects people—should be studied very carefully, of course. The entire people must be informed of them, and the people must have their say. While the congress has, so to speak, had its say on the program as a whole, the people must have their say on the subject of prices connected with the lives of people. Incidentally, I said this in my report to the Second Congress of People's Deputies: We simply must have the people's agreement on retail prices, and we will put forward this proposal.

[Reporter] Nikolay Ivanovich, people are interested in this question, too: What social guarantees and mechanisms are envisaged to protect the interests of Soviet citizens in the switch to a regulated market?

[Ryzhkov] I know of one expression that is currently very widespread: The so-called shock therapy. Now, I would like to say right away that I do not support such loud and strident phrases because this is no mere phrase. Behind it lies the heart of the matter. We do not believe it is possible to carry out economic reform in such a way that it has to pass through economic, or perhaps even political, crises. We have the opportunity to take a quite different route. So whatever we do and whatever problems we work on, we are all the while thinking primarily about the extent to which this will affect the people. That is the main thing. That is the end result. I particularly drew attention to this when I had my meetings with workers at factories and I was asked two practical questions at the same time. The first question was: Will the people's standard of living not decline when prices are free to fluctuate? I stress, when prices are free to fluctuate. Second: Will there be unemployment? As I see it, these are the two questions that constantly worry people.

As far as free-floating prices or generally the prices of foodstuffs and consumer goods, are concerned, I have already spoken about the pricing system. So now, on the subject of protecting people's welfare: We understand full well that it is not possible to carry out this kind of reform without the machinery to protect the individual. Otherwise standards of living will fall, and fall quite substantially, but quite simply we do not have the right to permit this to happen. So we have developed a machinery. It is now being polished up and we will put it forward. I hope that when our proposals are published—and we believe that pricing and social welfare protection make up a special section that must be, as the saying goes, discussed by the people—we believe that this machinery should operate very vigorously. What does it consist of? First of all, if—and I say if because this really does need the consent of the people; it is simply our proposal—if, as of 1991 we opt for a new level of retail prices, then naturally we must safeguard the people from the start. Let us suppose prices rise, and they certainly will rise. They will not fall; they will only go up. Therefore, we must create, and are creating, a compensation system. Thus, if prices rise to a certain level—and we know how high prices will rise—we must to some extent—I stress, to some extent—compensate the populace. We believe that students, pensioners, invalids, large families, and families with a low per-capita income should, of course, receive full compensation to offset the sudden price rises. To some extent, all the others will be compensated, and to some extent they will not. So much for compensation then, meaning that a one-off price increase should be compensated. If we move on now, and we believe that in some time there will be free prices on consumer goods, too, and these naturally can increase in addition to there being a one-off increase. We have worked out, the specialists have worked out an index system that determines, for example, how much prices have risen in, say, three or six months for a specific group of essential consumer goods. Accordingly, they say, there should be an increase in wages. Again, this means pensions and grants. For people with fixed incomes, white collar workers, etcetera, there should be an index that immediately compensates for price increases to some extent. That, then, is the outline put to us to protect the people from price increases. Once again, I stress that this protection will not...[changes thought] will be for these sectors of the population.

On unemployment: This matter, too, is of concern to everyone, and all the more so when figures such as there being eight to 10 million unemployed by 1991 have appeared on the pages of the press. Of course, this is disturbing for every citizen and all the more so when the right to work is enshrined in our Constitution. We must guarantee work. For this reason, I would like to express this opinion firmly, and incidentally, we discussed this matter in detail yesterday in the Presidium, at this very table, and we believe that it is impermissible deliberately to create unemployment in order to increase the efficiency of production. You know, there is a view that if only unemployment is created, everything else will work well. I do not think that is the road for us. Our road is not one along which unemployment is deliberately created for such ends. We have the opportunity: Yes, indeed, once the enterprises start work and their operation is inefficient, say, or no one takes their output, they will be forced either to change their profile or some, perhaps, will close and this possibility is not precluded. However, we have the opportunity to find work for these people. At the moment, according to our figures, we have 10 million vacant jobs, 10 million. That is a second shifts for the engineering industry

Now look at how weak our service sector is. It is only in the embryonic stage. Can we really compare our service sector with that in the highly developed countries? Therefore, some of the people who would be freed from the, let us say, material production sphere could, naturally, go into the service sector. It is exactly this that we must work on now in order to create a mechanism so that, first, the country will have some kind of regulation, and second, so that help would be provided: retraining, the creation of conditions so that if someone has to change profession he would ultimately have some kind of material assistance.

This question is being dealt with. So I would say that this does not threaten us in the foreseeable future. Those, then—more or less—are the questions you have asked me, and that is how I would answer them. In conclusion, I would just like to say that the road on which we have embarked is a very serious one. You must understand that it is an essentially new path. Never before have we come up against such problems. We always used to go our own sweet way. Now this, I might say, radical path is being offered today to improve the health of the economy. Therefore, we must approach this problem very earnestly. We believe that we can opt for these measures only with the consent of the people. The people, people generally, must realise that this is essential. Once we have unity on this matter, and once we have conslidation on this issue, then I belive we will come through the hard times. And of course they will be hard times, but we will come through them becasue we will have seen that ahead of us lies the opportunity to tackle those social problems which, alas, have been so badly neglected in our country.

[Reporter] Thank you for the interview, Nikolay Ivanovich.

New Customs Export Regulations Discussed

LD1105221790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 11 May 90

[Interview with Valeriy Draganov, deputy chief of the Main Administration for State Customs Control, by correspondent V. Bakarinov, place and date not given—recorded; from the "Vremya" newscast presented by announcer Kira Grigoreyeva]

[Text] [Grigoryeva] Our correspondent today met Draganov, deputy chief of the Main Administration for State Customs Control.

[Draganov] What has brought about, in the main, the list aimed at bans, direct bans and restrictions? Parallel with the rapid development of links, of democratization and of humanization of the political processes in the sphere of contacts between people, and the radical expansion of foreign economic relations, which has brought with it a larger percentage migration of businessmen, the further worsening of our domestic consumer market is evident.

I have only just returned from Lvov Oblast. I visited one of our customs posts which is in a critical state today—Mastiska. The column of cars lining up for admittance to customs control for entry to Poland is from two to seven kilometers long. Unfortunately, every second one is violating—is flagrantly violating—customs regulations. They line up five or six times after the customs officer has turned them back because they have exceeded one or another norm. Well, you must admit, this is not only a low level of culture and a low level of knowledge of the law, this is simply disrespect—this is simply disrespect—for laws.

[Bakarinov] Disrespect for the laws and also, in my view, well—these tourist trips are turning to a certain extent into business.

[Draganov] Unfortunately, yes. During the first quarter, just this one customs post detained up to 10,000 televisions, 16 tonnes of butter about 15 tonnes of sugar, and 170 decaliters of spirits. I am not even talking about smaller consumer goods, electrical, photographic, and other goods which are in short supply today. Under these conditions the government is simply obliged.... [changes thought] Well, it has done it. It has introduced restrictions. I must, nevertheless, make the reservation that, depending on an improvement in the consumer market, we will react to this very rapidly and flexibly. [Video shows Bakarinov and Draganov talking behind a desk in an office]

[Grigoryeva] That was a discussion on the list, the new list of those goods which it is possible to take out of the country. [as heard] You know that from yesterday additions to the customs regulations existing on USSR territory have been introduced.

Here are several specific excerpts from the new regulations. It is practically impermissible to take out any industrial goods and very many foodstuffs, including caviar and coffee. Souvenirs and presents must not exceed R30 per person. Those who are travelling to Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia can take with them R5 worth of foodstuffs. This is for those who are travelling temporarily. Those travelling abroad for permanent residence are allowed to take out jewelery and everyday items from precious stones worth up to R5,000 per person.

Agricultural

New Grain Prices Unlikely To Boost Yield

PM1005113490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May 90 Morning Edition p 1

[I. Abakumov commentary on unattributed report on USSR Council of Ministers resolution on grain prices, under the general heading "New Purchase Prices for Grain": "IZVESTIYA Commentary"]

[Text] In view of the fact that it is only purchase prices that are going up, while wholesale and retail prices remain unchanged for the time being, it is possible to speak of a tactical intention on the government's part to stimulate the sale of grain to the state. Last season, procurement pressure on kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] was considerably lessened, confirming the trend toward gradual democratization of economic activity in agro-industry. But many farms preferred not to overfulfill state orders, thinking that, given the existing prices, it is more profitable to use grain for maintaining and expanding their own stock raising. Meanwhile for a number of reasons—for example, because of a lack of modern equipment in feed production units—there was no significant increase in sales of meat and milk. Grain purchases were also less than expected. This is the motive behind the increase in purchase prices.

The increase in purchase prices will obviously be most advantageous for peasant farms and leaseholders not involved in state order commitments. But kolkhozes and sovkhozes, which do not yet enjoy the full right to determine crop disposition independently, will hardly be able to exploit the advantages of the new prices fully. Formally the state order does not apply to them, but not every director or chairman can oppose the rayon and oblast authorities. Moreover the government resolution is at least three months late, appearing not before, but after the sowing season. So all the signs are that we should not expect a significant increase in grain purchases in the current season. And this will not seriously influence the reduction of grain imports.

Nevertheless, the price priority given to fodder grain and buckwheat can be numbered among the positive aspects of the resolution. In addition, the price of biologically pure raw materials for children's and dietary food products has been significantly increased for the first time, and all quotas for their production have been removed.

Agricultural Developments for 6-11 May Reported

LD1205024490

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of reports on agricultural developments in the USSR carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian on 6-11 May, unless indicated otherwise. Times of broadcast, given in GMT, are in parentheses at the end of each item.

6 May

Twenty thousand ha have been sown with rice, in just five days, in Chimkent Oblast. Almost one quarter of this area as been sown with ecologically clean rice, with no herbicides. (1100)

7 May

In the Altay the sowing of forage crops has started in the areas from steppe Kulunda to the foothills of Salair. These are Sudan grass, chickpeas, maple peas and vetch-oak mixtures. They will be used for producing a highly productive one-crop system [monakorm]. Likewise, the sowing of peas has begun. The main work in the Altay will start in the second half of May, when the conditions are more favorable for the sowing of spring wheat. (1100)

8-10 May

No significant developments reported.

11 May

Land cultivators of the Ukraine are finishing the planting of sugar beets. They had to replant over 100,000 hectares in the southern oblasts because of seeds blown away by a dust storm. Sugar beets occupy 1.6 million hectares, from which 44 million tons of beet roots, that is, over 5 million tons of sugar, will be harvested. (0600)

Krasnopivtsev Examines Agricultural Price Reform

904A0343A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 4 May 90 pp 1-2

[Interview with A.A. Krasnopivtsev, deputy chairman of USSR State Committee on Prices, by SELSKAYA ZHIZN special correspondent S. Chudakov; place and date not given: "Can the 'Avalanche' Be Stopped?"]

[Text] An ossified system of prices and delays in setting up a new pricing mechanism have become an obstacle to mastering the economic methods of operations in our country and establishing and maintaining the necessary parity of trade between urban and rural areas.

Many prominent scientists, specialists, and production managers have already taken part in a discussion of the price reform which the newspaper SELSKAYA ZHIZN initiated in October 1988. A.A. Krasnopivtsev, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee on Prices, who met with our special correspondent, continues the discussion of this topic in the publication offered to our readers.

[Chudakov] Aleksey Alekseyevich, it is known that the current foodstuffs problem is due to a considerable degree to the price "scissors." The absence of a parity between wholesale and procurement prices has resulted in the peasant being left with simply nothing for developing production and meeting his social needs. The USSR State Committee on Prices is at present developing the foundations of a new pricing system. How is it going to be better for the peasants than the current one? What is your concept of price reform?

[Krasnopivtsev] According to our calculations, approximately R400 billion were expropriated from agriculture in the prewar and postwar years through the use of such "scissors." Unfortunately, this approach also persisted when the share of industry and agriculture changed, and the lag in the economic and social development of the rural areas began to hamper the overall development of the economy of our country. This was noticed but, as I see it, with a delay, and little has been done to date. To be sure, certain steps taken in 1953, 1958, 1965, and 1983 in order to comply with the demand to establish equivalent economic relations between the urban and rural areas are known, but this turned out not to be enough.

According to our conclusions, in the last five years a parity between what the rural areas contribute to the national income and what they consume from it has been attained. It has evolved without infringing on the interests of agriculture; however, some funds have once again left the rural areas in the course of a transition to full economic accountability and self-financing. As far as the price indices are concerned, on the whole they have been favorable for agriculture. Thus, prices for agricultural products grew by 20 percent for the entirety of products sold to the state in 1988 and 1989, whereas prices for the means of production for the agroindustrial complex increased by 19 percent. The amount of the increment in proceeds due to increased procurement prices totaled R24 billion, whereas the sum of cost increases was R7 billion.

[Chudakov] This is so if only the parity of prices is to be taken into account. However, budgetary funding for certain social and other projects established primarily for a number of kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] was cancelled in the course of our transition to full economic accountability and self-financing.

[Krasnopivtsev] Indeed, if we count overall parity rather than price parity there will be no surplus which I have mentioned.

This is why at present, when agriculture is proclaimed to be a priority, the slogan of maintaining the equivalency of trade between the urban and rural areas has become obsolete to a degree; the rural areas need to be given funds on top of this in order to bring their social and economic development in line with modern requirements.

[Chudakov] Is this to be accomplished by means of subsidies and grants rather than prices alone? How is this reflected in the draft of new prices?

[Krasnopivtsev] The overall level of new procurement prices and subsides includes payments at prices in effect—R117 billion, bonuses for exceeding the average annual volume of sales for the previous five-year period—R13 billion, and differentiated bonuses—R33 billion. On top of this, compensation for increased costs which are due to industry and other sources amounts to approximately R40 billion. The experience of applying differentiated bonuses in 1988 and 1989 has led us to the conclusion that it is not feasible to include in them all budgetary allocations which were previously used for financing individual programs and supporting weak farms. This is why we believe that it is sound to restore target-oriented subsidies in the amount of R9 billion. Finally, it is proposed to opt for an increase of R8 to 9 billion in the budgetary expenditures of the state with a view to restoring due priority to giving incentives for the production of grain and industrial crops.

[Chudakov] This is peanuts! Does it not turn out that these amounts are under five percent of total payments for products?

[Krasnopivtsev] Yes, but given our tremendous budget deficit which goes into tens of billions....

[Chudakov] Agriculture was not the one to create this deficit, was it?

[Krasnopivtsev] More precisely, agriculture was not the only one. We have agreed with you that incomes in agriculture need to be increased. However, wages in rural areas used to grow faster than labor productivity—this is also a "contribution" to the deficit.

[Chudakov] Still, the state budget and the coffers of the ministries were mainly replenished at the expense of the peasants paying excessively inflated wholesale prices for the means of production with even worse rather than better performance.

[Krasnopivtsev] This was the case long ago. We abandoned cumbersome price lists in the process of creating new wholesale prices for the means of production. We are using a normative-parameter method under which a price is set for, say, the X standard engine, and subsequently along with changes in some characteristics—output, fuel consumption, metal-intensiveness, and so on—the price changes on a scale. Such a change is envisaged that its advantage would go to both the producer and the consumer. This would provide an incentive for improving the quality of machinery.

[Chudakov] What guarantee is there that the performance of a particular engine is going to be actually maintained?

[Krasnopivtsev] New relationships and the increased role of the consumer are the guarantee. When ordering a piece of equipment, the consumer sets a ceiling price. Creating prerequisites for the operation of market forces is a guarantee. However, since there is no market for now, managerial forces have to operate. Yet, at present the producer of machinery has a superior managerial echelon—and the number of enterprises producing machinery is smaller than that of enterprises in the agroindustrial complex. There are more than 50,000 agricultural consumers, but the superior managerial link in the agroindustrial complex has been eliminated—first the Ministry of Agriculture, and then the Agroindustrial Committee of our country. This is to say that at present the consumers do not have a skilled representative, a professional customer. There are instructions on how to coordinate prices for new machinery but there is virtually no one on the side of the consumers to apply them.

[Chudakov] Perhaps a free market is still the best guarantee of partnership on an equal footing. Only in such a market may a real price be set for both the means of production for the rural areas and farm products. Would you agree with this?

[Krasnopivtsev] It is bad that there has been a lot of talk concerning the need for a market but there are no serious theoretical studies of this issue. I have been brought up in the environment of planned price-setting. I am certain that its efficiency would be sufficient if we worked with a greater clarity of purpose and more vigorously on coordinating price-setting with the plan, on changing it from an ossified form into a more flexible system which is refined every year as planned goals and conditions for production change. Meanwhile, plan assignments and economic instruments frequently were at cross purposes in our country rather than working in the same direction.

Perhaps we need to opt for free prices as the scale of perestroyka increases. However, there are neither theoretical studies nor practical experience in this matter. We have yet to gain it. You know that beginning this year potatoes, vegetables, and fruits will be sold at free prices. Wholesale fairs for fruit and vegetable products have begun operation. Therefore, the entire market mechanism, including free pricing, will have to be mastered in practice beginning with the harvest of this year.

It is the same with industrial products. So, there will be a market for a machine producer. So what? After all, he is a monopolist. There is nothing but the narrow egoistic interests of these collectives behind their desire to set prices independently. There is no market where there is no competition. However, the monopolistic right to jack up prices remains. This concerns me just as it does other people. After all, ultimately a market of this kind is like an avalanche for prices: They will sell expensive machines or equipment; this means that consumer goods, farm products, and foodstuffs will become more expensive. The machine builders will lose due to higher retail prices what they win due to raising prices for their products. So, should their wages be raised once again? This means that the machines will become more expensive yet again....

[Chudakov] And who will this avalanche finally hit?

[Krasnopivtsev] It is clear. The same people who unjustifiably increase wholesale prices by including in them unproductive expenditures in the hope of living better.

[Chudakov] That is, the heavier the burden of wholesale prices, the smaller the amount of production of farm goods—raw materials and foodstuffs? Are they the most significant point?

[Krasnopivtsev] Not quite. If we take a critical view of existing procurement prices and the numerous bonuses on top of them, then we will find that contrary to logic we did not provide incentives for increasing the volume of production in places where products are cheaper due to objective natural, climatic, and economic conditions. This system served the existing centralized procedures of planning and management. This is why the disjointed measures which we took in order to reduce the gap in the profit margins of farms regardless of the standard of production management merely offered a justification for tremendous losses. The introduction of various bonuses, including those for exceeding the average five-year level, has not changed in any way the cost-based nature of procurement prices. At present, the task is: At the first stage, to carry out simultaneously a number of measures ensuring mutual coordination of the wholesale and procurement prices, and subsequently to create a system that would operate flexibly and maintain at all times a level of prices that is in line with socially needed costs.

Previously in procurement prices we did not take into account the types of expenditures that are more feasible to disburse through the kolkhozes and sovkhozes rather than in a centralized manner, for example, expenditures for social security. After all, as of now subsidies account for three-quarters of the social security budget in our country. Also, look at the issue of using water resources for irrigation. In this sphere, potential in a number of regions is limited; we did not encourage saving water in any economic way. Therefore, the need to introduce fees for the use of water for irrigation through procurement prices is apparent.

On the other hand, at present differentiated bonuses in our country amount to 40 kopecks per ruble of list procurement prices. In specific oblasts and on specific farms they exceed procurement prices severalfold, that is to say, control of the procurement prices has actually been lost.

It is proposed to fully compensate cost increases due to changes in wholesale prices and tariffs—R29 billion—through prices, and to take into account the new rates of social security contributions, interest on loans, water fees, and other payments aimed at a more vigorous application of economic-accountability incentives and more efficient utilization of labor, natural, and financial resources (about R13 billion). In this manner, procurement prices will be brought as close as possible to socially needed costs, as a result of which their role in stimulating the development of agriculture and maintaining its equivalent exchange with industry will increase.

We should also stress the following peculiarity: The reinforcement of the cost-control orientation of prices due to the proposed expansion of the practice of using unified prices for the entire country, a substantial reduction in the number of price zones, and provisions for greater profitability in areas where the output of a particular product costs less.

[Chudakov] How is the problem of reconciling the economic interests of agriculture and the processing industry being solved?

[Krasnopivtsev] The difference between excessively low wholesale prices and procurement prices is subsidized from the budget—R90 billion. This does not facilitate efforts to use milk and cattle at the processing enterprises more economically. This is why we included in the procurement and wholesale prices all bonuses (except those depending on product quality) which were previously paid directly from the budget, having moved the subsidies closer to the point of consumption of products.

This concept and approaches to designing new prices were approved at the March (1989) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. We proceeded from them in the process of preparing the draft of new prices.

[Chudakov] However, you also opted for this concept in the process of developing a version of the draft which was discussed at a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Commission for Agrarian Policy Issues, which rejected it. What did they dislike in the draft? Here are the conclusions of a majority of participants in the discussion of the draft, which I wrote down. If it were to be implemented "... the rentability and profitability not only of those farms operating under relatively worse natural and economic conditions but also of economically sound farms would decline abruptly;" "the system is built on those working less well getting by at the expense of those working better;" "the method of determining procurement prices using standard rentability rather than on the basis of the volume of profit generated per unit of product proceeds from the fact that there still will not be a cost- control mechanism;" "...procurement prices are changed within the framework of actual payments that already exist, and nothing is added to them."

[Krasnopivtsev] A new cycle of work has now begun in cooperation with the Councils of Ministers of the republics and taking into account the recommendations made by the agrarian committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet and in the CPSU Central Committee. The draft discussed at the CPSU Central Committee was prepared for the conditions of a partial introduction of new wholesale prices.

[Chudakov] Is this to say that your point of view on the need to implement that variant of the draft effective 1 January 1990, which drew criticism, has not changed?

[Krasnopivtsev] Yes. I believe that had we adopted that draft we would already be working on a variant of procurement prices which should be introduced on 1 January 1991 in coordination with the new wholesale prices, all the more so because the draft already contained prerequisites for the movement of procurement prices tracking changes in other prices in order to maintain their parity.

The need to introduce one set of prices first and then a different one in 1991 was considered to be a drawback of that variant. As I see it, this was an advantage because we were making a transition to a mechanism of accounting for the changes in prices for the means of production which will occur this year. Of course, this is a tremendous amount of work from the technical point of view, all the more so because a mutually coordinated system is also envisaged for wholesale prices in the processing industries. Unlike the prices in effect, the main principle of designing the new wholesale prices in the processing industry of the agroindustrial complex calls for taking into account raw materials at actual, full costs of their acquisition and processing. That is to say, subsidies will be paid not at the stage of procuring raw materials but rather at the stage of selling final products to the consumer, in transfer from the processing enterprises to the wholesale elements of trade.

The state pays subsidies at present anyway, and they should be given to those to whom they belong, the consumers, by way of extra wages, retirement benefits, or scholarships.

[Chudakov] May every family be compensated for an increase in costs if retail prices are brought in line with costs?

[Krasnopivtsev] Of course, every family cannot be compensated precisely, strictly in keeping with its actual purchases. It is impossible to create such an arrangement. This means that we will have to proceed from average amounts. The simplest calculation is to divide the amount of cost increases by the number of population, and to give this sum back directly. Modifications are possible here, for example, some form of differentiating between the rural and urban populace. This segment of the reform needs to be weighed very thoroughly and worked on by the trade unions and labor and standard-of-living experts. However, the principle of per capita compensation should still apply. In the course of this, the low-income populace will win because it did not have these average expenditures, and high-income families will lose somewhat. Perhaps we will have to do this because this step will not bring about absolute leveling. A person making R350 will lose, say, R10 and will not notice it. Therefore, I do not see insurmountable difficulties in principle in this matter. However, all of this needs to be calculated, methodically perfected, and after this we need to go to the people and say absolutely honestly and in detail what the amounts of compensation are going to be, what they will provide and for whom, and how compensation is going to be carried out. In this case, everyone will be able to figure out himself how this is going to affect his budget.

I am convinced that it is necessary to restore normal prices for foodstuffs. Having received compensation, some people will not use it for foodstuffs. They will begin treating bread and other foodstuffs with more care. The peasants will receive a real evaluation of their work.

To my mind, in 1987-1988 a correct concept of the reform of price-setting was developed. It was quite balanced. We should have embarked on the road selected at the time planned, that is, should have introduced new wholesale and procurement prices beginning in 1990. In this case, we would be able to implement an already proven arrangement for flexible price-setting next year. Everything needs to prove itself, whereas ultimately practice is the criterion of truth.

Scientific

'Mir' Consmonauts Perform Experiments

LD1405085890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] Another working week is beginning aboard the "Mir" orbiting complex. Today the cosmonauts will perform geophysical and technological experiments and undergo medical checks. Maintenance work will be done on systems and equipment aboard the station. In accordance with the medical surveillance program, the commander and flight engineer will carry out a comprehensive check on heart and vascular systems, using the Chibis spacesuit, which simulates terrestrial gravity. This research makes it possible to assess the extent to which a cosmonaut's body is affected by long periods of weightlessness which cut it off from normal conditions on earth.

Under the extensive space materials technology program on the gallar device, another space smelting will be completed. Another monocrystal with semi-conducting properties and improved parameters will be obtained.

According to reports from the crew, the flight is on schedule. Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin are both healthy and feeling well.

Military

Ryzhkov Sends Greetings to WWII Veterans

LD1005095190 Moscow TASS in English 0939 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 10 TASS—Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov has sent greetings to an international meeting of World War II veterans, which is opening in Moscow today, on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany.

"Descendants will always remember and be grateful to those who did not spare their lives to defeat the treacherous aggressor and disrupt its crazy plans of enslaving mankind. We lower our heads in memory of those who died in that heroic struggle."

"The Soviet people, who sustained all the hardships of the war, remember with deep respect its comradeship with other nations and their contribution to our joint victory. The struggle against Hitlerite fascism has become an international lesson and a manifestation of internationalism," Ryzhkov said in his message.

He wished the international meeting and all war veterans good health, strength and well-being.

Text of Message Published

PM1105143590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 90 Morning Edition p 4

[USSR Council of Ministers Chairman Ryzhkov message to Moscow meeting of World War II veterans]

[Text] To the participants in the International Meeting of War Veterans

I cordially greet the World War II veterans—front-line soldiers, partisans, resistance movement fighters, members of the underground, workers in the rear—assembled in Moscow for the international meeting marking the 45th anniversary of Victory over Hitlerite fascism.

Your descendants will always remember with deep gratitude those who risked their lives to crush the treacherous aggressor and thwart his feverish plans to enslave mankind. We bow our heads in grief to those who fell in that heroic struggle.

Your common unfading exploit for the sake of life and freedom was the highest manifestation of the human spirit. It embodied fearlessness and self-sacrifice, hatred of evil and devotion to humanist ideals, love for the motherland, and a sense of the international fraternity of all people of good will.

The glory of victory will never cease to resound nor the light of your exploit be extinguished. And the more distant we are from the victorious May 1945, the more fully we become aware of its true historic significance.

The Soviet people, who bore the brunt of the war, remember with a sense of deep respect the combat cooperation with other peoples and their contribution to the sacred cause of our joint victory. The struggle against Hiltlerite fascism served as a lesson to the whole world and as the most graphic manifestation of internationalism.

For 45 years now we have managed to maintain peace on earth. That is to your great credit. National and international organizations of veterans and Resistance fighters are making a weighty contribution to stabilizing and consolidating world peace and conveying to young people the humane traditions of friendship and cooperation among the peoples. May you enjoy great success in this noble endeavor!

During the celebration of the 45th Victory anniversary I wish the international meeting participants and all war veterans good health, renewed strength, and happiness for many years to come.

[Signed] N. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers

Yazov Interviewed on 'Military Perestroyka'

AU1105164490 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 9 May 90 p 6

[Interview with Marshal Dmitriy Yazov, minister of defense of the USSR, for BORBA "through NOVOSTI"; date and place not given: "Deep Military Perestroyka"]

[Text] [Question] Comrade Minister, 45 years have elapsed since the end of the Second World War in Europe. What have its causes, duration, and outcome taught us and how can we learn its lessons under the present conditions?

[Yazov] Yes, much water has flowed under the bridge since the historic spring of 1945 when the fight to the death with German fascism was crowned with victory. Forty-five years is a whole lifetime. However, perhaps just this allows us to acquire insight into and become aware of such an event like our victory in the last war according to current authentic criteria. As one of the best loved poets in our country said, "More can be seen at a distance...."

Therefore, the victory in the Second World War has international-historic dimensions. It marks the time when the peoples of Europe and the whole world were saved from fascist subjugation and reveals new ways for social progress and perspectives for consolidating a just and lasting peace in the country. This was essentially a victory in the name of progress and peace.

[Question] Very active steps have been taken in the last few years to prevent a new world war by reducing military potential and the arms race. What kind of role is the Soviet Union playing in this process?

[Yazov] The role of this or another state in world development is determined, as is well known, not only by political declarations and diplomatic acts—although this is very important—but also by practical action. This has always been the case, but under the present conditions, the precise significance of the practical effect of concrete constructive steps—through which policy comes into being—is greater than ever. I would like to draw attention to exactly this in answering your question. Nowadays everyone admits that not one of the basic problems of the present time can be resolved without resolving the problems of disarmament. The key to this is in social progress and peace....

Indelible Memories

[Question] Comrade Minister, you participated in the war with a weapon in your hand and fought against fascism in order to, as you said, save the world and life. What are your most lasting memories of this time?

[Yazov] I have many memories and they are all indelible. However, if we are talking about two of the most lasting, the first is connected with my arrival at the Volkhov front in 1942 after I had graduated from the Moscow military school and with my baptism by fire only a few days later. I was not yet 18 at that time and the soldiers in my platoon, who were twice or three times my age, endeavored to shield me from fascist bullets as discreetly as possible, without hurting my conceit as a young commander. I will never forget this.... And the second is of 8 May 1945, when we found out about the signing of the act in the Berlin suburbs of Karlhorst and the unconditional surrender of fascist Germany. I was already an officer at that time with combat experience—an older lieutenant—but I rejoiced and celebrated like a boy. I do not remember ever feeling such splendid, elated feelings at any time before or since that day.

[Question] You fought on the Volkhov front in the north. That is very far from Yugoslavia. At that time did you know or hear about the struggle of Yugoslav patriots against the fascist invaders?

[Yazov] Of course. During political reports and talks on the international situation in our regiment we used to say: "We are pursuing the fascists on the most northerly wing of the front and our brothers, the Yugoslavs, are on the most southerly."

We knew and remembered that in the hills and vales of Yugoslavia the struggle against the fascists began at a time when the struggle was only being prepared in other European countries and that this struggle basically developed into a people's war. I can say that the officers and soldiers on the front were warmed by the knowledge that we were not alone and that thousands of kilometers away the odious enemy was being beaten by the fighters and commanders of the national liberation army of Yugoslavia.

In this connection I recall that the sources of the feelings of friendship and brotherhood of the Soviet people toward the peoples of Yugoslavia originated in distant times. Russian soldiers and volunteers gave their help more than once to the Yugoslavs who were fighting for freedom. Thousands and thousands of Yugoslav internationalists, shoulder to shoulder with the workers and peasants of the new Soviet republic, defended the achievements of the socialist revolution in Russia, the achievements of October. In the years of the Second World War, many Soviet people who had fled from fascist persecution fought against Hitler's people shoulder to shoulder with the Yugoslav patriots in your country. Almost 8,000 Soviet soldiers and officers gave their lives for the freedom and independence of Yugoslavia. Monuments to the Srem front and Ilok, the tomb in Belgrade, and joint mausoleums in Zajecar and Pozarevac and in other towns and villages in Yugoslavia are being attentively and carefully maintained by the inhabitants of these places. I was surprised and grateful when I saw this during my visit to Yugoslavia in 1988.

How do the soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces live nowadays? Applied to the Armed Forces, where does the essence of the movement toward humanism and democratic socialism lie?

Concerns and Problems

[Yazov] Like all Soviet people, the soldiers and officers of our Armed Forces live with the concerns and upsets connected with perestroyka while tackling its practical tasks and problems. As you know, these are not small in number at the present crucial stage in the development of our society.

Closely reliant on political, economic, and legal reforms in the country, widespread transformations are being carried out in the Armed Forces, too. In their entirety, these transformations represent deep military reform. Wherein lies its essence?

First, in strictly coordinating the construction of the entire Soviet defense with military defense doctrine and with the principles of reasonable measures sufficient for reliable defense. This is of course on a common basis with the United States and NATO and with the coordination of their practical activities. Second, in establishing the priorities of the qualitative parameters in resolving the tasks of defending the country, the military readiness of the Armed Forces, and its equipment and preparedness. Third, in the all-round democratization of army life and a radical improvement in the social everyday position of military personnel and their families.

A particular feature of our Armed Forces today is the growing sociopolitical and official activity of the regular personnel. There is increasingly obvious participation by democratic institutions in the resolution of the tasks which the regular personnel face....

[Question] The transformation in the Armed Forces of the USSR makes up the main element of military reforms and is being carried out, as is well known, under conditions of a very considerable reduction in defense spending. Does this not cause difficulties in your so-called "military" perestroyka?

[Yazov] Of course. It is well known that our country's military budget for 1990 has already been reduced to around R71 billion, which is 8.2 percent less than last year. There are plans to maintain this tendency. We plan to reduce our share of the national income of the country that is spent on defense by one and half to two times by 1995. Of course, we need lively reorganization in order to fulfill the tasks that lie before the Armed Forces....

Constructive Dialogue

Our principle approach to the construction and development of the Armed Forces in the present conditions can be expressed in the following way: the achievement of maximal results with the minimal spending of funds and resources and the unconditional security necessary for defense.

[Question] How do you see the future of the Warsaw Pact and NATO?

[Yazov] It is assumed that favorable conditions are gradually being shaped in Europe for the initiation of constructive dialogue between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, translating their joint relations into nonconfrontational relations, consistent with the transformation of the scope of the alliances from military to political-military. As regards the more distant future, our view is well known: We are committed to Europe ridding itself completely of military blocs and to the simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

[Question] Today, 45 years after the triumphant end of the war in Europe, one of the most topical issues of European life is the issue of the unification of Germany. How do you see the solution to this issue?

[Yazov] This can and should be resolved in close connection with the formation of new European structures for security and cooperation and the provision of guarantees for the existing postwar borders in Europe and the construction of a common European home.

[Question] Is the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the GDR possible?

[Yazov] It certainly is possible. This is based on the principle stand of the USSR in support of the elimination of foreign army bases and the return of all troops to their national territories. However, in this specific case, the solution of the withdrawal of our troops can be found only together with the United States, Great Britain, and France, as the victorious states in the Second World War, bearing in mind the validity of a number of jointly adopted documents and the details of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. In other words, we are ready to quickly withdraw our troops from the GDR if the United States, England, and France withdraw their troops from the FRG.

Finally, after he had told us about how Victory Day will be celebrated this year in Moscow, the minister of defense of the USSR, Yazov, wished from the bottom of his heart health and happiness to workers and defenders of Yugoslavia and "success in work for the good of your homeland in the name of progress and peace."

Military Conscription Law Discussed

LD1105183690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1040 GMT 11 May 90

[Interviews with participants in the Collegium of the Chief Military Procuracy, by correspondent Sergey Guryanov; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] The Collegium of the Chief Military Procuracy met recently to discuss fulfilment of the USSR law on universal military conscription and problems linked with this. My colleague Sergey Guryanov interviewed several of those who took part in the sitting. [passage omitted: Guryanov interviews Colonel Viktor Alksnis, USSR people's deputy, who speaks of the way in which law-making activity is lagging behind the processes taking place in the country today. Guryanov asks the following question of Alksnis]

[Guryanov] Why does the military question, the question of doing one's service, of being called up for service, occupy one of the main places in the activity of both the informal organizations and the parliaments of the Baltic republics?

[Alksnis] I think that this is first and foremost connected with the fact that a course has, nevertheless, been set, a course has been set toward independence, and insofar as the Army is one of the mechanisms that ensure integrity, including that of the state—it unites the state—then one of the first of these attacks is therefore, aimed at the Army: because having split the Army, having separated it into different quarters by nationality, for example, it becomes simpler to solve a number of other tasks. It seems to me that that is precisely why such a large amount of attention is being given to the problems of the Army. At the same time, dirt and slanders are thrown at the Army. But the whole thing boils down to this, you know—it is very bad—because what is happening now in the Baltic republics, and the attitudes toward the Army and people wearing military uniform, does nothing for the honor of those who have unleased this campaign. In any state the man in uniform has to have authority, and the fact that this campaign has been unleashed is very negative and is having a negative effect upon those people who have unleashed it—because one way or another we are all linked to the Army to some extent. It seems to me, therefore, that something has to be done to stop this campaign to discredit the Army.

[Guryanov] Vladimir Zolotukhin joins in again:

[Zolotukhin] The fact is that cases in which people die during the performance of their service remain a reality, and each such instance is seized upon by many informal associations, and a whole lot of talk takes place. The main thing is that we have to change our approach to the future of our Soviet Armed Forces—we have to return to the Armed Forces the understanding that they had when the Army was the child of the whole people, and when concern for the Army and for Army problems did not remain the prerogative of just one department on its own, the USSR Ministry of Defense. [passage omitted: Guryanov interviews (Ter-Grigoryants), deputy chief of the Main Staff of Ground forces, who speaks of the need for laws rather than merely Ministry of Defense orders to govern the components parts of the training of young people for service in the Armed Forces—the patriotic education of young people; treatment and health measures; physical training; and the study of Russian]

[Guryanov] Aleksandr Filippovich Katusev, chief military procurator and deputy procurator-general of the USSR, talked about how he saw the problem:

[Katusev] Unfortunately a political struggle has been taking place of late around the Army and military service. The Army gets in the way of some people in its role as guarantor against the intrigues of extremism; it is an obstacle for others as a school of internationalism, while a third group would like to see the servicemen as a labor force—this refers to ministries and departments. The call-up for military service is proceeding in a very complicated way. There are very many distortions and infringements of socialist legality, so we have, therefore, jointly with other departments and organizations, formed teams and sent them out to the localities to have a look at what the reasons are in specific terms.

[Guryanov] What do the reasons amount to?

[Katusev] Here one has to talk about the following aspects. Individual mass information media are whipping up the situation around the Army, and are showing it exclusively from a negative side. In some regions extremist-minded leaders of informal associations are also motivating people against service in the Army. They consider that Army service is a shameful thing, and so on and so forth, and there are also specific calls made in the Baltic republics, say, and in the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], not to go into the service of the Army of occupation, as they put it.

[Guryanov] Aleksandr Filippovich, 6,647 avoided call-up last autumn. Of these, 292 were (?brought) to account.

[Katusev] Yes, that is the case.

[Guryanov] This is an indication of the helplessness of the territorial procuracies: How should this problem be resolved in your view—for the law has to be obeyed?

[Katusev] The territorial law-enforcement bodies deal with the question of taking criminal proceedings against those who avoid the call-up. The military procuracy does not deal with this. Indeed, in some places, in some individual rayons and oblasts and even republics, the law-enforcement bodies are unfortunately inactive and do not take criminal proceedings against individuals avoiding call-up. We will put this question to the USSR procurator-general and to the minister of internal affairs of the USSR in order that measures can be taken against the leaders of law-enforcement bodies which do not carry out the law.

[Guryanov] Many of those who are today calling upon young people to refuse to serve in the Army are intimidating them, intimidating them over the high crime rate in the Armed Forces and the alarming crime-generating atmosphere.

[Katusev] What can one say? Last year the crime rate in the country rose by 32 percent. The Army is a part of our society. And when our society suffers, the other parts of it suffer, too, naturally. And so the growth in the crime rate in the Army last year was 9.8 percent, too. An enormous struggle is being waged: special commissions to fight crime have been formed in our Armed Forces. In some things we are successful, in others we are not successful. Last year we managed to reduce by eight percent the so-called crime that of late we have been calling bullying—this in itself is a certain step toward a reduction in the crime level. The crime rate is not all that high in the Army. In 1989 more crimes were committed in the Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon of Moscow than were committed in the whole of the Moscow military district. But our soldiers and our officers are suffering in the Caucasus, too, and they are suffering in the Baltic republics now, and they are suffering in other regions when they encounter extremists as they perform their military duty.

[Guryanov] In this connection do you consider that the law should protect the honor and dignity of the servicemen?

[Katusev] Without any doubt. There are special articles in our criminal code laying down enhanced liability for insulting militia workers while fulfilling their duties, for inflicting bodily harm upon them, and so on. We have put forward a proposal that laws protecting honor, dignity, health, and life should also be adopted with regard to officers and soldiers, and not just when performing their official duties, but just as servicemen.

Lopatin, Others on Radical Military Reform

90UM0566A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 16, 21-27 Apr 90 pp 5-6

[Roundtable discussion with V. Serebryannikov, doctor of philosophy, professor, and retired lieutenant-general; Major V. Lopatin, USSR people's deputy; Yu. Deryugin, candidate of philosophy; and Z. Filatova, sociologist: "Military Reform: Who Is For It and Why"]

[Text] **Only nine percent of the officers that were polled consider glasnost unnatural.**

[Filatova] The idea of a radical military reform is penetrating the various layers of public opinion deeper and deeper. But quite often it is reduced just to the need for a change to a professional army.

[Serebryannikov] The problem is a lot bigger, of course. We are talking mainly about radical improvements in military policy. We used to forget the possibility of a drastic diminishing in the threat of war; we got used to the display of force as a reaction to the militaristic ventures of the West. We unintentionally helped to create a confrontation, though we had a sincere dislike of wars. Now the situation has changed. From the point of view of reasonable sufficiency the range of our military power can be 0.9 to 0.8 of that of the West.

[Deryugin] The political factor is also of great importance here. We have to consider improvements in the concrete mechanisms which will enable us to design and carry out a military policy capable of providing for the reasonable sufficiency.

[Lopatin] I would say that a most important condition is to prepare the reformers. Among the components of a military reform is the division of the leadership of the armed forces at the political, administrative, and combat levels, the definition of the areas of responsibility at each of those levels, and the civilians' control. The latter should include the division of functions between the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff so that the Ministry becomes an administrative organ headed by a civilian.

[Filatova] Who will have the right then to make final decisions?

[Lopatin] I think that public organizations can participate in the design of military policy only before it gets to the decision making stage. Decision making should become an exclusive right of the organs of state power and administration. On top of that we need an independent parliamentary center to make evaluations and strategic assessments. This center, together with the President's Council, would summarize all the information concerning any threat to the USSR's safety. This refers also to economic, ecological, demographic, and other data and not just military information. The center would then offer well-founded proposals for decisions by the president, the Supreme Soviet, and the new Committee for Defense and State Security.

[Filatova] The military reform is being made necessary by the acute internal contradictions that the army has been facing recently. One of them, for instance, is the contradiction between the deep structural changes in the society and the absence of such in the armed forces.

[Serebryannikov] The main reason why the army is so far behind society is the lack of a precise, scientifically explained concept of perestroyka. Since its very beginning the military bureaucracy, and especially its top echelon, have resorted to patching up the holes and fixing the facade. And they are still doing just this. In some of the units at first this went as far as making lists of which officers had conformed with perestroyka and which had not and all of it was done quite seriously.

[Lopatin] Things are no better now. Recently, the subcommittee on the armed forces discussed a comprehensive, special purpose program aimed against "dedovshchina" [abuse and mistreatment of recruits] which had been prepared by the Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. The deputies decided that the program is just another plan to make... plans. Again there was nothing but empty words and slogans.

As a USSR people's deputy I often visit military units and I encounter the same problems everywhere: "dedovshchina", "us and them" groups in the barracks, protectionism, tensions in relations between the senior and lower-ranked military, an increase in the numbers of young officers who want to quit the military, and the stubbornness of the military bureaucracy as they wish to retain their privileges.

[Deryugin] Among other things, the antihumane relations existing in the army and in navy have resulted in suicides. Suicides make up 20 percent of the total number of the people who die in the military service every year. And the talk about the poor quality of the conscripts does not mean anything. According to the research, psychologically disturbed people account only for 10 percent of all suicides.

[Filatova] Would the transfer to a professional army help to find a way out of the situation?

[Serebryannikov] I think so. But this is not the only problem. It has become necessary to change to the professional army because of the revolutionized state of the military affairs. Contemporary hardware requires that those who handle it have high professional qualifications. This is the main thing.

[Deryugin] According to the research, the soldiers of the regular ground forces lose their acquired skills after three years of post-military life.

[Lopatin] One should not forget material incentives either. Together with the mechanisms for the social protection of a person they will be of considerable importance in the professional army. A military person does not have many constitutional rights at present. It becomes especially evident during one's discharge from the armed forces. According to Ministry of Defense data, there are over 270,000 families of military dependents who have a critical need for an improvement in their accommodations. That number includes over 170,000 families of officers and warrant officer who have no place to live. When we start pulling our troops out of East Europe tens of thousands of more families will find themselves in the same conditions. That why we need a special state program for the solution of these problems.

[Filatova] Does the Ministry of Defense see any way out of this?

[Lopatin] Mainly they are trying to unload the problem onto the local soviets. But the soviets have their own long lines of people.

[Filatova] Then a legitimate question arises: Where would the money come from?

[Lopatin] The Ministry of Defense should be the only spender of the military budget (at present the budget is distributed among dozens of ministries). At the same time the ministry should be made responsible for reallocating certain sums from hardware and weapons purchases to the new program I described.

[Filatova] If one has to judge by the reaction of the military high command, they treat the idea of a professional army without much enthusiasm. Their main reasoning is that it will cost five to six times more.

[Serebryannikov] I am not an expert on the economy but I think that the estimates should be made from a different principle. We cannot just multiply the number of the military by their salaries; we have to consider other factors also. The young people, free from conscription, will contribute to the people's economy. And this has a cost value also.

[Filatova] There is a centrist point of view: We need the professional army but the time for it has not come yet.

[Deryugin] This point of view aims to "bury" the very idea of a professional army. If we look at the American experience we will learn that it took them three to four years to change to a professional army. We have to take this into consideration also. If we start the transfer after waiting for several years then it will not be hard to figure out how many years the process would take. The transfer to a professional army is an objective need of society. You can order your subordinates around but you cannot do this to objective laws.

Baltic Republics

Report on Baltic Leaders Arrival in Tallinn

LD1205134390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 12 May 90

[Text] ELTA has reported from Tallinn—Cars adorned with Lithuanian and Latvian flags approached the Toompea Palace at 1100 today. The chairmen of the Supreme Councils Vytautas Landsbergis, Anatoliy Gorbunov and Arnold Ryuytel met there. Before the beginning of the consultations Arnold Ryuytel stated to numerous journalists that it was intended to adopt a declaration of alliance and cooperation of the three republics, letters to the presidents of the Soviet Union and the United States of America, Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush, and a joint communique. He also stated that an important part in the negotiations was allocated to Lithuania's economic blockade and its possible application to Latvia and Estonia.

Vytautas Landsbergis also stressed the importance of the solidarity of the three Baltic republics and said that the processes of de-stabilization and democratization should go together. Anatoliy Gorbunov expressed his belief that this meeting would help the world public better to understand the striving for renewed statehood of the Baltic republics.

After the signing of joint documents a press conference of the three leaders of the republics is expected.

Baltic Government Heads Adopt Four Documents

LD1205225990 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 12 May 90

[Text] The chairmen of the parliaments of the three Baltic states, Arnold Ryuytel of Estonia, Anatoliy Gorbunov of Latvia, and Vytautas Landsbergis of Lithuania held a meeting in Tallinn today.

Four documents were adopted: a declaration on the renewal of the treaty on unity and cooperation of the three states, signed in Geneva in 1934 and later stopped in 1940; a communique reasserting the Baltic drive for freedom and independence; a message to Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush calling upon them to revise the effects of the 1940 annexation of the Baltic states; and a statement on the will of the three countries to take part in the Helsinki II later this year.

Baltics Sign Political Cooperation Declaration

LD1205154190 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 12 May 90

[Text] The three Baltic republics have signed a declaration on political cooperation, recreating the 1934 Baltic Council. Reports from Tallinn say the declaration on the cooperation and community of views between the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian republics was signed by the republics' three presidents. The council is to include the presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers of the three republics and is to meet periodically, or at the initiative of one of the republics. Lithuania's Vytautas Landsbergis, Latvia's Anatoliy Gorbunov, and Estonia's Arnold Ryuytel were also understood to have written letters to United States President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. The three republics are seeking negotiations with Moscow over their separate declarations of independence.

Text of Agreement

LD1205205290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 12 May 90

[Text] An accord and cooperation agreement between the three Baltic states was signed in Tallinn today. It reads as follows:

We, Latvian Republic Supreme Council Chairman Anatoliy Gorbunov, Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis, and Estonian Republic Supreme Council Chairman Arnold Ryuytel, guided by the unconditional loyalty of our states' nations to ideals of state independence and freedom, relying on the historical experience in cooperation among the three states, affirming loyalty to universally recognized principles of international law, having firmly resolved to continue and to develop the political and economic cooperation among the three states and seeking their further contribution to the contemporary development process of all of Europe and representing three states that had formerly been members in the League of Nations, who are prepared to assume their rightful positions in the United Nations Organization on a parity basis with other states, have resolved: To renew the Agreement and Declaration on Accord and Cooperation, which had been formed between Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia on 12 September 1934 in Geneva and which was illegally discontinued in 1940.

Guided by new conditions to improve the mechanism of relations between us, that has been provided for in Paragraph 2 of the aforementioned agreement, to form a Baltic States Council to seek total restoration of state independence of the three republics; to establish that membership of the Baltic States Council, which is to meet periodically or at the initiative of one of the states, will be comprised of the Supreme Council chairmen of the Baltic republics and other high officials, in keeping with the discretion of the states.

This declaration, has been signed on 12 May 1990 in Tallinn. Each of its five copies in Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, English, and Russian langauges, is equally valid.

The Supreme Council chairmen of the three Baltic states also adopted a declaration on participation in the consultation of European security and cooperation questions.

Landsbergis Praises Agreement

LD1405101690 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 0000 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] The signing yesterday in Tallinn, of an agreement between the three Baltic states, and the continuation, at the same time, of the 1934 interstate and internationally known agreement, is a return to the family of European nations. This is how Vytautas Landsbergis appraised, in an interview with Lithuanian television, the document signed yesterday by the Supreme Council chairmen of the three Baltic states, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

The Tallinn agreement has completed in a political sense, that which had been earlier signed by the prime ministers of the three states, namely agreements for economic cooperation and future integration. Now we are entering a political area in general, an international relations orientation toward the East and the West, stated Vytautas Landsbergis. He further observed: Two partners are needed in negotiations. One cannot negotiate with a wall that faces one even if it (?is noted for its) [word indistinct] red bricks. Now we have in fact proposed four-state negotiations, although this will be understood as negotiations between two states; however our state comprises three allies, as against one partner, and this is essentially, a new proposal, that perhaps will enable the Kremlin to respond in a more positive manner than it has to date, said Vytautas Landsbergis.

Baltic Leaders Remark on Future Cooperation

LD1205170390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 12 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] As before, the events in the Baltic republics are at the center of the mass media's attention. With their generally similar attitude toward the country's central leadership, the Baltic republics are currently engaged in an attempt to work out a single policy. Today Tallinn was the venue for a meeting of the three republics' leaders.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent H. Lenk] It was in the building housing Estonia's Supreme Soviet that the chairman of the Supreme Soviets of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia—Vytautas Landsbergis, Anatoliy Gorbunov, and Arnold Ryuytel, respectively—met, along with spokesmen for the governments and foreign ministries of the three Baltic republics. The purpose of this meeting was to revive the activity of the Baltic Council, the consultative body that operated in the Baltic region in the 1930s.

A declaration was adopted today on unity and cooperation between Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, as was a message to the presidents of the USSR and the United States, and to the U.N. secretary general. A joint communique was published after the meeting.

[A. Ryuytel] The situation, the political situation in the country generally is difficult, just as it is in the Baltic republics. In particular, I would say Lithuania is in a difficult position but we are also aware of specific problems in Estonia and Latvia. I believe we must, therefore, discuss this question all together, and put forward proposals that would really provide a way out in terms of politics in the Soviet Union, generally, and would give Moscow a chance to voice its realistic view of how to help reach the correct decisions in this situation, and how to help our peoples, of course. The psychological situation in all three of our republics is very difficult. Our peoples cannot find a realistic way out given Moscow's confrontation, and given our republics' specific problems.

[V. Landsbergis] We are proceeding without retreating from what was started two years ago. I believe we can also stimulate the processes of democratization, self-determination, and freedom in the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, after all the various things we have experienced in the past 50 years, we will not repay this with evil, only with good.

[Gorbunov] (?Given) the political aspect of our life today, our meeting ought to have positive repercussions, since we will be discussing specific problems and coordinating our efforts to resolve specific political and economic problems. In my opinion that is exactly what is needed: for our actions today to the coordinated and integrated. [video shows arrivals at the Supreme Soviet; scenes from the meeting itself; three interviews] [end recording]

Results of Prunskiene's Western Tour Assessed

Prunskiene Interviewed

LD1305155590

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1300 GMT on 13 May broadcasts a seven-minute live or recorded interview with Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene by correspondent Guoda Salciute during Prunskiene's stopover at the Lithuanian embassy in Moscow, enroute from Bonn to Vilnius on 13 May.

Asked to comment on her visits to the world's capitals, Prunskiene replies that the trip "was necessary," admitting that "it was difficult to believe she would succeed in seeing the top leaders of these countries. However, that did take place, and of course, now attests to the fact that these countries are not indifferent, that they are participants in decisions regarding our affairs, and that we, in turn, must be mindful of how other states view this question, how they visualize it from their perspective, and within what framework they support our independence."

Prunskiene noted that insofar as the question of "support" is concerned, "they naturally give a uniform reply, that our quest for independence is legitimate, that they support it...." She added that they urge negotiations between the two sides.

Prunskiene notes that she acted as a representative of Lithuania, who was being consulted by these states. This consultation makes the role of these states significantly more definite and "gives rise to many hopes." She outlined her expectations, saying: "the meeting between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev is a very significant event. During the course of my visit, the U.S. public, journalists, and politicians naturally formed, perhaps, a more defined opinion of what is happening in Lithuania, what Lithuania seeks, and by what means it could be assisted." She observes that public opinion does have its impact on state leaders' positions. [passage indistinct]

Prunskiene recalls the "presence of a desire to resolve Lithuania's affairs," observing that "the rule of state leaders in that process has become considerably more definite." She admits to being currently unprepared to predict "what form this will take and what its result will be." Prunskiene adds that the process did not come to a halt with yesterday, and predicts that the leaders now, will consult among themselves.

She stresses: "Everything, or much, depends on what position we take ourselves, on what the consonance of our actions will be with the world's stance on this matter, and on what the maximal and realistically possible forms and concrete limitations of Lithuanian independence consolidation will be." She goes on to point out the need to take Western and Eastern positions into account in order to secure the most significant points.

Commenting on the statement that she has led her republic into the world arena, Prunskiene says she feels that she talked to the leaders and they found reason to look for means of resolving the question of Lithuanian independence.

She concludes by outlining her reception in various states and the press coverage accorded her.

Prunskiene on Kohl Meetings

LD1305182790

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1600 GMT on 13 May carries a one-minute report on Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene's return to Vilnius from the FRG.

At the airport scene an unidentified man asks Prunskiene to comment on her meeting with FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl. From poor reception Prunskiene answers, "It was one of the [word indistinct] meetings. It was interesting in so far as [words indistinct]. We did not require an interpreter. After a few sentences we quickly began to converse like old acquaintances, very openly, simply, and directly. I am so accustomed to associating with Germans, having done so over a number of years. In a certain sense, I am a student of Germany, since my doctoral dissertation [word indistinct] and because I have many acquaintances there. I feel a certain sense of openness and trust among [?his] surroundings and people. I am very satisfied with that conversation. I did not expect it to be so constructive and that our situation, as regarded by the West...[pauses] our situation among [words indistinct] namely, in that conversation, it was clarified to the greatest extent." Prunskiene is asked a question concerning the rest of her recent trip and she notes that she acquired an awareness of "international backbone," that furnishes knowledge of the support available.

Landsbergis Hails Tour

LD1405104490 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 0000 GMT 14 May 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis observed: The political and economic trip to Canada, planned by the premier, became a political and diplomatic journey of great significance, to the capitals of the world's great nations. Vytautas Landsbergis states that the premier conducted with excellence the diplomatic assignment that arose unexpectedly. [passage omitted]

Landsbergis Interviewed

AU1405100590 Vienna KURIER in German 14 May 90 p 4

[Interview with Vytautas Landsbergis, president of the Lithuanian parliament, by Niki Glattauer in Vilnius; date not given: "KURIER Exclusive Interview with Vytautas Landsbergis"]

[Glattauer] The U.S. mission of President Prunskiene was a failure. Is it now all over?

[Landsbergis] Failure is the wrong expression. Lithuania will also not take back the declaration of its withdrawal from the Union. As far as formulating certain laws differently—well, one could discuss this. But the claim of independence stands.

[Glattauer] How do you like the feeling of shaping world politics, although you are not a politician?

[Landsbergis] I am not interested in power. However, I love my country. It has been poisoned and ruined. All this has happened during my lifetime. I still believe that it is possible to save Lithuania. Many people of my generation say that it is a miracle that they are still alive, as everything is becoming worse and worse. But it did not destroy them.

[Glattauer] Will they now be destroyed by Moscow's economic blockade?

[Landsbergis] I am not anxious, although the majority of our people are enjoying now a little less affluence. I would be more anxious if our people were to give up their ideals for a little more affluence.

[Glattauer] Do you not feel like the bee that has stung the bear?

[Landsbergis] We do not want to sting a bear or an elephant or, excuse me, some other asshole. If you see it like this, all right. But Lithuania is not a bee. It will not die of the sting, but win.

Prunskiene Voices Readiness for Compromise

LD1205215290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 12 May 90

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Very recently Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene had a telephone conversation with Radio Free Europe's correspondent Kestutis [name indistinct]. In the course of the conversation, she noted, among other thing, that the West is exaggerating the danger of [word indistinct] to Gorbachev and also that of the stability of the East European situation. [passage omitted]

In closing, the prime minister declared that Lithuania is offering a unilateral readiness for negotiations, during the course of which, it will arrive at intelligent compromises that would satisy both sides, without discussing the independence act itself. [passage omitted]

Blockade Reportedly Lifted for 46 Enterprises

LD1405112590 Moscow World Service in English 1100 GMT 14 May 90

[Text] The economic blockade has ended for 46 Lithuanian industrial enterprises under national ministries. The Soviet Government has announced that they will be given priority in receiving material resources. This actually means resumption of supplies. Experts say the decision is prompted by the need to avoid the serious negative consequences of a blockade for the consumers of the goods produced by Lithuanian enterprises in the other republics. Besides, a stoppage of some of the factories could aggravate the situation on the country's consumer market. At present the Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Resources in Lithuania are drawing up lists of food and industrial goods for exchange with the enterprises in the rest of the country.

Lithuanian Blockade Has Effect on Union Industry

PM1205153290 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Leonid Kapelyushnyy in Vilnius under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Seeking a Compromise"]

[Text] Political forecasting seems to be the fashion in the Lithuanian parliament. Chairman Landsbergis, characterizing the existing situation, has again repeated that there can be no question of repealing or revoking the act of independence. As for the economic blockade, he said, it has not only affected us. We recently saw M. Gorbachev in the Urals. People there have nothing to eat, but they have metal. You can ban deliveries of metal to Lithuania and Lithuanian meat to the Urals. But that is not a blockade against Lithuania, it is against the Sverdlovsk workers. And the impression being created is that this power absolutely does not know what it is doing, and that its time is running out.

It is apparently in the light of the presentiment of the approaching end of Soviet power (or of the present political leadership?) that the chairman's supporters stand firm on the 11 March position. I would say that these supporters are in the majority. But it is already quite obvious that even among the irreconcilable wing (and still more among the moderates) doubts are arising. This led one deputy to express regret that "even under blockade conditions we lack unity, grumbling can be heard, and people are beginning to make accusations against the government."

Parliament did not break into applause when Deputy K. Antanavicius expressed the opinion that "we should give M. Gorbachev the opportunity to stand firm. After all, if Gorbachev is there, democratic forces in Russia will grow stronger." Laima Andrikiene drew attention to the fact that the international community's recognition of Lithuania depends largely on how it resolves its relations with Moscow. Sergey Pirozhkov called on parliament to suspend the operation of laws adopted since 11 March and start talks with the USSR Government on the basis of the Law on Secession from the Union.

"The center can be accused of harshness toward Lithuania. But surely we who sit here can be accused of the same with regard to our own people?"

Deputy Pirozhkov believes that through many of its decisions the parliament has raised a question mark over the possibility of achieving real political and economic sovereignty. His assessment is that destructive processes of terrifying power are beginning in the economy, the republic is facing a collapse of the financial system, the mafia is growing rich before our very eyes, and the working class bears the cross of suffering.

Let me quote the aforementioned Kazimieras Antanavicius: "We must tell the people: Unless the blockade ends, we cannot hold our ground, whatever efforts we make. We are not traitors, not panic-mongers, not weak-minded, but we must say that it will be very difficult. This is what we think: When the blockade ends, everyone will again be able to live well. But no, its consequences will be felt for many years to come. This stubbornness of ours leads nowhere, it is simply romanticism and ignorance of the economic foundation."

The main news of recent days: In the maritime port at Klaipeda, representatives of the administration, the labor collective council, the trade union committee, and the main political parties and social movements have sat down at a "roundtable" for the first time. Formerly irreconcilable communists of both parties and representatives of "Sajudis" and the trade unions, after a heated defense of their positions, have begun to seek ways of reaching a consensus. One of the initiators of the "roundtable" was maritime port chief N. Berezhnoy. His assessment of the results is positive and his prognosis optimistic.

It is a pity that such instances are as yet isolated occurrences in Lithuania.

Antiblockade Commission Meets in Vilnius

LD1105130190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] A meeting of the government antiblockade commission. [passage indistinct] Individual owners will be supplied with 100 liters of liquified gas. Jurgis Ilikevicius, director of the Lithuanian enterprise responsible for supplying oil products, noted that the Belorussians have so far not been fulfilling an agreement between the Lithuanian representatives and the Belorussian Council of Ministers. But the Belorussians have promised that they will supply all state transport vehicles in Lithuania with gasoline, and individual car owners will be able to obtain 10 liters of gas each in Belorussia. The state of affairs regarding the supply of gasoline and fuel is not completely hopeless because the Kaliningrad and Pskov enterprises are offering to supply oil products from Lithuania.

Vaidotas Antanaitis, minister of forestry, spoke about the production of paper and the forests. He noted that there is enough timber in Lithuania, but no possibilities to process it. The production of paper, especially of newsprint and of paper for packaging of food products, is continuing and there is no shortage of such paper.

Trade Minister Albertas Sinevicius reported that yesterday goods worth R2 million were received. A very important delivery of 21 tonnes of baby food was received. The value of imported goods was R262,000 [as heard].

This is the information from a meeting of the government antiblockade commission.

Reviews Gas Shortage

LD1205110890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 12 May 90

[Text] A meeting of the government commission was held today at the Council of Ministers to examine the blockade. Information by Valdas Vilunas:

Today a meeting of the government antiblockade commission started with the examination of the worst problem—gasoline. The Lithuanian government has assured all owners of private cars that they would be able to purchase their 30 liters of gasoline by the 21 May. At present the majority of gasoline pumps are no longer working. It was noted that over-expenditure of gasoline in Vilnius alone amounted to 2,000 tonnes. If nobody had cheated, there would be sufficient gasoline. On Monday it will be decided how to supply gasoline to those who did not get it.

And now about oil. Information has been received that 10,000 signatures have been collected in Tyumen for an appeal to Mikhail Gorbachev demanding that the supply of oil to Lithuania be continued. If this demand by the oil industry workers is not complied with, they are threatening a general strike at the end of May or at the beginning of June.

Lithuania is helped not only by industrial workers and experts. A pleasant initiative has been demonstrated by Georgian journalists. They published in the mass media the names of enterprises and their heads who do not supply products to Lithuania, or refuse to cooperate.

Meanwhile, a lively mania of purchasing goods continues in Lithuania: In May the purchase of stockings, fabrics, tea and other goods was 20-40 percent higher than in the corresponding month last year. Preparations are in progress to open commercial shops selling luxury goods, foreign cigarettes, and drinks.

The commission also discussed actions by rescue services in case of accidents on oilfields in Lithuania.

Shortages in Lithuania 'Successfully Absorbed'

LD1105172390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] [Announcer] Now for our regular "News from Lithuania" spot. On the line from Vilnius is our correspondent Elena Kurklietyte:

[Kruklietyte] It's already two months since the republic's Supreme Soviet declared restoration of Lithuanian state independence. Those two months have brought many worries and hopes, and there have been tangible changes in the republic's economy. Today, as every day, the Lithuanian government has issued a communique informing the population of the republic's economic situation.

[announcer] And what is that situation today? Is there substantial disruption to industry?

[Kurklietyte] According to the latest figures from the Lithuanian Statistics Department, there were forced stoppages at 123 industrial, construction, and transport enterprises on 8 May due to the lack of fuel, power, and material resources. Since the beginning of the economic blockade the republic's industrial enterprises have lost almost R20 million because of the commodity shortages. As a result of the fall in freight traffic the railways have lost almost R550,000 and motor vehicle enterprises R3.5 million in income.

[Announcer] Can one regard these figures as evidence of total economic destabilization in a republic like Lithuania?

[Kurklietyte] Well, in answer to your question I would refer to the findings of a government commission, stating that the first blow of the blockade has been successfully absorbed. To continue softening the effects of the blockade strategic guidelines for the orientation of Lithuania's economy will have to be drawn up. Ways are being sought to interest Soviet suppliers in cooperation with Lithuania regardless of political and other short-term considerations.

A final piece of news I received via the PAP and ELTA news agencies: Lithuanian prime minister Kazimiera Prunskiene today leaves Paris for Bonn, where she will be received by FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Algirdas Brazauskas, the Lithuanian vice premier and first secretary of the Independent Lithuanian Communist Party is also heading for the FRG today following a three-day visit to Switzerland, where he took part in a political security forum seminar in St. Gallen University.

Moscow Radio on Economic Constraints in Lithuania

LD1105141190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] We have received a report on the situation in Lithuania.

At present the situation in the republic has deteriorated, not only in the political but also in the economic sphere. This is accounted for, above all, by the fact that the actions of the new Supreme Soviet run counter to the hopes and aspirations of ordinary people, and hit hard at their vital interests. There are some 12,000 unemployed in the republic. Many enterprises are not operating at full capacities. There are major interruptions in the supply of building materials.

Meanwhile the republican government is looking for a way out of the situation which has arisen. Workers from many enterprises and organizations, for instance, are being sent on unpaid leave, and it has been suggested to them that they participate in work to clean up forests and tidy up territories.

But these current measures, as First Secretary of the Siauliai Town Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) Kardelis believes, threaten a social explosion in the near future, because people no longer have faith in Landsbergis.

Landsbergis Predicts Unemployment Rate

LD1105222990 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, has said that in case Moscow continues its economic blockade against Lithuania very soon 200,000 or 300,000 people here will be jobless. If the Soviet leadership is going to be assured during the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit that they are allowed everything they might resort to even sterner measures, disregarding the after-effects on the economy of their own country. A policy of this kind would be extremely dangerous to Lithuania. However, the Lithuanian economy would be seriously undermined only after a more prolonged time. Vytautas Landsbergis noted that the economy of Lithuania would have to be restricted so that less supplies of raw materials are needed. According to Mr. Landsbergis, the moods of the people here in Lithuania will be one of the main factors for enduring the blockade at least until summer.

Lithuanian Communique on Economic Situation

LD1205225590 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 12 May 90

[Text] Today's communique of the Lithuanian government on the economic situation in the country says that during the two last days there have been no changes in the supplies of raw materials and other resources to Lithuania. The stocks that the country still has make it possible to keep up the functioning of economy and social infrastructure but the small resources are drawing towards zero. Through ministries and departments the government is further working in all directions. Work is continued on drawing up the concept and principles of the future Lithuanian economy.

Western Reluctance To Support Lithuania Noted

LD1205165990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0930 GMT 12 May 90

[By TASS political observer Gennadiy Petrov: "Are We On the Way to a Compromise?"—TASS headline]

[Text] [no dateline as received] "Moral support, yes, but no more than that." Judging from foreign press reports on the results of the private trip by K. Prunskiene, chairman of Lithuania's Council of Ministers, across the Atlantic and to a number of Western European capitals, where she was received by leaders and leading politicians, the results may be boiled down to that formula.

The main aim of the trip was to secure the West's economic support in response to Moscow's sanctions, and the head of the Lithuanian government did not conceal this. Well, in "pre-perestroyka" times such a calculation might have been justified. However, other interests prevail at present in the leading Western capitals. For this reason the presidents and prime ministers to whom K. Prunskiene appealed as arbitrators for the settlement of a "family" dispute indeed did not rush to promise specific assistance, but one after another advocated arbitrating the conflict situation in relations between Vilnius and Moscow by means of dialogue. The West does not perceive any profit for itself in destabilizing the situation in the USSR and the process of democratizing Soviet society, in undermining the negotiations under way on the problems of disarmament, or in blocking the process of creating all-European security structures.

This position is illustrated not only by the conversations with Prunskiene, but by many other things, too: for instance, Washington's recent decision to revise the list of restrictions of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) or the statement of the session of the Council of Europe's ministerial committee expressing firm support for reforms in the Soviet Union and a desire to expand cooperation with the USSR.

With what recommendations for her own government has Prunskiene returned to Vilnius? As the French LE MONDE notes, Prunskiene "has been expressing disappointment over the caution of her interlocutors in discussing the issue of Lithuania's independence," and according to the U.S. NBC television company, "Prime Minister Prunskiene has let it be understood that there is a possibility of a compromise being achieved with Moscow." This might be served by the "Mitterrand-Kohl formula" according to which Vilnius should suspend the operation of laws affecting the Soviet Union's interests and unacceptable to the Soviet side.

Time will show whether this disappointment and interest in compromise will be transformed into a quest for constructive solutions.

Lithuanian Deputies on Lack of Western Aid

LD1105211190 Moscow TASS in English 2058 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 11 TASS—The attempts by Lithuanian leaders to enlist economic support of Western states have failed to tangible results. This is evidence by the information made public at a news conference here today by deputies of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet.

"The aid which Western countries are prepared to render us does not suit Lithuania," said Deputy Vidmantas Zemialis.

Replying to questions by journalists, another deputy, Laima Andrikene said that the economic situation of Lithuania remains very complex. There is an acute shortage of many raw materials, primarily oil. The republic's oil deposits are insignificant and can yield a maximum 300 tonnes of oil daily. However, Lithuania's daily oil requirements are estimated at 16,600 tonnes. She said that the republic does not have enough hard currency to buy oil abroad.

Lithuania Begins Domestic Oil Production

LD1105163490 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Oil has begun to be produced on an international basis for the first time in Lithuania. The daily capacity of the first well is 15 tonnes. The Power Engineering Ministry of that Baltic republic has disclosed that yet another 26 oil wells, with a combined capacity of 480 tonnes a day, will be ready for exploitation within the next two months. However, Lithuania needs about 16,000 tonnes to meet its daily requirement in full. Earlier, the republic received oil exclusively from other Soviet republics. Fuel shipments have been suspended in the wake of the economic sanctions by the Soviet Government. The Soviet leadership applied the sanctions in retaliation to the Lithuanian authorities' refusal to revoke the anti-constitutional decision to secede from the USSR, passed by that republic's parliament one-sidedly.

Military Convoys Reported on Vilnius Streets

LD1205095890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 12 May 90

[Text] Guoda Saluciute at the microphone: I must start the midday bulletin for 12 May with news about a drive by military armor through the streets of Vilnius. It started at 00:10 from the northern townlet and continued in the city, past the Supreme Council toward the airport. Fifty-nine armored transporters, 33 other military transport vehicles, and 20 vehicles carrying soldiers and ammunition took part in the drive. On the [name indistinct] street there were incidents with civilians, but no one was hurt.

But this, of course, is not the most important event today, although the day began with it. On the other hand, this is not the first such night drive in Vilnius.

AFP Interviews Lithuanian Adviser Cekuolis

AU1305130090 Paris AFP in English 1025 GMT 13 May 90

[Text] Vilnius, Lithuania, May 13 (AFP)—The presidents of the three Baltic republics' parliaments proposed a joint meeting with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in a telegram to the Soviet leader Sunday morning, Lithuanian government advisor Algimantas Cekuolis said here.

He told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE that he had just talked with Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis at the parliament building. He said the telegram "asks Mr. Gorbachev to decide where, when and how the four-party meeting can be held". The three Baltic republics want independence from the Soviet Union.

Mr. Landsbergis, Estonian President Arnold Ryuytel and Latvian President Anatolijs Gorbunov, meeting in Tallinn on Saturday, adopted several documents laying the foundation for a Baltic understanding.

They also decided to send joint letters to Mr. Gorbachev and U.S. President George Bush, the nature of which will not be released until the leaders have received them, the Baltic leaders told a news conference.

Lithuanian Foreign Affairs Departs for Strasbourg

LD1305165890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1600 GMT 13 May 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Journalists [at a briefing at the Supreme Council building] were informed that Foreign Affairs Minster Algirdas Saudargas has departed for Strasbourg, where he is to discuss the Lithuanian [word indistinct] at the European Parliament.

Lithuanian Self-Immolation at Zahony Border

LD1105174390 Budapest MTI in English 1020 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Budapest, May 11 (MTI)—Late Thursday [10 May] night at Zahony border crossing station, Hungary, Rimantas Daugintis, a resident of Vilnius, poured alcohol over himself and set himself alight, sustaining serious, possibly critical, injuries.

On Friday morning, Janos Zubek, spokesman for the Hungarian Border Guard, told MTI that the man's conditions was still critical.

He is in intensive care at Nyiregyhaza County Hospital.

Police and the border guard have launched an inquiry into the matter.

Motives 'Unclear'

LD1105174490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1700 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] As announced by an AP correspondent in Moscow, Thursday evening, Vilnius resident Rimantas Daugintis, poured (?gasoline) over himself and attempted to set himself on fire at the Hungarian-USSR border town of Zahony. Local police have stated motives for the self-immolation are so far unclear, as to whether they have any relation to the conflict between Vilnius and Moscow.

The Hungarian Press Agency MTI said the victim has been hospitalized with burns of up to 80 percent of his body.

Estonian Prime Minister Meets Yazov in Moscow

AU1105162290 Paris AFP in English 1540 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Paris, May 11 (AFP)—The Estonian prime minister, Edgaar Saavisar, met in Moscow Thursday with Soviet Defence Minister Dmitri Yazov, a spokesman for the Estonian representation in the Soviet capital said. The meeting between Marshal Yazov and Mr. Saavisar had been planned earlier this month, before the Estonian parliament voted to change the name of the republic and enact five articles of a new Constitution.

Mr. Savisaar at his meeting with Mr. Yazov suggested that young Estonians be allowed to do their military service in military units stationed in the republic, INTERFAX, a Moscow Radio news digest said. Those unable or unwilling to serve in the Army should be able to do alternative civilian service, as recently provided by a new Estonian law, he said. Of the young men due to be conscripted this spring in the republic, 863 have volunteered to serve in the Army and 1,577 had chosen civilian service, Mr. Savisaar said. The others have yet to make their choice. Moscow does not recognize civilian service and sends most conscripts to serve outside their home republics.

Mr. Savisaar was meeting later Friday with Soviet Interior Minister and presidential council member Vadim Bakatin, INTERFAX said.

Savisaar Comments on Talks

LD1105202590

[Editorial Report] Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian at 1700 GMT on 11 May broadcasts a six-minute interview with Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar in which he comments on his meetings on 11 May with Marshal Dmitriy Yazov, USSR minister of defense in the morning; Vadim Bakatin, internal affairs minister at lunch-time; and, People's Deputy Boris Yeltsin in the evening. Savisaar says that the subject matter of the different meetings was different, and likewise was the attitude of each of his interlocutors. He says his meeting with Yazov was a continuation of a previous meeting with Nikolay Ryzhkov, USSR prime minister, and Savisaar handed over the Estonian proposals concerning the spring conscription. Savisaar says: "And even if the defense minister remembered well, fondly how after the war he himself served at Haapsalu and how in the seventies he was elected USSR people's deputy in Harju rayon, all this did not help: [words indistinct] we each adhered to our [previous] positions. Yazov said that he does not recognize our law on labor service [alternative army service]"

On the meeting with Bakatin, Savisaar says they discussed the independence of the Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs, so that the Ministry would be subordinate only to the republican government. There are financial and organizational problems then to be resolved, Savisaar says, and he adds: "We came to the agreement that during the transition period which Estonia is currently experiencing it will be necessary to establish contractual relations between the Estonian government and the (?USSR) Ministry of Internal Affairs in the sphere of (?both) ministries of internal affairs, and I think that this is now a matter of the next few weeks, and we parted in agreement." Savisaar says that thanks to Bakatin, the Estonian conscripts who had been sent to Transcaucasia and on whose behalf the Estonian government appealed to have them transferred back to Estonia, have very recently returned.

Talking about the meeting with Yeltsin, correspondent Jaan Raudsepp asks if the subject of all Russians being recalled also came up. Savisaar says: "Yes, indeed. There was talk of many kinds of (?exchanges) in the future between the RSFSR and republic of Estonia, and that includes also economic and trade relations, as well as migration issues." Asked if Yeltsin would take part in any possible economic sanctions against Estonia, Savisaar said that Yeltsin has previously already expressed his negative view of the sanctions against Lithuania [words indistinct] has been instructive up to the point that this mistake will not be repeated in respect of Estonia."

Savisaar Says West Measured by Help to Lithuania

LD1205180790 Hamburg DPA in German 1718 GMT 12 May 90

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar thinks current Western fears about a threatened break-up of the Soviet Union are unfounded. In an interview with the Hamburg news magazine DER SPIEGEL, Savisaar concedes the independence process in the Baltic is "a separate matter," as the formerly independent Baltic states had never acceded to the Soviet Union. "The developments here cannot provoke a chain reaction," the Estonian head of government said. According to the "political law of inertia" the Soviet Union of today is "far from dissolution."

The Baltic question has to find its solution above all in the Baltics. The bases for this were "the common will of the three Baltic states...; secondly international law...and thirdly the support of the Russian democrats." [ellipses as received] The help from the West, which all Balts also hope for, must now be shown in Lithuania: "We measure the words and deeds of the West by its behavior in relation to Lithuania."

To Western charges the Balts' actions are endangering both perestroyka in the Soviet Union and stability in Europe, Savisaar said: "We are endangering the order laid down in Helsinki in 1975, which reminds us very much of the Vienna Congress of 1815." The Helsinki resolutions had "taken account, above all, of the interests of the superpowers."

For the Balts everything from Moscow came "too little and too late." The official annullment of the Hitler-Stalin pact on its 50th anniversary in August 1989 had not come at all. The lack of this gesture from Moscow had been the first thing to give impetus to the independence process in the Baltic and had finally made it irreversible, the Estonian prime minister said in the SPIEGEL interview.

Estonians Plan Soviet Federation Unity Conference

LD1105213490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] The decisions of the republic's Supreme Soviet relating to state emblems have caused a mixed reception in Estonia. We would remind you that the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] supreme body of power decreed the name Estonian SSR invalid, decided to stop using the shield, the flag, and the anthem of the Estonian SSR as state symbols, and decided to apply the articles of the Estonian republic's fundamental law of 1938. Many inhabitants of Estonia supported these government decisions, but at the same time, there is a large group of people who oppose the adopted decisions. Meetings were held at a number of enterprises which approved the initiative of the people's deputies of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet calling for the convening of a congress of deputies from all levels who advocate the unity of the Soviet Federation in order to join the efforts of all the bodies of local self government and work collectives for the protection of the constitutional rights of the USSR citizens residing in Estonia. Meetings were held at the Volta factory, the Tallinn at Lauristina machine-building factory, and others. The participants at the meetings elected the delegates to the Congress of People's Deputies from all levels, who advocate the unity of the Soviet Federation. The congress will take place in Tallinn on 19 May.

Estonian Leaders Have Meeting With Gorbachev

90UN1706A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 20 Apr 90 p 1

[A. Birov ETA dispatch followed by report on interview with Estonian leaders conducted by SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA correspondent in Moscow Vyacheslav Ivanov: "Will There Be Negotiations With Moscow?"]

[Text] There was a meeting on 19 April at which A. Ryuytel, chairman of the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet; E. Savisaar, chairman of the Estonian SSR Government; and E. Lippmaa, minister of the Estonian SSR Government, met with USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, in which N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and USSR Presidential Council members A.N. Yakovlev and G.I. Revenko participated.

Moscow is insisting on the revocation of the well-known decisions on the suspension of the USSR Constitution on Estonian territory. President M. Gorbachev emphasized that until the anticonstitutional decisions of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet are reversed and suspended there will be no negotiations since the legal basis for these negotiations is absent. Other conditions were put forward also. The Estonian side justified and explained its position and the decisions which have already been adopted. It may be affirmed that this meeting was a step forward, but not entirely in the right direction... for on the one hand the meeting was a step toward negotiations but, on the other, such will not take place without a reversal of the above-mentioned decisions. And only if Estonia revises its decisions is Moscow prepared to take up the solution of urgent problems. We may add here the following paradox: It was the adoption of a decision that is unacceptable to the center which was the reason and pretext for this meeting in Moscow.

The possibility of a confederation was also discussed and proposed. In the event of "concessions" on the part of the Estonian side, it could even be accorded special status, as was the case in tsarist Russia. The leadership of the Union attempted in every possible way to steer a solution of the question into the channel of compliance with the enacted Law on Secession from the USSR. In the discussion M. Gorbachev touched also on the gamut of the complex political situation in the country and said that ill-considered actions could altogether lead to civil war, the more so in that in Estonia the 40 percent Russian-speaking population adheres to a different, distinct viewpoint from that of the republic leadership. Mention was made of Yarov's dramatic letter on the alleged very difficult situation of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia.

Questions connected with the service of young people of Estonia in the Soviet Army were broached also. It is well known that Defense Minister D. Yazov does not share our aspirations and views. Nor was any decision made today on this issue. Prime Minister E. Savisaar will continue discussion of this matter next week. E. Lippmaa will have meetings with the Union leadership also.

Whether today's meeting is called negotiations or not is not that important. What is important is that the meeting took place, and the dialogue began. It is important now to reach consensus. This was not achieved today for neither party was willing to give way on its standpoints: Moscow is insisting on the decisions of the USSR Supreme Soviet—specifically, on the laws on secession and the delimitation of authority between the republics and the center; the Estonian side, on the other hand, proceeds from the decisions and decrees of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet—specifically, the official status of Estonia with all the decisions ensuing thence. Just one thing is clear today: The dialogue and negotiations will be complex, and all the difficult and contradictory tasks will not be tackled in one go.

The same day M. Gorbachev had a meeting with the leadership of the Latvian SSR.

Following the meeting of Arnold Ryuytel, Edgar Savisaar, and Endel Lippmaa with M.S. Gorbachev, N.I. Ryzhkov, and members of the Presidential Council, our special correspondent in Moscow asked the Estonian representatives several questions.

[Ivanov] What are your general impressions following the discussion? What did this resemble—the start of dialogue or the presentation of an ultimatum?

[E. Savisaar] In my opinion, this was very similar to the first meeting in respect of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact when our republic commission reported its conclusions and views. We failed to find a common language at the first meeting in Moscow at that time also. But this is a normal occurrence.

As far as Gorbachev's readiness for dialogue or ultimatum is concerned.... It is very hard to assess here. I would say that there is a readiness for dialogue, but on certain conditions. Whether these conditions should be considered an ultimatum or not is another matter.

[Ivanov] But were these conditions expressed in categorical form or was room left for "maneuver"?

[E. Savisaar] In my opinion, Gorbachev is a diplomat of such an order that he would express nothing in absolutely categorical form....

[Ivanov] But the discussion was cordial?

[E. Savisaar] Cordial, but at the same time tense.

[Ivanov] A question to the esteemed chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. Please tell us, was today's discussion any different in tone from that which you had with President Gorbachev by telephone in the first days of April?

[A. Ryuytel] Not specially, perhaps. True, other people were present at the discussion today, and the interview was conducted calmly, on the whole. There was no curt language, but the discussion was serious, of course.

[Ivanov] How long did today's interview last?

[A. Ryuytel] An hour and 20 minutes approximately, I believe. That is, all problems were discussed quite thoroughly.

[Ivanov] How do you see the prospects of compliance with the demands of your partners today concerning reversal of the Estonian Supreme Soviet decision on suspension of the USSR Constitution on republic territory?

[A. Ryuytel] We will submit this proposal to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. And the deputies will discuss it and then make a decision.

[Ivanov] When will this be?

[A. Ryuytel] It will evidently be examined first by the Legal Commission, which will then submit its considerations to the Supreme Soviet and all the deputies....

[Ivanov] So the negotiations will continue. Good luck!

Riga Radio Carries 11 May Latvian Supreme Soviet

Deputy Chairman Nominated

LD1105142890

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1300 GMT on 11 May begins carrying a live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga.

At 1302 GMT Gorbunov opens the proceedings.

At 1304 GMT Godmanis rises to speak. He states that the commissions have discussed the government's formation. He proposes Academician Arnis Kalnins as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and describes the economic tasks ahead.

At 1310 GMT questioning of Kalnins begins. Deputy Alekseyev, speaking in Russian and Deputy Gavrilov, speaking in Russian, question Kalnins about the economic plans of ministries for enterprises.

Questioning of Kalnins continues until 1350, during which time he is asked about the need to promote scientific and technical progress and to improve the railways.

Various deputies who know Kalnins praise his record and experience in legislative and administrative work.

At 1351 GMT it is announced that 173 deputies are present at the session.

At 1356 GMT a vote is held on Kalnins' candidacy as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. He is approved with 114 votes in favor.

Economics Minister Appointed

LD1105201490

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1357 GMT on 11 May continues its live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga.

Godmanis speaks about the envisioned cost of the new government, comparing it with the old one.

At 1400 GMT Godmanis proposes Janis Aboltins as minister of economics.

At 1402 GMT questions to Aboltins are begun by Alekseyev, in Russian. Aboltins discusses the causes of the rising costs of living. Ulme asks about the harmony of economy and ecology, private ownership, and increased production, and improved environment. Aboltins is asked a question on the division of scientific work and any reorganization. Shiptsov, in Russian, asks about the economy. Aboltins replies about grain, markets, also mentioning the blockade.

At 1416 GMT Aboltins is asked about accumulated assets, he discusses measures for preserving a healty balance.

At 1423 GMT Ozols poses a question. Aboltins is asked about the ministry's function, not in disrtributing but in promoting. Freimanis remarks about Aboltins being critical toward science, especially fundamental science. Aboltins says he retracted his criticism.

At 1429 GMT (?Freinbergs) asks another question on science, both applied and fundamental.

At 1432 GMT the session is adjourned for a recess.

The session resumed at 1500 GMT with the first speaker in the debate being Dimanis who is not happy with many aspects of Aboltins' propositions.

At 1507 GMT the speaker is Vaivars who considers various approaches to the problems of science, suggesting a council for science, and mentions several unwelcome phenomena in the past. He also wants some more specific information from Aboltins.

At 1513 GMT a count indicates 143 deputies are present.

At 1515 GMT Kodolins praises Aboltins, but thinks that the Ministry of Economics is becoming a kind of superior ministry and this was not a positive thing. On the whole he supports Aboltins' candidacy. (?Makharev), in Russian, says he will vote for Aboltins.

At 1524 GMT Janis Aboltins expresses thanks for support.

At 1525 GMT a count of deputies reveals 154 are present.

At 1526 GMT a vote on Aboltins' appointment as minister of economics is taken: 137 vote in favor, seven vote against, and six abstain.

Faction Leaves Session

LD1105204990

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1527 GMT on 11 May continues its live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga.

At 1528 GMT Godmanis discusses the importance, in this period of turning towards democracy, of public order and the protection of rights. He says the question of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is vital. He proposes Viktors Skudra for the position as minister.

At 1530 GMT Viktors Skudra outlines his proposals. He mentions the current developments, and his experience at the Ministry of Justice. Having been a procurator, he knew about internal affairs. He details the protection of the property of the republic of Latvia. There is a question of continuing as a republican ministry or, for the time being a Union-republic ministry. Skudra appeals for young people to join the force without arms. He discusses the alternative service to provide work for young men in the internal affairs service. The way militia workers walk the streets now is not permissible, he notes. The Minsk Higher Militia School in Riga should be taken over.

At 1543 GMT Silars asks about the KGB and Skudra's attitude toward this. Skudra regards that in time state security should come under internal affairs, but it is premature to be considered now.

At 1549 GMT there are questions concerning foreign citizens in Latvia, on outlines of further work, crimes in connection with goods in short supply, and speculation in this connection. There follows a question on fines helping militia funds.

At 1554 GMT it is asked if the KGB is a supervisory organ. Skudra says no, it can only function as a parallel organization. Skudra says the internal affairs lag behind the forces of civilized countries. Skudra discusses the financial affairs of internal affairs bodies.

At 1600 GMT Skudra says he would permit private detectives; he says the Baltic republics, and also other neighboring regions, should jointly operate against racketerring.

At 1603 GMT Geidans gives best wishes to Skudra.

At 1605 GMT a debate begins. A Russian speaker talks about the Riga militia meeting's resolution concerning the 4 May declaration expressing subordination to USSR and Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Conbstitutions, which had been adopted by a very large majority.

At 1612 GMT (?Bekasin) in Russian, speaks about MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] problems, about finances, and equipment.

At 1617 GMT Gorbunov remarks to Dimanis that if it will continue like this, i.e., exceeding the allotted time, the members of his faction will have exhausted all the time. (Kostin), in Russian, talks at length about internal affairs problems, also about language problems. Also praises the qualities of Skudra as a jurist, but calls for abstention in approving him.

At 1623 GMT Endzins, referring to previous speakers, asks when a jurist had been heading the internal affairs. He also recalls his experience in MVD work when he had been marked politically immature. He says there was also an unwillingness to serve in internal affairs. He mentions the present service under Steinbriks. The internal affairs should protect the citizens.

At 1628 GMT Jundzis speaks about the necessity of changing the minister, also about the threats, even by arms, to retain the present system. Concerning the declaration, he says these were not empty words. He says the problem of the alternative service is turning a hostile force into a protector of citizens. He mentions corruption. He asks why men leave the militia, not wanting to serve.

At 1633 GMT (?Stepacevs) asks about the militia workers meeting, having spoken there that the Supreme Soviet should deal with this, not a meeting of militia. Steinbriks, by his speech, showed that he was not suitable to be the minister.

At 1637 GMT Dimanis, after a couple of words in Latvian, continues in Russian. He is reprimanded by Gorbunov for giving prominence to nationality.

At 1639 GMT Jundzis speaks about depolitization of the militia, and supports Skudra.

At 1640 GMT Teikmanis says that he knows the Riga militia, that over a thousand at the militia meeting had shown that this was an attitude toward superiors. He refers to Skudra as a professional jurist, not somebody appointed as a general, referring to Steinbriks, the present minister.

At 1644 GMT, before the election of Viktors Skudra as minister of internal affairs, a count reveals 125 deputies are present, which does not represent the two-thirds necessary. Apparently the minority faction have not registered thereby declaring the election null and void. The vote counting commission carrys out another count. Gorbunov appeals to Dimanis, who leads the minority faction, who appealed for a nonparticipation in Skudra's election. Gorbunov says that nonparticipation in the election is one thing, but nonparticipation at the session is another. There is confusion in the hall, and the minority faction walks out.

At 1651 GMT it is announced that there are 115 deputies in the hall, which does not represent a quorum.

At 1653 GMT Gorbunov announces the session will resume at 0800 GMT on Monday. The session concludes at 1655 GMT.

Latvian Parliamentarians Disagree Over Ministers

LD1105213790 Moscow TASS in English 2103 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Riga May 11 TASS—By TASS Correspondent Galina Kuchina:

The Latvian parliament passed a bill on the composition of the republican Council of Ministers and approved the list of ministries today.

The new government, which has been nearly halved in size, was given a month to prepare a new programme of action and submit it before the parliament.

Differences between the parliamentary majority and the Ravnopravie Faction prevented the deputies from appointing a new interior minister today.

Ravnopravie deputies, who also include representatives from the Communist Party, sided with Riga militiamen.

Most of the 1,237 participants in today's meeting of Riga militiamen disagreed with a parliamentary address to law-enforcement workers.

Participants spoke about the persecution of militia workers for political convictions. Current Interior Minister Bruno Steinbrik fell out of favour because he became a member of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee.

Many officers said that they pledged allegiance to the Soviet socialist system.

Others said that the militia should serve concrete authorities, rather than adhere to the text of their allegiance.

Minister Steinbrik said he will continue to fulfill his duties until he gets orders from the Soviet minister.

At today's parliamentary session, deputies discussed the candidacy of former Justice Minister Viktor Skudra. He was nominated by the Popular Front faction.

During the vote, Ravnopravie deputies walked out.

The debate was postponed because of a lack of quorum.

Latvian Parliament's Division Viewed

LD1105192690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 11 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Vremya announcer Grigoryeva] In Riga the session of the Latvian Supreme Soviet of the new convocation is continuing work.

[Correspondent N. Kasyanova] Today the deputies discussed the composition of the new Latvian government. However, all the draft laws and important documents had already been thought out before the beginning of the plenary sitting of the present Latvian parliament, and, in essence, are being ratified by the all-decisive, overwhelming majority.

The balloting discipline is reminiscent of the former dismal memory of the unanimously condemned authoritarian style. But what about equality of rights [ravnopraviye]? That is what the minority faction has called itself, which has been joined by deputies from the Latvian Communist Party. Being condemned to continually losing, it there any point in the work? [video shows parliament in session]

[O.V. Shchiptsov, senior lecturer at the Riga Institute of Civil Aviation Engineers and member of the Ravnopraviye faction, identified by screen caption] So far there is no real democracy in the parliament's work. Why isn't there? Because the overwhelming majority—I would put it in quotes—would like very much to see that democracy, it would even unconsciously like to see that democracy that it condemns. That is, that which was before. That is, the absence of an opposition. That is, it would like us not to be in the hall.

Some say to us: What are you doing here? You are wasting your time. It seems to me we are not here in vain. The population listens to us. We have the opportunity to state our opinion. For the first time in two years a word of opposition is being heard via the mass media. If before only People's Front, People's Front, and People's Front was heard, then now another point of view is also being heard. Whether you like it or not, so to speak, our opponents are appearing before the eyes of the viewer, becore the eyes of the listener, as they are in real life, and not as they would like to seem. [video shows Shchiptsov talking and gesticulating to Kasyanova, reporter, in front of a hall almost empty of deputies]

[Yu.R. Boyars, senior lecturer of the Latvian University and member of the Latvian People's Front, identified by screen caption] I think this general unanimity has been brought about by the fact that it has been necessary to adopt these declarations of independence and such acts which demanded very great cohesion. Therefore, such a moment of euphoria came about. I think with time the deputies' points of view should differentiate themselves. This is inevitable. There are many deputies who think differently. But, thanks to the newly arisen party discipline they are restraining themselves to a certain extent. Well, after this first stage passes I think a group of deputies should still form which will represent the point of view of the center, or, let us say, democratic central, which will sound better.

[Kasyanova] Thank you. [video shows reporter Kasyanova sitting behind a table with Boyars]

Latvian Officials Remark on Vote on Laws

LD1205202590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 12 May 90

[Correspondent N. Kasyanova reports from Riga; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The republic has found itself facing the reality of two ministers of internal affairs: (Viktor Yanovich Skudro), a former minister of justice of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] who has been proposed by the commission of the Supreme Soviet and who has already spoken on his program at the session; and Lieutenant General (Bruno Yakovich Shtendrik), who has worked in the Internal Troops for some years and who accepts only the unabolished decree of Comrade Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs.

As a result, more that 700 workers in the Riga militia have met to take their own political action, and by an overwhelming vote—threeagainst, 14 abstained—adopted a resolution in which they declare that they will obey only laws of the USSR and Latvian SSR which have been adopted on a constitutional basis. If anyone takes any unconstitutional action, states the resolution, we reserve the right to take decisive counteraction. The resolution has been sent to the president of the USSR, the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR minister of internal affairs, and the Supreme Soviet of Latvia.

[V.Yu. Antyufeyev, deputy chief of the criminal investigation department of the Internal Affairs Administration of the Riga City Executive Committee, identified by caption] I consider that the greatest fault of the Popular Front of Latvia is that instead of consolidating forces for aspects of perestroyka in the republic that are aimed at increasing the welfare and safety of the inhabitants of the city and republic, it has moved to place the Russian-speaking part of the population and the Latvian part of the population of the republic and city in a position of confrontation.

As you have seen today—it is the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the garrison—we are insisting that we should be led by a professional staff and by our minister, Lieutenant General Shtendrik, who can consolidate all forces of the Riga and republican militia for the safeguarding of security and of law and order in the city and republic.

[Yu.Ye. Nigvintsev of a Special-Purpose Militia detachment, identified by caption] Militia workers have developed a sense of uncertainty about their fate. This is being confirmed in a real way. As of today one can say that we have lost around ten well-trained militia workers who have been forced to transfer out of the republic, to other republics in the Soviet Union. The issue of Latvia withdrawing from the composition of the Soviet Union has not been put to a referendum. That would remove a great many of the urgent issues. The situation would then be really quite different.

[Z.B. Chebers, deputy chief of the Internal Affairs Administration, chief of the Political Department, identified by caption] Why did I vote against it? In short, this is how I would answer. We can do nothing but deal with the Supreme Soviet's decision. It does, after all, have three quarters of the vote; it was elected by the people. We can do nothing but deal with this immense number of people. I think that the issue is like that of how the militia in other republics and in the country as a whole would behave if the USSR deputies made decisions which some proportion of militia workers did not like. [video shows audience, many in militia uniform, being addressed by speakers in a hall; interviewees are shown in a foyer]

Godmanis Discusses Role of Latvian Government

LD1205135690 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0847 GMT 7 May 90

[Speech by Latvian Premier Ivars Godmanis at Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga—live relay]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Before starting my report I want to say that these really are my personal propositions, which I expect to be the principal directions and problems of future activity of the Council of Ministers.

The main tasks of the government:

We must, evidently, formulate during this period a concept of the government's activity.

It appears to me that the concept of the government's activity, during the present situation, should be based on the model of Finlandization, or the example of Finland.

I think that we should make use of this example of Finland, which clearly and practically proves to the entire world and the USSR that the republic of Latvia, together with Estonia and the republic of Lithuania, can also exist and develop as independent states, and be subject to international law, while also, like Finland, preserving special relations with the USSR in the political, economic, military, and other fields.

The government, evidently, should prove in practice that if the republic of Latvia is precisely an independent state, and this republic maintains special relations with the Soviet Union, we would have all the opportunities for forming relations in practice economically advantageous, and moreover bilaterally advantageous, with the USSR as its neighbor, and also with all other neighboring countries. [passage omitted]

During this transitional period the basic principle of the government's activity could be:

First, intensive talks in Moscow with the USSR Government on forming such special relations between the republic of Latvia and the USSR, and imbuing them with specific contents in the political, economic, and military fields. At the same time the forming of special relations absolutely does not restrict the activities of the republic of Latvia, as an independent state, in relations with other countries, and also in political, economic, and social changes in the republic of Latvia itself. [passage omitted]

Second, a very essential direction of the government's future activity is the establishment of close ties of coordination at governmental level between the republic of Latvia, the republic of Lithuania, and Estonia, with the aim of, first, forming a united political platform for the transitional period to full actual independence in the talks with Moscow, and of publicizing and defending this at international forums, conferences, and institutions. [passage omitted]

The third principal problem or the principal direction of activity. Especially during the transitional period, it is important for the government of Latvia to develop concrete and mutual close ties in the economic field with the newly-formed governments of the Union republics. [passage omitted] We think that a specific establishment of such ties will politically reduce the burden on the government's position at the talks in Moscow. [passage omitted]

And forth, the establishment of direct political and economic contacts and long-term specific intergovernmental treaties and agreements with East European and other democratic countries in the world should be launched.

In the present situation the government will have to basically overcome four main series of problems.

First, the government will have to operate within the framework of an incomplete, undeveloped system of laws. [passage omitted]

The second problem, the second series of problems is that, apart from the fact that we do not have a developed system of laws, the lower structures or producing units, here I mean enterprises, establishments, organizations and other institutions, the lower structures in the given period function (ineffectively). [passage omitted]

The third series of problems. The third series of problems is more or less connected with the fact that we do not have developed relations, and development has not been started, between the government and the newly-elected local self-governments. [passage omitted]

And the last series of problems evidently is, neither more nor less, the control of the government over the situation, both economic and political, under that circumstance that we do not have regulated ties with the USSR. And this series of problems is connected with these talks in Moscow, which must be one of the decisive practical moves in the transitional period.

Talking about the government's principal tasks in general, evidently, neither more nor less than 11 could be mentioned. That is what I envisage.

So then, the government takes care of preserving and increasing the republic's property, by guaranteeing freedom of economic activity to all subjects of property. Second, tackles economic questions by introducing and adhering to the natural laws of market economy. Third, draws up concepts and programs of national economic development. Fourth, implements scientific/technological policy, introduction of scientific/technological progress, and scientific/technological development policy. Fifth, takes care of implementation in practice of social justice. Sixth, takes care of raising the standard of living among inhabitants. Seventh, implementation of health protection policy, tasks. Eighth, develops relations of commodity market relations and economic ties, both internally in Latvia and outside Latvia. Ninth, takes care of a rational utilization of natural resources, here also the questions of nature protection. Tenth, consolidation of legality and maintenance of order. Eleventh, an independent realization of foreign policy.

Allow me to outline by way of propositions. First, the present possible tasks, perhaps for a worsening of the situation both in economic and also in other spheres:

Evidently, the first task of the government is to prevent a crash as much as possible, I would even say a worsening of economic, social, and internal order in the republic of Latvia.

Second. Evidently, the government must [become] much more active in the following directions, because it is my deep conviction that the question of economic problems, of economic reform in Latvia, is to a fantastic extent connected with solving the political situation. Therefore an emphasis on political activity for the government, especially during this period, to my mind, will be essential. And talking here about making political activity more active, I see the following directions here. First, as I already said, there are the talks in Moscow which determine the implementation of the transitional period. Second, there are the talks between Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Third, the decentralized ties with USSR republics. [passage omitted]

Yes, the government can act as a certain legislation initiator, at the same time taking into consideration the potential of the new Supreme Soviet. Basically, the laws will be drawn up by the Supreme Soviet. What will the government do? The government will approve these laws, and the government's task is to draw up concrete programs, by means of which these laws can be implemented. [passage omitted]

At the same time, evidently, in implementing these draft laws, the principal goal with the minimal program, after all, is to achieve, in a word, what could be called the development here in Latvia of either denationalization or privatization. [passage omitted]

The maximum program. The maximum program, unfortunately, can be divided into two parts, in my opinion. The first part is connected with the problem of possible economic sanctions or economic blockades.

As you know, such is the case with Lithuania. Nevertheless, I think that the policy begun in Moscow by our previous government I think shall achieve, evidently, for these talks to be continued, that we will not come to a situation of an absolute economic blockade.

At the same time, if we mention the principal factors of how we would be able to overcome the difficulties which arise for us, then the main thing is nothing else than developing to the maximum the inter-government's decentralized ties with republics, which is also being done at present in Lithuania, and, likewise, the government must stimulate to a maximum enterprise-to-enterprise ties existing up to now. Therewith, in a word, I can say that the government's policy is not to break off ties, but to form these ties, these economic ties and also any ties with others, including the USSR, with a new quality.

One more principal problem of the maximum program: if it does not concern an economic blockade, then it concerns what will take place in the Soviet Union on 1 January 1991. [passage omitted] Here the situation is most difficult for us concerning oil, metals, non-ferrous metals. But the situation is better for us concerning meat and grain.

[Passage omitted] Here my personal opinion is that we must fix accurately, even by a Supreme Soviet decision, that range of minimum extensive-consumption and necessary-to-inhabitants goods which must be rationed—and there I am not afraid of the word [ration] cards—which must be rationed, while including the range of other goods into market relations. [passage omitted]

Continuing about the financial situation. The financial situation at present is, unfortunately, such that it could be said that an economic blockade has already almost begun.

As you know, the decisions that the savings bank will be joined to the USSR State Bank, that correspondents' accounts are being closed in Moscow, in practice means, in the first instance, that the R3.5 billion which have been deposited here are not, in practice, any longer at the disposal of the republic's government or of the republic. This situation shows that the Law on the Economic

Independence of the Baltic Republics is not being implemented. This affected us, Latvia, even before the adoption of our declaration. [passage omitted]

The question about industry. The most important question, as I said, in the minimal program is the situation, how to see that the all-Union enterprises come under the republic's jurisdiction. I think that here the government must work out two programs, and both to be modelled ones.

The first program is to regard an all-Union enterprise as an enterprise of a foreign country in Latvia, and, therefore, the republic of Latvia takes care only that this enterprise, by means of taxes, would pay, would settle its relations with the republic of Latvia, not laying claims that this enterprise be taken over into ownership of the republic of Latvia. [passage omitted]

I would like to propose two principles in agriculture. Without doubt, most importantly, no action, including that of the government, must reduce output of agricultural products. This means that by forming simultanesouly peasants' farms we must not in any way interfere or reduce production on profitable and well-working collective farms. [passage omitted] Concerning the internal affairs and the Committee for Security, I think that there is a maximum principle also, after all, for the new government to give the most essential and exact achievements, neither more nor less than maintaining order, and to a certain extent de-politicizing the organs for protecting internal order and also the situation existing in the Committee for Security.

'Lithuanian Situation' Feared in Latvia

LD1105210590 Moscow TASS in English 2038 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 11 TASS—Recent moves by the Popular Front-dominated Latvian parliament have given rise to fears that the "Lithuanian situation" may repeat itself in this republic, the daily IZVESTIYA said today in a dispatch from the Latvian capital Riga.

He reported panic buying to hoard food in Latvian cities. Many goods, including even matches, can only by bought by presenting residency cards. Petrol has not been sold to private car owners for a fortnight.

People in the countryside, for their part, are worried about fodder supplies, as it is unclear whether these will continue to be provided from federal stocks in the new political conditions, IZVESTIYA said. A cut-off in these deliveries will endanger hog breeding and poultry farming in Latvia.

The correspondent said pickets with armbands, including both young and middle-aged people, have formed a human chain around the Latvian Supreme Soviet for days, letting through only those with proper authorisation. When a deputy filed a formal question, asking who these people are, they were described as the Popular Front's "security guards".

The paper also reported that the city council in Daugavpils, where non-Lettish people account for a large share of the population, issued a statement, saying it reserves the right to "suspend republican Supreme Soviet and government laws and decisions that infringe upon the rights and freedoms of Daugavpils inhabitants on the territory of the city".

Also today, IZVESTIYA reported a similar conflict in Moldavia between municipal authorities and the republican parliament. Three major industrial cities in the western republic, which have mostly non-Moldavian populations, refused to recognise the parliament's decision to adopt a new republican flag.

Daugavpils Residents Protest Declaration

LD1205230790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2011 GMT 12 May 90

[Text] Daugavpils, (Latvian SSR), 12 May (TASS correspondent), [TASS dateline as given]—A wave of protests in connection with the Latvian Supreme Soviet's adoption of a declaration on independence has swept through enterprises in the Latvian town of Daugavpils, a town occupying second place in the republic in terms of industrial potential and size. A session of the town soviet was convened today at the demand of labor collectives and also voters. The question of the attitude toward the declaration was posed at this session.

While supporting the right of a nation to create an independent state and for that state to withdraw from the USSR, the people's deputies of the town soviet and the Latvian SSR from Daugavpils and also the voters who spoke at the session, said the decision adopted by parliament was anti-constitutional and would lead to a rupture of state relations with the USSR.

This worried many people. What effect will this have on the town, where the majority are employed at enterprises under union control? Will this not give rise to unemployment? Surely highly qualified specialists will not have to go to clear forests, as has happened in Lithuania? We cannot permit this, the deputies said. Perplexity was voiced from the rostrum, too, over the fact that if the new parliament was taking as a model the 1922 Constitution of Latvia, then why had it not drawn attention to the article stating the necessity of holding a referndum in connection with any change in the status of Latvia. Uncertainty about the future, instability, and the unpredictability of the development of events compels the town electorate to appeal for social protection to their elected representatives. Nine deputies represent the interests of the townsfolk in the republican parliament.

All our illusions about democratism were dispelled in the very first days of the work of the Supreme Soviet, Deputy Ye. Drobot. There is no parliamentary struggle; it is a struggle of ideology that is under way. This is also confirmed by the fact that it is only adherents of the ideas of the People's Front of Latvia who are being proposed to all ministerial posts. The question of a candidate's competence for a high post arises only as the last resort. This is why one can in no way accept the assertions by some people that the townsfolk must not be worried, that it is better to reassure them. The government is not expecting backing from us, it has no need of it. What it needs is our silence.

But there will be no silence, those who spoke at the town soviet session asserted. They decided to find out the opinion of the townsfolk by conducting a poll. This includes a number of issues topical for Daugavpils and the republic, including regarding the status of Latvia.

The deputies adopted a decision on participation in the activities of the coordinating council of Baltic towns and rayons sharing the idea of strengthening the federation; this council is being set up. The session retained the right to halt on the territory of the town any laws and decisions of the republican Supreme Soviet and government which contravene the Constitutions of the USSR and Latvia SSR and which infringe the rights and liberties of the inhabitants of Daugavpils.

RSFSR

Reportage on Gorbachev Tour of Frunze District

Discusses Price Hike Rumors

LD1105213890 Moscow TASS in English 2116 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 11 TASS—Soviet Communist Party leader Mikhail Gorbachev toured several factories in Moscow's Frunze District today to meet communists who nominated him their delegate for the forthcoming 28th party congress in summer.

Gorbachev said debates in the party should lead to a consolidation of its ranks, assuring that it was still possible to prevent a split at the congress.

"The party is a powerful, consolidating force of our people," he said.

He began his tour with a visit to the Yava tobacco factory. After that he went on to the Bolshevik Confectionery.

He discussed a wide range of issues, including housing shortages, working conditions and rumored price hikes.

"It is necessary to bring our prices in line with the world level," Gorbachev said.

"A market entails a full responsibility of the work collective for its products. Such a market is yet to be created, and we will be moving towards it step by step, keeping the price of basic food products under control," he said.

In the afternoon, Gorbachev met Frunze communists gathered in the IZVESTIA conference hall to discuss problems facing his perestroyka reform drive.

In order to speed up reforms, "it is necessary to expand socialist democracy and do everything possible to promote social justice. A socialist idea is a fruitful idea. Not in vain did it survive such serious deformations and millions of people are still loyal to it," he said.

Accounts about Gorbachev's meetings will be published later.

Speaks on Socialism at IZVESTIYA

LD1105213590 Moscow World Service in English 2010 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] The general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, had a series of meetings in Moscow on Friday with communists of Frunze District, who nominated him as their candidate to attend the forthcoming party congress in summer. Gorbachev visited tobacco and confectionery factories, as well as IZVESTIYA publishers. More on this from our reporter Tatyana Zeveranskaya:

A warmhearted conversation with IZVESTIYA publishers centered on the party's standing in the country, Soviet reform and communist duty to the nation.

In an opening speech to the meeting, Gorbachev said he was convinced the answers to the issues lay ahead. Mikhail Gorbachev spoke of his commitment to socialism as a guideline for his activity in his position as a communist. He said socialism could be carried through to the benefit of the nation, but stressed the need for learning from the domestic and world experience, past and present.

On his own vision of man-caring socialism, Gorbachev said it must be man-oriented and include the human potential (?in) all areas of life. He said he had long arrived at a conclusion that the nation could no longer live as it did. However, he said, changes in all areas of life must be made on ways of socialism.

On preparations to the 28th party congress, he expressed his regret about inadequate number of worker candidates, voicing confidence that party organizations would be represented by active Communists. First, this inspires hope for the congress's success, and second, Mikhail Gorbachev said: I believe we were right in starting the party discussion several months ahead of the congress. This, he noted, enables us to thoroughly analyze all problems related to the current stage of perestroya and society renewal, and all issues on renewing and reforming the party.

The appearance of this alternative democratic platform has spurred our discussion. It makes it possible to promote and to clarify some points.

The question of what kind of party the Communist Party should be—a vanguard organization constantly acting in all work teams and affecting all spheres of life and society, or should it be a parliamentary party, working mainly to gain some positions? Mikhail Gorbachev expressed the view that by changing and reforming itself the party should not abandon any spheres, but should be side by side with the people as a whole, especially at this important turning point.

Mikhail Gorbachev dwelled in detail upon the issues on a transition to a market economy, on political reform and on the revision of attitudes toward property.

Mikhail Gorbachev next answered a string of questions from the audience, including the incident on Red Square on 1 May. He called to fight back the diehards and to stand up to all the (?rabid), both on the left and right. Mikhail Gorbachev spoke of time running short and called for calm and opposition to pressure and demagogy inciting violence and disturbances. He said the need was for getting on with the reform.

Views Russian Communist Party

LD1105223690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Today at the conference hall of the IZVESTIYA newspaper, Moscow, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR president, and Valeriy Nikolayevich Baranov, head of a workshop of the Second Watch Factory Moscow Production Association, met with communists from the enterprises of the capital's Frunzenskiy Rayon, who had nominated them as delegates to the 28th party congress and the 28th conference of the Moscow City party organization. Our correspondent Vladimir Rabyko reports:

[Rabyko] Participants in the meeting—staff of the editorial office and printers of IZVESTIYA, workers from the Bolshevik Moscow Confectionary factory, the Yava factory, and the Ministry of General Machine Building—who attended the meeting, listened to their candidates, Communist Baranov and Communist Gorbachev, with equal attention. The only difference was that one spoke about the problems of perestroyka at the enterprise while the other spoke on the state level. There was only one prevailing thought: all forces should be devoted to the country's economic and social renewal and to raising the role of the Communist Party in solving these most important tasks. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev answered numerous questions from participants in the meeting. One of them touched on setting up a Russian Communist Party. Here is what Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said about this, inter alia:

[Begin Gorbachev recording] This is a most difficult issue. The special role Russia has played for ages in the formation and functioning of this multinational state is a reality. I cannot imagine and I do not think that the Russian people are developing a sense of alienation toward other peoples or the fate of the union. I do not think so and this is a deep conviction because, constantly meeting with peope during my trips, I see how people are concerned over the fate of a multinational state and people hope very much that we, while solving issues related with transformating into a federation, will attain an improvement in interethnic relations. Here the question arises: Why then did we not have a Russian Communist Party before?

Apparently, such a view of the issue has always been there. This, so to speak, has always been the bulwark of the center's strength, so to speak, in this multinational state. Now the idea that there must be a Communist Party, come what may, has captured Russian minds. Therefore, we have made the following decision: We should get together at a conference and discuss this with communists. What will a Russian Communist Party be today, if it is set up? It will account for 58 percent of the communists. Tell me, in this case, what will the forthcoming congress look like? Whose congress is it going to be, that of the CPSU or a Russian Communist Party? Then Russians will vote on any issue and that will be it. Then the question arises: Why have all other communists been invited from all over the Union to discuss the common fate of our state, the way perestroyka is to be developed, and the way international problems are to be solved? Then people will say that it is better to leave the CPSU, right? For it is logical. Then, (?the independents), those precisely who wish to turn the CPSU into a union of communist parties and the Union into a union of independent states, a confederative or associative one, those who advocate this need precisely this. They need a Russian party and then it is easier to leave (?the CPSU). We should think everything over, we should reason and we need to understand what answers the interests of all.

If a Russian Communist Party is needed, then perhaps we should think how it would reflect upon the CPSU, the Central Committee, and the leadership. Then some mechanisms should be provided that would retain the influence and the role of other parties. Speaking in favor of federalism in constructing a state, Lenin—and it is well-known what struggle he had to conduct proceeding from these positions and that he understood that only on this basis can people be united and their cooperation ensured—Lenin was dead set against federalism in party construction. Therefore, Russians, let us think, let us think seriously about it. [end recording]

Meets Factory Workers 11 May

LD1205002290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 11 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] In the afternoon, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev visited enterprises in Moscow's Frunzenskiy Rayon, whose communists have nominated him as a candidate delegate for the 28th CPSU Congress.

[S. Medvedev, identified by screen caption] The collective of Moscow's Yava Tobacco Factory were the first to meet the president, their candidate to the party congress, today. Although the enterprise is one of the oldest in the industry, it has been highly mechanized with up-to-date equipment. More than 15,000 million cigarettes and [word indistinct] are produced in these workshops every year. Production is, of course, harmful. The main raw material is tobacco. No doubt this is why Mikhail Sergeyevich questioned the workers in some detail as to the concern the Yava leaders show for their health and social protection. Incidentally, women here retire at 50 and more than half the workforce at the factory are women. There is a services department here and a cafeteria and health section, which are not doing badly. Even for housing, the waiting list is not at all long, thirty-one people. The workers talked about all this and their own mood and naturally asked questions in their turn. They were primarily concerned as to what will become of our economy in the future, whether there will be price rises and how social policy will be constructed given the transition to the market.

[Gorbachev] What does the transition to the market mean? Everything will be reviewed then: wholesale prices, purchasing prices, the system of forming retail prices. There will be measures of protection for all the workers at the factories, compensation, and for pensioners, students and veterans, everyone. In other words, an entire complex of measures has to be stipulated and implemented as we move step by step toward a market economy. Why is a market economy needed? For everyone really to start working. At the moment some people work while others are just hangers-on.

[Unidentified man] Isn't that always the case, Mikhail Sergeyevich?

[Gorbachev] Bear in mind that a great many of our enterprises operate at a loss. Twenty-three thousand million in losses.

[Unidentified woman] (?How can) [word indistinct] they earn?

[Gorbachev] Where? Someone does it for them, do you see?

[Unidentified man] [word indistinct] Someone must.

[Gorbachev] That is no way or working; one person working and yielding a profit another giving nothing.

[Unidentified woman] That is it exactly.

[Gorbachev] The market will put everything in order. All these things have to be done but we will be discussing it with you as we deal with them. When we are going to do something, we will try to reach an agreement. As I said before, when the time comes, we will ask for advice and tackle things. Now the time has come. [video shows the outside of a building, women in white overalls inside shake his hand, cigarettes seen in process of manufacture; Gorbachev walking through the factory talking to people apparently showing him around; stops to talk to group of workers; looks at machinery in operation; conversation amid the workforce]

[D. Kiselev, reporter] Moscow Bolshevik Order of Lenin Confectionary Factory. [Video shows a motorcade of Zil limousines entering a gateway]

[Unidentified woman] The collective of sweets women is very pleased to see you at our works. And, as is customary according to the Russian tradition, the collective meets you with bread and salt. [Video shows Gorbachev in a large room surrounded by smiling people, being given red carnations and a multicolored cake by the speaker and another woman, the onlookers start clapping and Gorbachev chuckles]

[Kiselev] Bread and Salt is the name of the cake. In the salt cellar is castor sugar, a symbol of a sweet life.

[Unidentified woman] What problems have we got? We have a very low wage. The average rank is the third. The average day rate is 64 kopecks.

[Gorbachev] So, if we take our foodstuffs. You see, if we could presrve completely and process—and process well—everything that we are already growing today in the fields and on the farms in agriculture, we would have a minimum of 25 percent, and in the main, of 30 percent or 40 percent more than there is now. Therefore this, shall we say, trashy [plevoye] attention to the processing of the whole foodstuff industry over whole decades has led to the situation that we cannot ennoble even those resources which we have and give them good packaging. Well, you know, give them the look of decent goods.

And you see, in actual fact. Look, I was given data when I was involved in agriculture matters, that just castor sugar in this simple packaging, this thick light-blue paper with the miserable dark-blue superscription of Castor Sugar. Well, if only this were packaged, then, just owing to this about 100,000, or 120,000 tonnes of sugar would be preserved. And a profit due to packaging of R1 billion in goods turnover is added. You see, it is forwarded loose, thrown about; production is spoiled.

Therefore, now we have allocated R77 billion for the reequipping of the light foodstuff industry for seven years, for two years of the last five-year plan and for the next five-year plan. [video shows Gorbachev talking to women around a table] [passage omitted]

[Gorbachev] I consider that for young families we should, you understand, find the opportunity in society, nonetheless, to give them credit, moreover, long-term credit.

[Female voice] Of course.

[Gorbachev] You can go to any American family and you will see that all this is on credit. This is on credit. And he pays credit for 10, 15, 20 years.

[Female voice] Illegal queues.

[Gorbachev] I understand. I understand. I understand what you are saying. I arrived in the Urals. What enormous industry! Heavy industry! Next door forest, taiga, no furniture. Well, how is it possible? The countryside is completely destroyed. The countryside is totally abandoned. We went out to one village. I met and spoke with villagers. A woman tells me: How is it possible to work productively if I distribute fodder in a bathtub? I pour it into the bathtub; what kind of work is that? Next door is such modern industry which does—Christ knows what it doesn't do. This is how we have managed things.

Therefore, we are making a serious turn now in the direction of goods, light industry, in the direction of accommodation, services, but we are only just getting this dead weight of ours moving. We have been giving 20 percent of the national income to military matters. Nowhere in the world is there a developed state that gives so much. Three or four times less; Japan, one percent. This is the situation. We must contemplate it and make a serious turn in response. I think we must see the illness through, but understand one another and do everything together. [video shows the bust of Gorbachev surrounded outdoors by men and women in white coats, as is Gorbachev himself. There is a brief shot of women in white coats hanging out of a window to look at Gorbachev]

[Kiselev] But this looks like a surprise even for the president. [video shows a table full of ornate chocolate cakes, surrounded by Gorbachev and people in white coats]

[Gorbachev] I have never seen anything like this in all the time I have lived in Moscow!

[Unidentified woman] This is one more bouquet for you! [video shows woman handing Gorbachev a pink candy rose to a ripple of laughter, which rises to a crescendo as Gorbachev gives her the abovementioned red carnations in exchange.] [Jubilant applause]

[Gorbachev] This is what a market is! There is no reason to be afraid of a market! [video shows the table of chocolate cakes]

[S. Slipchenko, identified by screen caption] When we were filming these work areas, the IZVESTIYA staff was embarrassed saying that they were not the printing trade of yesterday, but of the day before that. The president of the country was to look around these premises. People were waiting for him. However, it was later, in the evening, that the conversation about production took place. First, there was a meeting in the conference hall of the publishing house with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Valeriy Nikolayevich Baranov, candidate delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress, and representatives of the collectives who nominated them. These are the Bolshevik Confectionary Factory, the Yava Factory, the Ministry of General Machine Building, and of course, the owners of the hall the staff of IZVESTIYA. Valeriy Nikolayevich Baranov thanked the communists for their confidence and spoke briefly about his views and platform and answered questions. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev spoke next. It was, as it were, the final meeting of the day for the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and president with the communists of Moscow. Perhaps that is why it was also the most difficult. There were many questions and even when the chairman of the Constituency Commission wanted to put some of the written questions together, the general secretary decided to answer all the questions, among which some were topical and trenchant. The meeting ended late in the evening. Mikhail Sergeyevich looked around the work areas of the publishing house. [video shows women typing on old-fashioned equipment, people waiting for Gorbachev, then the conference hall. Baranov and Gorbachev shown speaking

Addresses Voters

LD1205165590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 12 May 90

[Address by USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev to voters in Frunzenskiy Rayon on 11 May—recorded]

[Text] First and foremost I would like to thank the communists here in this hall representing our district's party organization, in which Valeriy Nikolayevich [Baranov] and I are standing as candidates to be delegates to the 28th party congress. I would like to thank all of you, dear comrades, for the trust placed in me, for your wish to see me and Valeriy Nikolayevich as your representatives at the congress, which is evidently set to play an important, a very important role in the life of our party and in the history of our fatherland. So my first words are words of gratitude. [applause]

When I was pondering about this upcoming meeting I wondered what I should say to you—if I should set out a program, which is the norm nowadays. But I think I...my positions are known to you. I would just like to say that I will not conduct any other policy under any kind of pressures. For me, there is no way back. Not only because I have tied my destiny to it, and it is my choice as a communist and as a person, and I think that if you are a moral person, you have to give your all to this choice right to the end, but also because the answers to all the questions which life has posed, and which have built up in our country throughtout our history—alongside the true, historic achievements which have made our country what it is today and how it appears to the world—I think that everything that has built up and which has now become clear to us as a result of analysis and study, with the participation of the whole of society, on the basis of glasnost and democracy...we will not find the answers and solutions to these problems behind us by returning to the old ways of life, the old approaches, and, moreover, to the old concepts and views.

It is in moving forward that answers must be sought. I am profoundly convinced of this. Furthermore—and I'll say a few more words about this—we must now move faster. The situation demands this.

This is the first thing I wanted to say. I would only like to confirm once again to the communists of the okrug, that I am devoted to the socialist idea—for me it is the guiding idea of my activity, and it determines my standpoint as a communist. I think that, by using it as a starting point, using the experience we have built up, drawing lessons from the past, taking into account the experience of the whole of civilization, of all the other countries and peoples living and acting alongside us as they solve their problems, we shall be able to implement this socialist idea today in such a way that it will give truly great fruits, humane fruits for the people, for the individual.

I see changes in our opinion of socialism, mainly, in aiming to humanize our society, to make it more human by way of democracy, by way of involving people in all processes, by way of creating such conditions for living that would truly be in accordance with the principles of social justice and the protection of the person, and would help him to realize his human potential.

That is why I do not represent some sort of third way, nor those who think to solve and achieve their aims on the basis of recoil and rejection. I think that the socialist idea is a fruitful idea, and not a futile one: in spite of all the distortions it has gone through during its implementation in our country and in other countries, it still has, it has remained among people, and it still has many millions of supporters.

I think that we are on the right path. However, I agree with the critical stance of Valeriy Nikolayevich, my rival in this okrug, because I too have a critical attitude to everything we have done up until now and to the way we have lived. My main conclusion about the results of my entire experience of life, my political activity, and my reflections is that we cannot live as we have been living; it is necessary to change our life. I want to say again, however, that we must change and restructure it, but along a path of implementing the socialist idea. That is the first thing I would like to say.

Secondly, I have a feeling, and I would like to share it with you because through it I can give you my attitude to the current situation, and familiarize you with my position, my current views about how we must act now, at the present stage of perestroyka.

Here is a question asked by Comrade Smirnov, a representative of the party organization of the Ministry of General Machine Building. Incidentally, I would like to thank this ministry's party organization for proposing me as a candidate for delegate at the city party conference.

He expresses himself thus: he thinks that the political force which is able to develop and apply the most accurate socioeconomic system model for our society will have the most chances of victory in the political struggle taking place in the country. Unfortunately, judging by events of recent years, and by speeches and published material, the CPSU does not now have such a contemporary model. At best it has individual fragments of it, and it is not noticeable that anyone is working on its development. I assume that from this is derived all of our thrashing about, and our inability to predict real consequences of many decisions, or to react correctly and in good time to events as they happen. Can you really not see what dangers this holds for the CPSU? Yet the Bolsheviks, after all, had such a theoretical model, and they used it very successfully.

Now, I would like to argue with everything that has been said, but since you ended with the phrase that the Bolsheviks had such a model and that they used it very successfully, then I would start by examining this statement.

If there were a model, and the Bolsheviks, including under the leadership of Lenin, if we look at this stage, acting under his leadership, made successful use of it....[changes thought]. Allow me to put a question to you, Comrade Smirnov: Why did Lenin, at the end of his life, when analyzing the experience of the first years of socialist construction and the implementation of the program of revolutionary transformations after October, say that it was essential to have a fundamental rethink of all views of socialism? Moreover, even in the preceding years he had rethought many things.

Actually, this is the key to our current reflections. I think that we cannot....we must comprehend society theroretically, taking into account its state, its level of development, its maturity, from the point of view of the economy, from the point of view of the intellect, of political culture, and so on. Certainly. We must do all this, in order to forecast in terms of conceptions for the choice and direction of our policy and of putting forward goals, but I think that we must nevertheless search for the answers to specific steps in life itself. The whole trouble lay in the fact that—and I think this was the grossest error, particularly after Lenin, when he had already been aware of the need to change the views which were behind them at the initial stage of the revolutionary transformations—the trouble later lay in the fact that we....our society had foisted upon it an artificial model born, to a significant extent, in the struggle of opposing forces, and they tried to make the whole of society fit this model. For this reason it was that there were a great many things that were unjust and distorted, and that our hopes of achieving the plans for implementing the socialist idea, were not realized.

I think that the merit of the CPSU lies in the fact that it is interpreting the entirety of this path, with all its achievements and its losses, and it is standing firmly on a position of Leninist dialectics, on a position of reality, of taking these realities into account, both the internal realities and the external realities, in which our society and state are actually living and acting, interacting with other countries and peoples. It was precisely this that has enabled us to correctly determine the idea of perestroyka, to shape the basic directions, and if we do not have a timetable, I am convinced that we do not need one.

We need an orientation for the process, we need goals, and we need a quest involving the participation of all of society. It was for this that we created an atmosphere of democracy and glasnost. We are reforming the relationships of ownership, in order that through a politically new process under the conditions of democracy and glasnost, and through a change in the relationships of ownership, the person should be promoted as the main player in all spheres: the sphere of economics, the sphere of politics, the sphere of culture—well, in all social spheres of life—as the main player. And, by relying on a knowledge of the real processes and on all of society's potential, as well as by using the experience of other peoples, the person must move along the process of perestroyka and renewal.

That is in fact the actual formula: that socialism is the living creativity of the masses. Herein lies everything that has been caused by a fundamental and strategic error: via various forms, the person was separated or alienated from ownership, from political power, from culture, and by this means the greatest blow was dealt to the whole process of perestroyka and of revolutionary transformations of society.

I think that we have drawn the right conclusion, started along the road, and involved the people via the new mechanisms, the new forms of our society's life. People are at least in the process of becoming involved.

Thus, we do have a concept, and not only a concept but also a policy: a policy in the sphere of economics, a policy of perstroyka of our political system, a policy of the perestroyka of interethnic relations and of transformation of the federation. Finally, we have our own view, which is set out in the CPSU's program for congress, the program on the CPSU platform, and in the draft of the new rules regarding reform and renewal of the party.

I think that this speaks of the fact that we are moving realistically in the right direction. Having made a choice and having produced a design in the shape of a concept, we are seeking these approaches, in conjunction with all of society, and are working out steps. In connection with this, I value highly what has been done under perestroyka. The country is already different, the people are already different, the atmosphere is already different, and the party is already different, and we will never again be as we were three or five years ago. That is a very great achievement. We would not be able to achieve anything like what we are now achieving, if this had not been done in advance.

There have been errors, there have been miscalculations, yes. If there is anyone who wants to hold them against us, I would like to say that we all sincerely wish that there had been fewer of them. We have done all we could. But the knowledge and experience we all had at our disposal, even the best forces in the party and society, proved insufficient.

Just look how we began this five-year period, moving towards reshaping the economy. What did we begin with? With VAZ, with the Sumy Engineering Association. That was all the experience there was. Attmpts were made now and again with contracting in Kazakhstan. In Stavropol too. Others had a go as well, looking for ways.... These were all what you might call episodes. This was where the search started. Then it was two or three ministries. Afterwards it was half of our economy which had gone over, then the whole economy was on financial autonomy and self-financing. There is still no basis for the whole economy to be operating on the principles of financial autonomy and self-financing. It does not exist.

We have made the switch, but none of this yet exists. We still have loss-makers who bring us R2.4 billion in losses. There are front-rankers whose achievements are picked up and switched to others. There are various approaches, and so forth. But all of this is still before us. What we do is interpret all of this and draw experience from it. I shall tell you directly. Without that experience which we have accrued in the economic sphere, in the sphere of seeking political...in the political process, in the sphere of democracy, in glasnost, in the sphere of interethnic relations, nothing would be emerging for us today. This has been a period of ammassing quantities. We have to understand better and sort out what has happened to our history, what was good in it, what we want to carry forward with us, what to reject. We have very many people who love simple solutions, but there are none. The person who wants to say at this point that he does have the answers, the simple solutions, and that he will lead everybody painlessly down the right road, and for that reason calls for us to get rid of the present leadership as soon as possible, I can tell you, that person is a political swindler, and nothing more. I can assure you, quite responsibly, I say it to your faces, you communists, and to the whole country, these are political swindlers. The process of reform and renewal of our society is an historically difficult, very complex process. Moreover, I will tell you that we are implementing these revolutionary, profound transformations in a society which was very unprepared and very complicated.

We have become accustomed, you understand, to getting commands from the USSR Government about what nail with what kind of head to hit. We have all been outfitted from the point of view of theory, politics, economic approaches. We have become accustomed to lack of initiative, to wage-levelling, to the most terrible wage-levelling. The slightest initiative, the slightest advancement of a person because of his talent causes us annoyance. And so, you understand, when a farmer from Ryazan speaks in the Central Committee and says that he has shown what can be done if you work properly for a year, that he immeidately brought milk yield to 4,000-5,000 [kilograms], but they immediately started calling him a Rockefeller.

And in Chelyabinsk, or in Tyumen, I don't know which, they burnt out a lease holder. All of this is our consciousness. This is the kind of consciousness we have in society. By means of democracy and glasnost, by means of the individual's new situation, by means of involving him in all these mechanisms and new approaches, we, comrades, must awaken all this. I think this process has already started. It is going very fast and dynamically. It has dumbfounded us all; we are even in a state of shock, we are even in a state of confusion. It already seems to us to be a catastrophe: there it is and we are falling to pieces. There are still people who want to frighten us with this catastrophe, and say that it is connected with the current policy which today's politicians are recommending: Accept our services, and then you'll feel quite different.

True, one cannot say what they want to offer us. In five years we have not seen a single serious alternative....Let's be responsible about this and just recall, there has been nothing serious. There is criticism, and a lot of it, it's true, is justified criticism. This criticism must be accepted. To transform policies, make corrections, this is correct. Nevertheless, I think that all of this will confirm that we are on the correct path.

Elections here have come to an end. A system of soviets has been formed. The soviets are taking on themselves the things that party bodies used to do. There is an immense regrouping of forces, of allocation of labor. The party is freeing itself and searching for its role, and that is where the meaning lies of all the pre-congress discussions, and the working out of the documents, the process of which we must complete at the 28th congress.

That is to say, whichever way you look, we have reached a stage when we must do everything properly, and this is creating a special system. It is true that the question is what system. When one thing is done and another thing is not done, you won't get results. We started with the economy, you probably remember, and put forward the idea of acceleration, and thought through scientific and technical progress, to break free. We did not manage to break free. We did not manage, because the economic milieu in which we set that task rejects science and rejects scientific and technical progress.

Moreover, at that time we should have come to the understanding that we needed to reform attitudes to property. That is one thing. A second thing: we started to change relations in the economy, but see that we cannot achieve anything since the superstructure [Marxist concept] has everything in—us, our minds and actions. This old system needs to be destroyed. How to destroy it? By means of political reform, by involving the individual. For it was impossible to do it from above. The same fate would have awaited us of all reforms that started from above.

Our reform had already begun to falter. That was when we set about political reform. But this political reform developed in such a way and engendered such processes, such dynamics, that we have not been able to digest what has happened, to keep ahead of social movements and ideas. We are unable to ponder these things in a mature fashion and transform politics and practice. This is having an effect on our work. This is visible, comrades, to the unaided eye. Then it is suggested that political decisions are not keeping up with reality and practical moves are questioned. This is all true. Nevertheless, we are striving to synchronize these things.

These things are being debated within our party. This is all part of our pre-congress debate, so to speak. I tell you frankly, in party style, that we need a systematic approach at the present time, comrades. I think that we are approaching an exceptionally important congress. I think that we have created certain guarantees, through the new system of elections of delegates to the congress, that this congress will properly represent communists. Therefore, commuinists will now be directly influencing the course of the congress and its decisions. They will have more confidence that this congress represents the policy, and that these are people whom they trust.

It is a fact that Valeriy Nikolayevich and I have been put forward together. He inclines more towards the Democratic Platform. I incline more towards the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee. I do not think that we disagree on everything. There are certain fundamental differences between us. But there are many things in this alternative platform, this Democratic Platform, which have greatly stimulated the debate, enabling us to deepen the debate and clarify certain questions.

On the question of what kind of party we should have—whether it should be a vanguard party, operating constantly in all work collectives, in all spheres of social life, or whether it should be a parliamentary party aiming, basically, to win certain positions through a certain combination of actions and political moves, to promote its policy objectives and to get its representatives into parliament, I would say that there is a serious difference here. We in the CPSU Central Committee, including myself personally, are firmly committed to a party of the vanguard type.

I think that in changing and reforming itself, the party must not depart from any spheres, and it must be alongside, be with, the whole of our people, particularly at this important, critical stage. This is the first thing. This is a divergence in discussions, but there are also coincidences of view here, too. Yes, in the conditions that are arising of political pluralism the CPSU should also master the art of a parliamentary party to fight, to know how to conduct an electoral campaign, to join others, to create blocs, to fight for positions, and so on. So it isn't some sort of uncrossable wall—I wanted to say a Berlin wall, but it too is now crossable.

No. A discussion about democratic centralism has now started. Yes, we are talking about how we can strike a blow against party bureaucracy, by improving and constructing the party, by changing the forms of its activity. This is necessary. This is still a task for the whole party, in my opinion. Here we have a coincidence of views. The principle of the democratization of the party is what links these two platforms. This is a great coincidence of views, and I think this does indeed enrich the discussions on this matter. But where is the divergence when we are talking about democratic centralism?

We say: Yes, democratic centralism must allow, and presume on, complete freedom of discussion, platforms, alternatives and dissidence. A clash of positions, a contrast of views, but we are against factions with their own internal structure and their own internal discipline. The Democratic Patform allows the existence of factions and such things.

I think that if we set off down this road.... I think even that someone putting this thought into this democratic platform is pursuing the aim of breaking up the party. At this historic stage, out of this strongly organized political force, which should help us to advance perestroyka, to unite people, to integrate them, insofar as everything else in the framework of democratization and decentralization is accompanied by great centrifugal forces, the party is indeed a powerful uniting of political forces. [sentence as heard] If we turned this force into a discussion club, split into some parallel structures and clubs, like some structured formations, I think this would weaken the party, and would strike a very heavy blow against it, and in general this means a schism.

So, from this point of view I think that this is the most fundamental divergence. I would like to conclude by saying that we must not now lose our nerve. We must build up our offensive along the main line. We must give a resolute rebuff to the reactionaries [retrogrady], those who are pulling us backwards. In general we must engage in decisive battle against all the hotheads, from both right and left. Here we have a situation where they have combined against the main thing—the perestroyka line and those who are hauling it along.

What happened on the first of May at the end of the parade—that, comrades, was a breach. Let us not underestimate the fact that this is a signal that we should be pondering seriously. In this sense I would like to say to all IZVESTIYA journalists that they probably give grounds for the most profound pondering of this matter. We really must think hard on how it can be that, under the banners of the Moscow Electors' Association, currents emerged that are actually difficult to imagine.

I know.... I was at the watch works, and right there as I was about to enter the production area of Valeriy Nikolayevich, a young comrade came up and said to me: Mikhail Sergeyevich, I am from the DS [Democraic Union]—you know that organization—but nevertheless, he said, I categorically do not go along with what they wanted to demonstrate, those forces in Red Square.

Indeed, there were many others there, under slogans which they disagreed with, but this happened nevertheless. The organizers of that action had thought it out very fully. They gathered—even requested a demonstration to go on until 1800—to bring out half a million Muscovites and appeal to them to storm the Kremlin and the Lubyanka. Listen now, let us not oversimplify this. There were slogans there: Down with Lenin; Down with the CPSU! and Down with Gorbachev! Those were the main themes. I have them all, those slogans. Above that mob there fluttered the flags of anarchists, monarchists... and portraits of Nicholas II, Joseph Stalin, and Boris Yeltsin. So just think what we saw there, with what we were confronted. And that is logical, that is logical.

The times are now such that... we have reached a stage where everything is going to change in a real way. None of us have a moment to spare. Those who are leading perestroyka and moving it forward, if they are not decisive and consistent now, if they lose with perestroyka, then they are bound to come under fire, either from the right or the left. And the hotheads, too, realize that time is running out for them. And so the set-to is now about to become fierce. We must keep a cool head, not submit to pressure, we must not give in to the demagogy which is already calling for violence, for everything, for disorders. We must move the perestroyka process forward.

This is a most difficult question. We Russians sitting here in the capital must remember this. The special role which Russia has played for centuries, which it has played and continues to play in the formation and functioning of this state of many nationalities is a reality. In general, whether we like it or not, this is the case. I also think that history has confirmed that the Russian people cannot be accused of abusing this role, or their opportunities and position, although some people have come up with the idea of Russification, as they put it—and so on and so forth. I do not think that this applies to the Russian people. If there were any distortions, this happened at a time when we had a theory that fusion was desirable, and as quickly as possible, too. The fusion of nations was put forward almost as a political objective in itself. We can see what this fusion has led to, and the extent to which these theories reflected real processes in life. But it was not the Russian people who put forward these ideas.

[There is a 15-second break in transmission during which the words "M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with the voters of Frunze Rayon" are displayed on a blank screen. The recorded relay resumes with Gorbachev in mid-sentence]... to urge it on. And the Russians were slightly offended. I want to state this frankly. This is how I see it. People have said: if we are to be blamed for everything, for the things that have happened in the Baltic republics, blamed for what has happened there, then we ourselves ought to leave the Soviet Union, as [Valentin] Rasputin suggested. So you see how things are. If that is the case, we should get out, they are saying.

This has been picked up by other people, I tell you—especially since Russia is a fact, a real fact. It has shared everything, its experience, its potential, its resources and everything else. Russian people have travelled and developed the land in difficult meridians, in different climatic conditions. They have helped in the creation of industry and taken part in its development. They started off this way—and now they are living and working there. This is all normal. And we, Russians, all of us, did not regard our role in this process as being that of colonizers. How could we be colonizers? Come and see for yourselves. Look everywhere. I think that this was real assistance, given when the republics and the regions were building themselves up. This was a contribution.

If you look and see how the national income and resources are being divided up, you can see that we always divvied them out and gave everyone a share. So, that idea of colonization never occurred to the Russians. But some people began putting forward these calculations, suspicions, and reproaches. So, in their turn, the Russians began making calculations. It was even calculated that if we were to secede, separate from the Soviet Union—and extreme views of this kind do even exist—then within four, five, or six years we would be the most prosperous state in the world.

Such a concept and such a view have been set in motion. Comrades, we must be very attentive in deciding all these questions about the situation of Russia. I do not think that the Russian people are becoming alienated towards other peoples, or to the fate of the Union. I do not think so. I am deeply convinced of this, because constantly meeting people on my trips, I see their concern about the fate of the multinational state, and people are hoping very much that we, in deciding the questions connected with the transformation of the federation, will embark upon improving relations between nationalities.

In connection with this, in deciding all questions relating to Russia, both about economic sovereignty and political sovereignty, and in deciding the question of the Communist Party, we must remember that role. It has taken shape objectively, there's no getting away from it, not because we, so to speak, thrust our leadership upon all the peoples, without taking account of whether they want that or not. That is a process.... the result of a process...of a thousand-year one, frankly speaking. We understand that. The question arises: Why wasn't there a Russian Communist Party earlier? Obviously all that was understood, too. That was always the strong point, the strength, of the center in this multinational state.

But now, Russians have already taken to the idea that there should be a Communist Party and that's that! Therefore, it has been decided thus—that one should assemble at a conference and discuss together with communists, discuss everything openly.

You know, that is being urged. For instance, I think I already said that at the watch factory—I know, for example, that some are urging that deliberately, too. What is a Russian Communist Party today, if it is registered legally? It is 58 percent communists. Then tell us what we will have, what will the forthcoming congress be? Whose congress will it be? The CPSU's or the Russian Communist Party's? Further, in any question, we will vote as Russians, and that will be it. Then, the question arises, why did we invite all communists from the whole Union and we are deciding the common fate of our state, and how will we get perestroyka going, and how will we decide international problems?

Then they will say that it is better to leave the CPSU, right? Of course, then (?the independents), who just want to turn the CPSU into a union of communist parties, and the Union, into a Union of independent states, of a confederative or an associative kind. Well, that is what the supporters of that need. First get the Russian party going, and then it's easier to leave. Everything has to be thought through. I say that with complete frankness everywhere, in all auditoriums.

We should reason and understand what corresponds to the interests of all. If things are so, and if a Russian Communist Party is necessary, then we should probably think about how certain mechanisms should be built into the CPSU, the Central Committee, and the leadership which would maintain the influence and the role of other parties. It will then be necessary that the congress should vote for a decision so that consideration is taken of the right of not just a majority of communists—since there always is a majority in Russia—but also of the majority of the communist parties. Is this so? Probably so. Such mechanisms must be built into the leadership, into the Central Committee, into the Presidium or the Politburo or whatver there will be, or some form of Council, according to what we decide at the congress. This also should be so.

It is already established there that the leader of the Communist Party is included in the composition. So we must think everything through. Otherwise this may evoke a process, so to speak, whereby communists will divide up according to ethnic camps. Thereby we will lose the mighty integrating force that the party is, that a united party is. Lenin, while advocating federalism in state construction—and we know what a fight he fought proceeding from these positions and how he understood that one can only amalgamate peoples along these principles and ensure their cooperation—rejected federalism from the outset in party construction. So let us think, Russians. Let us have a good think about this, pondering at the same time the destiny of the country and of our multi-ethnic state and of our party.

What are, in your opinion, the prospects of the USSR as a federal state? [video shows Gorbachev reading out the question]

I think that our federation must undergo deep changes. And those laws which we have adopted give us the opportunity to realize the thesis which I have expressed on several occasions to the effect that a different extent of federal contacts, a different level of federal contacts and a different degree of freedom is possible within this federation, account taken of the specifics and of the differing level of development, of accumulated experience and of political culture and so on—I will not enumerate. This is what should form and be the subject for the process of renewal within the federation, and we are going to be appointing in the near future the Council of the Federation, where a principled exchange of opinions should take place concerning in what ways, by what steps, and in what time frame we should decide this issue, the issue of filling our federation with a new content.

I see our success, I connect our success with the renewal of the federation, but without fail with the preservation of the federation, because a different approach would bring the peoples into conflict and be unsettling, and we will be busy making relations clearer.

Here's a good note: Mikhail Sergeyevich, keep it up. [Gorbachev laughs; applause] We could end on this. Thank you, thank you for your attention. [applause]

More on Leningrad Plenum on 'Open Letter'

90UN1670B Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 90 p 2

[Discussion of "Open Letter" by members at joint plenum of Leningrad CPSU Obkom and Gorkom: "Consolidation—A Requirement of Perestroyka: Speeches in the Debate"]

[Text] **O.Ye. Polyakov, Secretary of the University Party Committee**

When we discuss the question of the letter published in PRAVDA we are actually discussing two questions: first, the legality and value of this letter and, second, its essence. From the standpoint of party rules this letter cannot—and here I disagree with Anatoliy Mikhaylovich—be considered a resolution or a decree of the party Central Committee. A Central Committee decree is mandatory for all communists. In this case we are dealing with a letter. And judging from its character and the small remark that precedes the letter, it is an anonymous document. Its origin is not known and we will probably be looking for its authors for a long time to come. This pertains to the value of the letter.

Now about its imperfection. One must say that recently—and this has been especially noticeable in the Leningrad party organization—there has been a tendency toward unification of communists and there is a very rational tendency toward analysis of the two platforms and disclosure of the really positive programs in both platforms. You probably know that on 18 March the Moscow committee of the Democratic Platform adopted a decision which calls for a split. This decision was adopted incorrectly. It lost a great deal because of this.

Why was the Leningrad coordination council immediately separated from the Moscow one? They understood that on this basis they would lose. And what is happening now? The authors of this letter sent on behalf of the party Central Committee are now following the Moscow coordination council down this same path. They are calling for a purge. On what basis? There have already been suggestions here—on the basis of the rules. Excuse me, but on the basis of what rules? The rules adopted at the 27th Congress with additions? But those rules are actually no longer in effect since the party Central Committee adopted a new draft of the rules at the plenum, which means that the Central Committee has rejected the old rules.

There is a draft of the new rules adopted at the Central Committee Plenum and there is a draft that has existed since the 27th Congress. In these two documents, one was adopted by the plenum and the other by the congress, there are principal differences: There is the leading role of the party and there is also the present situation. But the old rules begin with the idea that we are living in an age of developed socialism. Let us now vote on whether we are living in an age of developed socialism or not. If this is true the majority of us will have to put our cards on the table. In terms of the problems that are still in the stage of discussion, when all principles are subject to discussion everywhere, not only in the Democratic Platform but also at the level of the Central Committee, in all party organizations, when they have not yet assumed their final form, they are unclear, and they have not been adopted by a party congress—on such principles, of course, it is impossible to organize any purge.

Unfortunately, the discussion we have been conducting recently has changed into a discussion of personalities, especially on the pages of the newspapers: We do not like either the one or the other. Because this is not the way a discussion should be conducted. Indeed there are now people who count 15 points on which disagreements exist, but I can see seven: They include the question of democratic centralism, the leading role of the party and how it should be interpreted; the admissibility of factions; and minority rights. It is literally possible to single out about a dozen points. Our press should look into these points and see who is right and who is to blame. But we should not beat one another over the head but scientifically substantiate one viewpoint or another.

But here too there is a certain tendency toward unification. Even those members of the Democratic Platform who declared the need to get rid of democratic centralism themselves are beginning to understand that no social system, including the party, can exist without control—that would mean utter anarchy. That is, there is still reasonable discussion going on.

The current document suggests interrupting it.

Let us take a look at what the consequences would be. There would be a sharp split. If we adopted the plenum decision whose draft I read, would the split be between proponents of the Central Committee and proponents of the Democratic Platform? I do not think so. They would unite to fight against the letter of the Central Committee.

We would have a Volgograd variant, and we must think about the consequences of that.

I fully support, although I do not have the right to vote, I fully support Comrade Khrustalev who presented the draft of the decision, that is, I propose that they declare that this letter does not meet the conditions at least of the Leningrad party organization, that we continue discussion within the party, and that we conduct normal preparations for the 28th Party Congress.

V.S. Mikhalev, Secretary of the Signal Association Party Committee

I would like to discuss a couple of questions that do not completely come together on our agenda, including what Comrade Ignatov said. I like the definition of "party" in Ozhegov's dictionary. I will simply remind you. A party is a political organization of a social class which expresses and defends it interests and leads its struggle. Well, as far as a social class goes, in my opinion, we have found a common language recently—the language of the workers. As concerns the leadership, all that is also clear. Recently and for a fairly long time we have been doing nothing but that—leading and directing. And now about expressing and defending interests—here the question remains open. Not only among us but also in all the platforms that exist. And as of today we have a single platform which has been adopted. It is a pity, of course, that it was not adopted by a conference or a plenum. It is the platform of the Leningrad communists, and all the others are drafts. And all these drafts discuss one thing—who will lead and direct. But it is not altogether clear who will defend and protect.

I have read the draft of the decree of the Council of Ministers which will be submitted to the Supreme Soviet. It is called "On the Changeover to a Planned Market Economy." So they are planning for us to have millions of unemployed. It would be interesting to find out who will express their interests, defend their interests.

And, after all is said and done, we will have to be responsible. This issue is bypassed. They are planning a several-fold price increase and a compensation for the price increase of up to 50 percent, which means that there will be hungry people in our country. Who will deal with this problem? That is not altogether clear either. Therefore questions of expressing the interests of the workers and defending their interests should probably be envisioned in all programs if we are really the party of the workers. Moreover, if we have proclaimed a multiparty system this means that we will have several parties and it will be necessary to protect the communists. They will need both legal aid and economic aid. We should probably be thinking about this now.

Further. At the conference in Krasnoselskiy Rayon I was elected a member of the control and audit commission. Therefore I would like to ask Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Fateyev a question. I also attended the last plenum, which took place in this same hall. A document called "Materials of the Plenum" was distributed to us. Changes were adopted in the decree, namely: I suggested eliminating from Point 3 of the Decree on the February Plenum the phrase: "Whoever rejects its ideological-political and organizational principles." This was adopted. Further, on the agenda of the combined city and oblast conference it was suggested to add to the first question—"and on the formation of principles of the budget of the party organization" and the proposal was adopted.

It was suggested that the question of how many secretaries to have in the oblast party organization and for which areas be decided at a conference and not at the plenum. This was also accepted; Gidaspov said it was accepted. These things are not included in the documents that were published.

I have a question: Who has the right to revoke a decision of the joint plenum of the obkom [oblast party committee] and gorkom [city party committee]? This is the first thing.

And the second thing. In this connection this question occurs to me: The decisions that we here—excuse me, you here—will make might possibly appear somewhat different when they are in print. It is simply that this danger has presented itself. And the last think I would like to say is that the plenum is still the executive organ. There was the 19th Conference and pluralism was declared, and in the party, as I understand it, there is now a movement toward cutting off pluralism. And in essence it is a struggle of the upper echelons, a struggle for power, which has been discussed. A struggle for power! But I simply wanted to remind you of one thing: In this situation all the heat will be born by the local units, the local party organizations, and the secretaries of the local party organizations, and I would like to remind you of the proverb: "When masters fall out their men get clouted."

Let us begin to figure all this out from the bottom—everything will end here—but, as was discussed today, we should begin from the top. With those who wish to tear the party apart and gain power. The party Central Committee should probably provide an example of this, although I understand that it is not fashionable to defer to the Central Committee.

V.I. Kuzmenko, Deputy Party Committee Secretary of the Rossiya Association

Here is what we observe today if we analyze the party's recent work. We observe the amorphous condition of the party. To what are we being called? To maintain this situation. For how long? Should we prolong this agony for another month, two months, three months? To whose advantage is this, who needs it? Therefore we must take a stand and I support the proposal made by Yefimov in this case; it is the most acceptable to me personally. Namely:

First. To give an assessment in a plenum decree: That this letter has come too late, that the letter was not considered at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Second. It is necessary to write the following: We have ideological organs, we have the Academy of Social Sciences and we have the Higher Party School both of which have been relieved of their basic task of arming communists theoretically to solve the problems which are facing the country. And we have Comrade Shestakovskiy, the father of this "Democratic Platform" and the rector of the Moscow Higher Party School under the CPSU Central Committee. I do not understand what the Academy of Social Sciences is doing when Comrade Medvedev, our main ideologist in the party, is being asked what perestroyka is and where perestroyka is leading, and in response to these questions he says it must be expanded and deepened. This is the most businesslike recommendation for us communists of the local party organizations from the party's head ideologist.

Anatoliy Mikhaylovich in his report said that mistakes had been made. Let us enumerate these mistakes. With respect to the letter. Here I am, the deputy secretary of the party committee of the Rossiya Association. I can honestly say that every day we make an effort to rectify the situation in some way, to placate the people, to explain the situation in the country. What is socialism? We have to answer all these questions for ourselves. And our comrades are academicians who have a salary of R1,200 but still they cannot define what socialism is.

This must be expressed clearly and succinctly in a decree. It is also necessary to demand and record: Give a clear definition of what the Communist Party is. What is a socialist party, what is a Christian party, what are monarchists, and so forth. And this must be done! It must be recorded that the Central Committee has given an assessment of the organs which must work and give clarifications for this.

The people have asked: Why are there no explanations? I explain and they say: That is your own personal viewpoint which is subjective. I say: Yes, it is subjective. And these assessments must be given for all these questions to the point where we can determine who remains in the CPSU and who does not.

We should probably begin with Comrade Shakhnazarov, the assistant general secretary, whom we know from his articles in PRAVDA. And with Shestakovskiy, rector of the Moscow Higher Party School under the CPSU Central Committee, and with Yuriy Afanasyev. Why are they calling for us to do this and not starting with themselves?

G.A. Zyuganov, Deputy Chief of the Ideological Division of the CPSU Central Committee

For a party, especially in times of transition, it is exceptionally important to be able to evaluate the sociopolitical situation precisely and in a balanced way. Before moving on to the question under discussion at the plenum I would like to discuss this situation. Yes, it is critical and it is extremely difficult. And for now the situation is continuing to deteriorate. And we must see and evaluate this realistically.

The question arises: Why? It seems to me that there are three circumstances to which we should pay attention here. First of all we should note that many problems that have accumulated over the decades, including in party life, have to be resolved all at the same time: modernizing the economic mechanism, conducting a political and legal reform, and carrying out a renewal of the party and its structures. When many problems are being solved simultaneously it is very important to establish priorities correctly.

The second circumstance on which I would like to focus your attention is related to the fact that perestroyka was begun at a time when the moral health of society was at its worst. When its nervous system was exhausted, when irresponsibility had essentially become a constituent element of any work. This significantly complicates the work for party renewal and the development of its program documents as well.

And the third thing. The credit of confidence the people gave the party even at the beginning of perestroyka has largely been used up. Unfortunately, even during the course of perestroyka it was further exhausted as a result of the mindless fight against drunkenness, the introduction of the practice of electing business leaders which did not justify itself, the growth of crime, speculation, and so forth. All this complicated the situation even more.

Therefore from an ideological-political standpoint, in order to consolidate the party and strengthen its ranks it is very important immediately to add to such fundamental political concepts as perestroyka, democracy, and glasnost: culture, responsibility, and legality.

I would like to say a couple of words about culture and legality. The CPSU Program and its Rules are law for communists. If we reject them we no longer have a foundation on which to reach any agreements. This is especially clear from the example of the USSR Constitution. Yes, it is outdated and in many ways it does not correspond to the new reality. But when during the past several years we have allowed this Constitution to be violated repeatedly we have ended up with a constitutional crisis in the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. This is a blind alley; it does not lead to agreement but to an emergency. This is obvious to almost everyone. We must not create this situation in the party. It will inevitably lead to a split.

In this connection I would like to appeal to you for this. If we decided to develop a platform to consolidate and unify the party and not to conduct purges, we must reach a firm agreement on key issues. We have a basis for this—the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Congress. It is a good basis for further work. This is a draft which can and should be perfected as a result of broad discussion in all party organizations of the country.

I agree with you that our press, our party science, and the ideological division of the Central Committee are not conducting enough propaganda or discussion of the materials of the platform, taking advantage of the corresponding channels and means for this. I assume that this situation can be rectified in the near future.

Now briefly about power. There is a keen struggle for power going on today. You can see how events are developing in this sphere. I am very alarmed by the fact that many communists still do not understand that historically parties have existed for one purpose: to unite people on the basis of their program objectives and tasks and to realize them through the corresponding levers of power.

If the parties, relying on this basic methodological principle, do not succeed in developing a clear program that corresponds to the interests of the broad masses of workers, it will be pushed to the sidelines of political life. Therefore the development of this program and the preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress acquire fateful significance for all of us.

Now about the comparison of platforms. First of all about their content. In my view, they have a number of ideas and principles in common. At the same time a number of sections are missing from the Democratic Platform. It sharply criticizes our country's entire history. It essentially rejects everything that has happened in our history. To look at it from the standpoint of principle, it rejects Lenin, Leninism, October, our choice of socialism, and everything else. If we do not agree with this then we must honestly answer the questions: What kind of a party are we, whom do we serve, whose interests do we reflect, and do we have the right to be called communists? This is the main fundamental issue on which the platforms diverge. And here it is simply impossible to straddle the fence.

About democratic centralism. If one is in favor of the party as the political vanguard of the Soviet society one should be clearly aware that such a party cannot exist without democratic centralism, without party organization in production. There is a clear cut answer to this question in the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee. I do not think we have any reason not to support that position.

Now about the tactics of the leaders of the Democratic Platform. Their main objectives are to split the party, to lead a considerable number of communists away from it, to take away the material base, and to realize their own ideological objectives. They do not conceal this and publicly declare it from all podiums. But if this is not a split, what is it?

Suggestions are coming in from throughout the country to take a clear and concise stand with respect to the Democratic Platform. The CPSU Central Committee adopted the open letter which our plenum is discussing. I quite agree that first we must resolve the question of our attitude toward the leaders of this platform who themselves in their speeches, statements, and interviews have rejected the CPSU and admitted that there is nothing that links them to the party of communists.

I think separation from them is simply inevitable. As for the communists who have not read this platform carefully and are simply attracted by the eloquent phraseology, here we must do patient and consistent explanatory work. We must help them to straighten out all the stratagems of the new politickers.

Therefore the proposal to discuss the letter in the local party organizations is quite justified. I consider it very important to discuss it collectively and comprehensively and to sum up all the remarks and suggestions from the local areas and, after that, to consider the results at a plenum of the obkom and finally determine the position of the oblast party organization.

A.P. Zhitenev, Secretary of the Kirovskiy Zavod Association Party Committee

First of all, about my position. I am in favor of separation. But yesterday when listening to the remarks of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev at the Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League] Congress I paid attention to the detail that in principle we are not against those people who stand on the Democratic Platform, perhaps by accident, perhaps deliberately, but these are not the people from whom we need to separate. This is the way I understood his answer. We must separate from the leaders who are vying for power, denying all the achievements of the Communist Party.

Now imagine that at the Kirov plant we have a party organization of almost 60,000. There are people who sympathize with the Democratic Platform and therefore when I spoke at the obkom and gorkom bureaus and said I was in favor of separation I was asked the question: "Are you not terrified?"—I answered: "No, I am not terrified." Today I wish to rephrase the question: "Are you not terrified of losing a large part of such organizations as the Kirov plant and other large industrial enterprises?"

There are neither criteria nor procedures for separation. And in order not to go up to the microphone I should like to suggest a draft decree. First—take the letter under advisement, and second—recommend that it be discussed in the party organizations. And on behalf of our joint plenum I insistently demand once again that we convene an extraordinary plenum of the party Central Committee.

Vlasov on RSFSR Presidency, Sovereignty

LD1305223790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 13 May carries a 30-minute recorded interview on the "Topical Interview" program with Aleksandr Vladimirovich Vlasov, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Council of Ministers chairman and CPSU Central Committee Politburo candidate member, by correspondent T. Karyakina in Vlasov's office in Moscow.

Vlasov begins by making some general remarks about the transience of life and the swift passage of time. The clock in his office makes him aware of problems still to be tackled.

Karyakina asks him about the old image of Soviet politicians. One used to get the impression, she says, that those men in suits were born wearing them. This gave rise to legends about their personal lives. Vlasov himself was rumored to be a relative of Suslov or Brezhnev, she said.

Vlasov agreed that he had been dogged by such stories, but it was merely a result of his early start in politics, at the age of 28, when he became a party rayon oblast committee secretary. By 32 he was secretary of Irkutsk Oblast industrial committee. His wife, too, has been assigned various famous relatives in the popular mind. Vlasov's father was in fact a railway worker and his mother a worker in the Baykal area.

Vlasov still maintains ties with his old party areas, such as Irkutsk and the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR]. His current post as chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers is, he considers, the hardest of all, "and really so when you are not satisfied with the results of your work. Moreover, the period has turned out to be a really revolutionary one."

"When perestroyka has seriously fired up society, and when the government has to work in a new way, all the responsibility falls on the republic's head, and specifically on the government."

Karyakina interjected: "And it is always on show."

"Of course", Vlasov agreed: "We are open. I had to enter office rapidly, master the problems, and get a feeling for them. And I really did have a sense of impotence, in that as a minister I had more rights than the chairman of the Council of Ministers."

"That is a paradox," suggested Karyakina. "It is a paradox, but it is a fact," said Vlasov. "And it is only now, when we are quietly picking up speed and the government's rights are becoming real ones, that an attitude to work and some kind of minimal satisfaction, perhaps, is appearing."

Karyakina asks Vlasov about his relationship with the intelligentsia. As a young man he did not have much to do with such people—partly through a sense of ignorance, he said. Later, however, he did a lot of work with such people.

When asked about the personal qualities which facilitated his career, and whether these indeed hindered him during the period of stagnation, Vlasov indicated that independence and responsibility were the most important virtues displayed by some local party leaders even in those years. He noted that when he stood as a candidate deputy for the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in the Yakut ASSR he was accused of being the "father of stagnation". He replied that he did not know about that, but that he could be some kind of "great-nephew of stagnation."

One of his acts as a party leader which gave rise to controversy was, Vlasov noted, the decision to open a mosque and register Muslim believers in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR in 1972. Until then, 60 percent of the population who professed Islam had formed an underground community, whereas Christians and others could worship openly. Although this decision merely restored the full rights of peoples who had had their ethnic status rehabilitated only in the 1950's, it was denounced as "the propagation of religion" at the time.

The journalist then turned to Vlasov's current work. "Today you have a fairly high post as RSFSR Council of Ministers chairman. Our republic is in a state of disorder. Economic shocks and interethnic difficulties are beginning to reach us. One will not gain one's laurels in this post too quickly. Yet you intend to campaign for the post of president of Russia. Tell me, do you already have a serious program? Perhaps you have an idea what the first presidential decree that you sign would be, in view of all the circumstances which I have listed? And what will follow this first presidential decree if you become president?

Vlasov says: "We, the government, undoubtedly have a program. We will pass it to the people's deputies before the congress starts. It is a program for the economic and political sovereignty of Russia. The fact is that the Russian Federation suffered the most in the period of the system of administration by injunction. It was identified with the center, and all the political and economic structures were related to the center; and the Russian Federation had a minimum of rights. It is self-evident that the republic's multi-ethnic composition and the backwardness in the socioeconomic development of Siberia, the Far North, Far East, and the center of Russia, and the non-chernozem lands, of course, were not taken into account. All the planning, funding, deployment of production forces, and distribution of resources were decided by the center. Normatives and upper limits were passed down to us."

Karyakina: "Simply to be carried out."

Vlasov "Simply to be carried out. Indeed, it would have been fine to have carried them out, but one still had to beg, beg and beg again. Figuratively speaking, the republic's government was in the same situation as some general invited to a wedding for the sake of ostentation.

"We get a lot of letters from different people. Recently I received a very rigorous, demanding, but generally well-disposed letter from Comrade Petrov, a professor. I would like to read a few lines out of this letter:

"Everything that is produced on RSFSR territory must be taken from the Union ministries. Everything must be taken: timber, coal, oil, gas, chemicals, all of culture, all the VUZes [higher educational institutions], and so on. A situation in which the RSFSR is in an unequal position compared with other republics is equally impermissible. Only the equivalence of exchange with all republics must be adhered to firmly and rigidly. "I agree with Professor Petrov, and today it is fundamentally important that the Russian Federation, like the other republics, in accordance with the newly-adopted law on the demarcation of powers between the USSR and the federated units, should for the first time acquire an opportunity to resolve all issues independently and to construct its relationship with the center on a mutually advantageous contractual basis.

"What is involved is above all the redistribution of ownership, and Russia's exclusive right to dispose of its wealth and of the scientific and technical potential it has accumulated. We also consider that rights relating to the deployment and development of production forces on a republic's territory should lie entirely within the competence of that republic. To implement investment and structural policies, and pricing issues is a very important matter. In the context of the transition to self-management and self- financing, it is necessary to resolve post-haste the issue of changing prices, wholesale prices, and tariffs. Without a price reform we will be unable to go over to new principles of economic management."

Karyakina: "How will this reform affect the ordinary person living in the republic?"

Vlasov: "Well, above all it is aimed at improving people's lives and at revealing the individual potential of each person, each inhabitant of Russia. We are seeking to use the initiative and energy of the people for economic perestroyka, and most importantly to involve them in the system of soviets' work.

"We are concerned by both regional egoism and parochialism, which already exist today. "So our program presupposes initiative by enterprises; complete freedom of action for them; independence for local bodies of power on the basis of the law on local self-government; and the formation of a budget on the basis of long-term normatives. That is the main path for resolving all economic and social problems throughout the territory.

"The other, no less acute problems which the Supreme Soviet will tackle can not bear being postponed. These include the provision of foodstuffs, consumer goods, and housing.

"The ecological situation in the republic is giving rise to grave concern. Today 43 industrial centers are de facto ecological disaster zones. There are also our water areas: protection of the Baykal, the Volga basin, Lake Ladoga, and others. The democratization of public life and the swift rise in national self-awareness have moved the task of a cultural revival for Russia, and of improving spiritual and moral health, into the foreground. So you can see there are a great many problems. They now need to be tackled in a specific way, using the new forms and approaches which life is working out; and also, I would say, a new economic mechanism.

"In the agro-industrial complex, for instance. The way must be opened wide for all forms of ownership, so that the peasant should become master of the land in a real way. We need to change the proportions and growth rate of investments, reinforcing this with material and technical resources. In other words, the primacy of the agro-industrial complex, which has been repeatedly declared in various documents and decisions, should begin to operate. And that will allow us to tackle many issues on the social transformation of the village and the modernization of the processing branches of the agro-industrial complex. Ultimately it will allow us to increase the production volume of all types of livestock and agrarian produce. These are only some of the economic problems."

Vlasov continues: "The paramount issue for the Russian Federation is, however, equality of nationalities' rights and fraternal friendship between people, and cooperation and mutual aid. In my view, work should be started immediately on developing a legal status for national autonomous units, as well as treaties and agreements between them and the Russian Federation. It is also necessary to think about a new status for the Russian Federation. In short, the new parliament faces very intensive and complex work.

"Your question about what the first laws which the Council of Ministers chairman will adopt, should he be elected: I think that regardless of who is elected, if I were entrusted with it, then the first laws the Supreme Soviet should adopt must be on a very acute social problems: people's protection, their legal and social protection. Today some 28 million of the 146 million in the Russian Federation have an income below the substance level, and another 50 million are on the borderline. So add it up: 78 million is a very large number. If one goes on to take poorly-protected categories of people, such as pensioners, participants in the Great Patriotic War, and invalids, there are more than seven million of them in total. [as heard] There are 33 million pensioners, and 11 million of these receive pensions under R70 a month. And the government's task, especially in the conditions of a transition to a market economy, is a very urgent one.

Karyakina: "What else is impeding us from living better?"

Vlasov: "What impedes us is years of having the concept hammered into us that everything is handed out from the center, that it distributes everything. And this has developed passiveness in people, alienation from concrete work, and people's minimal interest in the results of their work. It has practical parallels with parasitism.

"And today we will not do anything. Not one law will operate, and not one decision will be carried out unless people are involved in that decision, and interested in the results of their work. What the government is now proposing—economic reform, a transition to a market economy, and a number of other specific measures—is above all aimed at making people more active."

Karyakina: "Changing their mentality."

Vlasov: "Changing their mentality. And that mentality, too, has formed over the years, after all. I recently met the writer Astafyev, and we discussed this subject. He summed it up very wisely: People's inertness and passiveness is derived from the corruption of poverty. Think about those words."

Strike Threatened in Ufa Over Chemical Works

LD1205121190 Moscow World Service in Russian 0937 GMT 12 May 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] An INTERFAX correspondent reports from Ufa that the public of the city has planned for 13 May the holding of a Green Ecological Chain demonstration in protest against the continued operation of the Khimprom [chemical industry] industrial association, which is the main villian for the ecological catastrophe in Ufa. Extraordinary discharges of ethanol some time ago poisoned people, and put out of action the water pipes in a number of southern rayons of the capital of Bashkiria. The Combined Committee of Public Organizations, which was formed to monitor the ecological situation in the city, is urging residents in Ufa to commence a warning strike on 21 May if, even after the holding of the Ecological Chain demonstration, the operation of the Khimprom enterprise is not stopped. The Chain, reports the INTERFAX correspondent, will stretch 40 km from the Khimprom production association to the city's administrative center.

Western Republics

Ukrainian Leader Discusses Current Issues

LD1405073390 Moscow TASS in English 0728 GMT 14 May 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksey Petrunya]

[Text] Kiev May 14 TASS—Ukrainian Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol is certain that the republic's new government, to be formed at the session of the newly-elected parliament which opens tomorrow, will have enough verve to keep nationalist and secessionist sentiments in check.

"The times require unity, not confrontation, concrete deeds, not rally confrontation," Masol told TASS.

The consolidation of forces will help speed up economic development, ease social tensions and boost public morale, he said.

The 61-year-old prime minister, who has been on the job since 1987, said that the Ukrainian economy has been growing in terms of GNP, consumer goods production, services and housing. He, however, complained about the low return on economic reforms, saying that economic growth has been slow.

Radical economic reforms and the transition to a regulated market economy are high up on the agenda, Masol stressed.

Pro-independence sentiments are widespread in the republic, ranging from calls for a facelift of the command-administrative system to hard-boiled demands for secession, he said.

The USSR should be preserved as a federation of a new type, based on an economically-justified division of labour and fair trade between republics, he believes.

Proponents of economic isolation are more concerned with their political ambitions than their compatriots' future, he said.

The republic should actively cooperate with foreign countries, he said. In the past few years the Ukrainian government established bilateral contacts with Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croatia, Austria, Brazil, Canada and West Germany, he said.

Joint ventures are mushrooming.

The time has come to set up Ukrainian trade agencies consulates, and, in the future, independent diplomatic missions, in neighboring countries with large Ukrainian communities he said.

Ukrainian Congress Delegate Selection Viewed

90UN1754A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 12 Apr 90 p 3

[Interview with P. Todorov, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, by V. Demidenko: "Timely Interview: How the Delegates Are Elected"; first paragraph is PRAVDA UKRAINY introduction]

[Text] **The system of electing delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress evokes lively interest not only in the party but among broad sectors of the population as well. Both Communists and nonparty people attach great significance to this question. Indeed, the results of the party congresses will depend to a decisive degree on the makeup of the delegates. A RATAU correspondent talks with P. Todorov, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, about how the selection of delegates will take place in our republic.**

[Demidenko] Petr Prokofyevich, please tell us about the powers and tasks of your commission.

[Todorov] Our commission coordinates the activity for the oblast, district, and Kiev city electoral commissions. Special attention will be devoted to examining disputes, declarations, and complaints from communists about all types of violations. Members of the commission also render aid to the oblast electoral commissions with regard to methodology. And, together with the congress' credentials committees, the Central Electoral Commission prepares a report on how the elections for deputy were conducted.

In addition, we do not intend in any way to make substitutions or interfere in the activities of oblast, district, and Kiev city electoral commissions. They will independently resolve all questions related to the organization of candidate nominations and conducting elections.

[Demidenko] The elections begin, properly, with the formation of party districts. According to what principle are they created?

[Todorov] There are several versions. First of all there is the single-seat district. There the number of Communists is determined by a quota of representation at the congress. Communists nominated by the local party organizations which belong to the district run for one seat in this district.

In the second version a district is created for several seats: For instance in a rayon of a large city where there are 12,000-16,000 communists.

And finally there is the third variant—the united multiseat electoral district. It can be created both for a whole rayon and for an oblast. I would like to emphasize that the decision to adopt one or another version is made in each oblast independently.

[Demidenko] What is the procedure for nominating candidates to be delegates?

[Todorov] Only the local party organizations nominate candidates for delegate. At broadened plenums of the oblast party committees it is worth defining at what level the party organization can nominate candidates independently. Small party organizations conduct group assemblies organized by the raykoms [rayon party committees] or gorkoms [city party committees]. Shop party organizations may also nominate candidates in large party organizations. This may also be done at report-back election assemblies. And this is all the more so since today, judging by incoming information, many of the local organizations have made the decision to conduct reports and elections before the congress.

At an assembly any Communist has the unrestricted right to nominate and challenge any candidacy, including his own. And members of the party who are not registered with a given party organization may be nominated. During the nomination and discussion of the candidates it is necessary to provide for an objective evaluation of their political and moral qualities, their competitiveness, and the field of candidates as a whole.

The party organizations belonging to a district have the right to conduct assemblies or conferences in support of the nominated candidates. During the election campaign, the party organizations which have nominated the candidates may create support groups to campaign for his election and may issue election programs and leaflets.

[Demidenko] Tell us about the process of voting itself.

[Todorov] Organization of the secret ballot and the tally of the votes in the party organizations are carried out by vote-counting commissions. The ballot is handed out according to a roll of the communists of a single district upon presentation of the party membership card. In addition, the electoral commission is obligated to provide Communists who are absent for valid reasons on election day with the opportunity to vote, where necessary through the use of advance voting.

The elections are considered valid if more than half of the CPSU members registered have taken part in them. By the way, only party members take part in the voting, but candidate members of the CPSU may take part in the nomination and discussion of candidacies.

[Demidenko] How will elections take place in single-seat party electoral districts?

[Todorov] Proceeding from the quotas of representation for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress and the proposals of the raykoms and gorkoms, the oblast and Kiev city electoral commissions form a single-seat territorial district. Districts encompassing several rayon party organizations may be created. The number of Communists in a district may deviate by an insignificant degree to one side or another from the established quota: One delegate per 4,000 CPSU members for the 28th CPSU Congress, and one delegate per 2,000 party members for the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress.

The district electoral commission monitors the elections at the local party organizations, approves the text of the election ballot in a district, ensures that the ballots are prepared and supplies the local party organizations with them, determines the results of the election in a district, and carries out other functions.

All the candidates nominated at the district's local party organizations are included on the secret ballot. The last and first names and patronymic of the candidate as well as his position and his place of work are indicated on the ballot.

The basis for including a candidate on the ballot should be the record of the nomination assembly and his personal agreement.

The candidate may withdraw his candidacy at any time before the beginning of voting in the district but no later than the deadline set by the electoral commission. At the same time the party organization that named the candidate may withdraw a candidate it has nominated.

A candidate will be considered elected if he has received at the elections the greatest number of votes with respect to the other candidates but not less than half of the votes from the total of CPSU members taking part in the voting. In those districts where no one of the candidates has received more than half of the votes, a runoff election will be held at the decision of the district commission. In this case the ballot will carry only the two candidates who received the greatest number of votes with respect to the other candidates.

In the event that elections in a district are considered not to have taken place or no single candidate in a district has received the needed number of votes (even after a runoff election), the oblast party conference may elect a delegate to the free seat.

[Demidenko] Is it more difficult to organize elections in the multiseat electoral districts?

[Todorov] A multiseat district may combine all the party organizations of the oblast, or one or several rayon party organizations. When organizing direct elections in a district which includes the oblast's party organizations, the obkom plenum or, on its instructions, the oblast electoral commission examines the candidates nominated by the local party organizations and backed by the rayon and city party conferences and verifies the legality of electing the candidates for delegate. The list includes all the candidates backed by the rayon and city party conferences. The list is published in the press with brief biographical data of the candidates.

Together with the party raykoms and gorkoms, the oblast electoral commission organizes meetings of the candidates in the local party organs and with the aktiv, and it ensures that the Communists have been exposed to each candidate.

On the basis of the published list of the candidates, the electoral commission approves for the secret balloting a single ballot which indicates the last and first names and patronymic of each candidate as well as his position and his place of work. Then the ballot is printed and sent to the party raykoms and gorkoms, which organize the voting at the local party organizations. Toward this end the party raykom and gorkom, together with the appropriate commissions and with regard for the proposals of the local party organizations, form a rayon (or city) vote-counting commission. A similar commission is also elected at assemblies of Communists at the local party organizations.

The vote-counting commission for the party assembly sums up the results of the voting, indicates the number of Communists who were on the register and took part in the voting, and establishes for each candidate the number of votes "for" and "against." The record of the assembly is sent to the rayon (city) vote-counting commission. The composite data on the party organizations of the rayon and city are presented to the oblast electoral commission.

The elections are acknowledged to have taken place if more than half of the party members who are on the register in the district's party organizations have taken part in the voting. Candidates become delegates when they have received the greatest number of votes with respect to the other candidates but not less than half of the votes from the total of the CPSU members taking part in the voting. In cases where elections have not taken place or there are still free seats, the oblast party conference has the right to elect delegates to the free seats itself.

[Demidenko] Do the elections have any special features?

[Todorov] When delegates are elected directly by local party organizations where the number of Communists exceeds the established quote for representation, the party organization may constitute a single-seat or multiseat electoral district.

At the suggestion of the party committee of the above party organization, the district commission which is organizing the elections gives its approval. The peculiarity is that the Communists of this party organization, after the legality of the elections is recognized, do not take part in the election of delegates at the territorial party districts or at the oblast conferences.

[Demidenko] Are there any other election procedures allowed...

[Todorov] Yes, the delegates may be elected at the oblast party conference. If the party obkom plenum makes the decision to elect the delegates at the oblast party conference, then the elections are conducted in accordance with existing instructions and those amendments which the March (1990) CPSU Central Committee Plenum made to them. In addition, the conference makes up a list for multi-candidate secret balloting only from the candidates nominated at the local party organizations and backed by the rayon party conferences.

If there is to be voting for free seats the conference has the right to nominate other candidates, but in this case the party organizations of the district where the elections did not take place must have the opportunity to nominate their own candidates at the conference.

[Demidenko] One last question. The Ukrainian Communist Party Plenum decree "On the Convocation of the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress" says that it is considered necessary when nominating candidates to guarantee representation of young Communists. What will specifically be done in this direction?

[Todorov] Nomination of candidates from the young Communists is also carried out at the local party organizations where they are registered. There can be several versions. In particular, the creation of one or several districts in the oblasts is possible, depending on the number of young Communists. In this case they themselves will decide whom to nominate from their ranks and whom to elect as delegate to the congress. But this is a recommendation. In each specific instance Communists will make their own independent decisions locally.

Interregional Deputies Group Sets Up Committee

LD1205131790 Moscow World Service in Russian 0937 GMT 12 May 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] A correspondent of the agency [INTERFAX] reports from Kiev that an All-Union Consultative Committee has been formed in the Ukraine under the name The Union of Democratic Forces. The initiators of its formation were members of the Interregional Group of USSR People's Deputies headed by Yuriy Afanasyev, and also representatives of radical democratic associations and parties. A Council of Provisional Representatives of those parties and associations began to operate at the same time as the Consultative Committee. One of the main directions of the work of the Committee—The Union of Democratic Forces—is the organization of roundtable conferences between representatives of the authorities and of the opposition movements of radical tendency.

Pollution Causes Closure of Crimean Beaches

LD1205125490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 12 May 90

[Text] A period of summer holidays is near. Unfortunately, we have bad news for many of those who planned to spend holidays in the Crimea or southern Ukraine. Following accidental outbursts of waste effluent, all the beaches in Feodosiya and Saki, the Solnyshko, Pribrezhniy, and Novyy in Evpatoriya, some beaches in Simeiz and Kerch have been closed. The Azovstal and Ilyich metallurgy combines and coking coal enterprises in Mariupol have polluted the Azov Sea to such a degree that the beaches on the famous Berdyansk spit, in Primorsk, and other places on the Azov Sea coast had to be closed. Some Odessa beaches are under threat of closure, too, owing to pollution of the Black Sea coast.

Report on Donbass Plant Poison Leaks

PM1105142390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 May 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Dispatch by correspondent N. Lisovenko: "The Poisonous Smell of Almonds"]

[Text] Donetsk—Misfortune has again struck the Donbass. Following the disaster at the "Aleksandr-Zapad" mine, when three miners died and 80 were injured to varying degrees as a result of a leak of chlorobenzene at the Gorlovka chemical plant, signs of mass poisoning started appearing in the neighboring "Uglegorskaya" mine at the end of April.

Thirty-five people complaining of headaches, high blood pressure, and an accelerated heartbeat have already been hospitalized in the oblast hospital for occupational diseases. The "Uglegorskaya" mine has been stopped in order to avoid more serious consequences.

The fact that a smell of almonds has been noticed in mineshafts in Kalinin and "Kondratevskaya" mines and that it causes ill health was reported by workers in these enterprises located near to "Uglegorskaya" mine. A state commission, headed by Nikolay Surgan, deputy chief of the Ukrainian state mining technical inspectorate, carried out an investigation into the reasons for the emergency and came to the conclusion that the same chemical plant was to blame for everything—or, to be more precise, the scrap heap at that plant, where harmful waste from industry has been heaped up for 30 years. Around 1,500 compounds have formed from this waste, including some which were previously unknown. Something in the products from the reactor where the emergency occurred could have turned out to be the most poisonous of poisons.

Over 300 specimens of air, water, and soil were taken for laboratory analysis. They showed the presence of phenol, formaldehyde, and some other, still unidentified compounds.

On the recommendation of the state commission, which has completed its task, measures were taken which should prevent chemical substances from the chemical plant's premises from finding their way into the Volyntsy drinking water reservoir, which supplies nine mining villages.

Realizing that the dimensions of the incident are getting bigger, the state commission and social organizations from Gorlovka and Yenakiyevo appealed to the USSR Council of Ministers for assistance, and the Council of Ministers formed a special commission not only to resolve the question of which people and departments involved in the catastrophe are to blame, but also concern to deal with the problems of job placements for the many thousands of miners from the poisoned mines, the construction of facilities to prevent the further diffusion of this poisonous underground black spot, compensation for losses, and so on.

In a word, this is another case of damage totaling tens if not hundreds of millions of rubles.

Miners Demand Declaration of Disaster Zone

LD1205045890 Moscow TASS In English 2232 GMT 11 May 90

[BY TASS correspondents Anatoliy Gordeyev and Vladimir Yurkevich]

[Text] Donetsk May 12 TASS—Miners at the Ugelgorskaya coal mine in Yenakievo demanded that central Donets coal basin (the Ukraine's southeast) be declared an ecological disaster zone.

On Friday they were supported by coalminers from the neighbouring city of Gorlovka. The call was prompted by frequent cases of coalminers being poisoned at their workplaces.

Back in December last year, hundreds of miners at Gorlovka's Alexander-West mine were poisoned and three miners died because chlorobenzene, spilled at a local chemical plant, penetrated the mine workings. By decision of a government commission that investigated the causes of the emergency situation the mine came to a standstill temporarily.

Four months later, a similar situation developed at the Uglegorskaya mine. There was no loss of life but chemical substances that penetrated the mine forced the miners to abandon coalfaces. A government commission began to investigate the causes of the incident.

A preliminary sampling of the air and water in the mine workings revealed the presence of not only chlorobenzene but also benzene, phenol, styrene, acetone and other chemical substances. The miners of another two mines located near the Gorlovka chemical plant declined to go down into the mine, demanding safe labour guarantees.

Agencies of the prosecutor's office instituted criminal proceedings in connection with each case of group poisoning, Nikolai Demikdenko, public prosecutor of Donetsk region, told TASS.

Already now without waiting for the end of the investigations, residents of towns and settlements of central Donbas are mentioning the Gorlovka chemical plant as the direct culprit of the poisoning incidents. It is precisely there that the traces of chemical substances that penetrated the mines are leading.

For the time being, the sanitary and nature conservation agencies have closed the mines down. More than 10,000 miners are out of work.

The danger of water pollution in the region has arisen at the same time: the resident of ten towns of Donetsk and Lugansk regions may soon find themselves without drinking water.

The residential area of central Donbass are astir, with meetings and rallies being held. The miners demand complete information on what happened and the publication of results of chemical analyses, which the government commission expects to get in the middle of this month.

Moldavian Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman Elected

LD1105203590 Moscow TASS in English 2015 GMT 11 May 90

[By TASS Correspondent Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[Text] Kishinev May 11 TASS—The deputies of the Moldavian parliament elected Ion Khadyrke, 40, a man of letters and a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, as the first deputy chairman of parliament at its session today.

Khadyrke is the leader of the Moldavian Popular Front, the supporters of which constitute a majority in the current parliament. Recently he withdrew from the Soviet Communist Party, pleading "disappointment with the pace of its reorganisation".

Viktor Puskasu, a professional lawyer, was elected the second deputy chairman of Parliament. He was the deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Republican Supreme Soviet of the previous convocation.

The two candidacies had been suggested by Mircha Snegur, chairman of the Republican Supreme Soviet. He believes that such parliament leadership is required by the present-day sociopolitical realities in the republic and by the complex problems that the new parliament is to tackle.

These conditions require that representatives of the most influential political forces and social movements are at the head of the republican parliament.

The deputies completed the formation of standing commissions, some of which will perform functions thta are new to the republican parliament, in particular, to monitor the Armed Forces and secret services on Moldavian territory.

Moldavians Refuse To Accept New State Flag

LD1105215190 Moscow TASS in English 2054 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 11 TASS—Residents of Tiraspol, Bendery, Rybnitsa and some regions of the left-bank Dniester refused to accept the tricolour, the new state flag of the Moldavian republic. The newspaper IZVESTIYA writes today that the blue-yellow-red flag has not been raised in these areas since April 27, when it was endorsed as the state flag.

"This was out of question in Tiraspol, and attempts by activists of the Moldavian society Vatra to raise a tricolour above the building of the State Council in Bendery were foiled by workers," the newspaper writes. "Prior and immediately after May 1 city councils of these cities refused to recognise the legitimacy of this amendment to the Moldavian Constitution."

IZVESTIYA writes that at the resumed session of the Moldavian Supreme Soviet many deputies demanded that criminal proceedings be instituted and leaders of "rebel" city councils stripped of their deputy powers. The Supreme Soviet rescinded their decisions and ordered the tricolour hoisted by May 9. In reply thousands of people gathered for a meeting of protest in Tiraspol on the eve of Victory Day, and local soviets in Bendery and Rybnitsa reaffirmed their rejection of the tricolour.

The newspaper quotes opponents of the tricolour as saying that the Supreme Soviet did not have the right to copy the flags of foreign states, namely Romania and Chad, which feature the same colours in the same arrangement.

Moldavian Party Election Results Reported

LD1205124290 Moscow TASS International Service in Rusian 2048 GMT 11 May 90

[Summary] Kishinev, 11 May (TASS)—TASS correspondent Aleksandr Takiy reports:

A report-back and election campaign has been held in the Moldavian Communist Party over the past month and a half. Almost half the secretaries of primary party organizations have been changed. In town and rayon committees, one-third of the leaders have been changed. About half of the party leaders were elected in multicandidate elections. For the first time, the secretaries of town and rayon committees were elected not by electoral committee but by all the conference delegates.

Caucasus

Article Views Caucasus 'Bloody Interrayon War'

PM1105083190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 May 90 First Edition p 4

[Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Kaushanskiy article under rubric "Azerbaijan: Political Situation": "If Everyone Goes on About His Own Thing...."]

[Text] We drove from Gyandzha at dawn for the area of combat operations. I cannot bring my hand to place this strictly military combination of words within quotation marks. Probably because at Kazakh we were asked, "for safety's sake," to transfer to a minibus belonging to the local rayon internal affairs department. A loaded submachinegun appeared in its cab. The radio was crackling above my ear, and lying on my neighbor's knees was a map indicating places where hostages had recently been taken and the numbers of people killed. The entire group, which included representatives of the militia, the internal troops, and the KGB, was tense because on the local desert roads it is more than just theoretically possible to receive a point-blank burst of fire from a passing vehicle in broad daylight. The flareup of violence in March, which singed Azerbaijani and Armenian settlements bordering on each other, threw up a shower of sparks in April too.

I will allow myself a small digression. A few years ago I had occasion to write in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA about an amazing person who built an amazing house in Gyandzha—Ibragim Dzhafarov, who used to drive troop trains along front-line railroads, frequently during bombing raids. After the war he spent several years rebuilding railroad bridges destroyed by the enemy in various cities in the country. Dzhafarov returned to what was then Kirovabad and, not finding even a collapsed adobe home, began building... a glass house. Made from empty bottles which fellow countrymen collected for him all over the district.

Before leaving Gyandzha, I looked up Dzhafarov in his abode, which is open to everyone. I asked him: "Tell me, father, what would happen if the bottles gathered for you by your former Armenian neighbors were pulled from the walls of your house?" "It would be bad," he replied after thinking for a bit. "The house would collapse. And what would we have left to share?...."

Back in November 1988 48,000 Armenians lived in his native Gyandzha, but exactly one year later 2,000 were left. Today there is hardly anyone. Even mixed families have left.

It passes understanding: internal borders in our own homeland. A locality on the territory of three rayons—Kazakhskiy, Noyemberyanskiy, and Idzhevanskiy—like a patchwork quilt. When you cross from one rayon into another, you come across island villages surrounded by neighbors' territory. And these islands are marked with a dotted line on the maps. Each village has "its own" State Automobile Inspectorate posts. As yet customs posts and border markers are lacking though.

There are constant sparks between the islands. In March there was the tragedy of the Azerbaijani village of Baganys-Ayrym with its 11 houses burned down and six inhabitants, including a child, killed. Bullets were fired at shepherds from the forest, and a section of the Yerevan-Kazakh road was undermined. The Azerbaijani villages of Barkhudarly, Alibeyli, and Bala-Dzhafarli were fired upon, and a USSR MVD [Internal Affairs Ministry] investigative-operational group vehicle was attacked. Three Azerbaijani residents and their Zhiguli have not been found to this day after disappearing on the Armenian side. An Armenian was killed on the Azerbaijani side. How much time has passed, but there is no way the warring sides will reach agreement on where, when, and how to exchange the dead, if they are produced.

The noose of tension has loosened slightly but not let go entirely. The press has already reported the taking of servicemen hostage on the night of 12-13 April. Exchanges of fire too, but there are also other circumstances without which the present situation cannot be understood.

Lieutenant Colonel A. Astakhov, representative of the internal troops:

"The whole trouble is the unpredicatbility of events, when it is hard to calculate where the next hotbed of tension will arise and why. But it is essential to forecast, for this will prevent casualties. Look at the map. Here is the Azerbaijani village of Kemerli, and there the Armenian Berdavan. Very close to a poultry farm on the Azerbaijani side the neighbors have begun building their own poultry farm, without bothering even about a fire break. The foundation trench has already moved several meters onto 'foreign' territory. You smile? But when each one begins looking for his own hens, which are indifferent to whose zone they peck grain in, and accusing his neighbor of perfidy, when people start fighting with rifle in hand for every meter of land—what then? I specially drove out to Noyemberyan along with a land manager and a representative of the militia and tried to demonstrate to the local authorities the perniciousness of such arbitrary construction. Do you think they listened to me? And there are many such potential hotbeds of tension."

Lt. Col. A. Veliyev, chief of the Kazakhskiy Rayon Branch of the Azerbaijan KGB:

"I believe that the republic administration made a wise decision to involve our department in normalizing the situation. We have notified all the villages in the rayon that the committee's staffers will also be stationed in each one along with local representatives of power. They go about in uniform, their names are known, and this is more a psychological factor—but it has worked, and people feel better protected. Although it is too soon to be euphoric: The villagers nerves are as taut as strings, and ours too, I have to admit. Only for a different reason—someone is deliberately sowing provocative rumors in order to destabilize an already complex situation. We received a telephone call just before you arrived—Armenian hostages had been taken in the region of Barkhudarly Railroad Station, practically an entire locomotive team. I went there at once. And what was the outcome: The team had delivered its 53 cars to the station and safely left for its native Idzhevan...."

I reread the notes in my pad, and another quite sinister participant—albeit not a material one—in this senseless and, to our great regret, bloody war on an interrayon scale rose up before my eyes to its full height. Its name is fear. Inhabitants are afraid to carry out field work, and women refuse to go to remote livestock units to milk cows and to do the washing at forest springs. I have witnessed an old man entreating an internal troops officer: "Chief, take us in your armored personnel carrier, for we want to go shopping for food." For food—this is from one village to another. From Upper to Lower Askipara. Between them lies a narrow band of Armenian land. Who carved this accursed boundary, and when? In former times none of the neighbors took it seriously.

It is incredible but true: At night elders come from both sides to the "neutral strip" between Armenian and Azerbaijani villages. They grew up together, studied together, got married without asking about "paragraph 5," and could not conceive of Caucasian banquets without each other, but now.... The old men will sit at night, have a smoke, lament their fate with each other, complain about the bad times and bad people, and go home. What in the world is more inhuman than a border of despair passing not so much through the land as through souls which only recently considered themselves kindred?

I had a particularly keen sense of the unreal nature of what is happening when our minibus reached Barkhudarly village. Amid a sea of greenery, the wonderful scents of flowers, and the placid whistling of birds there was an internal troop armored personnel carrier outside the school building long abandoned by children, dry reports over the radio, maps laid out on a roughly fashioned table showing the posts set up on the possible lines of approach to the village by "bearded ones...." With hope and love the village's remaining inhabitants feed their little garrison and stoke a little bathhouse for it. So long as the soldiers don't leave. So long as there isn't a repeat of the recent dreadful days when two inhabitants, one of them a nine-year-old boy, died under fire from bandits. So long as they don't end up as hostages, like the Ibragimov family. On listening to people and experiencing their anxieties with them you no longer perceive as something alien, incomprehensible, and bureaucratic-officialese the phrase from the internal troops' operational report—"....at the request of the local inhabitants and party organs assistance is being given in guarding the population during the period of field work."

At the request of the local inhabitants.... At an improvised village meeting they also asked me many things in the belief that a correspondent's presence could help to resolve many purely everyday, domestic questions, bypassing the not very efficient local organs of power. But they asked more, and poured out their soul. It hurt me to see tears in the eyes of 58-year-old K. Gasanov, team leader on the state farm. "I have 1,000 hectares of land at my disposal," he complained. "But I cannot work on it with my people. The tractors stand idle, for people are afraid to go into the field: The 'bearded ones' shoot. Straight from the forest. When will this end? Who needs such perestroyka, if we adults have taken the children away from the village for their safety? When will fear leave these places, and when will we go visiting each other as before?"

What can you reply to people? That it certainly is not perestroyka that is to blame for the deaths and sufferings of innocent people on both sides? This is obvious. It is not perestroyka, but it is being fought against by those who from midnight through 0500 hours 25 April fired from the Armenian side on the villages of Yukhaly, Buzgov, and Kyarmachakh in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic's Babekskiy Rayon and on Sofulu, Barkhudarly, and Ashagy-Askipara in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic's Kazakhskiy Rayon. It was the target of those who fired on a peaceful tractor driver from an automatic weapon near the population center of Aygeovit in Idzhevanskiy Rayon during the day of 24 April, and on an MVD group in the village of Sarushen in Martunikskiy Rayon 5 May.

Something else is also obvious: It is certainly not Armenians or Azerbaijanis who are killing people and burning houses—they are nonhuman beings who are doing this. Their crimes are outside the realm of nationalism. Their calls for the demarcation of two neighboring peoples on the basis of spectral territorial claims and their attempts to use fear to shut the mouths of those who disagree smack of the Middle Ages. The nonhuman beings on both sides will not benefit from the stabilization of the situation nor, consequently, from the surrender of weapons, which will deprive them of real power. They can only be countered by the sole means that they fear most of all: Everyone must unite on both sides of the warring shores. Working people, the intelligentsia, and local party and law-enforcement organs. This uniting has already begun, and it is necessary to support it and lend it accelerating force.

And the final point. There, in Barkhudarly, in the deserted school, I once again remembered Ibragim Dzhafarov's "glass" house, which Azerbaijanis and Armenians together assembled. If the fruits of someone's "foreign" hands were pulled from its walls, they would collapse. Why did this image surface again? Probably because I noticed in the corner of the schoolroom, by a submachinegun rack, a dust-covered portrait of the great Nizami, who many centuries ago warned us of the possible consequences of an encroachment on justice, peace, and goodness in relations among people.

On returning, I found his words in a small volume of poetry: "If even a little cupidity penetrates people's friendship, at that very instant a hostile feeling will arise between them. If there appears to be friendship, but everyone goes on about his own thing—this is false friendship based on hostility."

Ministry Reports Shootings, Deaths in Armenia

LD1205121990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 12 May 90

[Text] We have received a report from the Ministry of Internal Affairs press center:

Armenian extremist organizations are continuing to arm themselves, it says. Every day the duty section of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs receives operational reports about bold attacks by armed fighting men on various installations in order to seize weapons and explosives. One such incident occurred on 9 May in Artashat Rayon of Armenia. A group of armed forces led by (Khudaberdyan) in the village of Azatavan killed a teenaged villager. Another armed group in opposition to the first retaliated and shot and killed (Khudaberdyan) himself and two of his relatives and wounded one of (Khudaberdyan)'s relatives.

If one considers the fact that a large number of particularly grave crimes in the country are committed with the use of firearms, it is clear that the creation in Armenia of armed illegal formations is fraught with the most serious consequences. This is confirmed by the tragedy in Artashat Rayon.

Diaspora Broadcasters Hold Meeting in Armenia

NC1205125390 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1800 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] At the initiative of the Main Directorate of Foreign Broadcasts of the Armenian State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasts and the Committee for Cultural Relations With Diaspora Armenians, a consultative seminar has been organized for the directors of diaspora Armenian radio and television programs.

Radio and television broadcasters have arrived in Armenia from various diaspora communities, including those in the United States, Australia, France, Argentina and Brazil.

The diaspora Armenian broadcasters held their first meeting with their colleagues in the fatherland today.

Various activities are planned for the broadcasters, including meetings with intellectuals, cultural workers, and officials and visits to scenic locations in the fatherland. The broadcasters will also be able to arrange visits to places of interest in order to prepare programs for their broadcasts.

Armenia To Remove Hazardous Material

NC1105093290 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1800 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] In fulfillment of the 18 April 1990 decision of the Armenian Supreme Soviet Presium, the republic's government examined the issue of removing the explosive and combustible semi-manufactured materials kept in the processing sectors and storage depots of the Nairit scientific-production association. It also examined a package of measures formulated by the association to ensure that these materials are cleared from nearby roads.

The government endorsed the package of measures presented and instructed Nairit scientific-production association to take prompt action to complete all work in this direction by 15 June. It also instructed the Yerevan branch of the Transcaucasian railways to procure and dispatch the necessary freight and tank cars in accordance with the freight removal schedule. The republic's Internal Affairs Ministry was ordered to ensure the unimpeded movement of the freight cars along the tracks near the Nairit scientific-production association.

The executive committee of the Yerevan City Party Committee has been entrusted with supervising the implementation of the decision.

Armenia Supreme Soviet Makes New Appointments

First Deputy Premier

NC1205104890 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Yerevan, 11 May (ARMENPRES)—The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium has issued a decision appointing Mikayel Samsonovich Grigoryan first deputy chairman of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers.

Mikayel Samsonovich Grigoryan was born in 1942 in Kalinino in Armenia's Kalininskiy Rayon into a family working in the service sector. He graduated from the Armenian Agricultural Institute in 1964 with a degree in mechanical engineering.

After graduating from the institute he undertook economic and party work. For the past few years he has been the director of the [Agrarian] Department of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee.

Agro-Industrial Committee

NC1205094990 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Yerevan, 11 May (ARMENPRES)—The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium has issued a decision appointing Shavarsh Amayakovich Aleksanyan chairman of the Armenian SSR State Agro-Industrial Committee.

Shavarsh Amayakovich Aleksanyan was born in 1935 in Salut village of Gukasyanskiy Rayon into a collective farmer's family. He graduated from Yerevan's husbandry and veterinary institute in 1961 and from the party's advanced higher school in 1977.

He has carried out economic and party work since graduating from the veterinary institute. Between 1973 and 1990 he was first secretary of the Akhuryanskiy Rayon party committee, first secretary of the Aparanskiy Rayon party committee, and first secretary of the Akhuryanskiy Rayon party committee.

University To Be Established in Leninakan

NC1205162490 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Yerevan, 11 May (ARMENPRES)—The Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers has decided to set up a technical university of northern Armenia in Leninakan.

The initial decision to establish a university was taken by the executive committee of Leninakan city soviet of people's deputies at the suggestion of the Armenian Ministry of Education, following an agreement reached with the Armenian SSR State Planning Committee. The enterprise is based on an initiative of the Armenian General Benevolent Union [AGBU], which signed a memorandum in this regard on 3 August 1989 in Los Angeles.

Armenian architects will participate in the preparation of the designs for the building complex of the university, while AGBU, in cooperation with American organizations, will undertake to provide all the necessary instruments and technical equipment.

A committee has been set up under Yuriy Khodzhamiryan, deputy chairman of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, to oversee the organization of the work in connection with the setting up of the university.

The committee has been instructed to invite the official representatives of AGBU and other interested American organizations to conduct negotiations within three months and sign relevant agreements in connection with the building of the university, its functioning and status, and financial issues.

It is planned that 50 students will enroll in the Technical University of Northern Armenia in 1990.

The executive committee of the Leninakan city soviet of people's deputies has been instructed to cooperate with the Armenian SSR Education Ministry to decide on the temporary premises for the Technical University of Northern Armenia. The relevant supervisory boards have been instructed to allow the dutyfree importation of those materials and instruments which are necessary for the equipment of the university, and to ensure the protection of the materials which are being received from the United States.

Arrests for Curfew Violations Reported

LD1105135690 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0202 GMT 11 May 90

[Text] Our correspondent (Sayyad Mamedov) reports from Stepanakert:

From 3 to 9 May, the social, political, and operational life in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and rayons near the border remained complicated. Transport in the trade enterprises of the oblast worked harmoniously.

Four trains consisting of 56 cars entered the Stepanakert railway station and two trains consisting of 50 cars left the station.

During the period between 7 and 9 May, 60 people, including nine people for violating the curfew, seven people for possesssing firearms, and 44 people for various reasons, were detained in the region under the state of emergency. Nine people were brought to administrative responsibility and in Stepanakert 11 people were arrested.

Azerbaijani Leader on Soviet-Iranian 'Alliance'

TA1105163690 Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 9 May p 8

[Text] Azerbaijani People's Front leader Ebulfez Ali Elciyev issued a statement to HAZAR, a magazine published by Azeri Turks in Istanbul with the aim of supporting the Azerbaijani national cause and disseminating news about regional developments to the world. In his statement, Elciyev declared that the Soviet administration and Tehran have formed an alliance against the movement in Azerbaijan.

Elciyev recalled that the Azeri Turkish nation has been waging a struggle for freedom for the past 200 years, and thousands have been martyred in the name of this cause, as was the case in the 20 February incidents. Elciyev said: We, as well as our ancestors, who have struggled for Azerbaijan's independence, have been called by various names by both the West and the East. These names range from pan-Turanians, highwaymen, and mass murderers, to bourgeois counterrevolutionaries. They suppressed the Azerbaijani people's aspirations for democracy and independence with these phrases. They formed an alliance against us, although they know that we will not attack any people's freedom or create problems with anyone.

Of Course We Are Muslims

The leader of the Azerbaijani People's Front, who changed his name from Ebulfez Aliyev to Ebulfez Ali Elciyev, said: Gorbachev and his aides portrayed us to the world as people who are trying to establish a new radical Islamic state. Of course our people are Muslims, but from the start we announced that we will follow the line of a democratic, secular, and contemporary state. Through his propaganda, Gorbachev tried to enlist the reaction of the Christian world against us. Democracy and secularism, however, constitute our very existence.

Iran's Scheme

Elciyev remarked that the Iranian regime is trying to falsely convince the Azerbaijani people about its feelings of "Muslim solidarity," adding: Even if Iran is aware of the religious awakening here, it is unable to understand the national awakening. Setting aside their mutual hostility, the Soviet and Iranian administrations formed an alliance against the cause of Azerbaijani freedom, because both of them stand to lose from Azerbaijan's awakening. The Azerbaijani people and all democratic forces of the world should beware of this alliance against Azerbaijan.

Elciyev recalled that there are people within the Azeri Turks who are trying to sow seeds of strife, noting: They ignore those who perpetrate the massacre and try to degrade the victims.

Anti-Soviet Activists Seize Georgian Building

LD1205211790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2010 GMT 12 May 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The situation in Georgia is complex at the moment. Groups supporting the secession of the republic from the Union are becoming more active. Their actions are by no means always limited to collecting signatures. Yesterday, for example, informal youth organizations seized the building of the Georgian Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League].

Georgian Communist Party Congress Previewed

PM1205204490 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 May 90 First Edition p 1

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Kaushanskiy article under the rubric "Georgia: The Political Situation": "Communists Facing a Choice"]

[Text] Today the attention of the republic's inhabitants is focused on the forthcoming 28th Georgian Communist Party Congress, which is to begin work on 15 May. The tone of the speeches heard at party conferences and the character of the local party leadership's meetings with workers, rural working people, and the intelligentsia are sufficient indication that the discussions at the congress will be difficult.

Choosing which decisions to adopt will also be difficult. Various options, as the saying goes, are possible. And judging by the numerous newspaper accounts and television debates and the opinions of ordinary communists with whom I have talked in recent days, these options amount to the following positions: The congress has to choose between the formation of an independent communist party seceding from the CPSU, autonomy for the Georgian Communist Party within the framework of a federation of republic communist parties, and the structure that operates today.

But there are nuances even within these positions. For instance, at their conference the communists of Tbilisi's Ordzhonikidzevskiy Rayon put forward this idea: The Georgian Communist Party declares the status of full independence, draws up its own program and statutes, but remains within the CPSU on the basis of the principles of equal rights.

Those comrades who have gained most wisdom through party experience suggest that it would be better not to spur on the horses, so to speak, toward independence solely for its own sake, after which the destabilization of the situation in the republic's own party home could begin. Amid the chorus of many voices, one idea is emerging increasingly persistently: Is it not more expedient to hold the forthcoming party forum in two stages? At the first, delegates to the Union congress could be elected, and later, after the Union congress, the appropriate decisions could be adopted.

Making unequivocal predictions on the eve of the congress is an extremely risky thing to do. The days are now gone when communists' opinions were more in the nature of a decorative overlay than a real influence on the everyday life of primary organizations. One thing is clear: The republic's party ship will no longer sail the old course. Too many problems have accumulated. The critical arrows fired by the republic's communists at the present party leadership's practical course are too sharp. The leadership is blamed for losing the initiative, lacking militancy, and failing to find a common language with the informals, and for the exodus of communists from the party, which is beginning to become alarming.

"Why are we losing the initiative to other political forces even on questions relating to the intraparty sphere? Why is our Communist Party continuing to play only a third-rate role in the national liberation movement?"—N. Kurtanidze, secretary of the Rustavi "Azot" Production Association party committee, asks in the pages of the republic newspaper ZARYA VOSTOKA. The present Central Committee bureau, the author writes, is manifestly not up to the role dictated by the times.

The possible paths to a split are already prompting many questions. For instance, if the course of a complete break with the CPSU prevails, what will the thousands of communists who do not agree with that objective do? And what will be the status of Russian-speaking party members? And what about the reaction of the party organizations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia? Every issue is a problem.

But, be that as it may, the Georgian Communist Party is today the only political structure with a clearly formulated program for the republic to gain true sovereignty and autonomy. The formulation of state programs to resolve urgent problems of the development of the Georgian language, culture, and history, the concept of national development that was formulated jointly with the public, the stopping of ecologically dangerous construction projects—this is the credit balance that Georgia's communists are taking to their congress.

Against this background the opposition parties' widely publicized statements scarcely inspire faith in their capacity to find a way out of the labyrinth of economic difficulties. The political programs promise, rather, a return to the methods of rule of "the best friend of Soviet physical culture enthusiasts" [Stalin]. By way of an exmaple of one such program, let me cite an extract from the April appeal of the monarchist (conservative) party of Georgia to the peoples of the Caucasus: "Today we are facing a choice: Unless the whole of the Caucasus combines to form a mighty fist, unless our forces are channeled into the destruction of the empire, unless we stop making claims against each other, there will be an obvious danger of our degeneration and destruction."

Only one thing is not clear: How do the monarchists plan to destroy one empire while establishing another monarch in its ruins, and an imported one at that, Czar Georgiy XIV Bagration, who now lives in Spain?

Back at the end of March, speaking on local television, G. Gumbaridze, chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium and first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, cited some very eloquent figures. The republic receives from outside about one-fourth of the electricity it consumes, 96 percent of the oil, 100 percent of the natural gas, 93 percent of the rolled nonferrous metals and steel pipes, 82 percent of the timber, 40 percent of the meat, 76 percent of the milk, 94 percent of the grain, and 98 percent of the sugar.

So is it a good idea to cut the umbilical cord linking the republic to the all-Union market within the framework of a renewed federation?

Central Asia

Turkmen Communist Party Congress Opens

PM1405093190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 May 90 Second Edition p 2

[PRAVDA correspondent M. Volkov report: "Congress Has Opened"]

[Text] Ashkhabad, 11 May—The 24th Turkmen Communist Party Congress began its work in Ashkhabad yesterday. Delegates representing the republic's 115,000 communists are to discuss problems of economic and social development and outline ways to resolve them.

"After long years of stagnation, the first serious attempt to radically change the state of affairs in the republic was made at the previous, the 23d, Communist Party Congress," S.A. Niyazov, first secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee, pointed out in his report speech. "However, the bad phenomena which struck society were by no means completely disclosed at that time."

People in Turkmenistan will be slow to forget the Sixth Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee Plenum when the inflated authority of high-ranking party functionaries was debunked—as PRAVDA described at one time. Communists expelled three Tashauz Party Obkom [oblast party committee] secretaries and the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] chairman from the CPSU directly at the plenum. The mighty cleansing wave has rolled throughout the republic. People have put their trust in the new leadership. The prestige of party organizations, which have increased in numbers, has grown appreciably.

Nevertheless on the first day of the work of the current congress, a considerable amount of criticism was voiced regarding leading party bodies.

At their congress Turkmen communists were unanimous in voicing total support for the CPSU Central Committee position set out in the Open Letter "For Consolidation on a Principled Basis."

Late in the evening delegates once again elected S.A. Niyazov, chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet, as first secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee.

Report-Back Speech Given

LD1105194590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 11 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] The congress of the Turkmen Communist Party opened in Ashkhabad today. As distinct from past practice, the preparation for this congress was made not only by the staff of the central apparatus but also by the delegates themselves and by primary party organizations. A gathering of representatives of the delegations took place on 3 May, and as a result the agenda of the congress gained two extra points: the first concerned introducing to the Turkmen Supreme Soviet proposals about changes and addenda to the republic's Constitution; the second point was about the attitude of the congress delegates toward the open letter of the CPSU Central Committee to the country's communists advocating consolidation on a basis of principle.

Comrade Niyazov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Turkmen Communist Party, made the report-back speech of the Central Committee. Over the past five years which were most difficult in the history of the country and of the republic, the numbers in the republican party organization have grown by five percent, and its prestige has noticeably grown. The results of the elections to the Turkmen Supreme Soviet, which took place in January and passed off on a broad alternative basis, testify to this. Two thirds of the deputies of the republican parliament are communists. Many voters supported the measures proposed in the election platform of the republic's CP for the further development of ethnic culture, of the mother tongue and of popular traditions, for ecological enhancement, and for economic recovery. For instance, it was decided to stabilize the production of cotton at the level of 1,300,000 tonnes, having reduced the volume of the state order from the center to 1,000,000 tonnes. One third more housing is being built now, and twice the number of nursery schools and schools and six times the number of hospitals now are being built. But these advances clearly lag behind the rate of growth of the population. Real per capita income is just R75, when the subsistence minimum is R90. The republic's inhabitants receive one third less social and communal services than the average for the country. People are very alarmed by the marked growth in crime in the republic, and by inflationary processes. [video shows congress in session; Niyazov making a speech; congress delegate talking to correspondent in street] [passage omitted]

Niyazov Reelected Chairman

PM1405162590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 May 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Correspondent Vladimir Kuleshov report under the rubric "Direct Link": "Turkmen Communist Party First Secretary Elected"]

[Text] Ashkhabad—As the result of a direct secret ballot the delegates to the 24th Turkmen Communist Party Congress have elected S. Niyazov, chairman of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, as first secretary of the republic Communist Party Central Committee.

"If we proceed from reality today," S. Niyazov said in an interview with IZVESTIYA's correspondent, "the Communist Party is the only political force capable of piecing together our fragmented society to resolve economic and social tasks. Under complex conditions for the republic we must think not about how to divide the efforts of various organizations, the party, and the soviets but fight to consolidate all this. In addition, here, as distinct from other regions, however much we have criticized the work of party committees at today's congress, the Turkmen Communist Party enjoys quite high trust and authority with the population. Precisely on the initiative of the Bureau." [sentence as published]

Niyazov Interviewed

LD1205183790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 12 May 90

[Interview with newly reelected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan Saparmurad Niyazov by unidentified correspondent, at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan in Ashkhabad on 12 May—recorded; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The 24th Congress of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan ended its work today in Ashkhabad. The delegates who spoke voiced their attitudes toward the draft platform of the CPSU for the 28th Congress of the CPSU and toward the draft Rules of the CPSU. Ideas regarding candidacies for election to the leading bodies of the CPSU were expressed. Delegates to the 28th Party Congress were elected. As a result of a direct secret ballot, the delegates to the Congress of the Republican Communist Party elected Comrade Niyazov first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan by an absolute majority.

Our correspondent interviewed him.

[Niyazov] It is the second day that we have talked about these matters at our 24th congress. Even today the standpoints of the delegates to the 24th congress, of the communists, have appeared unambiguously. We are in favor of strengthening party unity and of precisely delineating the relationship between the CPSU and the communist parties of the Union republics. We are in favor of unity between the CPSU and the parties of the Union republics, within the framework of a federation, with a single set of rules. Of course, certain specific features in the work of the parties of the Union republics are allowed, and we would defend this. Not everything done within the party throughout the country is to our liking. Not everything has our support. For this reason, we are currently working out definite positions at the congress, and the congress delegates will give their instructions to the delegations [to the 28th CPSU Congress] so that they defend precisely those positions. [video shows the congress in process; delegates seated; speakers at the rostrum; Niyazov in the now-empty seats in the auditorium talks to the unidentified correspondent]

Work of Turkmen Party Congress Reported

LD1205143790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1240 GMT 12 May 90

[Text] Ashkhabad, 12 May (TASS)—The 24th Congress of the Communist Party of Turkmenia [CPT] wound up here today by committing the CPT Central Committee and all communists in the republic to act more decisively, on the basis of experienced gained, to accomplish socioeconomic and political tasks, to extend socialist democracy and to refine all aspects of life in the republic.

The congress adopted a statement "For the Reinforcement of a Renewed Soviet Federation," discussed the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th CPSU congress and the draft CPSU Rules, elected the leading bodies of the Turkmen Communist Party and delegates to the all-Union forum of communists, and endorsed candidates for election to the leading bodies of the CPSU.

Saparmured Niyazov was reelected first secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee by direct secret ballot.

More on Background to Dushanbe Events

PM1305145090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 May 90 Second Edition p 2

[Part two of TASS observer Viktor Ponomarev article: "The Bells of Hope"]

[Text] **2. Impotence**

Dushanbe, Moscow—The people did not accept the resignation. The Central Committee received a deluge of telephone calls from all corners of the republic—about 1,500 of them. And more than 200 telegrams and written protests from labor collectives. People perceived the memorandum signed by the republic leadership as desertion.

"What is all this about a quiet life?" N. Zaripova, a party veteran, said indignantly at the republic Central Committee plenum. "Talk about resigning. In difficult times you have to work, so that people can see what kind of party it is."

M. Mamadzhonov, republic military commissar, said to the Central Committee first secretary's face:

"We are going into the attack, when all at once a white flag appears at the command center behind us. In the morning the plenum expresses full confidence in you personally, and in the evening you surrender. Who are you answerable to?"

The whole republic was in uproar: What is happening, the laws are not in operation, there is no sense of responsibility, only indiscipline and idle talk. Too much pussyfooting. Many local officials spoke about a paralysis of the highest organs of power, seeing events not from the windows of a Central Committee besieged by demonstrators, but from among the people, who condemned the sortie in the capital and the immoral scuffling over state portfolios. The people demanded that K. Makhkamov resolutely impose order in the republic.

They are now trying to convince us all that the events caught the leadership unawares. People know that those who should have acted continued to flirt and maneuver, making a show of unity with the people. What people? A crowd of louts brought into the capital specially? Informals from "Rastokhez" belonging to the "provisional committee" which extracted a memorandum on resignation from the government? Supernumerary mullahs calling for the overthrow of the authorities and the establishment of an Islamic state? Of course, all of us should have time for discussions, debates, and the quest for better options. For frank and equal dialogue between the authorities and all social forces. But when dialogue unilaterally turns into diktat, blackmail, and terrorism, the time for words is past.

"Strange things are happening here," a Tajik colleague told me in a midnight discussion. "When the provocative rumors 'about Armenians' should have been extinguished quickly, all of a sudden the republic's television has 'no one available.' The deputy minister of justice sets off for Ispechak to shoot the film for television. And later at the plenum he justifies himself by saying that he was not acting as a member of government, but as deputy chairman of the informal and as yet unregistered organization 'Rastokhez.' At the plenum he assured us that as deputy minister he demanded that the law enforcement organs rebuff the rioters, but he omitted to mention that he himself, as a leader of 'Rastokhez,' went to the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the KGB to free the bandit ringleaders. Another government member, a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, sets up some kind of provisional committee, and although a leadership already exists, forms a new government. Apparently no one is doing their own job. Everyone has a 'hobby.' They impose a curfew, yet 'militants' drive around the city in vehicles without license plates, and, moreover, they have passes."

Incidentally, N. Shevchenko, representative of housing district 64, asked about this same point from the plenum platform. It was also spoken of indignantly by R.

Musayeva, first secretary of Tsentralnyy Party Raykom [raykom committee], who, during those terrible days, tried to turn back organized columns of vehicles that were on their way to the capital carrying militants, using her powers of persuasion on the guys, many of whom went home.

But what I cannot understand is this—the helplessness, and perhaps deliberate capitulation, of the republic's ideologists.

"Why are concepts like the peoples' friendship, patriotism, internationalism, ideological education, and revolutionary renewal disappearing from press items?" Kh. Sharipov, chairman of the State Committee for the Press, asked Central Committee workers. "Why do major party leaders and prominent representatives of the intelligentsia flirt with the Muslim clergy and rejoice in the emergence of new model homes and the revival of old rites that are incompatible with the dignity and spiritual freedom of the individual? No one is sounding the alarm about the danger of dividing people into believers and unbelievers."

M. Isayeva, an actress at the drama theater, was also to say at the plenum:

"I am very worried as to why our republic has started in such a hurry to build mosques instead of theaters, clubs, and libraries. I have spoken repeatedly about ideological questions, because I knew what this could lead to...."

For a long time people in Dushanbe have spoken about the neglected state of work with young people and the provision of jobs for them, frequently quoting the folk proverb: "Idleness is the mother of all the vices." But as yet it is only talk....

"I do not understand our communists' position," A. Kasymova, secretary of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, told her colleagues. "We all keep applauding, but there is one thing that no one has mentioned yet. Everyone was sitting and praying by the Lenin monument."

I too saw the crowd in the square sink to its knees at the sound of the mullah's voice, and along with the crowd, valiant militia officers and many responsible officials also prostrated themselves....

Nor has there been a political assessment of the activity of the informal organization "Rastokhez." Its popularity is growing by virtue of the demagoguery of its leaders, who have not come up against a weighty, well-argued rebuff. Yet the criteria exist for such an assessment. A. Kasymova herself, who has repeatedly entered into a dialogue with the informals, told their leader T. Abdudzhabborov frankly: The program and statutes you have prepared amount to the overthrow of soviet power in Tajikistan.

A scientific assessment of them also exists. A group of scholars from the state university, having made a special study of the "Rastokhez" statutes and program, notes that the vague and imprecise formulations, enabling people to make their own interpretations, make up a hotchpotch of social, economic, and political concepts designed to conceal the reasons for the organization's emergence and its true tasks. Their slogan is: good thoughts, good words, good deeds. In unofficial conversations they make no secret of their thoughts. Was it not M. Mirrakhimov, one of the "Rastokhez" leaders, who stated that the time for persuasion and discussion has passed? Was it not he who said: We will travel around the regions of the republic, meet with students in hostels, and rouse them to the struggle against the Russians.... He also has particular scores to settle with the Uzbeks, whom, according to his "good words," Tajiks will be mistaken for when they drive the Russians from the republic. That is not my invention. It is taken from a report from last year, when the KGB gave him an official warning on the impermissibility of his actions. To the best of my knowledge, the prosecutor still has a copy, which, on a repetition of a similar offense, would be attached to the criminal file. As for good deeds, Doctor Ye. Timoshenkova expressed it best:

"The bandages will soon be removed from those who were injured or beaten up, and new facilities will soon be built to replace those burned and destroyed. But who will heal the wounds in the hearts of many thousands of Dushanbe's people, wounds they received in those days that were terrible for us all, and how will they heal them? It is a question of fear and uncertainty about tomorrow...."

I went to the city cemetery and saw families bidding farewell to their parents' graves. I went to the station, where people were crowding round in the hope of a place on the containers, which are already booked up until late fall. But I also went to visit families where they told me: Our ancestors lie in this land, it is our land, and we will not move from the spot. But together with our Tajik brothers we will make every effort to ensure that every culprit in the tragedy gets what he deserves. That is why applause and shouts of "right" greeted Ye. Timoshenkova's words to the effect that much will depend on a political assessment of events. If everything is attributed to criminal elements and stupefied young people, she said, the people will stop believing us!

It is the absolute truth that it arose spontaneously. In the evening of 13 February, when raids were becoming frequent in the housing districts of Dushanbe, the men picked up spade handles, hoes, and iron bars and went to their doors, ready to stand firm on the thresholds of their homes, to the death. Disunited, suspicious of everyone who arrived and every car appearing nearby, they were ready for anything for the sake of their families' lives and honor.

As night drew on, two men met—a USSR KGB general well known in Baku and Nakhichevan, Yerevan and Stepanakert, Tbilisi and Fergana, and R. Odzhiyev, an internationalist serviceman and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet: What is to be done?

That night Odzhiyev went to the television station and asked for air time. He appealed to all people of goodwill, but especially the Afghan veterans from his own regiment: We will wait for you in the morning at the monument to fallen Hero of the Soviet Union Mironenko.

Nearly all the Afghan veterans turned up, wearing their uniforms smelling of gunpowder and their combat awards. Did they ever think, over there in the alien mountains, that this time they would have to oppose obscurantism in their own motherland? The first mobile order groups appeared in the city, mobilizing radio cabs for their needs. They monitored the city streets around the clock, and sobered up—usually with a word, and where necessary with a blow—the young people intoxicated by permissiveness and their gray-bearded, shaven-headed prompters.

"The word went out from between 32 teeth, and found its way into 32 districts," the internationalist servicemen said, recalling those anxious days and nights. "We were everywhere. We assembled the people in the courtyards and explained that they should not be protecting their apartment or even the building, but the whole housing district."

"Alarm bells" began to appear in the yards. Sometimes a piece of rail, sometimes pipes, sometimes a real ship's bell. They rang out again and again in those few anxious days, summoning "our" people and warning the neighbors of the danger threatening them. In housing district 91 the alarm was sounded when an angry armed mob of 300 people was marching on its houses. They reached the border—the road, with a solid wall of men in front of it, ready to rebuff them. The new arrivals fell silent in surprise. The people rightly have a saying: The jackal is brave only in the pack, in face of strength he puts his tail between his legs. Three ringleaders in national dress of caftans and embroidered caps withdrew from the front ranks to the rear. They started throwing whatever came to hand over the heads of their own men. But whoever chucks a lump of mud gets a stone in retaliation, and the crowd turned back. On the border of the neighboring housing district there was a new wall: of Tajiks, Ukrainians, Russians, Uzbeks, Ossetians, Germans. Shoulder to shoulder. And, in addition, the mobile groups of Afghan veterans and chekists who had come speeding to their assistance....

Days passed, and the "alarm bells" fell silent. The time had come for serious thought. Everyone was asking himself: What has actually happened? And probably everyone had a vague sense that something very important had happened, different from the string of bloody events in other regions of the country. I personally, having visited the hot spots, would call it the Dushanbe phenomenon. The inhabitants of the capital of Soviet Tajikistan have something to be proud of. If you rise above the numerous instances of vandalism and savage atrocities by young people sent into the squares by the forces of darkness, you can see, you cannot fail to see: For the first time in the country in such a clear and visible way, an outbreak of interethnic strife did not disunite people, but rallied them, regardless of the composition of their blood or the sound of their surname. Uniting to form international detachments, together they defended their small, but shared, homeland. The force of evil and anarchy, the force of nationalist arrogance revived the force, all but lost in our day, of human decency and honor. And this proud, united force itself inflicted a tangible rebuff on the forces of darkness. But let us not forget that the "alarm bells" still hang in the city.

But "navruz" crept unnoticed into Dushanbe—the festival of spring and the first plowing, the festival of renewal, forgiveness, and mercy, which sprang up long before Islam. True, as my friends joked bitterly, it arrived in militia weather. February's wounds are not yet forgotten. But the hope has already sprung up that not only the luxuriant blossoming of the almonds and apricots promises radical changes for the better. The bloody events uncovered the hidden sources of rebellion. Recovering from an unprecedented moral shock, people finally saw the main evil, an evil that is discussed by everyone in the republic today, from well-known scientists and poets to modest villagers. To speak openly, and there is no point in doing otherwise, the main brake, the main force behind the outright boycott of perestroyka was the nomenklatura cadres. For instance, in the agro-industrial complex. For many years the people appointed to key posts in its lower and middle echelons have been not so much competent as loyal. It is here that fake payrolls, receipts for nonexistent goods, and other devious documents are drawn up, while millions stolen from the state are distributed among their own men. Without firm links with the rayon, oblast, and republic bosses of the sector, no one will receive an award, an honorary title, or anything else. A good job is bought or distributed on the basis of kinship ties. The millions concealed at the expense of the state are not a myth or the imaginings of a feverish mind.

According to the law enforcement organs, in the last five-year plan alone Tajkistan "lost" 1.37 million sheep, or 86 percent of the five-year plan for meat sales to the state. So how can meat products get into the stores? An expert report has established that overreporting of nonexistent cotton amounted to more than 700,000 tonnes of raw cotton. That cost the farms R500 million, or, when translated into the end product, more than a billion. But you cannot build apartments or hospitals from an empty purse. The culprits are known, there is no need to seek them, but they are once again lurking in the shadows. And no doubt D. Karimov, first secretary of Dushanbe City Party Committee [gorkom], was very well aware, when he spoke at the plenum, that processes similar to the February processes are being repeated in a whole series of republics, and here one can sense the hand of an experienced orchestrator outside the republic.

Doctor of Sciences Professor M. Dzhumayev, leader of the cotton selection and seed growing laboratory of the republic State Agro-Industrial Committee, has repeatedly come forward with public exposes of overreporting and the embezzlement mechanism. Not for nothing do they call him "muallim," which means teacher—for his personal uprightness, boldness, and incorruptibility. In the event he was slandered in the central press, had two heart attacks, and the laboratory was disbanded. A dismissal order has not yet arrived, but for three months he and his loyal assistant have received no wages. Now he keeps the gene pool of the best varieties of cotton, gathered over 30 years, on the balcony of his apartment.

I saw his desperate letter to M.S. Gorbachev about the rogues in agro-industry and organized crime in the republic, which he contrived to send to its addressee. I also know about the head of state's resolution: "To Comrade G.P. Razumovskiy..., Comrade Ye.S. Stroyev. Please investigate and report." I saw this letter, with the president's stamp on it, also in Dushanbe. Xeroxed, it is being passed around many interested parties. Because among those whom Professor Dzhumayev mentioned by name are many people who were directly involved, he is convinced, in the tragic events in Dushanbe.

Is not this the answer to a question that cannot fail to interest the investigation into the criminal case that has been brought with regard to the mass disturbances: Who financed them, who inspired them?

But it seems that a sketch in February's KROKODIL about the machinations of B. Karimov—who has now been expelled from the party and his posts—while he was chief of No. 7 Mobile Mechanized Column and minister of road building has as yet failed to attract the attention of law enforcement organs. Yet is not this where the answer lies to the question of the reasons for his rapid rise to the posts of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and State Planning Committee chairman?

And what about the patronage offered by the minister of culture and his apparatus to the boss of a movie and concert complex and video mafia, in whose saloons the future rioters honed their ideological muscle?

Until all this and much else is investigated with the utmost thoroughness, until the ties linking those who have been dismissed from their posts, and some who still remain in the shadows, with the criminal world are fully exposed, the situation in the republic will not change. Not for nothing do people fear that the February events will be passed off merely as a failed "palace coup." Only the "godfathers" will change, and they will retain the potential once again to send hundreds of "Islamic militants" into the capital's squares in the guise of representatives of the people demanding justice. The Tajiks know that if you leave a scorpion with his tail cut off, he will grow a new sting.

People have not lost hope. Hope sprang to a considerable degree from the arrival in the republic of a large group of professionals tasked by the president with bringing out into the open all those involved in February's tragic events.

People have indeed begun to hope. Let not that hope be disappointed. And they are sorting things out among themselves. I will probably never forget the honorable old man, esteemed head of a large Tajik family, who, after thrashing his younger son with a belt for taking part in the disturbances, went around the courtyard and, shedding tears at the shame that had fallen on his gray head, beseeched his neighbors:

"Forgive me, good people, for raising my son badly.... Forgive me, Russian brothers, forgive me, Uzbek brothers...."

But who will apologize to him? For the vile weeds of corruption and the thistles of bellicose nationalism. Or for the poverty we encountered in a village in the Sary-Chashma zone. Poor machinery, kerosene stoves, the smell, adobe huts, irrigation canals full of impurities. And on the table, nothing but potatoes, and perhaps occasionally turkey. No flour, no sugar, no coal. A new pair of galoshes in the family calls for a celebration.

But even the old man hopes for changes for the better: It cannot be that perestroyka has stopped on the threshold of the republic. Only let there be no repetition of what happened in February. And to that end, let the "alarm bells" which rallied all people of goodwill, and have become bells of hope, continue to hang in every courtyard as a reminder, not only of black days.